ENCOURAGING FAITH, SERVING SOLDIERS

ENCOURAGING FAITH, SUPPORTING SOLDIERS

THE UNITED STATES ARMY CHAPLAINCY

1975-1995

PART ONE

by

John W. Brinsfield, Jr.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 1997
Dedicated to all chaplains, chaplain assistants, and civilian staff members who served God and Country during the Golden Age of the Army Chaplaincy: they performed missions of grace and encouragement for soldiers throughout the world with great success.

And those who lead the many to righteousness will shine like the stars forever and ever...Daniel 12:3
The story of the United States Army Chaplaincy is one of spiritual dedication and selfless service by chaplains, chaplain assistants, and civilian staff members of all denominations and faith groups. It is a privilege for me to commend to you this history of one of the oldest branches of the Army and of the men and women who served in it from the end of the Vietnam Conflict to the end of the Cold War.

DONALD W. SHEA
Chaplain (Major General) USA
Chief of Chaplains
FOREWORD

A trained historian and active duty chaplain, John Brinsfield has written a volume that will engage any reader interested in the United States Army's epic journey from Vietnam to Force XXI. In this creative process, he has splendidly chronicled the defining events which precipitated major changes within the Army from 1970 to 1993. Within this tableau, he has embedded the human issues with which the Army and the Chaplain Corps contended. The reader will gain a greater perspective of how the Army confronted the issues.

Only within this detailed Army setting can Chaplain Corps history, responses and initiatives be understood and appreciated. As one who thought he knew somewhat of Chaplain Corps policy, I found that John had much to teach me. Even when specific events and initiatives are not new to the reader, they are placed in a new, insightful perspective.

Many other areas of this volume provide an important, yet easily forgotten reminder of how the Chaplain Corps has continually responded to Army needs. For example, in response to racial unrest and drug abuse in the early 1970s, chaplains established the first Human Relations Council in U. S. Army Europe to address these problems. Or how in that same period, the Chief of Chaplains designed and directed the implementation of 48 programs to address the religious, moral and morale needs of the Army. Various of these initiatives became pilot programs for the Army as a whole. The many other significant accomplishments of the past twenty-five years you should read for yourself.

This volume will inform even the historically minded reader about the human, policy, doctrinal, and constitutional challenges the Army faced from 1970 to 1995.

WAYNE E. KUEHNE
Chaplain (Colonel) USA
Director
Plans, Policy Development, and Training Directorate
Office of the Chief of Chaplains
PREFACE

This is the seventh volume in the History of the United States Army Chaplaincy series. The guidelines for these serial histories, originally conceived by Chaplain (Major General) Gerhardt W. Hyatt in 1973, were described in the Preface to Parker C. Thompson's *The United States Army Chaplaincy from Its European Antecedents to 1791*, which was the first volume in the series. The specific areas to be included in the histories were:

a. Major national or Army eras in chronological order.
c. The religious and political climate peculiar to each period.
d. Specifics of chaplains in their work and organization.
e. Uniforms, pay, and the place of chaplains in the military.
f. Attitudes and behavior influenced by theology.
g. And, above all, primary source material for study and use by active duty chaplains stationed away from "the great wealth of libraries."

Needless to say, this was a tall order even by Chaplain Hyatt's exacting standards. With respect to this current effort, inclusion of all of these items was made even more complicated by the fact that there was no comprehensive history of the U.S. Army from 1975 to 1995 available. There were a few organizational and campaign histories in print, but in the main a history of the Army during this period had to be constructed so that the Chaplain Corps history could be related to it.

In order to attempt to meet these goals, and to give some coverage not only to senior chaplains but also to those at the battalion and brigade levels, a "top down" and "bottom up" approach was selected. The first part of the history would deal with plans, policies, doctrinal and organizational issues from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains perspective. The second part would deal with religious support for soldiers at the unit level with particular emphasis on deployment missions. There was some overlap, but primarily each part stuck to its theme.

Since reports on the history of the Chaplain Corps itself were mostly episodic, much of the material had to be reconstructed from oral interviews supplemented by annual reports, newsletters, and other primary source documents. The result was one of the first histories of the Army and of the Army Chaplaincy since Vietnam.
In addition to the guidelines for the serial histories, there were special themes which were incorporated into this volume which helps account for its length. Among these were the Chief of Chaplains' Total Chaplaincy Goals, the history of special chaplain programs which became pilot programs for the Army, the history of diversity in the Chaplaincy, the history of the Constitutionality Case of 1979-1986, the history of the Chaplaincy in Reserve Components and the growth toward a fully integrated Total Army, and the contributions of the Chaplaincy during combat, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations.

The single major impression or thesis which emerged from four years of research and reflection was that the Army Chaplaincy performed singular and even heroic work during this twenty year period in helping the Army with the dramatic transformation in the military which occurred after Vietnam. As long as the courage, morale, ethical conduct, and spiritual strength of the American soldier remain important elements for readiness, the Army Chaplaincy can never be regarded as marginal. Seven Chiefs of Chaplains, supported by the finest Chaplain Corps in the world, anticipated and met challenges for the finest soldiers in the world, serving in the finest Army in the world. That is what this story is about.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To say that this history of the U.S. Army Chaplaincy since the end of the Vietnam War reflects the product of many contributors is an understatement. Eleven different authors, ten of them chaplains, provided written materials for incorporation into this interpretive study. More than 200 individuals gave taped, written, or telephone interviews; 18 staff members and volunteers assisted with administrative details, and six word processing experts helped produce the first draft manuscript of approximately 1,100 pages for staffing. Of these 235 individuals, only two had official taskings. All the rest responded voluntarily to help reconstruct and preserve the record of religious ministry to soldiers and family members since 1975 by chaplains and chaplain assistants from more than 100 faith groups. Each contribution, great and small, was essential; all were deeply appreciated.

At the risk of unintentional omission, some individuals must be acknowledged for their extraordinary support. Chaplain (Major General) Matthew A. Zimmerman and Chaplain (Major General) Donald W. Shea, Chiefs of Chaplains from 1990 to the present, were the fathers of the project. Four former Chiefs gave generously of their time to read and correct various parts of the history: Orris Kelly, Kermit Johnson, Patrick J. Hessian, and Norris Einertson. Additional readers included a number of retired chaplains who reviewed short sections of the manuscript. Chaplains Charles Kriete, Harold Lamm, Edward O'Shea, Richard Tupy and Joseph Beasley were in this number. Special appreciation is due to General H. Norman Schwarzkopf for reading a portion of the Desert Storm Chapter, and to Lieutenant General John Yeosock for granting a lengthy interview which illuminated many of the strategic and ethical issues in the Gulf War.

Most of the staff members in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains were asked to help with interviews, administrative resourcing and advice. In addition to the senior chaplains who supported the project, Chaplain (Brigadier General) G.T. Gunhus, Deputy Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (Colonel) Timothy C. Tatum, Chaplain (Colonel) Wayne E. Kuehne, Chaplain (Colonel) Charles D. Camp, Chaplain (Colonel) John J. Kaising, Chaplain (Colonel) Henry E. Wake, and Chaplain (Colonel) George Pejakovich among them, the civilian staff enabled communication and resourcing requirements to meet the demanding two year milestone schedule. Ms. Bess E. Ballard, Ms. Patricia M. Jennings, Ms. Jody A. Dunning, Ms. Betty P. Smith,
Ms. Charlotte M. Able, Mr. Roger W. Able, Ms. Marie S. Walker, Mr. Kelvin D. Davis, Ms. Barbara Breyfogle and Mr. Robert L. Parlette worked hard to meet every request. Their assistance was invaluable.

Among the contributors, Chaplain (Colonel) John C. Scott, USA (Ret.), gave generously of his time and expertise. His historical recollections, critiques, and wisdom were irreplaceable. Other contributors, advisors and researchers included Dr. William Hourihan, Chaplain (Captain) Barbara Sherer, Master Sergeant Michael Swingler, Chaplain (Captain) Kristi Pappas, Chaplain (Major) Mary Pitts, Chaplain (Major) Marvin Mills, USAR, Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) O.Wayne Smith, Chaplain (Major) Jere Kimmell, Chaplain (Colonel) Robert Vickers, Chaplain (Colonel) Gary Councell, Chaplain (Colonel) Robert Hutcherson, Chaplain (Colonel) Calvin Sydnor III, and Ms. Kim Casey.

The administrative support staff, largely from the Fort Belvoir Chapel Community, contributed the resources and the personal assistance necessary to operate the central Chaplain History Project Office at that installation. Chaplain (Colonel) Gary Sanford, Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Cecil Ryland, Chaplain (Major) Kirby Weimer, Chaplain (Major) Martin Applebaum, Chaplain (Captain) Robert Loring, Mr. Mike Brown, Mrs. Liz Brown, Sergeant First Class Dean Wakefield, Sergeant First Class Marion Lemon, Sergeant First Class Sarah Tillman, Staff Sergeant Rosanna Noel, Sergeant Randy Schwantes, Specialist Valerie Ofoma, PFC Jerry Peebles, PFC Adam Dowlen, and PFC Mike Levesque helped do everything from requisition funds to move furniture. Others who helped with different xerographing, proofreading, correcting, indexing and research support missions included Ms. Kim Gromniak, Ms. Anet Springthorpe, Mrs. Marietta Branson, Miss Cindee Brinsfield, Ms. Christine Rainwater, and Mrs. Beth Wilson.

The four individuals who had most to do with the final form of the book included Chaplain (Colonel) William Hufham, Deputy Director of the Chaplaincy Services Support Agency, and Chaplain (Colonel) Gilbert H. Pingel, succeeding Deputy Director in 1995, who read, staffed, corrected and approved each chapter. Mrs. Linda Holmes, Executive Assistant. Customer Service Supervisor for the Church Growth Institute, Forest, Virginia, worked for 18 months to input and edit 15 of the 16 original chapters and to prepare index entries. Mr. Michael Hobson, Writer-Editor,
Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, performed much of the final editing based on staffing comments. They were all indispensable in achieving the Chief of Chaplains historical goals and in being key contributors to the book.

Chaplain (Colonel) John W. Brinsfield, Jr.
Principal Author and Special Project Officer
U.S. Army War College
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Photo credits: Ms. Nella Hobson and PAO Staff at Ft. Jackson; Sergeant Major Elmer Castro, Master Sergeant Michael Swingler, Chaplain Barbara Sherer, Chaplain Rick Kuhlbars, Ms. Jody Dunning, and Ms. Charlotte Able and staff at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains; U.S. Army War College Library and Photo Lab; Military History Institute Photographic Collection, Carlisle Barracks; and donations from the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps members around the world...
PART ONE

MEETING CHALLENGES TO THE ARMY AND TO THE CHAPLAINCY

“And I heard the voice of the Lord saying, ‘Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?’ Then I said, ‘Here am I! Send me.’” Isaiah 6
Chaplains of the IV Corps
Fourth from left in the front row (kneeling) is Chaplain Gerry Gerfell, the IV Corps Chaplain.
Fourth from the left in the middle row is Chaplain Sampson. To his right is Chaplain Norris Einertson, future 17th Chief of Chaplains. Fifth from the left on the top row is Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman, future 18th Chief of Chaplains. To his left, in the center of the top row, is Chaplain Donald W. Shea, 19th Chief of Chaplains. These chaplains, with other Chiefs, became the architects of religious support for the Army during the quarter century following Vietnam.
CHAPTER I
THE REFORMATION AND MODERNIZATION
OF THE ARMY AFTER VIETNAM
1972-1984

"The soldier's heart, the soldier's spirit, the soldier's soul are everything."
General George Marshall

"At the time of greatest institutional crisis immediately after Vietnam, the Army was obliged to fundamentally change its character...Army reform centered primarily on ideas and people rather than on machines...."
Brigadier General Robert Scales

Long before the Vietnam War was over, it was apparent that the Army was suffering from a loss of spirit and purpose. From Vietnam to Germany morale in the Armed Forces dropped to a point which posed a danger for even the minimal completion of most military combat and training missions. Desertion, drug abuse, racial unrest and a loss of trust in the national leadership contributed to what some observers called "the disarray and disintegration of the American military."¹

The loss of support for the Vietnam War was rooted in the nature of the conflict itself. A high tech American intervention, without clear strategic goals, attempted to defeat a successful rural-based peoples' revolution. The introduction of conventionally equipped expeditionary forces and the application of massive fire power could not destroy popular support for the insurgents and only increased anti-Americanism both in Southeast Asia and in other places around the world. An old military maxim states, "The longer a war continues the more barbaric it becomes." As the Vietnam War dragged on from five to ten years, it degenerated from an effort to protect an enclave of democracy to a orgy of destruction. Young service men sent to protect America from the Communist menace found not John Wayne heroics but free fire zones, body counts, a massacre at My Lai, and the bombing of population centers — the long, dismal array of atrocities that many felt were the result of an inept American strategy in Vietnam. The immersion of credulous G.I.s in this dehumanizing experience was one of the fundamental causes of the upheaval within the Armed Forces.²

In such a demanding combat environment, the soldiers needed a just cause to support. It was clear that the administration of President Lyndon Johnson had failed to provide a convincing explanation and justification of the American involvement. Simplistic rhetoric like "fighting for democracy in Vietnam" or "halting communist aggression," though not without some element of

¹ See endnotes at end of chapter.

²
truth, was inappropriate to the complex situation faced in Southeast Asia. The Johnson administration had never expected to become engaged in a protracted ground war in Asia on such a scale. Even when the involvement deepened, it attempted to keep the war limited, a war without full mobilization of the home front and without a hated enemy. But in such a situation the continued killing and continued criticism had a profound impact on the spirit and morale of both the nation and those serving in its armed forces.

In December 1967 General William Westmoreland reported to President Lyndon Johnson that the war in Vietnam was being won: "Expect increased success in 1968," he told the President. However, in February of 1968 during the Tet holidays, the Viet Cong launched a 21-day offensive throughout Vietnam to include attacks on 34 provincial towns in 64 districts, on all major cities in the south, as well as attacks on the American Embassy and MACV Headquarters in Saigon, which contradicted General Westmoreland's estimate, to put it mildly. Even though American and South Vietnamese forces destroyed 80% of the Viet Cong military during Tet, the magnitude of the attacks fed the anti-war sentiment in America and seriously eroded General Westmoreland's credibility. The Tet offensive, moreover, resulted in 33,000 civilian casualties (killed and wounded) and more than one million new refugees. In Saigon alone 9,580 dwellings were destroyed. To many in America it seemed that the policy in Vietnam was simplistic, blind and bloody.

With little prospect of winning a speedy victory, the question of the morality of the war in Vietnam increasingly engaged the attention of the American people. In 1969 Professor Richard Falk of Princeton said that "the use of high-tech weapons in Vietnam was a crime." Professor Adam Bedau of Tufts wrote that "the Vietnam War amounted to genocide." Dr. Michael Waltzer of Harvard wrote that the whole Vietnam experience was a war crime. Others saw a fundamental erosion of integrity throughout senior American civil and military bureaucracies.

Even the civilian churches in America questioned whether chaplains should be supporting the war and whether they were being prophetic in their ministries. The Presbyterian Church report put it this way: "The Church and its Chaplains must be keenly sensitive to the erosion, exploitation, or softening of its witness." The report of the Episcopal Church was more to the point:

Our commission strongly endorses the necessity for a ministry to the military community, but a ministry for which both priestly and prophetic roles are stressed. The Chaplain ministers to people wherever they are found, but the Chaplain is also the public voice of conscience who introduces a self-critical dimension within all institutions. His responsibility therefore is to ask the difficult moral question, whether this particular kind of participation is allowable from a Christian moral prospective. The dilemma is whether the Military Chaplaincy can ask these questions, given its dependence on the military structure.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
INTRODUCTION

Chaplain Orris E. Kelly, a United Methodist, was the Fourth Infantry Division Chaplain in Vietnam from July 1969 to July 1970. Chaplain Kelly felt that one of his most important functions as a chaplain was to help his men deal with problems of conscience such as: "How can I kill in a war I don't believe in, to destroy a person I do not have any understanding of?" Kelly wrote, "I do not believe that the Chaplain's position is to uphold or disprove the administration's position on war or politics. I consider myself a spiritual advisor to the soldier to help him with questions of conscience. The soldier must make up his own mind as a free agent. The Chaplain becomes a facilitator by helping the soldier clarify the issues and make his own decisions."*

In June of 1969 President Richard Nixon announced the beginning of the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. In that same year Chaplain Major General Francis Sampson, the Army Chief of Chaplains, visited Vietnam. Chaplain Sampson noted problems with drug and alcohol abuse among American soldiers. A number of initiatives then followed in the Chaplain Corps to respond to the drug and human relation problems in the Army, because at heart they were spiritual problems.

From 1969, when the withdrawal began, to 1973 when the final cease fire was signed in Paris, the number of incidents involving crime, rebellion and drug abuse mushroomed among military personnel worldwide. For example, from 1966 to 1971, the five peak years of Vietnam involvement, the Army desertion rate increased nearly 400%. During the same period the desertion rate for the Armed Forces as a whole jumped 300% from 8.4 to 33.9 per thousand. The Army's 1971 rate of 73.5 per thousand was three times as great as the highest Korean War levels and even surpassed the World War II maximum of 63 per thousand during 1944. In making such comparisons it is important to keep in mind that, unlike those of World War II, most Vietnam Era desertions did not take place under fire -- indicating that service men took off not because of danger but because of disgust with American policy and leadership. Annual Army desertion and AWOL rates in 1971 were the highest in modern history: 17 AWOL's and 7 desertions for every one-hundred soldiers.5

Drug abuse levels in Vietnam were higher than in any other location in the world. Over half the soldiers in Vietnam tried marijuana at least once and nearly 14% smoked it every day. In a survey of more than 4,600 men in the 25th Infantry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, and the 173d Airborne Brigade, nearly 10% of the soldiers claimed to have used either heroin or opium on a daily basis. Forty-four percent of the men contacted said they had tried at least some type of narcotic while in Vietnam, 35% reported trying heroin, and 20% said they had become addicted while in Vietnam.6

Another major factor contributing to soldier unrest was the nature of military service itself in Vietnam. The oppressive conditions of enlisted duty repeatedly sparked defiance and internal opposition. Racial discrimination, the most pervasive and damaging of these grievances, caused particularly widespread unrest among black servicemen. Given the large and steadily mounting percentage of non-whites within the ranks, discriminatory conditions inevitably led to frequent black rebellion. Maintenance of officer privilege and of a repressive punishment code were constant.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
irritants to enlisted people and led to resistance.

Perhaps one of the most severe incidents occurred at Camp Baxter near the demilitarized zone in Vietnam in 1971. After a period of "intermittent demonstrations, a couple of killings, secret meetings and threats," the camp was virtually in a stage of siege. A major racial clash occurred at the base which left at least one black soldier dead. When the military police were called in after the riot they discovered that many soldiers were carrying illegal arms and that both blacks and whites had assembled secret arms caches of ammunition, grenades, and machine guns to defend themselves from further attack. At the March 1971 funeral for the black riot victim, 200 black soldiers staged a black power demonstration. In a very real sense the American Army was fighting on two fronts, one against the Vietnamese guerrillas in the jungles and the other against embittered militants within its own ranks. The strain of black resistance, influenced no doubt by reports of similar unrest back home in America, was nevertheless a key factor in crippling U.S. military capabilities in Vietnam.\(^7\)

Unfortunately many of these clashes led to the deaths of service members by the practice of "fragging," as in placing a grenade in or near a soldier's cot at night to kill him. By July of 1972, as the last American troops were leaving Vietnam, the total number of such incidents had reached 551, with 86 soldiers dead and over 700 injured. In effect these were the casualty figures for the Army's "other war" in Vietnam, its battle with the insurgents in its own ranks.

**United States Army - Europe**

By 1970, when Congress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the U.S. 7th Army in Europe, even with its distinguished World War II history, had been depleted for the purpose of supplying officers, experienced non-commissioned officers, materiel and money for the U.S. war machine in Southeast Asia. In some respects the 300,000-man American force in Germany was less an Army than an armed, savage mob of New World Visigoths.\(^8\) Standards had collapsed, morale was a farce, and discipline in many of the units resembled something very close to anarchy.

The crime statistics involving U.S. soldiers in Germany at this time were staggering. In 1971 an average of 5,100 American service members were charged with a crime each month. In 1970-71, 3,000 black soldiers were charged with crimes against other service members or against German civilians. A number of gang rapes were reported throughout Germany. In July of 1971 in the town of New Ulm, eight soldiers kidnaped a 16-year-old German girl and gang raped her. The following weekend American soldiers committed eight additional assaults. Firemen in the town refused to respond to a blaze in the barracks for fear of being beaten. A month later 15 soldiers raped two girls camping beside the Danube. In Stuttgart, 100 soldiers armed with knives and stones fought German police for 5 hours in what was described as the city's bloodiest fighting since World War II. In Wiesbaden, 15 teenagers--all children of American soldiers--first beat up a German man tending his

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
garden, then battered two local utility workers. When the police arrived, only by drawing their guns could they drive away 200 counter-attacking American high school students.  

Part of the Vietnam bequest was an increase in drug addiction. As the epidemic spread to Europe, hashish became as common in many units as cigarettes or chewing gum. An enterprising soldier could earn $100,000 a year by driving to Munich once a month and buying wholesale a load of hashish which merchants sold in planks 3 inches wide and a quarter inch thick. After returning to his unit and cutting the planks into grams, the entrepreneur could peddle each gram for $1 to $2. Some soldiers smoked more than 100 grams per month, "lighting up with a compulsive frequency of a Marlboro Man." Rarely, if ever, had a modern fighting force been as consistently high on drugs as the American Seventh Army. In one artillery unit at New Ulm, for example, authorities estimated that 50% to 80% of the 1,600 enlisted men were stoned on duty, and half of them also used hard drugs.

Another cancer eating at the Army's vitals was racial hatred. Many black soldiers felt like second class citizens. Although 14% of the Army's enlisted troops were black in 1971, the officer corps remained 97% white. Blacks and whites often segregated themselves in the barracks which became tinder boxes of tension. Graffiti were as ubiquitous on Army posts as on New York subway walls: "kill whitey; black is beautiful; KKK, get the niggers."

In the summer of 1971 Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman was assigned to Hanau, Germany, as the Division Artillery Chaplain for the 3rd Armored Division. Chaplain Zimmerman recalled that Hanau was known to the soldiers as the "arm-pit of race relations." Fights between white and black soldiers in the barracks were almost hourly occurrences. When a black soldier was killed in Hanau, Chaplain Zimmermann recalled, several of the soldier's friends grabbed a white soldier and held him out of a top story window by his ankles. When they dropped him on his head he was killed.

The military police, in Hanau, referred to two armies in the town: a day army and a night army. During the night there were constant fights between armed military policeman and soldiers as well as a war between black soldiers and the German police. In 1971 and 1972 there were more Army memorial services in Germany than there were in Vietnam, a condition which reflected the high crime rate and the tensions between black and white service members.

Much of the hostility which existed between the black and white soldiers was due to a lack of knowledge and appreciation of black culture. White soldiers frequently made fun of Afro hairstyles and the combs that black soldiers carried. Black music likewise seemed to irritate the white soldiers. Segregation was by choice in most of the barracks. Indeed, the condition of the soldiers in the barracks was not unlike the atmosphere of gang warfare in many of America's larger cities.

Chaplain Kermit Johnson, who was assigned to Germany in the same period of time, recalled

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
that many commanders desperately sought black chaplains to help with the racial problems just as they sought chaplains in general to help with drug and alcohol abuse problems. Many of the soldiers in Germany had served in combat units in Vietnam. It has been estimated that many of those soldiers in Germany who had served previously in Vietnam were undergoing symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Tragically, alcohol abuse frequently complicated the symptoms of PTSD. Chaplains, therefore, frequently had to deal with soldiers who had complex symptoms not only of depression but also of substance abuse.

Many chaplains and assistants responded with "new" programs to help their commanders with a variety of problems. In Germany, Drug Abuse Treatment Centers were set up in most major units. The chaplains in Hanau set up a human relations council in 1971, the first council of its type to be established in Europe. Chaplain Matthew Zimmermann was elected the first President. In addition to their work in drug and alcohol abuse prevention and on human relations councils, which were designed to help diffuse racial tensions and to promote the education and appreciation of diverse minority cultures in the Army, chaplains also began coffee house ministries to give soldiers a less stressful place to spend their leisure time. Likewise, in Heidelberg, Chaplain Al Ledebuhr, the U.S. Army Europe Chaplain, promoted a series of Racial Harmony Workshops for chaplains in order to help them train for their important ministries of counseling across racial lines.11

The Continental United States: Fort Hood

As was the case in many military communities in Germany, units training in the United States had similar problems in morale, racism, and alcohol and drug abuse. As an example, Fort Hood, Texas, had so many difficulties with drugs that the soldiers renamed the post "Fort Head." After the 1968 Democratic National Convention, an organization of Black Panthers began to demonstrate at Fort Hood for increased representation in the command. Black power symbols were seen in many of the barracks. Since the Army's Equal Opportunity Program was just beginning, chaplains and chaplain assistants were the de-facto Equal Opportunity representatives in their units.

In a sense there was real racial warfare at Fort Hood. Buildings were burned down at night; shotgun battles took place in the streets; anyone shouting a racial slur stood in jeopardy of his life. On the entire post there were very few black chaplains. Chaplain Joel Miles, a Christian Methodist Episcopal Chaplain, worked hard to help resolve some of the racial problems, as did his colleagues.

Many of the complaints that black soldiers made were rooted in the fact that the Army was simply not integrated. In the post exchange there was an absence of products used by black soldiers and family members, items such as combs suitable for Afro hairdos for example. There were few, if any, visible black leaders and little attention to black culture. One early innovation came with a gospel music service instituted by the chaplains and facilitated by a chaplain assistant, Sergeant Bob

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Bonner, who was an accomplished musician. As was the case in many military environments music seemed to help bridge the gap between hostile groups.

By 1972 at Fort Hood, the commanders of the 1st Calvary Division and the 2nd Armored Division had encouraged the formation of a Black Officers Association for discussion of problems that black officers faced on the post. Likewise various black officers would mentor each other to bring issues of discontent to the attention of the Army. As a further gesture of affirmation for the black community, several experiments in black music and worship were conducted at Fort Hood. Chaplain Tom McMinn, the III Corps Chaplain, had become aware of a black gospel service movement sponsored by Chaplain John Paul Monk at Fort Carson, Chaplain Roy Plummer at Fort Lewis, Washington, and an even earlier one sponsored by Chaplain Leroy Johnson in Germany. Chaplain McMinn wanted to attempt the same type worship experience at Fort Hood. Two of his black chaplains, Chaplain Elvernice Davis and Chaplain Irving Jennings, both began services in their divisions with intentional appeal to black soldiers. Chaplain Davis began a service of gospel music to invite soldiers to sing the familiar hymns they were accustomed to sing at home. Chaplain Jennings began what was known first as a "Black Service" in the 2nd Armored Division in September of 1974 with an intentional appeal to black solders. Eventually Chaplain Davis' Black Gospel Choir joined Chaplain Jennings' Black Service. This effort was an attempt to help black soldiers cope with an Army not yet integrated and, in many respects, still hostile to black culture by focusing their energies and attention on a common bond of worship and fellowship. By strengthening one another morally and spiritually, the black soldiers were better able to serve in a still maturing multi-cultural environment. Before the year was out, Chaplain James Russell was leading yet another black gospel service at Fort Bliss, Texas.

By 1974, even though the Army as a whole had experienced severe problems in morale, a loss of purpose, and problems of racism, sexism and open rebellion, the Chaplain Corps had contributed Human Relations Counsels in Vietnam, Europe, and in the Continental United States. From 1970-71 there was a major push in race relations by the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Black chaplains were intentionally recruited and affirmative action plans were set in place so that a representative number could be selected for advanced schooling and appropriate assignments. Within two years there were 65 black Army chaplains on duty, about three percent of the Corps. This was an increase but still short of the Chief's 15 percent goal. Throughout the continental United States 38 installations opened Drug Rehabilitation Programs and by June of 1971 the Office of the Chief of Chaplains had assigned 82 chaplains and 81 chaplain assistants to be trained in the Army Drug Dependency Program as counselors for soldiers.\textsuperscript{12}

In July 1973, four months after the last U.S. Army chaplain left the Republic of Vietnam, Chaplain Gerhardt Hyatt, the Chief of Army Chaplains, wrote:

Commanders are requesting Chaplains to develop, in their units and on their post a

\textsuperscript{12} See endnotes at end of chapter.
more rewarding quality of life. This demand is testimony to the magnificent effort we had made in meeting the challenges of past years. A successful religious program throughout the Army can only be achieved to the degree that we are able to establish and maintain open communication, shared input to the decision making process, quality pastoral performance, and personal responsibility. Such a climate is necessary if we are to meet the pastoral needs of the modern soldier. I am confident we will accomplish the mission.  

Chaplain Leonard Stegman, formerly the USARV Staff Chaplain, wrote as well:

The survival of the Army, and also of our nation as a whole, is becoming more and more dependant on highly visible and morally motivated leaders. The problems faced by our commanders, now and in the months to come, will test their patience, ingenuity and ability to the limit. Deeply involved in these problems are the activities, aspirations, and desperation of the men under their care. From conversation with countless commanders I know they are desperately seeking help to fulfill their responsibilities. I know they are looking to us, their Chaplains, as never before to be their support in the difficult area of human relations and for spiritual and moral leadership. In this crisis we, as Chaplains, can be real performers or duds. We can gain all or lose all for the image of the Chaplaincy for the next generation.

Even in an Army in disarray and with some units at the point of disintegration, the Chaplain Corps sought largely on its own initiative to develop programs and a ministry of counseling and presence to reestablish a sense of purpose, morale and public esteem in the rank and file of the Army. The Chaplain Corps was the first to respond to many of the drug and human relations problems. As the Army entered its formal reformation and modernization process in the decade of the 70s, the U.S. Army Chaplaincy followed suit to help meet the Army's spiritual needs.

**Reduction In Force, 1972-1976**

One of the catalysts which led to the reform and modernization of the Army in the decade of the 1970s was the reduction in size of American military forces at the same time that the Soviet Union was increasing its total military strength. In 1972, wearied by a ten-year war that produced more than 360,000 American casualties (57,000 of whom were fatalities) the United States Congress directed a reduction in military forces. Coupled with a withdrawal from Vietnam, a re-deployment of troops, and a redistribution of war materiel, the demobilization of the Army proceeded to a point below pre-Vietnam war levels a decade before. The total strength of the Army declined from 1,124,000 in 1969 to 811,000 in 1973. In organization, it declined to thirteen divisions, six in the

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United States and the remaining seven scattered from Europe to Korea with separate brigades in Alaska, Panama and Berlin.

In order to reduce the total force by 300,000, the Army instituted early release programs and general discharges for the convenience of the government. These “reductions-in-force” or “RIF’s,” produce immediate morale problems, skill imbalances in many critical military specialties, unit shortages and a decline in trained strength and readiness. For example, Chaplain Kirby Weimer, serving at Fort Hood, Texas, during the reduction, recalled that many field grade officers would receive a RIF notice on one day and return 48 hours later with an enlisted rank. Particularly hard hit were Army helicopter pilots, thousands of whom who had been trained at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and Fort Wolters, Texas, during the Vietnam War, deployed to a combat zone, and returned to the United States to face an early retirement. Although many military leaders conceded that the reduction of Army strength was not unexpected and saved the national defense budget more than 5 billion dollars from 1968 to 1973, they wondered what such a reduction would ultimately cost in training and readiness.  

At the same time the United States defense establishment was reducing its strength, the Soviet Union had increased its combined military forces to 4.6 million or double that of the United States. In 1972 the Soviet Union produced and deployed 1,527 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as opposed to 1,054 in the United States inventory. Likewise the Soviet Union produced and deployed 935 long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons as opposed to 430 long-range bombers in the United States Air Force. It was apparent to the leaders at the highest echelons in the Pentagon that the commitment of United States forces in Europe, Panama and Korea required planning for multiple contingencies.

Recruitment for the military service, in the aftermath of Vietnam, was a frustrating task. The draft had ended in 1972, and few high school graduates were willing to join the new “volunteer Army.” As a result, the military forces reluctantly accepted markedly lower quality soldiers. Forty percent had no high school diploma and 41% in the early 70s were category IV, a mental aptitude grouping of the lowest order. The lower standards for induction forced the Army to lower its standards for discipline and training. Even so the ranks of the young men willing to wear the uniform continued to thin.

By 1974 the Army was 20,000 soldiers below authorization and missed its re-enlistment target by 11%. In the period from 1972-1974 the combat arms units were 14% short. Manning and training shortfalls combined to make only 4 of 13 active component Army divisions ready for combat. The All Volunteer Army had yet to take a recognizable and professional form, for the job of the soldier in the early 70's was thankless as well as frustrating. By 1973 a Harris Poll revealed that the American public ranked the military only above sanitation workers in relative order of respect.

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Visions of Resurgence: The Reformation of the Army’s Spirit

On June 30, 1972, General Creighton W. Abrams replaced General William C. Westmoreland as the Army Chief of Staff. General Abrams was determined to prepare the Army of the 70s to meet its world-wide military mission: "You have got to know what influences me. We have paid, and paid, and paid again in blood and sacrifice for our unpreparedness. I don't want war, but I am appalled at the human cost we have paid because we wouldn't prepare to fight," General Abrams told his subordinates. Abrams recognized that one of the key elements in any initial reform of the Army would be to restore a sense of patriotism, integrity, honesty and devotion to duty to the dispirited leaders of the post Vietnam period. He stressed the values and the discipline that would have to be instilled in what was to be, in effect, a new Army.

In July of 1973, at the Annual Command Chaplains Conference, General Abrams addressed the chaplains on the subject of reform and modernization: "The Army is and always will be, people. Our people are really good. It is a rare man that wants to be bad, but a lot of men are not strong enough to be good all by themselves, and a little help is enough. It does not make any difference if they are officers, non-commissioned officers, or in the lower ranks. It does not make much difference where they come from. If we have faith in them and encourage them and keep standing for the right ourselves, the Army will get back into the shape the country needs and has to have. You have got to get down with them, and roll up your sleeves and get in among them, all ranks. They have got to feel that, they have got to know that, and when they do, there is nothing they can not get done and get done well...This has got to be a living, breathing, everyday effort." Before Abrams’ tenure as Chief of Staff was cut short by his death from cancer in 1974, he had instilled a new spirit of renewal in the Army’s senior leadership. He had convinced them that reform was not only possible, but had already begun.

OPERATION STEADFAST: TRADOC AND FORSCOM

In fiscal year 1973, the United States Army began its most sweeping reorganization in ten years. Dubbed Operation STEADFAST, the reorganization of the Army sought to realign the major Army commands in the Continental United States on a functional basis. Headquarters U.S. Continental Army Command, or CONARC, situated at Fort Monroe, and headquarters U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, or CDC, based at Fort Belvoir, VA, were discontinued. Their successor organizations, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, and the U.S. Army Forces Command, FORSCOM, received the realigned missions on July 1. TRADOC assumed the Combat Developments Mission from CDC, the CONARC individual training mission, and command from CONARC of the major Army installations in the United States that housed

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Army training centers and Army branch schools. FORSCOM assumed CONARC's operational missions: the command and readiness of all divisions and corps in the continental United States and the installations where they were based.21

As part of General Abrams' vision of resurgence in military values and professionalism, preparedness, effective organization, and modernized weaponry, the United States Army Training Doctrine Command would accept the responsibility for training the Army of the future. The United States Army Forces Command, established (as was TRADOC) by the Department of Army on July 1, 1973, accepted the mission of continued tactical training and operational deployments.

General William DePuy, the first commander of TRADOC, was regarded as one of the most brilliant general officers in the United States Army. With World War II experience fighting the Germans in Normandy as well as a strong conviction developed over an entire career that the Army must "train as it fights," General DePuy dominated the process of institutional metamorphosis in the early years in training, doctrine and leader development.

As its first order of business, TRADOC began a fundamental reformation of Army training. Adopting General DePuy's simple and direct maxim, "an Army must train as it fights," training reform began by pushing young officers out of the classroom and into the field. Instead of concentrating on training schedules, the Army refocused itself to train to a standard, preferably one based on necessary combat skills. The "Systems Approach to Training" was developed on the proposition that even the most complex combat maneuver could be subdivided into a series of discreet individual tasks. Each task would have set conditions and a measurable standard by which soldier skills would be evaluated and to which the soldiers would be held accountable.22 In order to test the readiness of soldiers and units to perform their tasks, the Army training and evaluation program, or ARTEP, appeared in 1975 and became the principle vehicle for measuring training readiness.

In order to give units a realistic but bloodless war game in which to practice their tactical skills, Major General Paul Gorman, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training at TRADOC, developed a training method for using integrated laser technology which could be attached to all weapons from rifles to tank guns. The United States Navy had already adopted such a "Star Wars" approach to training. In the TRADOC ground war adaptation, remote control cameras could record video coverage of a battle area giving combat units immediate feedback on how well they had done in simulated combat situations. Eventually this laser approach to training culminated in the creation of the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. In a vast exercise area, the multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) permitted combat units to be pitted against each other in relatively free play, force-on-force engagements. The success of the NTC was the result of not so much its technology, but of its effect of its real world, real time, no nonsense combat simulation on how the Army prepares units for war.23

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21 See endnotes at end of chapter.
Doctrinal Reform: How to Fight

The fourth Arab-Israel War which began on October 6, 1973, jolted the Army out of its doctrinal doldrums and forced it to face the reality that its method of fighting risked obsolescence. Israeli experience made it clear to the Americans that the modern battlefield had become enormously lethal. Whereas a World War II tank required an average of 17 rounds to kill another tank at a range of 700 meters, by 1973 tanks required only 2 rounds to kill at 1,800 meters. The American TOW missile used by the Israelis could kill with almost a 90% probability out to a range of 3,000 meters. To small unit commanders the realities of this precision revolution meant that, "what can be seen can be hit, and what can be hit can be killed."24 If the Americans hoped to defend Europe against overwhelming Soviet numbers, evolutionary changes in training and doctrine would have to close the gap on the Soviet Army. A ten year lag in development of conventional combat capabilities while fighting in the jungles of Vietnam would have to be made good by quick and thorough revolution.

General DePuy dealt skeptically with those who looked at the development of doctrine as a scholastic exercise. "Doctrine, or the method of war an Army employs," noted DePuy, "doesn't work unless it's between the ears of at least 51% of the soldiers who are charged to employ it."25 DePuy also had an almost obsessive desire to break the Army from its Vietnam malaise and get it moving again.

Beginning in late 1973, General DePuy hosted a year of meetings with branch commandants, allies, and the Air Force. He demanded that a new doctrinal manual be written in simple English. He personally wrote much of the 1976 version of Field Manual 100-5, which sought to define the fundamentals of land warfare. He wanted to give the field a practical guide on "how to win the first battle of the next war." The Fulda Gap Region of the German border became a familiar prospective battlefield. The October '73 war became the model for the first battle: short lived, exhausting, and terribly destructive to both sides. If, like the Israelis, the American Army expected to fight outnumbered and win, it had to exploit every advantage accruing to the defender in order to hit the enemy first and with great precision. FM 100-5 reflected the value that both the Israelis and the U.S. Army placed on the liberal use of suppressive fire power to paralyze an enemy momentarily before maneuvering against him.

The new doctrine in Field Manual 100-5 stressed an "Active Defense" in which division commanders would quickly shift six to eight battalions to repel a Soviet attack of twenty to twenty-five battalions. Using "battle calculus," which identified enemy targets to be eliminated, division commanders would re-set their defenses after the first battle to defeat the additional follow-on Soviet echelons.

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As soon as it was published, Field Manual 100-5 became the most controversial doctrinal statement in the history of the American Army. A chorus of objections came principally from outside TRADOC, the most discordant from outside the Army. Criticism centered on the manual's preoccupation with the effects of weapons and exchange ratios and a perceived return to the American fixation on fire power and attrition warfare rather than the maneuver-centered focus traditionally attributed to modern armies.

Lieutenant General Donn A. Starry, in command of the Army's V Corps, charged with defending the Fulda Gap in Germany, was one of the first to publicly question the utility of the tactics in Field Manual 100-5. General Starry particularly did not like the math. Facing him across the inner German border were at least four Soviet and East European tank armies arrayed in three enormous echelons of armor, infantry, and artillery. Starry had neither the forces nor the time to reset the defense before being overwhelmed by second and third echelons even if he could defeat the first echelon. In addition, the Soviets had increased their missile strength dramatically in the early '70s. From 1968 to 1973 the Soviet Union had added 727 intercontinental ballistic missiles to its inventory and more than 500 short-range ballistic missiles. The Soviets likewise had the largest tank army in the world and the largest in their country since World War II. With a personnel cap of 780,000 imposed by Congress on the strength of the United States Army, organized into thirteen divisions, it was clear that the Soviet threat would have to be offset by continued technological development in weaponry and continued doctrinal development in tactics and leadership.

Technology and the AirLand Battle

From 1977 to 1981, a period that coincided with the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the Soviet Union continued its buildup of what was already the largest military force in the world. In 1977, when President Carter made the decision to cancel the production of the B1 bomber, the Soviets were building one similar Backfire Bomber every 12 days, each one having a range of 5,100 nautical miles. In that same year the Soviet Union had 675 medium and heavy bombers to the United States' 414. The Soviet Union was producing or testing 8 new intercontinental ballistic missiles each year and by 1980 had a total of 300, from a starting point of 75 in 1962. In 1977 the Soviet Union added 1,000 new medium range missiles, and by 1980 had 200 of these deployed in Eastern Europe. In 1977 the Soviet Union had 1,400 strategic missile launchers in Eastern Europe, 1,000 of which were re-loadable. The Soviets also had produced 93 missile submarines by 1981 with a range extending to any part of the United States from either the Atlantic or the Pacific Oceans.

In order to offset this huge buildup in Soviet weaponry, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown supported a policy of increasing the technological advantage in U.S. weaponry. Secretary Brown wrote, "the military balance between the United States and its allies and friends on the one hand and the Soviet Union and the states subordinated to them on the other is not nearly so unfavorable as the

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denigrators of U.S. military capability have been proclaiming for the last few years; but it is precarious enough. The United States must not fail to take advantage of the advantages that it has—economic, political, ideological, or any other and among all these, the United States technological advantage is one of the most important and valuable. There were, of course, alternatives to a reliance on increasing technology. For example, the United States could have doubled the number of military personnel under arms to approach Soviet levels. It could have increased defense procurement budgets by 50% in order to compete with the Soviets in quantities of equipment. It could have substituted the purchase of allied military equipment for much of the U.S. military production. However, none of these options would have been economically acceptable to the American people.

Instead Secretary Brown and his Pentagon planners, including Mr. William J. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in the Carter administration, made the decision to recommend monumental increases in the quality of weapons available for American military forces. General Abrams had already called for new weapons initiatives in tank production, air defense artillery, and other vital areas. But the main strategic problem Secretary Brown and Mr. Perry had to deal with during the Carter years was to offset the idea of a nuclear exchange. The Soviet Union did not believe the United States and its NATO allies would fight a nuclear war or could win one if they did. Since the Soviets out numbered the NATO forces in conventional units, the temptation for them to attack in Europe seemed to Mr. Perry and to his boss, Secretary Brown, to be growing. The solution was the "offset strategy"—to use the U.S. advantage in technology to make up for the Soviets' huge numerical advantage in weapons and men.

This concept also reflected deeper assumptions about the attitude of Americans toward defense in the wake of Vietnam. American young people and their parents would not countenance another draft. That alternative was not politically feasible. Nor would the Americans wish to pay for an attempt to match the Soviets tank for tank and soldier for soldier. Instead, the American force multiplier would be high technology. This was a centrist way to answer charges that the Democratic Party of the Carter years was soft on defense without bursting the budget or imposing sacrifices that could not be sustained. It was a way to prevent politics from undermining defense.

Concomitant with the Department of Defense’s emphasis on high-tech weapons development, there was a sharp evolution in doctrinal thinking at the tactical level. This was prompted in part by the debate on the Active Defense, which General DuPuy's 1976 FM 100-5 had outlined; but it was also a result of new tactical concepts and concerns. Just as with the Active Defense, the new doctrine was a product of a wider historical current of the time. It too sprang in large degree from the thinking and influence of one man, General Starry, who succeeded General DePuy as TRADOC’s Commanding General in July 1977. This new doctrine came to be called AirLand Battle.

General Starry, a major contributor to the earlier Active Defense doctrine while Commandant

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of the U.S. Armor School, examined its assumptions in the field during 1976 - 1977 as V Corps Commander in Europe. From that experience he brought to TRADOC a close appreciation of the powerful Soviet second and follow-on echelons beyond the main battle front. Whatever the success of a skillful Active Defense, the numerical superior follow-on echelons would at some point prevail by sheer numbers and roll over the defenders to secure victory. Starry's concept of the major Central Battle fought by the corps and division, analyzed functionally, suggested and clarified the requirement for U.S. forces to fight a deep battle simultaneously with the main or close-in battle. Thus could U.S. forces disrupt the enemies echelon line-up, throw off his time table, and prevent defeat.28

Tactical nuclear planning, to provide a ready option to deter or counter Warsaw Pact Forces if directed by national command authority, was an aspect of the planning. Deeper cooperative planning with the Air Force accompanied this work, and by late 1979 planners were developing joint concepts for deep interdiction and for operations upon an integrated conventional-nuclear-chemical battlefield. The integrated battlefield was a concept, however, larger than those options alone. The concept called for integrated AirLand Operations and integrated maneuver and fire support; it presented a larger total battlefield vision extending from the U.S. rear area forward and deep into the enemy rear.

This planning in 1979-1980 went forward in a changing national political climate, as the perceptions of the Carter administration about the state of U.S. military readiness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the unstable Third World underwent sharper vision. The year 1979 marked twin foreign policy defeats for the United States: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the opening of the Iranian hostage crisis.

In late 1980, the ideas of the integrated battlefield were developed further and refined in the concept of an extended battlefield. This view possessed not only distance, but time and resource dimensions. Publication of this concept, retitled AirLand Battle by Headquarters, TRADOC, followed in March 1981.

Following publication of the revised FM 100-5, the concept of AirLand Battle was sanctioned as the Army's fighting doctrine for the decade ahead. Adjusted in 1986 to clarify and expand the idea of the operational level of war, to put into better balance the offense and defense, and to highlight the synchronization of the close, deep, and rear battles, AirLand Battle furnished a revitalized doctrine for the future.

**Threat Responses**

The reform and modernization of the Army in the decade of the 1970s was driven not only

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by the lessons of Vietnam but also by the perception of the Communist threat at that time. From 1945 to 1975 the United States Government had embraced several Counter force Strategies which constituted what some geo-political historians later called "Cold War I." These strategies included the containment of Russian expansion as espoused by Ambassador George Keenan and the Truman Doctrine from 1945 to 1953. The containment policy was effected by such actions as the Berlin AirLift, support for Greece and Formosa, implementation of the Marshall Plan and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Korean War, likewise, was an effort to contain the expansion of Russian Communism in Asia through what was perceived at the time as an Asian satellite government.

From 1954 to 1961 John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration, had urged a massive retaliation or "brinksmanship" policy which guaranteed retaliation of land-based missiles in the event of a general nuclear war. The "flexible response" policy of the Kennedy Administration included, in the extreme, the assured destruction of 25 percent of Soviet cities and 100 per cent of all major Soviet military targets. Nevertheless, the flexible response policy likewise dictated a more limited intervention into Vietnamese and Russian-Cuban affairs.

With the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the policy of the United States became that of a "sufficient deterrent." The growth of detente and treaty limitations agreements with the Soviet Union, to include the Salt Agreement of 1972 and the limitation of strategic offensive arms, froze the land-based missiles deployed by the United States at 1,054 and those deployed by the Soviet Union at 1,618. The Nixon Detente was relatively short lived in light of the Soviet Union's intervention in Angola and Afghanistan.

"Cold War II" began in the Carter Administration and witnessed a growth in United States defense expenditures from $89 billion in 1976 to more than $118 billion in 1979. These funds were to effect the reorganization and technological modernization of the All Volunteer Army to provide a defense establishment, in Secretary Brown's terms, "capable of winning two and a half wars" in any world-wide scenario.

In addition to a competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, which in 1973 Premier Chou En Lai of China had called the cause of "world intranquility and an age of great disorder," there was also a mushrooming of revolutionary activity in the Third World. In a sense there had always been a draining of mineral resources from Third World countries to industrialized countries. Indeed, by 1980, if all of the countries of the world had sought to achieve the same standard of living as was then in effect in the United States, most of the earth's mineral resources including, iron, manganese and petroleum would have been exhausted in eight years. Nevertheless, the poverty imbalance between older, affluent nations of the industrialized West and "emerging" Third world nations with access to advanced military technology was troublesome.

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In January of 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote: "the particular manner in which our economy has expanded, means that we have come to depend to no small degree on imports, exports and earnings from overseas investments for our material well-being. A large scale disruption in the supply of foreign oil could have as damaging consequences for the United States as the loss of an important military campaign, or indeed a war." This concern was one motivation behind the 1980 formation of a Rapid Deployment Force which could be sent quickly to any part of the globe where American interests were endangered; a threat that was now seen as a product as much from the Third World instability as from Soviet expansionism. International economic disorder, in short, could almost equal in severity the threat to America from the Soviet military build-up. Since the widening gap between rich countries and poor countries was likely to increase the frequency of Third World revolutions, the outlook was for a very busy Rapid Deployment Force in the decades following.

Regardless of their variety of institutional forms of government, most of the new countries in the Third World had one common political characteristic: the gradual awakening and activation of the masses regardless of whether they were yet participating formally in their own governmental processes. This was the essence of the worldwide democratic revolution which was beginning to spread rapidly in the 1970s. This political revolution was reflected each day in newspaper reports, as evident in the following headlines from the New York Times:

Black Protests Mounting in South Africa (May 16, 1973)
World Gypsies Resist Genocide by Assimilation (June 18, 1971)
Rhodesia Guerrillas Double-time to Polls (March 11, 1980)
Teheran Students Demand Role in University Control (February 21, 1979)
Shaw Quits Iran for Indefinite Stay (January 17, 1979)
Somoza Yields Post: Flies to United States (July 18, 1979)

New regimes and leaders had begun purposefully to exploit the mass media to the utmost in order to mobilize popular support for their revolutionary programs. "It is true," stated President Nasser of Egypt, "that most of our people are still illiterate. But politically that counts far less than it did 20 years ago. Radio has changed everything. Today people in the most remote villages hear what is happening everywhere and form their opinions. Leaders cannot govern as they once did. We live in a new world."^30^30

In essence, then, the history of the United States Army in the 1970s was characterized by recovery from the Vietnam War, by reduction in size, by the creation of an all volunteer force, and by reorganization and modernization to meet evolving national defense requirements. These requirements included nuclear, conventional, and counter-insurgency defense plans which were global in their geographical extent. The organizational reform of the Army, of the All Volunteer Army, included the formation of the United States Forces Command, United States Army Training

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and Doctrine Command, Reserve Readiness Regions, and a varied force structure to include light divisions as well as heavy armored divisions. The development of what became known as "The Army of Excellence," in the 1980s did not escape public attention. Morale among the soldiers was high by the mid 1980s. A 1986 Army survey of its personnel found that about 72 percent of the officers agreed with the statement that military service "is an experience one can be proud of." Almost 55 percent of the enlisted members polled also agreed.

And if polls were any indication, the military became a more respected institution with the public. In 1984, 63 percent of Americans surveyed in the Gallop Poll said they had "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the military, ranking second — after church and organized religion—among 10 American institutions. The turn about was nothing short of remarkable. The military outranked the United States Supreme Court, banks, public schools, newspapers, Congress, television, organized labor and big business. A Harris Survey of July 1989 found that Americans had more confidence in the military than they had in the medical community or even in the Supreme Court.31 Fifteen years of modernization and training had revitalized the Army's spirit and had replaced the "lost decade" in Vietnam with a new Army of Excellence.
ENDNOTES


6. Ibid., pp.11-43.

7. Ibid., p. 43.


10. Ibid., p. 461.


13. Ibid., p. 214.


17. Ibid., p. 7.

18. Ibid.


CHAPTER II

THE HYATT YEARS
EXPANDING THE CHAPLAINCY’S VISION, COMPETENCE AND INFLUENCE

Before the Vietnam War ended it was apparent that the Chaplain Corps would be challenged in many different ways to help meet the human needs of the Army. Whereas historically the Army had been totally mission oriented, personnel and personal management issues demanded increased attention after Vietnam. Chaplains, often with little support from their civilian ecclesiastical counterparts, had to be innovators and visionaries for a new world of ministry. Chaplain Gerhardt Hyatt, formerly the MACV Chaplain in Vietnam, was selected to lead the Chaplaincy during this challenging period.

MILESTONES:

- Innovative programs from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains to redirect the Chaplaincy and to meet the needs of the Army.
- Emphasis on Installation Chaplains as the key to quality soldier ministry.
- First Reserve Advisor to the Chief of Chaplains.
- Organizational Development and Clinical Pastoral Education expanded.
- Chaplains serve on Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Teams.
- Emphasis on minority recruitment.
- First female chaplain commissioned for active duty in the Army.
- First Gospel Services in the U.S. for soldiers.
- Personal Effectiveness Training sponsored.
- Chaplain Service School Instructors assigned.
- Chaplain Assistant MOS reviewed for quality improvement.
- Creation of the Chaplain Center and School at Fort Wadsworth.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
The Army Chaplaincy: Designing Ministries to Meet the Army’s Needs

You have got to get with them, and roll up your sleeves and get in among them, all ranks...a little help is enough.

General Creighton W. Abrams
Chaplains Conference on Ministry to Soldiers

The Crucible of the Seventies

Chaplain Gerhardt W. Hyatt was promoted to Major General on August 3, 1971, by General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army. General Westmoreland had been the senior commander in Vietnam during the most difficult phase of that war. The same day Hyatt was promoted, he was appointed the thirteenth Chief of Chaplains of the United States Army by President Richard Nixon. Chaplain Hyatt’s four-year term as leader of the Chaplaincy paralleled a period of unprecedented turbulence and unrest in the Army and in the nation. The country, the churches and society in general found themselves in a crucible of changing values, conflicting ideologies and the apparent disintegration of many traditional values in American life.

Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas reflected upon the social turmoil in the United States when he addressed the staff and students at Westminster College on November 2, 1974. It was an important speech that highlighted the conditions of that period. His remarks reminded those who heard them of apocalyptic prophesies. He summarized the angst and hopelessness that seemed to permeate the times. Paramount to his concerns was what he referred to as the looming economic crisis. Inflation was rising steadily. OPEC nations were strangling the economies of most other nations of the world with profiteering from their oil production. As a result of the Yom Kippur War (October 1973), prices of oil on the international market rose more than 200 percent. Fulbright echoed the words of President Gerald Ford that inflation threatened to "destroy our country, our homes, our liberty."¹

In addition to economic issues, Americans faced the usual national security dilemmas. The Cold War continued unabated. The military-industrial complex was busy churning out weapons and supplies to fend off the multi-faceted Russian threat, or, if necessary, to destroy it. In October 1973 the war between the Arabs and the Israelis resulted in heavy Israeli casualties as well as in economic chaos. The ubiquitous fear of another Arab-Israeli conflict was ever present. At the same time the tentacles of communism were reaching deeper into the Western hemisphere. Sentiment for revolution was growing in Iran and in many other nations. The following newspaper headlines of the seventies, highlight some of the fierce issues that affected the lives of almost all citizens in one way or another:²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 1972</td>
<td>Five men break into Watergate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 1972</td>
<td>Navajo Indians gain control of the Bureau of Indian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13, 1972</td>
<td>Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam resume</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ See endnotes at end of chapter.
January 22, 1973 | Supreme Court says states cannot interfere with abortion during the first six months of pregnancy
---|---
January 24, 1973 | Court orders desegregation of schools in Memphis
February 11, 1973 | First National Women's Political Caucus ends in Houston
February 21, 1973 | Senate establishes federal security force at airports
February 27, 1973 | 200 armed Indian supporters control Wounded Knee
October 10, 1973 | Vice President Agnew resigns
October 30, 1973 | House committee meets to consider impeachment of Nixon
March 7, 1974 | Numerous indictments in Watergate investigation
August 9, 1974 | President Nixon resigns
September 8, 1974 | President Ford pardons Nixon

It would be hard to imagine such a short period of time filled with so many world-shaking events. Trouble spots occupied the attention of foreign policy and military strategy experts throughout the nation.

Conditions in the churches were no less tempestuous, for divided public opinion during the closing years of the Vietnam War had savaged the unity of many mainline denominations. Many church leaders were vocally opposed to the war and insisted that the chaplaincy was no longer a viable ministry option for them. On May 17, 1968, a unanimous vote was cast by 500 members attending the American Jewish Congress to terminate the military chaplaincy. This was but the prelude of similar challenges to come.

The Winter Edition of FOCUS, the United Church of Christ Youth Magazine, illustrated this situation. There appeared a feature article entitled "An honest letter to . . . the not yet drafted," by The Reverend Ralph Weltge, Secretary for Young Adult Ministry in the United Church of Christ. Among other things, Weltge stated, "Put in plain terms, you are young and vulnerable; and they'll use a military gang-bang to rape your mind . . . Boot camp is really the American version of Chinese 'thought reform.'" He continued, "As they work you over, you may perceive the contradiction between military training and what you learned back home in church, and want to talk to the chaplain. Beware of him! After attending his compulsory 'character guidance lectures' you may already suspect his incompetence -- at least to counsel you on the problem of Christian conscience." Weltge went on forcefully to recommend that soldiers and those about to be conscripted should consider applying for conscientious objector status. Though the article did not represent all UCC leadership, it did portray the strong feelings of some leaders of that denomination and others.

During the years 1971-75, several denominations wrestled with the issue of providing chaplains for the military. Some came close to withdrawing support for the Chaplaincy altogether and recalling chaplains they had already endorsed. Meetings were held between denominational leaders and their chaplains to try to make decisions on this matter. Unfortunately, many of the more radical ecclesiastical leaders had never served in the military and therefore had very little understanding of what a chaplain did. Some saw the chaplain as a cheerleader for war or one who was so controlled by the command that he could not take independent ethical or moral positions.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
The American Civil Liberties Union, in a joint study with The United Church Of Christ, produced a document entitled, "The Abuses of the Military Chaplaincy." The author defined "abuse" as any structure or activity of the Chaplaincy that does not tend to further free exercise of religion. The claimed abuses included the Army setting standards for selection of chaplains; screening of chaplains by a military board; establishment of denominational quotas for chaplains; performance of military functions by chaplains; precedence of General Protestant worship services over denominational services; Human Self Development programs; and command relationships such as the chaplain serving on the commander's staff. There was little in the life of the chaplain that the study did not interpret as abuse.

At approximately this same time Professor Harvey Cox of Harvard University wrote a controversial book, *The Military Chaplain: From a Religious Military to a Military Religion*. In response to Chaplain Ray Strawser's recommendation to purchase the book for the staff, the Chief of Chaplains wrote him a note stating, "Forget it! We've had experts try to sabotage us! It's an effort to salve their own conscience for their own inadequate effectiveness in their ministry and divert attention from the utter bankruptcy of their philosophy." It was apparent that the Chaplaincy was under attack from several directions and the Chief of Chaplains, on occasion, had a yen to strike back.

**A Canadian -American Chief**

Chaplain Gerhardt W. Hyatt, son of a noted minister and missionary, was born in Melford, Saskatchewan, Canada, on July 1, 1916. Hyatt graduated from Concordia College in Canada, Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, Missouri, and George Washington University (Master of Arts). He also received the honorary Doctor of Divinity Degree from Concordia Seminary in 1969. He was ordained in the Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod in 1944 and installed as pastor of Our Savior Lutheran Church, Raleigh, North Carolina. In June 1945 he entered the Army as a chaplain while still a Canadian citizen. He became a United States citizen in November of that same year.

Chaplain Hyatt served in numerous field and staff positions around the world. One of his first assignments was to a transportation battalion which became a part of the historic Task Force Smith during the Korean War. The Army had little emphasis on readiness, and the task force entered Korea without adequate support. Among other deadly lessons, they found that the 2.5 inch bazooka did not work and discarded it. The contacts Hyatt made and the challenging experiences he had during that period prepared him for many future assignments.

In his next combat tour, during the Vietnam War, Chaplain Hyatt served as the command chaplain for the Military Advisory Command-Vietnam (MACV). In a very unusual following assignment for that time, he was detailed for a three-year tour with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in the Pentagon. Later he became the Director of Personnel for the Chaplaincy, and then served as Deputy Chief of Chaplains under Chaplain (Major General) Francis Sampson. In total, Chaplain Hyatt worked in the Pentagon for 12 years before he became Chief of Chaplains. All of these experiences in the field with soldiers as well as in high level staff positions provided excellent preparation for the demands that faced him and the Chaplaincy in the Seventies.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Hyatt, His Staff and Their Challenges

Chaplain Hyatt was in many ways a very reticent man, yet he became one of the most influential figures the Chaplaincy ever produced. His strengths lay in several areas important for the future of the Chaplaincy. He was not merely a theoretician. He knew the Army well from his service at all echelons and in a wide variety of assignments. He was masterful in relating to top generals and other Pentagon officials. Some said that Hyatt could achieve more with a handshake than others could through years of staff work. Much of that resulted from his 12 years in the Pentagon before becoming Chief of Chaplains, and his associations with young officers who themselves later became general officers.

Chaplain Hyatt had the managerial brilliance and foresight to surround himself with highly effective chaplain staff officers. Though Hyatt was a quiet and conservative individual, he had no fear of innovation and encouraged his staff to think new thoughts and try new programs. 10 Among the innovative members of his staff were Chaplains Orris Kelly (his Executive Officer), Charles Kriete (Director of Plans, Programs and Polices), and Edward O'Shea, Richard Tupy, Richard Martin, and a host of others who served as action officers. He also enjoyed the support of his Roman Catholic deputies, Chaplain (Brigadier General) Aloysius J. McElwee, 1971-1973, and Chaplain (Brigadier General) Thaddeus F. Malanowski, 1974-1978.

Chaplain Hyatt, perhaps better than any other chaplain of his time, understood the Army as a system and wanted the Chaplaincy to be an integral part of the system. He wanted to help the Army address the severe problems it faced and at the same time demonstrate the professionalism of the Chaplaincy. The programs developed by his staff were in large measure responses to emerging needs and the mission to help the Army respond to them.11

Chaplain Charles Kriete, Director of Plans, Programs and Polices, shepherded most of the innovative programs implemented during the Hyatt years. Many of these were not new creations, but rather adaptations of existing activities that already were being tested in some form either in the civilian community or in the military. The genius of Chaplain Kriete and his staff was in their ability to envision the metamorphosis of these programs and activities into shapes and forms that would meet the unique needs of the Army as a system at that time. The demand for chaplain ministry to the institution was overwhelming. Chaplain Hyatt was exactly the kind of leader needed for the uncertain times between 1973 and 1975, and he gathered around him the right kind of staff officers to implement his vision to enhance the respect of the military for the Chaplaincy and thereby enable it to become a more professional branch. The programs Hyatt and his staff implemented lasted through the Seventies and beyond.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Institutional Stress and Change

It has already been noted that the Army (as well as the nation) was suffering a "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder."12 Some feared the Army was falling apart. The Vietnam War had left deep psychological, social and spiritual scars that were festering and slow to heal. Additionally, the war, or at least the times themselves, spawned a plethora of other symptoms reflecting the disquiet of those years. Some of these problems related directly to the Army. This was especially true of the Draft. As early as 1969, President Nixon had established a panel to develop plans to end the draft and move toward an all volunteer Army.13

Conscription did not end until June 1973, with the final induction of Private Dwight Stone of Sacramento, California. For the first time since 1948, the military services would be composed completely of volunteers. The concept of the modern Volunteer Army or VOLAR was born. New incentives were needed to attract young men and women to the Army. Less stringent standards, better living and working conditions and the provision for beer in the barracks were some of the innovations. Kitchen Police (KP) was seen as a strong negative inducement; and, therefore, the Army began hiring civilians to perform those and other mundane duties. Many of the changes did improve the quality of life of soldiers and did help in reaching recruitment goals. Some of the changes, however, did not last very long—one of those was beer in the barracks. Soldiers actually wanted discipline and rigorous training. That was the reason many enlisted. Some felt instead they were being coddled and not challenged. It was a time of uncertainty for both soldiers and the Army leadership. High rates of drug abuse and misconduct were prevalent in the continental U.S. (CONUS) and in Europe and these exacerbated the seething problems involved in moving from war to peace.

In early 1973 there were still a few chaplains in Vietnam. The war was quickly moving toward closure for the United States, but toward an uncertain future for citizens of South Vietnam. The last chaplain serving in Vietnam left the war zone in March 1973. No chaplains served in Vietnam after that date.14

Before his retirement, Chaplain (Major General) Francis L. Sampson, the former Chief of Chaplains, approved a Five Year Program for Fiscal Years 1973-77.15 This excellent document outlined where he saw the Chaplaincy at that time and placed continued emphasis on the traditional functions of Chaplain Corps' ministry, training, and administration. It was an important document that basically stressed "business as usual." The plan, written in 1970-71, could not envision the dramatic changes in emphasis that would be required to meet the needs of the period for which it was written. New challenges faced the Chaplaincy and new means of management would be required.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Pastors for the Total Army Community

Upon assuming the office of the Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain Hyatt issued a document with 48 projects in eight areas that he determined needed to be addressed for the benefit of the total Army. At the Command Chaplain Conference in July 1974, Hyatt said the following regarding his Five Year Planning Guidance:

The premise on which the objectives of the Five Year Planning Guidance are based is that the parish ministry is at the heart of the chaplaincy. We are professional pastors and we have a total ministry to the entire community. Perhaps more than anyone else, we can provide the leadership, personal openness and acceptance, and professional expertise which commanders need in order to have a positive and healthy environment, a climate of moral responsibility, and a community of openness and trust.16

That document was refined in FY 75 and published as "Objectives for the Seventies."17 The eight major areas listed in the guidance were:

- Religious Services
- Religious Education
- Pastoral Concerns
- Human Self Development
- Administration and Financial Management
- Professional Development
- Management and Procurement
- Research and Development

Each major area was broken out into its various elements, and a detailed schedule listed all that was to be accomplished in each component. In September 1974, the Chief of Chaplains issued a Memorandum entitled "Army Stewardship Concept." This document specified two main objectives "(1) Reciprocal and collaborative relations between chaplains at all levels and (2) A commitment to action rather than reaction." The Plan included Key Result Areas such as the Chief of Chaplain's Planning Guidance. The Key Result Areas were basically the eight areas previously specified in the "Objectives for the Seventies."18 They were intended to be measurable so that effective evaluation could be applied and the Chaplaincy would be able to determine at any time how much had been accomplished.

The management processes established by Chaplain Hyatt provided the means by which new programs could be introduced into the Chaplaincy to meet the changing needs of the Army. They also established the framework and the philosophy under which the Chaplaincy would operate for the next decade or more. At the heart of Chaplain Hyatt's strategy was his conviction that installation chaplains were the key leaders for implementing ministry for soldiers and family members. The best

See endnotes at end of chapter.
senior chaplains should be found at installation level, he believed, and quality ministry would follow.

Soldier and Family Support
Hospital Ministry

Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) began in earnest in the Chaplaincy in the 1960s as a result of the efforts of Chaplains Thomas Harris and John Betzold who coordinated the program with the Office of the Army Surgeon General. As a result of Chaplain Harris' creativity and excellent staff work, not only did he gain acceptance for the CPE program, but he also succeeded in receiving approval for a chaplain to teach medical ethics and doctor patient relationships as a member of the staff of various Army Medical faculties. Initial CPE training and ministry was carried out only in hospital settings. It was soon recognized, however, that the skills learned had a much wider application. Chaplain Hyatt envisioned CPE being used in many other areas of the military community. In FY 72-73, he approved a concept for the development of a Community Model CPE program at Fort Benning, Georgia, and at Fort Knox, Kentucky, pioneered by Chaplain Robert Crick and by Chaplain Thomas R. Smith. The Community Model required CPE students to take one quarter of training in each of the following areas: Basic Training Brigade, Family Chapel, Post Stockade, and the Post Hospital. This broad-based training enabled chaplains to serve in a wide variety of assignments whereas the medical model essentially prepared chaplains only for the narrower hospital ministry. Later in the seventies the community model was eventually broadened and training was provided at Forts Benning and Hood.

By 1973, seventy-five chaplains had completed one year of CPE training. Chaplain Hyatt saw value in CPE for all chaplains. He saw it as a means of extending skills and enhancing ministry. He declared that he wanted every chaplain to have at least one quarter of CPE training. In order to carry out this objective he announced that he would establish CPE training centers at 14 CONUS installations, five Major Army Medical Centers, and three Overseas locations. During this period of growth the Chaplaincy also began training CPE students for the higher level of CPE Supervision. This meant that chaplains could then provide supervisory training for other chaplains. This was very intense training and produced highly qualified mentors. Walter Reed Army Medical Center was the first Army center to be granted accreditation for training supervisors, by the civilian Association of Clinical Pastoral Educators.

Family Life

Interest in Family Ministry had been growing since the end of the Vietnam War. In the Modern Volunteer Army more soldiers were married than ever before and the need for ministry increased significantly. Some chaplains received graduate training in family life ministry at the American Institute for Family Relations (AIFR), in California. Family Life Ministry programs began in the early 1970s at such places as Forts Campbell, Ord, and Sill. These programs normally provided

See endnotes at end of chapter.
full-time ministry in counseling, parenting, and education.

The U.S. Army Chaplain Board, recognizing the need for greater emphasis on Family Life Ministry, designated one of its staff members in 1974 to specifically focus on this area. Another major area of need for ministry and emphasis was to Asian spouses and their family members. Many soldiers who had served in the Far East returned with Asian spouses who were isolated and alone in their new environment. It was a critical ministry often provided by the chapel team to help integrate foreign spouses into their new community. One entire edition of the *Military Chaplains Review* was devoted to the need for this ministry.

At the end of the war in Vietnam, many former Vietnamese soldiers and citizens fled the conquering hordes of North Vietnamese invaders. Some escaped to neighboring nations and many eventually made their way to the United States. It was decided that ministry should be provided to families and individuals under American control. A refugee camp was established by Department of the Army at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. Assigned to provide special ministry were three Roman Catholic and four Protestant Chaplains, three Vietnamese speaking Protestant Missionaries, three civilian Catholic Priests, and a Buddhist Monk. Four Army chaplains also ministered to Vietnamese refugees on the Island of Guam.

Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention

Another legacy of the War in Vietnam was the gargantuan and pervasive problem of drug abuse. It was clearly a major symptom of the times. Its cost in terms of dollars and manpower were enormous. On July 17, 1971, President Nixon called for an "urgent and immediate" program to deal with the escalating problem of drug abuse. In response to the President's message, the Army published DA Circular 600-85, "Army Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program." Drug and Alcohol Prevention Teams were established throughout the Army. Chaplains served on most of these teams as pastors, counselors and moral leaders.

Chaplain involvement in drug and alcohol ministry has a long history, perhaps first receiving Chief of Chaplain emphasis after Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Sampson's visit to Vietnam, July 11 to August 8, 1969. Following Chaplain Sampson's visit to Southeast Asia, he directed that the Army chaplains conduct day-long training workshops throughout the Army on drug and alcohol abuse as part of the chaplain's monthly training program for the third quarter of that fiscal year.

Chaplain Delbert Gremmels wrote the justification for the chaplain spaces on the drug training teams. The Army recognized the skills chaplains possessed and accepted Gremmel's proposals. Chaplains were highly successful in providing ministry to those addicted and in the development of strategies and ministries aimed at prevention. This action was important to the success of the drug teams. It also provided the basis for retaining many chaplain spaces that would otherwise have been lost during the Army reduction in force. During 1973-74, seventy-eight chaplains worked with eighty-one drug teams. As other personnel were trained in drug counseling and prevention, the chaplains played a lesser roll. They did, however, remain active in ministering and providing support in the drug

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
abuse milieu.

In 1973, Chaplain Orris Kelly became the first Executive Officer in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. One of the first tasks assigned to him by the Chief of Chaplains was to work with Brigadier General Robert Gard, from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, to develop methods for dealing with the serious problem of drug abuse. They met with many experts in the field and with Congressional Staff personnel. One of the major objectives was to develop a training program for drug counselors. Chaplain Kelly was assigned the duty to study and identify an institution where such training could be done. He recommended Yale University, because of the excellent training it provided, even though it had only recently canceled its ROTC program in reaction to the Vietnam War.29 Chaplain Kelly's involvement was a natural evolution from his leadership in the area in Vietnam, and while serving in the Plans, Programs and Policies Division of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.30

Chaplain involvement in drug ministry consumed much of almost every chaplain's time. It was uppermost on every commander's mind and took high priority in the chaplain's workload. The effort was rewarded by success in helping individual soldiers combat their addictions and won widespread respect for the abilities of chaplains. The old stereotypes of chaplains as inept "Chaplain Stainglass," or overly pious "Father Mulcahey," were quickly fading away. As non-chaplain personnel became trained and competent in drug prevention and treatment, the chaplaincy let others take the lead. By the early 1980s, there were only four chaplains remaining who were directly involved in drug ministry.

Multi-cultural Programs

Toward the end of United States involvement in Vietnam (late 1960s - early 1970s), American society was seething in racial unrest. What happened in civilian communities was true of the Army as well. The morale of many units was seriously degraded. Chaplains had long been involved in race relations ministry through counseling, training and race relations councils. Now a strenuous effort would be required to meet this challenge.

Since the initiation of the All Volunteer Army, the presence of minorities in the Army steadily increased. The number of blacks, for instance, nearly doubled immediately after 1973. The same was true of other minorities, especially Hispanics. The face and the color of the Army was changing dramatically. That was not the issue. The problem was that many soldiers were not yet ready for this transition.

In December 1972 the Office of the Chief of Chaplains convened a conference of distinguished black leaders to assist in meeting the needs of minority soldiers and the recruitment of black chaplains. As a result of that meeting, a goal was established to have 15% of the chaplaincy comprised of black chaplains.31 It was felt that this would ensure the ability to equitably assign black chaplains wherever needed to provide special ministries and reduce tensions. Although that lofty numerical goal was never met, it did serve to highlight the emphasis placed on soliciting chaplains to meet the changing ethnic composition of the Army. The special recruitment effort did result in an increase to 65 black chaplains with similar increases for other minorities.32

See endnotes at end of chapter.
In FY 73-74, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains sponsored a Gospel Music workshop, and underscored special programs for Martin Luther King Day, Black History Week and other significant cultural events.

The Chief of Chaplains Five Year Program for FY 74-78 addressed the problem of race relations. "The Army chaplaincy must bring to bear the resources of religious faith and work within this framework to alleviate the situation." The Chief of Chaplains also called for the initiation of ministries of human relations to accelerate "the integration of cultural and racial resources into existing programs." Special conferences for black chaplains were convened to hear their needs and concerns. Throughout FY 1974, Race Relations and Multi-cultural Workshops were held in various places with 211 chaplains in attendance. In his March 1974 Newsletter, Chaplain Hyatt wrote:

The Army has set out to win the battle against racial discrimination. This commitment is clear in programs, plans and training developed and used world-wide...All human beings must be freed from those personal and institutional abuses which rob life of meaning and fulfillment.

Gospel services proliferated to almost every CONUS and overseas installation as a means of meeting both religious and cultural needs of black soldiers and their family members. The history of the Black Gospel Service is not fully known, but it is possible that the first modern Army Gospel Service was held by accident in Kaiserslautern, Germany, in 1968. Chaplain Leroy Johnson formed a black concert choir to sing on Armed Forces Radio Network, and later toured Europe, singing at "gospel services." In CONUS, the first Gospel Service was held (by Chaplain John Paul Monk) at Fort Carson, where racial tensions between soldiers and the civilian community ran high.

Chaplain Roy Plummer initiated a very successful and highly recognized program of Black Gospel Services, in 1973-74, at Fort Lewis, Washington. When he was first assigned, Chaplain Plummer was told that he was too young and too black to conduct the main Protestant service at the 9th Infantry Division Chapel. Some white parishioners began to leave the chapel. Subsequently, a black member of the congregation began to invite as many African American soldiers and family members as possible to attend the service. In less than one year the congregation was too large to fit into the chapel. At about this same time, at the urging of Chaplain Tom McMinn at III Corps, Chaplain Irving Jennings began to conduct Black Gospel Services at Fort Hood, Texas. Chaplain James Russell followed suit at Fort Bliss. As with the service at Fort Lewis, the Gospel Services were the most heavily attended and certainly the most enthusiastic of any services held on posts.

The focus on the needs of black soldiers was clearly essential. It soon became apparent, however, that the problem was much larger. Other minorities, racial, cultural and religious, also needed special ministries. Chaplain W. E. Smith, a Reservist and professor at Brigham Young University, was prophetic when writing:

Sooner or later, trends which appear in American life are felt in the military—whether these trends are sociological, political, economic or religious. The current trend which

See endnotes at end of chapter.
reinforces concepts of pluralism and sanctity of the individual is no exception. 39

Focused emphasis was being placed on meeting the needs of black soldiers, there was also an increased awareness of the needs of Hispanic soldiers and their dependents. Special cultural programs centered around special historical or religious events began to find their way into parish programs and the general military community. Additionally, religious groups other than Judeo-Christian began to clamor for recognition. Special arrangements were made to accommodate religious and dietary needs of Muslims and others. Recognition of gender (female) as a minority category was also coming to the forefront. Plans were already being laid to meet this challenge.

This new perspective on pluralism led to the development of a broad emphasis on Multicultural ministry. One of the chief architects of the new programs, a young chaplain named Matthew A. Zimmerman, was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. 40 Chaplains met annually to identify needs both of minority chaplains and their constituents, to recommend initiatives and to evaluate the success of ongoing programs. New policies were developed to address inequities and to ensure that every soldier was treated with dignity and respect.

**Transforming the System:**
**Personal Effectiveness Training**

The Army that returned from Vietnam was in disarray. Morale, discipline and leadership were at an extremely low point and sinking deeper. Army leaders, especially noncommissioned officers and junior officers, were reluctant to enforce rules and to maintain high standards. Over 800 reported "fraggings" and other threats to life and limb immobilized many of the leaders who were positioned to correct these very problems. 41 Young officers and sergeants were sometimes afraid to enter soldier work or living areas for fear that they would be attacked either verbally or physically. Soldiers continually challenged the authority of their leaders. In many instances it was difficult to determine who the real leaders were.

Chaplain Hyatt gave a highly effective speech at the Infantry School on the subject of leadership and why soldiers do not reenlist. He stressed the need for proper treatment of soldiers. Reports of the speech reached General Abrams, the Chief of Staff of the Army, who passed on the report to Lieutenant General Bernard Rogers, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). 42

In August 1973, General Rogers asked the Chief of Chaplains asked the Chief of Chaplains for assistance in working out a program to increase leadership effectiveness of junior officers and noncommissioned officers. 43 Chaplains were chosen because of their training in problem-solving, counseling and communication skills. These were the skills needed to build trust and confidence in junior Army leaders. A team of chaplains worked with social scientists at Fort Bliss, Texas, to develop what would be called "Personal Effectiveness Training" (PET). The PET program, while not mandatory, was implemented at almost all CONUS installations. PET training consisted of workshops and seminars which provided skills and experience in communications, counseling and effective leadership. Graduates of these programs returned to their units and practiced the new abilities with

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
the soldiers under their command or supervision.

Chaplain Albert Ledebruhr, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Command Chaplain, requested that Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) trained chaplains be assigned to the European Command in order to form counseling teams to assist with the implementation of the PET program. These counseling teams conducted workshops throughout the command. Their seminars had two main emphases: 1) to train officers and NCOs to be more efficient and responsive in understanding and meeting needs of their soldiers, and 2) to acquaint participants with practical techniques and methods of counseling.

The PET program contributed to a restoration of confidence and leadership at the middle management level of the Army. Social scientists from the Office of the Surgeon General were very impressed with the program and expressed an interest in engaging in future projects with the Chaplaincy. In 1974 the PET program was highly rated by commanders in the field. The decision was made at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command that PET should be included in the Program of Instruction for all Drill Sergeants. As non-chaplains were trained in the PET skills, chaplains turned over responsibility for the program to the commanders, but remained available to assist in instruction and in consultation.

Organization Development and Parish Development

In 1970 relations between the races, particularly black and white, were severely strained. The Secretary of Defense requested improvements in communications between the races as a means of alleviating the problem. The Office of the Chief of Chaplains contracted with the National Training Laboratories (NTL) to begin an extensive and intensive training program in human relations and interpersonal dynamics. Several chaplains attended strenuous training sessions at the NTL training facility at Bethel, Maine. In 1971-72, nearly 100 chaplain advance course students participated in Human Relations training. At the same time, similar training also was being conducted on 19 CONUS installations. Dr. Cy Mill, NTL consultant, stated that Army chaplains:

Have power at their command which is rarely used, the power of the church, power of their position as representatives of right and justice, power of their individual personalities, and power to limit the extent to which they will accede to the restrictions which bind other branches of the service.

Another innovative program, known throughout the Chaplaincy and the Army as Organizational Development, had its roots in new instructional approach mandated by TRADOC and implemented at the U.S. Army Chaplain School in 1968-1969. In an effort to focus training on the tasks, skills, and attitudes chaplains needed to perform their religious support duties, Chaplain Charles Kriete, Director of Curriculum development, Chaplain Richard Tupy and Chaplain Edward O’Shea applied a TRADOC Systems Engineering process to identify tasks and then design a curriculum to

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support task specific training. By dividing the Advanced Chaplains Course into small groups, Chaplain Ed O'Shea observed that “reality teaching was done in a real way.” Chaplain Chet Lindsey, the Chaplain School Commandant, approved the initiative.

As part of the instructional revolution at the School, Chaplain Ed O'Shea introduced an instructional method called the Group Process Plan. The GPP was not only a small group learning process but also a problem-solving technique. Chaplain Krize thought it could be described as “task-oriented sensitivity training.” It was this plan,” Chaplain O'Shea later recalled,” which gave birth to Organizational Development. In fact, Colonel Morton, the first Commandant of the Sergeant Majors Academy, which was organized at Ft. Bliss in 1971, had visited the Chaplain School earlier and determined that the Academy would utilize the GPP as its teaching methodology. Chaplain Harold Lamm and I were commissioned to spend three weeks at Ft. Bliss introducing the process to the staff and training the faculty in its use. Chaplain John Scott, who served as the first chaplain appointed to the Sergeant Majors Academy, may have been among the first chaplains in the Army to transition to the Organizational Development program.

The purpose of Organizational Development was to enable participatory management and decision-making. Chaplains and laity at all levels worked together to set goals, improve communications and enhance relationships. Major stress was placed on the process used and the development of interpersonal skills rather than on a quantifiable end product. Heavy emphasis was placed on the effect of interpersonal relations and human dynamics on decision-making in the Army. Chaplain leaders felt that effective ministry included being in touch with one's own feelings as well as those of the chapel team and other constituents. The Chief of Chaplains appointed Chaplain Edward O'Shea to serve as his senior project officer for the implementation of Organizational Development programs to be conducted at 17 posts by the end of 1975. O'Shea was highly qualified and an enthusiastic proponent of this movement. Much of the success of the program was due to his skill and leadership.

Chaplain Hyatt viewed the chaplaincy as a "decentralized non-system." He wanted input from post chaplains and commanders and in turn sought to empower them to provide ministry. Consultants were used to gain information and identify resources to meet those needs.

At Fort Bliss, Texas, Chaplain Trevor Turner, the installation staff chaplain, gathered his twenty or so chaplains together for several days to learn how to apply the methods of organizational development. Civilian leaders under contract with the Office of the Chief of Chaplains facilitated the sessions. Chaplains began by identifying their own strengths and weaknesses. They then looked at the needs of the religious community. As a result of these meetings, chaplains learned not only how to relate more effectively with each other, but also how to organize and implement programs to meet the actual needs of their parish.

The experimental programs were highly successful and in 1974 the Chief of Chaplains decided to eliminate the outside consultants and rely on his own chaplains to provide Organizational Development training. Consequently, OCCH established a "Green Suit" network of 12 chaplain trainers. This cadre traveled throughout the Army providing new resources to chaplains on the posts to help them develop proactive ministries in their commands, units and chapels. They also served as personal consultants to the installation staff chaplain.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Organizational Development continued to be used as a tool to increase the effectiveness of chaplains' pastoral and prophetic ministry. In 1974, four interrelated goals were specified: 1) to assist chaplains to evaluate their leadership styles, 2) to develop alternatives to traditional programming and development, 3) to assist in the creation of an open work environment, and 4) to aid in emergence of proactive rather than reactive approaches to ministry.\(^{57}\)

In 1974, the Chaplaincy changed the name of its program from "Organizational Development" to "Parish Development." The purpose of the change was to allow for the incorporation of a theological underpinning and perspective.\(^{58}\) It had been felt by some that the program up to that point had been too "secular" and it needed a distinctively theological imprint on it. The same "green suit" network provided the impetus and the training for the new endeavor. Two pilot programs were established.\(^{59}\) The program at Fort Leonard Wood was led by Chaplain Eugene Allen, and the program at Fort Myer by Chaplain William Martin. The Mid-Atlantic Association for Training and Consulting (MATC), provided training for chaplains and assistants and in 1981 they began training consultants to work with parishes on a regular basis.\(^{60}\)

The same general principles used by Organizational Development were incorporated into Parish Development. The significant difference was that the focus was specifically on improving parish life. By 1981 almost every Army installation had established a Parish Council through which planning and coordinating of activities was accomplished. In establishing the program using chaplain leaders, the Chief of Chaplains wrote that:

> Our ultimate goal is to be able to do for ourselves what we currently have others doing for us. We want to develop chaplains who can assume the role of consultants to installations other than their own, and serve as internal consultants on their own.\(^{61}\)

One effect of reemphasizing the role of the chaplain as religious leader, as in the Parish Development program, was to identify an area of Chaplain Corps autonomy at the DA Staff level. Chaplain Hyatt wanted the Army to understand that chaplains had a distinct contribution to make as religious leaders and advisors to commanders in the areas of religion, morals and morale. As a result of his valued relationship with General Abrams, Chaplain Hyatt was placed on Abrams' personal staff. Other senior commanders soon followed suit and added their staff chaplains to their personal staff organizations.\(^{62}\)

**Management by Objectives for Results**

In 1970, at approximately the same time that Organizational Development was being introduced to the Chaplaincy, a parallel management device was being developed. Chaplain Clifford Keys, Director of Management at the Chief of Chaplains Office, determined that new methods were necessary for moving the Chaplaincy into the future. Management by Objectives for Results (MBOR) became the new model of management. Peter Drucker and George Odiorne had introduced the

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method in the business world.\textsuperscript{63}

MBOR used many of the techniques of Organizational Development and Parish Development and, therefore, it was seen as a complementary effort. It was a goal setting, participatory management process that envisioned the chaplains and laity working together as a team at every level of the institution. Chaplain Hyatt stated that MBOR "enables a united effort in accomplishing the work of ministry in chapel/unit/parish setting. It opens the door to effective communications."\textsuperscript{64} MBOR required the definition of the Chaplaincy or parish mission, clarification of roles, establishment of goals, identification of indicators to determine effectiveness, result oriented objectives, action plans and feedback.\textsuperscript{65}

MBOR, in various forms, remained the management process used throughout the seventies, eighties and into the early nineties. It could be questioned whether the innovations of the seventies would have occurred without these procedures in place.

\textbf{Values and the Human Self Development Program}

The initial concept for the Human Self Development Program arose in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Bits and pieces began to make their way into the system until a full fledged program was installed in 1973. The official program was established under AR 600-30.\textsuperscript{66} In preparing for the new program the Chief of Chaplains Newsletter announced the following definition:

The Human Self Development Program is an Army wide coordinated human relations program. The word "human" is used to emphasize we are not to manipulate persons as though they are "things." The word "self" emphasizes dignity, responsibility and personal worth of human beings. The word "development" suggests processes rather than perfection as a goal.\textsuperscript{67}

The focus of the program was on the whole person. It was to address people problems and was implemented at the local installation or the small unit level. Chaplains and other officers participated in the instructional aspects of the effort. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command specified that two hours of training in Human Self Development were required for all recruit soldiers in Basic Combat Training and for those in Advanced Individual Training. Films and other resources were provided by the US Army Chaplain Board. The major goals of the program were to:

(1) Maintain positive social values
(2) Increase personal responsibility
(3) Prevention as well as rehabilitation
(4) Alternatives to drugs and alcohol abuse, racial bias and AWOL
(5) Positive teaching about America's past and future
(6) Emphasis on personal uniqueness and self-fulfillment.\textsuperscript{68}

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Human Self-Development Councils were established at unit and installation levels to deal with human relations problems arising locally. Provisions were made in the Chief of Chaplains' Five Year Program for development, staffing and printing of resource materials.\(^69\) Much of this work was done by the U.S. Army Chaplain Board.

**Religious Education**

Throughout much of the history of the Chaplaincy, religious education was carried out by chaplains and lay leaders. The first civilian Director of Religious Education (DRE) was hired by the Army in Germany in 1956.\(^70\) There was a slow but steady increase in numbers until the early 1970s. The Chief of Chaplain's annual report states that by 1974 there were 87 DREs in the Army and the number was increasing. DREs were originally hired "as a way of assuring quality control and professionally trained leadership in the chapel religious education program."\(^71\) Professional religious educators were also used as resource persons for the total religious program and often were members of the senior chaplain's staff. During the mid-1970s the major emphasis was on improving the quality of religious education. Teacher training programs were developed and the DREs played a crucial role in that project.

Jewish Lay Leadership Training was established in 1973 as a direct result of the growing shortage of Jewish chaplains in all military services. In many places the only way Jewish services could be provided was through the use of trained lay leaders if they were available. The Department of Defense Armed Forces Chaplain Board published "A Jewish Program and Resource Guide For Lay Leaders in the Armed Forces of the United States."\(^72\) Training was provided on a regional basis to interested and qualified Jewish personnel in that area. The National Jewish Welfare Board granted certification for the faith group to ensure their objective standards were satisfied. Jewish Lay Leadership was highly successful particularly on smaller installations and units where no chaplain was available. Jewish chaplains often became circuit riders providing professional services on a rotating basis. In the interim, Lay Leaders provided ministry and leadership.

**Female Chaplains**

Women were playing a more prominent role both in society and in the military in the early years of the 1970s. The Women's Liberation Movement was in full swing. Congress was debating the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and women everywhere were ascending to positions hitherto forbidden to them. The Army anticipated the passage of the ERA and began making plans for full integration of women into the Army. The fact that the amendment was not passed in 1970, did not deter the Army from moving ahead with its own plans. With the dissolution of the Women's Army Corps, female soldiers were being integrated into the Army in new and challenging ways.

The ending of the Draft was accompanied by a shortfall in accessioning male soldiers. At the

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same time, a study revealed that more women with generally higher qualifications could be recruited at less expense. The Womens' Armed Services Act of 1948 had limited the number of women to 2% of the total force, and only 10% of that 2% could serve as officers. Now the way was clear for more women not only to volunteer, but to be recruited. In 1972 only one out of every 50 soldiers recruited was female, but in 1973 that figure climbed to one out of every 16. Since then, the number of women in the Army has remained at approximately 11% of the total force.

Seminary enrollment of women had escalated during the last years of Vietnam. More denominations were recognizing the ordination of women. It was time to consider commissioning the first female chaplain since the Civil War. In 1864, Mrs. Ella Hobart was selected by her unit, the First Wisconsin Regiment of Heavy Artillery, to be its chaplain. She was a leader in the Religion-Philosophical Society in Illinois and was not ordained. Although she served with her unit for several months, possibly in combat at Fort Stevens near Washington in 1864, she was denied a commission by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. No female chaplains had served since that time.

Chaplain Charles Kriete, Director of Plans, Programs and Policies, recommended to Chaplain Hyatt that a woman be commissioned as a chaplain. Chaplain Hyatt agreed. The Navy had a female chaplain and the Army needed to get on board as well. The first denomination to respond with a woman candidate was the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME). The Chaplaincy approved The Reverend Alice M. Henderson, an ordained AME minister, to be the first female chaplain. In choosing Chaplain Henderson, the Chaplaincy met two of its affirmative action goals, for Chaplain Henderson was also black. Chaplain Henderson was sworn into the Army on July 8, 1974, at U.S. Forces Command Headquarters in Atlanta. She completed Basic Chaplain Training and was assigned to the 426th Signal Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. She later remarried and became Chaplain Alice Henderson Harris. Approximately one year later another AME chaplain, Betty Pace, was commissioned an Army Chaplain.

The early years were not always kind to women chaplains. They constantly felt that they needed to "prove" themselves and justify their ministry. Sometimes they were greeted with hostility by soldiers, commanders and other chaplains. On occasion they were "paraded" before the troops and the press which perhaps created false expectations. Chaplain Janet Horton wrote that they were sometimes expected to be "the Star Spangled Barbie Doll" or "Wonder Woman, Marilyn Monroe and Tina Turner, all rolled into one." Some of the early pioneers paid a heavy price in paving the way for their successors. Many were not selected for promotion and were released from active duty. Those who followed were more successful.

Chaplains In Service Schools

The ministry of chaplains as instructors in Army service schools, at West Point, at the U.S. Army War College and other locations in the 1970s was the result of the need at the end of the Vietnam War for a new approach to moral leadership training in the Army. The My Lai massacre of March 1968, and the resulting Peers Inquiry of March 1970, underscored the failure of thirty officers and senior noncommissioned officers in Task Force Barker of the American Division to model and

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enforce standards of conduct in Vietnam. While this incident may not be representative of the total Vietnam experience, the wide publicity generated by the tragedy at My Lai called into question the type of training enlisted soldiers and officers received in the laws of warfare and professional military ethics.

For two hundred years, from 1775 to 1975, Army Chaplains had been expected to assist the commander with training soldiers in moral conduct. General George Washington had ordered the soldiers of the Continental Army to march to worship services in brigade formation, under arms, and to pay close attention to the sermons that chaplains delivered. During the Civil War, chaplains were required by Army regulation to "report to the colonel commanding the moral and religious condition of the regiment, and such suggestions as may conduce to the social happiness and moral improvement of the troops." Throughout its long history, the Army had always assumed that chaplains would teach morality to enlisted soldiers, but not necessarily to officers who were assumed to be "gentlemen." In the course of World War II, and subsequently in Korea, and during the war in Vietnam, chaplains conducted thousands of Character Guidance classes for soldiers around the world. At the end of the Vietnam War, the scope of the chaplain teaching ministry expanded to include officer as well as enlisted soldier instruction.

On 21 January 1971, General William Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army, directed Major General Franklin M. Davis, Jr., Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, to study the moral and ethical climate of the Army and the leadership qualities required for the decade of the 1970s. Among studies considered was the Peers Inquiry, directed by Lieutenant General William Peers:

The findings of this study surprised and in some cases shocked many of the Army's senior leaders. In general, it discovered that the majority of the Officer Corps perceived a stark dichotomy between appearance and reality of the adherence of senior officers to the traditional standards of professionalism. Instead, these officers saw a system that rewarded selfishness, incompetence, and dishonesty.

As a result of the Army War College studies and the concerns of the Army Chief of Staff, courses in ethics, leadership, and professionalism were initiated in Army service schools, at West Point, and at the War College itself. Chaplain Charles Kriete attended the War College in 1974-1975, and in 1975 he was assigned as the first chaplain to serve on the faculty. Other chaplains who served on the faculty included: Chaplains Edward O'Shea, Donald Davidson, Timothy Tatum, John Schumacher, Thomas Norton and John Brinsfield.

Chaplain Hyatt recognized that if the moral climate of the Army was to change, it would have to be done at least in part through the kind of training officers and noncommissioned officers received at their Service Schools. Chief among his concerns was that some stress be placed on ethics and moral leadership. He coordinated at Department of the Army, at the Major Commands, and with the commandants of the Schools themselves for the placement of chaplains on the faculty of all the Service Schools. His efforts were rewarded.
Chaplain Benjamin Price was one of the first chaplains to serve as an instructor in a Service School—at the Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Chaplain Benjamin Smith was appointed as director at the Defense Race Relations Institute, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. This was a highly visible and critical position and indicated great respect for Chaplain Smith and for the Chaplaincy. These appointments had been preceded by earlier, temporary assignments, of chaplains to a few Service Schools. Chaplain Thomas McMinn had been assigned to the Command and General Staff College to teach the Law of Land Warfare, among other leadership subjects, in the 1960's; and Chaplains Benjamin Smith and Harold Lamm served as instructors during the Vietnam War at the Civil Affairs School.  

By 1974 fourteen chaplains were regularly assigned to the faculties of Service Schools. Most taught moral leadership, ethics, counseling, and human relations. Chaplain Donald Clark was assigned as a branch chief at the School for Administration at Fort Benjamin Harrison. The Sergeants Major Academy was established at Fort Bliss in 1973. A chaplain assignment was requested by DCSPER to help develop the curriculum, the course objectives and instructional methodology. Chaplain John Scott, for example, served as Director of Leadership and Management at the Sergeant Majors Academy and was responsible for fifty percent of the specified curriculum  

A list for the Chief of Chaplains of the chaplain instructors and the Service Schools to which they were assigned included:

| U.S. Army Institute of Administration | Chaplain Donald Clark |
| Air Defense Artillery School | Chaplain Jerry Autry |
| Armor School | Chaplain Richard Matthew |
| Command and General Staff College | Chaplain Don Adickes |
| Field Artillery School | Chaplain Roland Day |
| Infantry School | Chaplain Harold Davis |
| Academy of Health Sciences | Chaplain Meredith Standley |
| Sergeants Major Academy | Chaplain William Bander |
| USAIMA | Chaplain David Polhemus |
| Quartermaster School | Chaplain John Scott |
| USAS/TCFS | Chaplain Michael Rogers |
| Transportation School | Chaplain John Pearson |
| The Army War College | Chaplain Archie Roberts |
| Defense Race Relations Institute | Chaplain Rueben Askew |
| | Chaplain Charles Kriete |
| | Chaplain Benjamin Smith |

At the Army War College, Chaplain Charles F. Kriete wrote a brilliant paper for the Strategic Studies Institute entitled, "The Changing Moral Dimension of Strategy." In 1977 Chaplain Kriete became the Commandant of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School. He later returned to the War College and taught strategy and military history until his retirement in 1983.  

Service School instructors, while under the direct control of the commandant, received

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chaplain technical supervision from the Staff Chaplain at TRADOC. The Chief of Chaplains maintained a keen interest in the selection and performance of instructors. In 1974 and 1975, Service School chaplains attended conferences sponsored by the Chief of Chaplains to provide materials and guidance for improving moral leadership and ethics instruction and to ensure standardization in course materials. Chaplains had an opportunity to learn from each other as well as from the resource persons provided by the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

One of the most popular and highly publicized Chaplain Service School Instructors was Chaplain Jerry D. Autry who served at the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas. Chaplain Autry not only taught counseling and ethics at the ADA School, he also volunteered to help preach at the Center Chapel. He wrote weekly articles for the Fort Bliss newspaper, played championship racquetball, and, with his wife Jackie, was active in a multitude of chapel programs. In 1975 Chaplain Autry wrote an article for the Military Chaplains Review in which he observed:

There are twenty-three service schools in the Army plus national-level senior service schools and academies which trained over 240,000 students last year. Because of numbers alone, the opportunities for the chaplain’s ministry in this environment are staggering. The chaplain, as an image-builder, is performing a service that will enhance the ministry of all chaplains in the field. From my perspective, therefore, every chaplain benefits from the service school chaplain’s ministry.87

As a chaplain who had been awarded the Silver Star for heroism in Vietnam, Chaplain Autry’s perspective was important. So too were the ministries of teaching, leadership and responsibility modeled by all chaplain service school instructors.

Conscientious Objection

In the decade of the seventies there was a growing number of soldiers seeking to be classified as Conscientious Objectors. Much of the impetus for this came from disapproval of the waning Vietnam War, and the disenchantment many denominations felt with the Army. Many church groups actively provided information to soldiers on how to apply for that status. The Department of the Army faced a mountain of applications from soldiers, and the sincerity of many was questioned. Because of the massive applications and questionable motivations, the Army leadership considered removing Conscientious Objection as a basis of separation from the military. Chaplains were to be part of the review process. The Chief of Chaplains did not agree with this proposed policy and officially and strongly nonconcurred with the proposal.88 Chaplain Hyatt saw the legitimate role of the chaplain as a confidant and as a pastor, not as one who approved or disapproved applications.89 He encouraged chaplains to be active in providing ministry to those who were struggling with matters of conscience.

The Department of the Army established a Conscientious Objector Review Board in

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Washington to examine appeals. The Military District of Washington provided chaplains to participate in these regularly scheduled Board meetings. Chaplains Franklyn Holley and Edward Gaffney were the original chaplain members of the Board.90 The volume of appeals was so great that later Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman, an action officer in the Chief of Chaplain's Office, and others, spent at least one day each week at Board deliberations.

Chaplain Assistants

A severe shortage of chaplain assistants existed in the early 1970s. At the same time the Army was in the process of reclassifying many soldiers who were serving in other specialties. The Women's Army Corps (WAC) which previously had basically a single occupational specialty for its members, was being integrated into the rest of the Army. Consequently, in 1972-73 the Chaplain Assistant MOS (71M) was opened up to members of the WAC. The Chief of Chaplains agreed to the proposal with the stipulation that women be assigned only to TDA units.91 He did not feel that the time was right for women to be integrated into combat units. The first WAC to be awarded the Chaplain Assistant MOS was Specialist Lorraine Daleshal. After completing chaplain assistant training, she was assigned to Fort McClellan, Alabama, which had previously been the home of the Womens Army Corps.92

In 1973-74 reclassification continued throughout the Army. The difficulty for the Chaplaincy was that many soldiers, mostly male, who were being reclassified as chaplain assistants did not know what duties were expected of them. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that many being reclassified were in higher grades and had neither the experience nor the knowledge to lead subordinate chaplain assistants. Additionally, they occupied grades that normally would have been available for career progression to those who had been serving in the specialty. This degraded the morale of many long term chaplain assistants.

Chaplain assistants were anxious to improve their professional training and stature. Training in Church Business Administration was offered to numerous chaplain assistants.93 It was to the advantage of both the enlisted personnel and the Chaplaincy to offer this training. Assistants were facing greater and greater competition for promotion. Professional training such as in Church Administration would enable them to remain competitive. The Chaplaincy and chapel programs benefitted through the increased skills and competencies of the assistants.

A task force was formed in 1974 to study the MOS 71M and prepare recommendations for the Chief of Chaplains. Among the suggestions offered by the committee were the following:94

- Prepare new job descriptions that would adequately reflect the duties of chaplain assistants.
- Explore paraprofessional roles for assistants (e.g. precounseling & church administration)
- Determine training needed to enhance the career field
- Explore certification in Church Business Administration

Chaplain Marvin Hughes was instrumental in drafting plans that would, in time, turn the chaplain assistant MOS into a professional service.

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The United States Army Chaplain Center and School

As a consequence of Operation STEADFAST, the reorganization of the Army in CONUS, decisions were made to collocate the U.S. Army Chaplain School and the U.S. Army Chaplain Board. General William DePuy, Chairman of the Interservice Training Review Board (ITRB), and Chaplain Will Hyatt were two of the key leaders involved in the process.

One of Chaplain Hyatt's dreams was to have the Chaplain School located on an installation where it could stand alone and have the distinctiveness it deserved. His vision was a small post where the School would be the main occupant and all the functions of the post would revolve around the institution. On 6 March 1973, the Chief of Chaplains proposed to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, that the activities of the Chaplain School relocate to Fort Wadsworth, Staten Island, New York, from Fort Hamilton, in Brooklyn, New York. The School had many different homes over the years. Fort Hamilton was one of the longest site locations since the School had been located there in the early 1960s. Chaplain Hyatt further proposed that the School's name be changed to the United States Army Chaplain Center and School. It would become a total academic complex. It would house the School, the Museum, and a proposed "Institute for Family Life and Human Relations."

The name of the school was changed at the beginning of FY 73, but the actual move did not take place for another couple of years. Formal approval and announcement to Congress occurred on 19 July 1974 and the move was completed by the end of September 1974. The United States Army Chaplain Board, a Field Operating Agency of the Chief of Chaplains located at Fort Meade, was collocated with the School in 1975. The United States Army Chaplain Center and School now had finally found the home it had sought for many years.

Chaplain Hyatt wrote in his Information Letter that "While the move is a mere four miles long, it is the culmination of our dream to provide a professional home for the U.S. Army Chaplaincy." The four miles from Fort Hamilton to Fort Wadsworth included the length of the Verazanno Bridge. The footing of one end of the bridge was on Fort Hamilton, while the other footing was on Fort Wadsworth. Little could Chaplain Hyatt know that five years later, in 1979, the School would move again. This time to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Moreover, in 1993 another move would be announced to relocate the school to Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

The Reserve Components

The Reserve Components were continually gaining stature during the seventies. It was obvious that they would be critical to the success of any future ground wars. Reserve officers were being assigned active duty tours as staff officers at Department of the Army and at Major Army Commands. In 1974, Chaplain Elmer G. Smith was the first Reserve Chaplain to be assigned to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains as Reserve Advisor to the Chief of Chaplains. Chaplain Theo D. Hooland was the first Army National Guard Chaplain assigned to a like position.
In 1974 a new Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) was developed for the Chief of Chaplains Office and approved by the Army Staff. Chaplain Hyatt had tried for several years to gain approval for a Reserve General Officer for his staff. The 1974 TDA authorized one brigadier general. Later Chaplain Herman A. Norton, professor of Church History at Vanderbilt University, was chosen as the first Brigadier General, USAR, in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.99

Army Reorganization

In 1973 the Army was in the throes of a complete reorganization. The Continental Army Command was divided, as a major part of Operation STEADFAST, into two new commands: Training and Doctrine Command and Forces Command. The emphasis of the Army was on decentralization. It was not merely an attempt to modernize, but also to tailor the Army for a future with less manpower and fewer resources.

One example of how quickly change came occurred in Panama. In July 1974, the U.S. Army Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) was relieved as a major command and, after 57 years, became a subordinate command of FORSCOM.100 During that same period of time (February, 1974) Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Panama's Foreign Minister to renegotiate the Panama Canal Treaty.101 On 18 September 1974, Hurricane "FIFI" caused a national disaster in Honduras. Nearly 100,000 people needed medical assistance. U.S. Army-South’s role "shifted from surveying to rescue and assistance."102 USARSO became an early prototype for regional support in an operation other than war.

Deployments during Crises

The Republic of Turkey: Ministry on the Margins of Diplomacy 1974-75.

How long will we be stuck in Turkey with no mission? Trees don't live that long!
Specialist Dan Taylor
Chaplain Assistant
Sinop, 1975

In 1974-1975, U.S. soldiers were deployed, with chaplain support, on four continents and in a variety of threat situations worldwide. Divisions and brigades of forward-deployed forces were important deterrents in the Cold War era. For a brief time, a small contingent of troops in Sinop, Turkey, captured the attention of the Department of Defense, the Congress, and the President of the United States. The issue was whether the southern flank of NATO would survive.

Sinop was, in 1974, a picturesque Turkish town with a population of approximately 15,000 located on the Black Sea. Its name was derived from the ancient Greek city of Sinop, the home of Diogenes, the Skeptic philosopher, and later of Marcion, the Christian heretic. In 1974 its value to NATO, and therefore to the United States, lay in its close proximity to a number of Soviet defense

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installations and launch sites, 175 miles north in Russia and in the Southern Ukraine. The official designation for the joint U.S.-Turkish intelligence station, located on the top of a hill overlooking the town of Sinop, was TUSLOG, Det 4, or Turkish-United States Logistics Group, Detachment 4. The soldiers, sailors, and airmen stationed there, whose numbers fluctuated from 165 to more than 200 intelligence analysts and linguists, simply called it "Diogenes Station." The mission of the intelligence personnel at Sinop was to monitor all Soviet microwave and radio transmissions of interest to Turkey and the United States as allies in NATO. *Time Magazine* and *The New York Times*, among other news media, ran extensive stories on the American bases and posts in Turkey including "the four intelligence gathering sites: Sinop, Golbasi, Karamursel, and Diyarbakir, located roughly in an arc from Istanbul to Ankara."

The physical appearance of Diogenes Station was a dead giveaway that it was an intelligence station. On perhaps fifty acres of ground there were twenty buildings including a chapel (one of the few permitted by the Turkish government), an officer's club, an NCO club, a mess hall, several barracks buildings, a gymnasium, a post exchange with a short order grill, a headquarters building, and, behind two barbed wire fences, several buildings covered with antennae and satellite dishes. Moreover, a large "water tower" occupied a portion of ground near some Byzantine ruins on the north side of the post. It was the only "water tower" in Turkey with an elevator.

Morale support for military and civilian personnel at the station was as good as might be found at any isolated post. Mail was irregular because there was no radar at the airport, but at least once each month there were letters and packages from home. The two chaplains on the post, the only Army chaplains in Turkey, ran a comprehensive religious program including Protestant Bible studies, choir practice, two worship services each Sunday, daily Roman Catholic Mass, bus tours to the Seven Churches of Revelation archeological sites in western Turkey, and a ministry to the Turkish Boys' and Girls' Orphanages in downtown Sinop.

Counseling ministry under these circumstances was exceptionally critical. Family problems occurring some 8,000 miles away in the United States and the serious communication difficulties in calling home depressed many soldiers. Alcohol consumption for many was an almost daily ritual and was often excessive. Chaplain Chester R. Steffey, the Protestant Chaplain and Chaplain Charles D. Logue, the Catholic Chaplain, worked long hours in 1974 to assure that every service member, male or female, had the opportunity to talk to a chaplain everyday. "The coffee pot is always on in the chapel," and "There are no strangers here, only friends we have not met," were two common slogans the soldiers often heard as they passed the chapel.

The Poppy and Oil Issues

In May 1974, the Turkish government announced a resumption of support for farmers planting poppies for the production of legal medicinal opium. Although the production of opium was very important to the manufacture of morphine, and promised to relieve some of the pressure on Turkey's economy, it was also a violation of a 1962 agreement with the United States by which

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
The Kennedy Administration and Congress had guaranteed $35 million in annual grants to Turkey if cultivation of poppies were curtailed. Experience with the international drug trade convinced many U.S. lawmakers that "legal" opium quickly turned into heroin on the black market. The U.S. State Department recalled U.S. Ambassador William B. Macomber, Jr., to discuss the "poppy issue," and threatened to withhold $20 million in development aid for Turkey in retaliation for this breach of understanding between the two governments. Representative Charles B. Rangel of New York warned that current law required the President to cut off all foreign aid of any sort "to countries not cooperating in the curb of international drug traffic." 106

The Invasion of Cyprus

On January 28, 1974, General George Grivas, one of the key leaders who had helped Cyprus achieve independence from Great Britain, died at the age of 75. If General Grivas had been remembered only as a hero in the independence movement, there could have been a simple state funeral with appropriate demonstrations of national respect and grief. However, General Grivas had, in his later years, championed the cause of the unification of Cyprus with Greece. This position was opposed by the independence-minded government of Archbishop Makarios as well as one-third of the population, more than 100,000 of whom were Cypriot Turks.

On July 16, after trading blows with the government for weeks, a faction of the Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers, overthrew the government of Cyprus and installed Nikos Sampson as the new President. Archbishop Makarios took refuge at first on a British airbase, then in Malta, and finally in London. President Nixon was advised that the safety of the 3,200 Americans, including tourists, could not be assured.

Before Washington had time to react, Turkish Premier Ecevit ordered a full-scale invasion of Cyprus. Citing the obvious violation of the 1960 treaty (which established Cyprus as an independent state), by President Sampson and his "Union with Athens" party, Ecevit moved to establish "a federation" government which would respect the rights of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. On July 20, Turkish aircraft bombed the airfield at Nicosia as a precursor to an air, sea and land invasion of 40,000 Turkish troops.107 In Athens, Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannides mobilized 120,000 Greek troops and threatened war with Turkey.

On Cyprus the Turkish invasion was overwhelming. Within 48 hours Turkish forces had seized one-third of the island, approximately 200 square miles of territory. After intense negotiations with the United States, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, a cease fire was declared on July 22. Two days later President Sampson of Cyprus resigned, replaced by President Glafkos Clerides who had pledged to negotiate an acceptable long-term solution to the problems on Cyprus.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
The United States Congress Acts

As the problems concerning Cyprus were being reported in the world press, the U.S. House of Representatives faced the question of a request from Turkey for an increase in military aid. The Turkish government had just paid $52 million for modernized arms from U.S. defense industries. They requested an additional $173.7 million in aid and the right to purchase $230 million worth of tanks and spare parts for heavy equipment.

On September 19, Senator Thomas Eagleton introduced legislation in the U.S. Senate to cut off all foreign aid to Turkey and to delay the delivery of military equipment the Turkish government had already purchased. In spite of the President's plea against it, the U.S. House of Representatives voted its approval on September 25, by a margin of 307 to 90, with the provision that the implementation of the legislation would be delayed until December 15, 1974, in order to give the President time to negotiate. 108

Reaction in Turkey ranged from anger to outrage. Twenty-five thousand Turkish students organized a protest march in Istanbul. 109 Students burned the American flag in the streets. The Turkish government almost immediately began purchasing arms from West Germany and the Soviet Union. As a preface to an agreement between the Soviet Union and Turkey, the Soviets extended $700 million to Turkey to build a steel mill and two power stations. On July 25, 1975, Turkey announced that the validity of the Turkish-American joint defense treaty was void. All military activities on some 26 bases would cease on July 26. Only the NATO base at Incirlik would remain in mission status, and that base would be under strict Turkish scrutiny. The 7,000 American military personnel could remain in country, but the post exchanges would be closed, no Army Post Office mail would be allowed into Turkey, and all international Christmas mail would have to arrive in Turkey by September 1, 1975. 110 In effect, American soldiers in Turkey had no mission except to wait. For the American military it was to be proverbially "a long, hot summer."

Ministry to Those Who Wait

In the summer of 1975, Lieutenant Colonel John Norris, the commander of Diogenes Station, had present in his command approximately 165 soldiers. With the interruption of the installation's mission for most military personnel, with the exception of the military police company which was hardly larger than a platoon, the challenge for Lt. Col. Norris, his two staff chaplains, CWO Tom Stephen and the company commander, 1st Lieutenant Dan Puckett, was how to keep the troops busy so that boredom, irritation, and depression did not become major morale problems.

Compounding the difficulty of having no mission and no job, the soldiers at Diogenes Station were also subject to constant harassment by some of the more radical elements in the town of Sinop at the bottom of the hill. One MP standing gate guard duty said that serving at Sinop reminded him of a potential "Custer's Last Stand," with 165 soldiers surrounded by 15,000 unhappy Turks. 111 The hostility of some of the townspeople went beyond mere unhappy expressions. Late July 1975, the

See endnotes at end of chapter.
main water pipe which carried all of the potable water up the hill to the Americans was mysteriously broken in multiple places. Since the pipe, made of terra cotta clay, ran for seven miles to a river south of town, repair took weeks. Moreover, due to multiple death threats against the Americans, Lt. Col. Norris put the town off limits not only to individuals, but to vehicular traffic. In effect, the soldiers had no bath or laundry water, no water to drink or use for coffee, and no water to flush the bathroom facilities. Since food could not be transported through the gate from the town, the soldiers ate hamburgers and drank Pepsi Colas from the Post Exchange warehouse.

At the same time the food and water were being curtailed, the Turkish workers who had run the Army motor pool and the mess hall declared a strike for higher pay. Negotiations with the Turkish labor union seemed to be linked to discussions at a much higher level concerning the future of the base itself. The American troops, deprived of many comforts, including mail and even water with which to brush their teeth, dug latrines, ate hamburgers and waited.

Chaplain Charles Logue, the senior Army chaplain at Sinop, devised a number of activities to assist soldiers with their boredom. Nightly seminars on Turkish history and the religion of Islam were presented in the chapel as a way to defuse hostility toward the Turkish people who remained NATO allies in spite of the treaty and labor union disputes. Discussion groups met to devise ways in which soldiers could help one another cope. Worship services, Bible studies and counseling continued daily.

The last week in July, Chaplain John Brinsfield arrived from Fort Bliss, Texas, to replace Chaplain Steffey whose tour had been completed. Chaplain Brinsfield was the last officer to enter Turkey before the closure of the bases. In essence his deployment was a comedy of errors. When he landed at Ankara, he was told by the Army liaison officer to write his family a letter using Turkish stamps since mail through APO channels had been shut off. After a trip of 400 miles in an Army van, sometimes along the Turkish Black Sea coast where there were no speed limits, guard rails or at times paved roads, he arrived at Sinop to find three messages from the Chief of Chaplains Office. The first was sent to him in Atlanta where he had been on leave. It instructed him to return to Fort Bliss. The second message was sent to John F. Kennedy Airport in New York, telling him his deployment had been canceled. The third had been sent to Rome, Italy, instructing him to contact Fort Bliss. After all three messages had missed him by minutes, the decision to let him stay at Sinop was easy. Chaplain Brinsfield began eating hamburgers with his troops and prepared for a 13 month tour.\[112\] The deployment gave contemporary meaning to the old observation, "They also serve who only stand and wait."\[113\]

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Systems Issues:  
Chief of Chaplains on the Commanders Personal Staff

Chaplain Hyatt, after some discussion among other staff members, was placed on the personal staff of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton W. Abrams. Hyatt's task was to advise General Abrams on matters of religion, morals and morale to help the commander better accomplish his mission. This was a significant step and one that the Chief of Chaplains hoped every commander and every chaplain would emulate. Prior to this time chaplains generally served on installations under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel or the Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA). The problem with this arrangement was that it sometimes put the post chaplain at a disadvantage in competing for resources and personnel. Additionally, the chaplain had no direct access to the commander. If the installation DCSPER/DPCA was fair-minded, he would see that the chaplain received his equitable share of resources and was fairly represented to the commander. Unfortunately, this was not always the case.

Perhaps one of the most significant arguments for this new staff arrangement was that the commander was responsible for the religious program and moral welfare of the command. The chaplain was his representative in these areas. Without direct access to the commander, the chaplain could not effectively manage that responsibility. Additionally, chaplains were protected by regulation and law in the area of privileged communication. There were things that had to be discussed only with the commander. Chaplain Albert Ledebuhr worked hard both in Europe and in CONUS to have chaplains placed on the commander's personal staff. Later he reflected that many of the significant accomplishments of the Chaplaincy would have been impossible without that relationship.

The reorganization of the Army after Vietnam had other impacts on the Chaplaincy. A major effort was undertaken in what was called MOGA (Management of Grade Authorization). The Army wanted to bring its TOE and TDA authorizations in line with its TAADS (The Army Authorization Document System) documentation. This had not been the case before, but now the Army was faced with decreased manpower and increased missions. The Army needed 6,000 spaces in order to increase the size of divisional forces. The Chaplaincy in that round lost 66 spaces with eight colonel spaces downgraded.

More bad news was ahead. The Army wanted to reduce the Chaplain Branch strength from 1,465 to 1,370 by 1976. The question was how that would be accomplished. The Army was considering a Reduction in Force (RIF). The Chief of Chaplains wanted to take the reduction in the least painful way for his chaplains and their families. He decided he would meet the requirement by limiting the number of accessions and releasing chaplains who were not selected for promotion for the second time. Chaplain Marvin Hughes labored intensively to protect every position possible. He doggedly followed every attempt to reduce the chaplaincy and succeeded in keeping the reduction well below the projections.

Chaplain Richard Tupy, personnel systems staff officer, developed a new computerized method for use in personnel management. The system paralleled the Army's grouping of Specialty Skill Identifiers (SSI) and Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI). These identifiers would indicate the

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
special training and experience a chaplain had in a specific field. One example of an SSI was that of a Clinical Pastoral Education Supervisor. Very few chaplains possessed an SSI. On the other hand, almost all chaplains held ASIs, such as training managers, funds custodians, and manpower management specialists.

Evaluation:
Gaining Confidence, Admiration and Respect

It is not possible to evaluate the successfulness of all the programs of the Hyatt era, but it is clear that cumulatively his period was a watershed of change. Though much of what resulted from his leadership was pure reaction to pressing needs rather than planned design, Hyatt transformed a scraggly corps of individualists into a cohesive, professional and highly competent Chaplaincy. Among the chief instruments he used in reaching this goal were Organizational Development and Management by Objectives for Results. Chaplain Hyatt and his staff demonstrated that management was a ministry, indeed one on which all others may depend.

In his farewell letter Chaplain Hyatt wrote to the chaplains:

You have expanded your ministry to encompass more than I ever dreamed could be done in such a short time. You have gained the confidence of the whole Army, the admiration and respect of the Congress and the gratitude of the citizens of this nation and the members of the religious community... You have found methods of opening doors into people's individual lives to improve the spiritual quality of their sojourn on this earth. And, you have had the courage to minister to the Army and its power structure... I am grateful to God for every day He has given me to be Chief of such noblemen in His Kingdom... My heart will always be in the Chaplaincy of the United States Army.

Upon his retirement from the Army on July 29, 1975, Chaplain Hyatt became the President of Concordia College in St. Paul, Minnesota, and later spearheaded a multi-million dollar fund raising drive for the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod. He died while on a trip to Washington, DC, in August 1985. Chaplain Orris Kelly, his successor as Chief of Chaplains, stated simply, "Chaplain Hyatt stood head and shoulders above his contemporaries as a visionary leader. He was one of the finest and most efficient Chiefs in the history of the Chaplain Corps."
ENDNOTES


22. Ibid.


24. Office of the Chief of Chaplains Annual Historical Review, July 1, 1974 - June 30, 1975, p.34.


27. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) Harold Lamm, USA, Ret., January 11, 1984.


32. Office of the Chief of Chaplains Annual Historical Review, July 1, 1973 - June 30, 1974, p.34.

33. Ibid., p.37.

34. Ibid., p.34.

35. Ibid., p.38, 39.

36. There are references to a service conducted by a black freedman, informally, the “assistant chaplain,” for other freed slaves at the Union (U.S.) Hospital in Newport News, Virginia, during McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign of 1862. See the reports by Chaplain William Meech, 1862, Rare Book Section, Chaplain Corps Museum.

37. Interview with Chaplain Leroy Johnson, USA Ret., July 12, 1994.
38. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) Roy Plummer, July 5, 1994.


40. Chaplain Zimmerman became the Army’s 18th Chief of Chaplains in 1990.

41. “Fraggings” involved soldiers throwing or planting hand grenades to explode or kill their leaders. Though not a frequent occurrence, it did happen occasionally in Vietnam.

42. Oral interview with Chaplain (Col.) Charles Kriete, USA Ret., October 12, 1994.


46. Office of the Chief of Chaplains *Annual Historical Review*, July 1, 1974 - June 30, 1975, p.29.


49. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Charles Kriete, 22 December 1995.


51. *Ibid*.

52. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Charles Kriete, US Army War College, 4 January 1996.


58. Ibid., p.13.

59. In 1978, a similar program to train chapel activity specialists for organizational development was also established.

60. Ibid., p.14.

61. OCCH, Information Letter, DACH-AM (276), March 1, 1975.

62. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Charles Kriete, 4 January 1996.


65. Ibid., pp.48-50.


68. Ibid., pp.75-76.

69. Ibid., p.78.


71. Ibid.


75. Office of the Chief of Chaplains, *Annual Historical Review*, July 1, 1974-June 30; 1975, p.35.


78. The exception was the ministry of chaplains as Professors of History, Geography and Ethics at the United States Military Academy from 1814-1893. Even so, these chaplain-professors taught cadets moral philosophy in class; the regular officers were taught through sermons and by example.


81. In the Department of Corresponding Studies.

82. From 1976 to 1995.


85. *Ibid*

86. Oral interview with Chaplain (Col.) Charles Kriete, USA Ret., October 12, 1994.


94. *Ibid.*, p.120.

95. OCCH, DACH-PP Information Paper, December 31, 1975, p.27. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.


97. OCCH Information Letter, DACH-AM (270), September 1, p.1.


102. *Ibid*.


106. *Ibid*.


113. Attributed to the seventeenth century English poet, John Milton.


CHAPTER III

THE KELLY YEARS:
RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT DURING MODERNIZATION
1975 - 1979

"One of our dilemmas is that our knowledge is about the past, but our decisions are about the future. We have so few precedents to guide us through these kaleidoscopic times. So much has happened: two global wars, nuclear fission, population explosion, cybernetics, Freud, Stravinsky, Picasso, Ionesco, moon landings, Telstar... and an assassinated President. These, along with a list of other events from our recent past, tend to convey not only a sense of change, but of loss -- the sound of a door shutting to the past.

To say we are caught between a past that is much different from the present, and a future that we know will be immeasurably different from both -- is common place. We are slowly realizing, however, that one age has ended, but the new one has not yet begun."

Chaplain (Major General) Orris E. Kelly
Chief of Chaplains, 1976

MILESTONES:

- Institution of a Professional Development Plan for the Chaplaincy
- Forward Thrust Doctrine
- First Chaplain faculty member assigned to teach at the Army War College
- Management by Objectives for Results
- Chaplain Assistants renamed Chapel Activity Specialists
- Parish Development Program
- History of the Army Chaplaincy (5 volumes) published
- First Reserve Chaplain assigned to the staff of the Army Reserve Component Personnel Center

See endnotes at end of chapter
Ministry to the Institution and to the People

Chaplains have looked after the Army’s spiritual welfare, have championed our soldiers’ human needs, have set the moral tone for the Army... They have always been there when we needed them.

General Bernard W. Rogers
Chief of Staff, USA, 1977

In the mid-70s many nations in the world were experiencing major political and military realignments as old alliances broke down and new ones arose from the ashes. In April of 1975, Saigon fell to North Vietnamese forces as Congress denied further military aid to previous South Vietnamese allies. The aftershocks of the war in Vietnam were powerful and often disruptive in American society and in the armed forces. The USSR signed a twenty-five year pact with Vietnam, thus essentially ending North Vietnam's old confederacy with China. China's Mao Tse-tung died in 1976, opening the possibility for new relationships with the West. In 1978, the United States announced full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

President Jimmy Carter, elected in 1976, had made several important international diplomatic initiatives. Talks between the United States and Russia on nuclear ground testing resulted in a treaty in 1976 which for the first time included on-site inspections of facilities. In another part of the world, signs of progress also surfaced. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt visited Israel in 1977, marking the first visit by an Arab leader since the founding of the nation of Israel in 1948. In 1978 talks between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, hosted at Camp David by President Carter, resulted in the drafting of a proposed peace treaty for the two Middle East countries.

President Jimmy Carter warned on the domestic front that the energy crisis in the United States could bring on a national catastrophe. He suggested handling this crisis with the force and resolve of a military operation. He further announced that within five years American ground troops would be removed from Korea. Overcoming Congressional opposition, he signed the Panama Canal Treaty which would end United States’ control of the Panama Canal on December 31, 1999. Carter, seeking to assuage the unrest in America, granted pardon to most Vietnam-era draft dodgers. Each of these decisions had far reaching implications for soldier morale as well as for the allocation of Army resources.

Trouble also was brewing in the Western Hemisphere. Sandanista guerrillas attempted to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. A military junta seized control of Honduras, while at the same time the 200th coup in 158 years took place in Bolivia. Cuba, although no longer a major threat in the Western Hemisphere, deployed military advisors to Angola.

See endnotes at end of chapter
Adjusting the Army Structure

Geographically, the United States Army was oriented toward Europe throughout the decade of the seventies. Since the Cold War showed no signs of thawing, the Army had to be prepared to engage the Soviet Bloc at a moment’s notice. The major concern of the 1970’s in the Army, therefore, was Readiness. The Army announced that it must be prepared to wage war in more than one geographical area at a time. To make a swift transition from peace to war, there could be no substitute for soldiers, units and equipment capable of immediate deployment to Europe, or other trouble spots in the world.

It was not an ideally prepared Army. As late as 1979, readiness remained a thorny problem. Serious male personnel shortages led to expanded roles for women. However, the combat exclusion policy prohibited the assignment of women farther forward than brigade level. In 1979, only four of the ten CONUS divisions were deemed ready for overseas deployment. The Army busily reshaped its forces as best it could for a changing battlefield. As a result of battles in the Middle East, American defense plans placed new emphasis on highly mechanized and armored divisions. The Army was transitioning from a 21 division to a 24 division force (16 active and 8 National Guard). Army strength reached 790,000 in 1975; and, in spite of new missions, decreased to less than 770,000 by 1980.

The Army continued to adjust to current conditions and plans to meet future contingencies. The STEADFAST reorganization to address serious command and control problems was nearing completion. The former Continental Army Command was divided into the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM). General William DePuy, the first commander of TRADOC, provided a new focus for the Army. DePuy's vision was to "win the first battle of the next war." He placed heavy stress on combat developments, doctrine and organization and viewed Army Training Centers as crucial to the Army's future. Under the leadership of General DePuy and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, Major General Paul F. Gorman, TRADOC embarked on a Systems Approach to Training (SAT). This required soldiers to train to established Army standards and to have that training regularly evaluated and reinforced. Each part of training was to be sequential, building on previous steps. This emphasis also required that there be a solid link between Army doctrine and the training soldiers received. As part of this new process the Army introduced the Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP). The ARTEP was a performance oriented program for collective training. Included in SAT was the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) to indicate individual soldier proficiency. Also during this time, the Department of the Army and TRADOC undertook a study of officer training. The study called RETO, the Review of Officer Education and Training, under the direction of Brigadier General Benjamin Harrison, involved every part of every officer's training and resulted in a major overhaul of Army training programs. TRADOC placed great emphasis on strengthening force and firepower in the Army's divisions. Division '86, a test program with the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, from 1977 to 1979, resulted in a restructuring of Army divisions. The new heavy division required more mechanized and armored equipment and more people. This stretched the resources of the Army to the limit. Each of the changes in Army organization, doctrine, and training transformed the way the chaplaincy was

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organized and trained as well.

Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, following the force structure issues carefully from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, paid a visit to Fort Hood to discuss the assignment of chaplains. Chaplain Billy Ingram from the 1st Calvary Division and Chaplain Joseph Stock, who was the Assistant Division Chaplain of the 1st Armored Division at Fort Hood during the period the restructuring experiment was taking place, noted that commanders had long requested assignment of chaplains to battalions. The restructuring of the division provided the opportunity to accomplish that. This concept of forward positioning for chaplains became in 1978 the Forward Thrust Doctrine of the Chaplaincy. Chaplain Stock recounted that assigning chaplains to the most forward units accomplished several goals. It identified the chaplain with the unit. It put the chaplain on the commander's staff. It allowed the chaplain the opportunity to provide more meaningful coverage to the unit, more counseling and more services tailored to the unit's needs. Both the units and the religious support teams benefitted from the new arrangement.

**Chaplain Orris E. Kelly, Chief of Chaplains**

General Bernard Rogers, Chief of Staff of the Army, wrote an article in the *Military Chaplains Review* entitled "The Challenges of the Chaplaincy." General Rogers set out a summons for the next four years. He listed four difficulties faced by chaplains:

1. Providing spiritual guidance in a pluralistic society—cooperation without compromise.
2. Providing for human needs—finding proper balance between spiritual and secular duties.
3. Providing a moral framework for the military community—if the officer corps is to be the "conscience of the Army," that is doubly true for chaplains.
4. Getting out from behind the pulpit and immersing himself in every facet of the military community.

It was into this challenging type of environment that Chaplain Orris E. Kelly had stepped to become the Army's fourteenth Chief of Chaplains. Chaplain Will Hyatt retired from the Army on July 29, 1975—on the 200th Anniversary of the Army Chaplaincy. Chaplain Kelly, formerly Hyatt's Executive Officer, was promoted from Colonel to Major General on July 1, 1975, by General Walter T. Kerwin, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. He assumed the office of Chief of Chaplains on August 1, 1975.

Chaplain Kelly, a native of Montrose, Kansas, graduated from Kansas Wesleyan University. Upon graduation he entered the Army as a second lieutenant infantry officer. He served as a line officer in 1945-46. After his discharge from the Army he entered Garrett Theological Seminary in Illinois, and graduated in 1953. In June of that year he was ordained a Methodist minister. Chaplain Kelly reentered the Army as a chaplain. He served at Fort Leonard Wood, in Japan, at Fort Riley, at

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See endnotes at end of chapter
the Chaplain School, in Germany, in Vietnam and at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains as Director of Plans, Programs and Policies and later as Executive Officer. He graduated from the Army War College resident course in 1973.8

In his first letter to the chaplains in the field, Chaplain Kelly emphasized servant ministry. This became a major theme of his leadership. He wrote:

The Eternal Word of God provides direction with new goals and purposes so that we can place rapid change and crises in His perspective as concerned loving human beings. We are part of a ministry that provides faith and meaning for life as people seek to cope with their human conditions. May God guide our efforts.9

While Chaplain Hyatt had been a planner, Chaplain Kelly was an architect and builder. Generally Hyatt was most comfortable in the world of ideas, and Kelly was most at home in the world of people. On numerous occasions Kelly reminded the chaplaincy that the chaplain's best work is always done with people in meaningful relationships10 This philosophical insight formed the background for some of Chaplain Kelly's greatest innovations and achievements: Forward Thrust, Family Life Ministry, Ministry of Presence, and Management by Objectives for Results.

Chaplain Kelly was grateful for the excellent structure laid by his predecessor. He saw his mission to build on that foundation, to refine it, implement it and give it continuity throughout the Army.11 Many of Hyatt's ideas were still in their infancy and needed to be brought to full maturity. Since Orris Kelly was a part of the origin and development of those plans and programs, it was logical that he should see them through to completion. Besides that, his mission was to prepare the chaplaincy for a very difficult future, to enhance the professionalism of chaplains and chaplain assistants, and to be a prophetic voice to the leadership of the institution in which chaplains serve. His agenda was a broad one that, if successful, would provide a solid basis for broader and more meaningful ministry in the Army.

Organizational and Systems Ministry

Many challenges faced the Army in the years 1975-79. The Army was reorganizing, or as Chaplain Kelly described it, "redefining itself."12 It was preparing for a smaller, more mobile and more lethal force. It was also adapting to an all volunteer force and adjusting to economical, sociological and cultural changes. The chaplaincy felt the impact of every transition the Army made.

One of the first and most threatening challenges proposed by the Department of Defense (DOD) in late 1975 called for a reduction in the officer corps of 4,400 officers. The objective was to go back to the level that existed prior to the war in Vietnam. Originally the DOD decreed that the reduction would come from other than line officers. Under the proposal the chaplaincy stood to lose up to 600 chaplain positions. If that happened, the chaplaincy would be reduced by more than one third of its professional officers. Chaplain Kelly was concerned about the threat and told Chaplain John Scott, his staff action officer, that he could not accept a reduction of over 100 chaplains, he

See endnotes at end of chapter
would be able to compromise for a loss which amounted to less than one hundred.

In December 1976, the Secretary of Defense revised the total reduction to 1,100 officers. Further negotiations between OCCH and the Army Staff in 1977 resulted in a reduction of only 84 chaplains. Some senior generals insisted that no cuts should be taken from troop units (TOE). Chaplain Kelly argued that to take all cuts from installations (TDA) would seriously cripple the ability of chaplains to provide ministry on installations worldwide. A compromise was reached that took some reductions from each category. The reductions were as follows:13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TTHS</td>
<td>-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDA</td>
<td>-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Divisional TOE</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>-84</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By a stroke of good luck, the reduction came at a most appropriate time. Because the Chaplain School was changing the Advanced Course to two 21-week TDY courses from a 39-week PCS course, Chaplain Henry Hilliard determined that only half the current number would be needed in the student account (TTHS). This meant that thirty-one spaces were no longer needed. Thus, the actual reduction involved only 53 spaces, well below Chaplain Kelly's direction to Chaplain Scott.

### Defining Ethics

The Army struggled with many ethical questions in the mid 1970s. Chaplain Kelly described the movement to implement ethics training as slow and ponderous. "The Army was feeling its way in ethics after Vietnam. The whole country was confused about who we were. The Army had difficulty defining who we were but there was a strong feeling among Army commanders to get back to ethics."14 Army leadership showed a deepening interest in the factors influencing ethical decision-making. The Army's interest was how these factors impacted on organizational leadership and the ethical dimensions of leadership. Kelly pointed out that one of the best indicators of the Army interest could be seen in the increased hours of instruction included in the Command and General Staff College curriculum. He wrote:

Progress has been made in raising the consciousness of decision-makers. But much more needs to be done ... Chaplains must be in the forefront of those who influence the ethical dimensions of military life and mission.

Commanders at all levels of the chain have a right to honest, courageous and responsible advice when the effects of their decisions go far beyond an immediate pragmatic result.15

Chaplain Kelly understood the expertise many chaplains had in the field of ethics. Some of these chaplains taught at service schools, but there were many others in troop units and on installations who were concerned about ethics in the Army. Some senior officers felt that the chaplaincy, because of its professional training, should be the proponent for ethics. Chaplain Kelly

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See endnotes at end of chapter
resisted and finally refused that role since it would appear to be just another chaplain program and have no real impact on the Army. He felt that Army command leadership should be responsible and the chaplains could lend their support. However, he did make Ethics/Moral Integrity a matter of priority for the chaplaincy. He wrote the following as a challenge to all chaplains:

We ought to be the definers and proclaimers of ethics and morality ... I believe we should be committed to help create within the Army an atmosphere of ethical and moral consideration based on personal integrity which facilitates responsibility.

The emphasis on ethics involved many different activities. Chaplain instructors were already teaching ethics at most service schools. Perhaps most significant was the selection of Chaplain Joseph Beasley to teach in the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy in 1971. A graduate of the University of Chicago, among other institutions, Chaplain Beasley was the first chaplain instructor assigned to the Academy in the twentieth century. Arriving at West Point shortly after compulsory chapel was abolished, Chaplain Beasley found a ready cadet audience for his courses in history, world religions, and ethics. He was soon one of the most popular lecturers at the Academy, where he remained as a permanent Associate Professor until he retired in 1980. His course on the "History of Western Ethics" looked first at classical ethical theories and at the application of those theories "to evaluate and understand moral problems concerning race, poverty, politics of dissent, the sanctity of life, war and international relations." Chaplain Beasley believed in teaching principles rather than rules, "not to convert cadets, but to help them understand our predicament."

At the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Chaplain Charles Kirete, who was assigned as the first chaplain faculty member in 1975-1976, dealt with such weighty subjects as the moral dimensions of strategic planning. After two years of brilliant work at the War College, Chaplain Kirete was selected to be the Commandant of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School at Fort Wadsworth, New York. Chaplain Ed O'Shea, who was assigned to the faculty in 1977, taught a number of outstanding officers who led the Army in the 1990s. Among the members of the Army War College Class of 1978 were future Generals Gordon Sullivan, Binford Peay, Gary Luck, and John Shalikashvili.

The Office of the Chief of Chaplains (OCCH) wanted ethics to be considered in everything chaplains did and directed that their ethical responsibilities be clearly stated in the revised Field Manual 16-5, The Chaplain. Additionally, OCCH sponsored annual seminars on ethics. In April 1976, the first seminar was held at the Chaplain School. Attendees included newly designated commanders (Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels), chaplains, staff and line officers and resource persons. The purpose of the meetings was to help sensitize new commanders to ethical dimensions of leadership, and to learn from them and each participant what other ethical areas needed to be explored.

Chaplain Kelly viewed ethics as a means of ministering to the institution. This instrumentality involved prophetic ministry. It consisted of two distinct emphases: support and confrontation. Chaplains should encourage commanders and the system to make decisions based on moral principles which contribute to the welfare of the soldier. When such decisions were made, the chaplains should

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affirm and support them. In those rare instances where ethical principles and soldier welfare were disregarded, the chaplain must have the moral courage and fortitude to speak out to commanders against injustice as did the prophets of old. Only when chaplains exercised this ministry of integrity could they hope to fulfill their calling as God's representatives to the soldier and the Army.

During this period, the department of the Army transferred $300,000 to U.S. Army, Europe to support a Chaplain Quality of Life Program. The funds were used to conduct Values Clarification workshops to assist soldiers who were wrestling with their own values. The program was highly successful in spite of strong criticism later from some chaplains, commanders, and a few members of Congress who viewed the program as a tool of secular humanists to confuse the values of our citizens.

Korea:
The Panmunjom Ax Attack

On August 18, 1976, two U.S. Army officers were savagely murdered, and nine other UN Command personnel injured at Panmunjom, Korea, when they were attacked by thirty North Korean guards wielding axes, ax handles, and metal pipes. The two officers were the first fatalities in the Joint Security Area since the 1953 Armistice. Had the killings taken place somewhere along the border other than at the truce site, they might have been listed as one of many serious violations of the Armistice Agreement. Occurring where they did and in such a flagrant manner as to be witnessed by photographers, they caused extreme indignation and a massive demonstration of power by the United States forces.

The United Nations Command soldiers were supervising and providing security for five Korean service corps personnel trimming a poplar tree when the attack occurred. Early in August, Lieutenant Colonel Victor S. Vierra, the U.S. Army Support Group-Joint Security Area (USASG-JSA) Commander, had decided that the branches of the 40-foot Normandy poplar tree near the Bridge of No Return obstructed line-of-sight visibility between the UN Command Post and Observation Post (OP) 5. Captain Arthur G. Bonifas, 1st Lieutenant Mark T. Barrett, and ROK Army Captain Kim Moon Hwan took five U.S. enlisted soldiers, three KATUSA personnel, and five workers to the site at 1030 hours on August 18 to cut some of the tree branches back.

As the tree-pruning detail began work, a party of nine North Korean soldiers commanded by Lieutenant Pak Chol arrived in a truck. Lieutenant Pak ordered Captain Bonifas to halt the trimming. The UN Officer refused, and the work continued. Approximately 20 additional North Korean soldiers arrived at the scene. Lieutenant Pak then "threatened death if the activity was not halted." Captain Bonifas, believing these statement were mere threats, ordered the trimming to resume and turned to observe the workers.

Lieutenant Pak, insulted and ignored in front of his troops, yelled "Chook yo!" (Kill!), and kicked Captain Bonifas, signaling an all-out attack by the North Korean soldiers. As the enemy troops swung clubs, metal pipes, pick handles and axes seized from the work party, both Captain Bonifas and Lieutenant Barrett received mortal injuries. For four minutes, showing remarkable

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restraint, the work force attempted to break contact, extricate their members and evacuate the area. Captain Bonifas' body was recovered and the UN party withdrew by truck and jeep. No shots were fired by the UN forces although all combatant troops were armed with pistols.

Upon hearing of the incident while on a trip to Japan, General Richard Stillwell, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, returned angrily to South Korea. On August 19 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Commander, US Forces Korea, declared DEFCON 3 for all U.S. military units.

At Camp Greaves, South Korea, Chaplain Robert Hutcherson was informed that there had been fighting in the JSA area and that he should implement the chaplain alert plan. Chaplain Hutcherson visited Camp Kitty Hawk, the garrison area of the troops involved in the JSA, but was able to get no closer because the JSA had been sealed off.

On August 19, Lieutenant Colonel Vierra asked Chaplain Hutcherson to prepare for a memorial service the next day at Kimpo Airport in Seoul. Chaplain Hutcherson, Chaplain Bill Harris, the Third Brigade Chaplain, 2nd Infantry Division, and Chaplain John Weyand, who provided Catholic coverage for the Third Brigade, planned two services. The first was conducted under the wing of a C-130 aircraft, which was to fly the bodies of Bonifas and Barrett to Japan, on the morning of August 20, by General Stillwell and Chaplain Hutcherson. The second service was conducted at Camp Kitty Hawk by General Stillwell, Chaplain Weyand, and Chaplain Hutcherson. Chaplain Harris was at the second service and joined the other two chaplains in visiting with soldiers after the ceremony.

Captain A G. Bonifas, 33, and Lieutenant M.T. Barrett, 25, were both married. Each received the Purple Heart, the Bronze Star with "V" device, and an ROK award for heroic sacrifice. Bonifas, on the selection list for major, was promoted posthumously. He was buried with full military honors at West Point, Barrett at Charleston, South Carolina. Their deaths brought the number of Korean-based U.S. military personnel killed in action since the July 1953 Armistice to 51.

Following the US/ROK shift to DEFCON 3 on August 19, the North Koreans went to "a wartime posture" the same day, the first time since 1953 both sides had placed their forces concurrently in an advanced readiness condition. General Richard Stillwell, seething at the incident and all of its results, was convinced that the UN Command could not tolerate denial of its legitimate rights in the JSA or DMZ. His plan "to cut the damn thing down" (the poplar tree) was dubbed Operation Paul Bunyan, and it quickly received both JCS and Presidential approval in Washington.

On President Ford's orders, in the early morning hours of August 21 a 110-man UN Command task force cut down the infamous poplar tree. During the hour-long operation, Guam-based B-52 bombers and F-111 fighter-bombers flew overhead while a 300-man US-ROK Quick Reaction Force hovered in helicopter gun ships South of the DMZ. Several artillery, aviation infantry, and armor units from the 2nd Infantry Division were in direct support of the task force. Before the day was over, President Kim Il-sung of North Korea sent a message of "regret" which was accepted by the UN Command on August 22.

Chaplain Hutcherson, who had moved in convoy on August 21 with his driver, PFC Walter Altic, PFC John Davis, and KATUSA Sergeant Bae Jae Buk toward Panmunjom, recalled providing ministry to troops "who were thoroughly frightened, anticipating incoming artillery fire from North

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Korea at any moment.”36 Fortunately no fire was exchanged. “My only contact with other chaplains during those days was with Chaplain Paul Forsberg, 2nd Infantry Division Chaplain, and with Chaplain John Kowski, Eighth Army Chaplain,” Hutcherson said. “Chaplain Kowski was a great mentor during this time, offering advice and giving encouragement to a thoroughly frightened battalion UMT. He and Chaplain Forsberg were both real assets to me at the time.”37

After the tree was cut down, and some degree of normalcy was restored to the area, public affairs officer made the statement that no chaplains were visible during or after the incursion into Panmunjum to cut down the tree. Both Chaplains Kowski and Forsberg were quick to state that Chaplains Harris, Weyand and Hutcherson were exactly where they were supposed to be, doing exactly what they were trained to do.38 General Stillwell had nothing but positive impressions of the chaplains’ activities, their calm ministries of encouragement to the living and respect for the officers who had given their lives for continued peace in Korea.

**Affirmative Actions**

The pluralistic reality of American culture was increasingly expressing itself in diverse ways in 1975. The clamoring of many groups for recognition and status was finally bringing results in the courts and in society. Women could no longer be ignored as equal partners in the workplace, especially the Army. Minority soldiers including Black, Hispanic, Asian American, Native American and others also were seeking to be recognized as full members and equal partners.. The religious climate in America was also changing. It was no longer just the "Big Three"—Protestant, Catholic and Jewish. Now Buddhists, Muslims, Sikhs and a host of other sects or religions were clamoring for recognition in powerful ways. The Chief of Chaplains had long been concerned about these issues and had developed plans and programs to address them.

In the mid 1970s the Army began to develop Affirmative Action Plans (AAP) to ensure that each soldier, regardless of race, religion, ethnic origin or gender, was treated with dignity and equality. In 1976 the Chief of Chaplains submitted his first AAP to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The Plan focused primarily on recruiting minority and female chaplains. By the end of September 1976 there were 82 blacks, 14 “other” and 4 women in the chaplaincy. By the end of FY 1979 the numbers had increased to 112 blacks, 33 “other” and 9 women. The AAP submitted for 1979 called for 12.8 % black (180), 1.2 % Hispanic (17), and .05 % women. The target for women had already been exceeded.39

Affirmative Action activities did not end with a plan. The chaplaincy instituted several programs designed not only to increase awareness of the need, but to stimulate actions to correct injustice and unfairness. To keep the need before the chaplaincy, the Chief of Chaplains directed that the AAP be a top inspection priority for members of his staff visiting MACOMs and installations.40 He established Minority Ministry Conferences. Initially these conferences involved only black chaplains. They provided a forum in which these chaplains could express their frustrations and their needs and hopes for the future of ministry in the Army. Later the conferences were expanded to include all minorities, as well as Caucasians, to address systemic issues and make recommendations

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to the Chief of Chaplains.

The Minority Ministry Conference in 1979, under the leadership of Chaplain Donald Clark was typical. The theme was "A Clear Message for Changing Times." The objectives of the workshop were to develop action plans:

- To enhance recruitment of minorities
- To address priority concerns of minorities
- To address issues of supervision.\(^41\)

The United States Army Chaplain Board produced two recruiting films in 1976 for recruiting minority chaplains. The Chief of Chaplains also let a contract to produce "A Handbook for Minority Chaplains."\(^42\)

The few female chaplains in the Army also needed support to deal with institutional and personal biases they faced in their new role. Chaplain Kelly was sensitive to these needs and established a female network under the supervision of Ms. Ida Butcher, a staff person in OCCH. A special women's conference was held each year for several years. Later it met concurrently with the Minority Chaplain Conference and finally was merged into the Minority Ministries Conference. Sexism workshops sponsored by the Chief of Chaplains were held on TRADOC and FORSCOM installations to deepen awareness and sensitivity to sexist behaviors.\(^43\)

Religious groups, particularly Muslims, were pressing for recognition by the Armed Forces Chaplain Board so that they could endorse a chaplain for active duty. Because of dietary restrictions several religious groups appealed for separate rations.\(^44\) Many of these and other requests required staffing within the chaplaincy. A plethora of new and unfamiliar religions were appearing in America and in the Army. The Army was not adequately prepared to deal with the new requirements presented by these groups. Consequently, OCCH commissioned a study to produce a handbook on less familiar religions.\(^45\) Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman was the OCCH point of contact for the study. Eventually two Department of the Army Pamphlets were produced and distributed to commanders and chaplains in the field.

### Relocation of the Chaplain School

In 1975 the proposed relocation of the Chaplain School became a serious matter of consideration. In anticipation of the move, the Army Chaplain Board left Fort Wadsworth for Fort Meade, Maryland, in September 1975.

Two simultaneous, though not supporting, actions had had serious implications for the Chaplaincy. The first was that the Army wanted to close single mission posts. The Chaplain School was the only activity at Fort Wadsworth; and therefore it fit that criteria. Chaplain Kelly did not agree with Chaplain Hyatt's dream of the Chaplain School positioned on its own post and therefore supported the relocation.\(^46\) His requirements were that the School be located near a large urban area where institutions of higher learning would be available for chaplain professional educational

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purposes. His recommendation was to relocate either to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, or Fort Devens, Massachusetts.

The second major action was prompted by the House Appropriations Committee, which raised a question about consolidating the separate Army, Navy and Air Force Chaplain Schools into one. The "InterService Training and Review Organization" (ITRO) was established by DOD to explore the feasibility of the consolidation recommendation.\(^{47}\) Chaplain Edward O'Shea represented the Chief of Chaplains. None of the Services, particularly the Army, favored the proposal to consolidate or to collocate. The Army Chaplaincy felt it had the most to lose under the proposal. A summary of arguments presented by the Army included the following:

The environment in which ministry took place differed with each Service (Army foxhole vs. Navy battleship). The level at which chaplains were assigned differed (maneuver battalion vice Air Force base) and the length, intensity and curriculum differed as well. At that time the Army had a one year resident Advanced course versus a few weeks for Navy and Air Force. The Army had its own school staffed and run by chaplains. That was not entirely true of the Navy.\(^{48}\)

After hearing all the arguments, the ITRO recommended that the Army relocate within the Army and the other schools remain where they were.\(^{49}\) On March 25, 1977, the Office of the Secretary of Defense recommended to Congress that the Chaplain School relocate internally within the Army and informed Congress that the Chief of Chaplains preference was to move either to Fort Monmouth (his first choice) or Fort Devens.\(^{50}\) Several other locations were suggested, but they did not meet Chaplain Kelly's criteria. Chaplain Kelly related that Fort Rucker had a strong desire for the School to move there. A wealthy individual in a neighboring town offered to purchase all the furnishings to make the School a first class institution if it would relocate to that installation. Chaplain Kelly refused the offer.\(^{51}\)

Meanwhile, the Army was struggling with the decision to move the Chaplain School. The Army selected Fort Monmouth, but political considerations continually delayed the final decision and announcement for several more months. When the Congressional representatives from New York (particularly Staten Island and Brooklyn) heard about the proposed move to New Jersey, they became indignant. Staten Island wanted to retain the school, while the Brooklyn delegation wanted to move it back to Fort Hamilton.

When he learned that the final announcement of the move to Fort Monmouth was imminent, Chaplain John Scott called Chaplain Roy Peters, the Commandant of the Chaplain School, to alert him. Chaplain Peters decided to move his advance party to Fort Monmouth immediately following the announcement. He relocated them the day the announcement was made.\(^{52}\) That action was perhaps in part responsible for preventing a reversal of the decision. A few days after the public announcement, one of the New York Congressmen arranged for a meeting with Chaplain Peters and the Secretary of the Army, at Fort Drum, in upstate New York. His apparent intention was to try to force a reversal of the Army decision. When he learned, however, that Chaplain Peters had already relocated some of his staff, the Congressman decided that he was fighting a battle he could not win. Peter's move was bold, and his timely action proved to be successful. The move of the School to New Jersey was completed by the end of 1979.
The Chaplain as a Member of the Commander’s Staff

When Chaplain Hyatt became a personal staff officer to the Chief of Staff of the Army, he saw this relationship as a possibility for all staff chaplains. Chaplain Kelly shared his predecessor’s vision and sought consistently to accomplish that goal. He viewed the subjugation of the chaplain under another staff section as preventing the Chaplaincy from having its rightful status and influence.

When the Army announced the CONUS Installation Management Study (CIMS), Chaplain Kelly saw it as an opportunity for change. The revision of Army Regulation 5-3 "Installation Management" was unacceptable to Chaplain Kelly since it did not place the chaplain on the installation commander's personal staff nor did it provide for a separate staff office. Chaplain Kelly met with Major General Ursano. They agreed to incorporate Chaplain Kelly's requirements in the revised AR 5-3. This was a very sensitive issue at Department of the Army as Chaplain Scott learned when he made his first coordinating visit to a high ranking civilian in the Army Management Office. He was greeted with open and vociferous hostility. It was only through the intervention of a high ranking military officer that a rational discussion became possible. A few people at Department of the Army did not like chaplains and would attempt to prevent any favorable action.

It was later decided that AR 5-3 would be combined with AR 10-10 and that the Department of the Army would not direct how field commanders should organize their staffs. The Army distributed AR 5-3 on July 25, 1977. While it did not dictate organizational structure, it did give "typical examples" showing the chaplain as a personal staff officer. While it was not all Kelly wanted, it was at least the proverbial foot in the door. The chaplaincy would have other opportunities to address this subject.

A Hymn Of Blasphemy?

The Armed Forces Chaplain Board identified the need for a new Armed Forces Hymnal for religious services. Several contract musicologists recommended hymns and other worship aids for inclusion in the hymnal. The intent was to provide materials that would be useful to a wide variety of religious groups. One of the hymns selected became a matter of strong contention with civilian church leaders and Congressmen.

"It Happened on a Friday Morning," or Hymn #286, was viewed by many people as blasphemous. Chaplain Kelly estimated that his office alone received over 45,000 letters on this subject. Just responding to the volume of letters required an exorbitant amount of time. The question was, however, what to do with the hymn. Some people wanted to excise the hymn from the book. One chaplain did. Chaplain Kelly wrote to Representative W. C. Daniel that the hymn was widely respected and reflected the pluralism and religious diversity in the United States. He also stressed that because of that diversity the hymnal offered broad choices. The Armed Forces Chaplain Board, composed of the three Chiefs of Chaplains resisted any drastic action. The AFCB did not want to be put into the position of being told what could be included in its book of worship.

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Questions of free exercise must be balanced with those of propriety. It was finally agreed that the hymn would be removed, but only with the publication of a new issue.

**Chaplain to the Cadets**

Civilian ministers served on the staff of the United States Military Academy at West Point for over one hundred years. Various Chiefs of Chaplains for many years desired to assign military chaplains to that prestigious institution. In the 1977 time period, following considerable turmoil at the Academy, the Army considered a number of changes. Chaplain Kelly determined that it was a propitious time to recommend the assignment of military chaplains to replace their civilian counterparts.

Chaplain Kelly discussed the possibility of making this change with General Bernard Rogers. With General Rogers' approval Kelly went to the Academy to talk to General Andrew Goodpaster, the Superintendent of the Academy. After some discussion General Goodpaster agreed to go half way with Chaplain Kelly. The Academy would have 50% civilian chaplains and 50% military.\(^57\) This change broke precedence with over a century of Military Academy history. The agreement included the provision that the Chief of Chaplains would nominate potential chaplains for the Academy and the Superintendent would make the final selection. A Roman Catholic chaplain was assigned almost immediately to minister in the Catholic Chapel which was owned by the Catholic Archdiocese of New York. Chaplain Colin Kelly III, son of a famous World War II hero, was the first Protestant Army Chaplain to be assigned under this agreement.\(^58\)

During the same time period, Jewish leaders desired to construct a Jewish Chapel at West Point. President Jimmy Carter had a vital interest in this project and met with Chaplain Kelly and a Jewish fund raider to inaugurate the program. The Chief of Chaplains committed the Chaplaincy to assign a Jewish chaplain to West Point upon completion of the chapel.\(^59\)

**Selection of the Chief of Chaplains**

Since the 1950s, a pattern had evolved that for each two Protestant Chiefs of Chaplains there was one Roman Catholic Chief. Merit was not the sole determinant. Denomination was also a factor. Lieutenant General DeWitt Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), questioned whether this policy was appropriate or if it was discriminatory.\(^60\)

The Office of the Judge Advocate General examined the precedent and determined that it was in fact discriminatory. The decision that ensued determined that selection of the Chief of Chaplains should be made solely based on merit. However, it was also allowed that denomination could be considered as a factor, but not a deciding criteria. The Vice Chief of Staff, a Roman Catholic layman, agreed with the decision.

The civilian Roman Catholic leadership was upset by the legal opinion. They had a strong desire to have a senior Catholic chaplain in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, and the decision

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\(^{57}\) See endnotes at end of chapter
meant that that situation might not always be true in the future. They felt they were downgraded, especially when a Protestant deputy was selected to serve with a Protestant Chief. As a result of the change, two Protestant chaplains in a row served as Chiefs of Chaplains, and each had a Catholic deputy.

Cardinal Cooke, Military Vicar, and head of the Military Ordinariate, expressed grave concern about the change in policy. He expressed his sentiments in a pastoral letter to Catholic Army chaplains:

While I recognize that the Protestant Chaplain selected for Deputy is an outstanding minister, I was very disturbed at the major shift in policy which this selection represents. In light of this development, I have requested Archbishop Ryan and the staff of the Military Ordinariate to conduct a thorough review of the current situation of our Catholic Chaplains in the Armed Forces and the denominational balance portrayed in leadership positions, especially in the Army Chaplaincy.61

Archbishop Joseph T. Ryan, Coadjutor Bishop, met with the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Clifford Alexander, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, and the DCSPER to determine leadership positions occupied by Catholic chaplains. In order to correct the perceptions that not enough senior Catholic chaplains served in senior leadership positions, the Chief of Chaplains agreed to fill one of the three Colonel positions in his office with a Catholic Chaplain. Chaplain John J. Cunniffe reported to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains in early January 1979 to serve as a Special Projects Officer to research the Catholic issues under discussion.62

Within one year Chaplain Patrick J. Hessian, a Catholic, was promoted to Brigadier General and selected to become Deputy Chief of Chaplains. Four years later he received a promotion to Major General and became the sixteenth Chief of Chaplains.

**Doctrine**

The Army during the 1970s began to look at how it operated on the battlefield. New doctrine concerning the composition of divisions and corps came into existence. The AirLand Battle concept was established which focused on the massing of forces and high mobility on the battlefield. It was time for the chaplaincy to review and revise its operational doctrines as well in order to support the changes made by the Army.

Chaplain Kelly initiated the doctrine of Forward Thrust for the Chaplaincy. During the war in Vietnam, and after, chaplains were assigned at brigade level and provided coverage to battalions. Battalion Commanders wanted their own chaplains, not merely someone who provided coverage as possible. Chaplain Kelly also felt that chaplains ought to be assigned close to the troops. He therefore emphasized that chaplains be assigned to battalions in order to be more effective in dealing with people.63 Chaplain Kelly met with General Donn Starry, commander of TRADOC, and won his approval to move ahead with the concept.64 Chaplain Wayne Kuehne and other members of the

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Combats Developments Directorate (USACHCS) presented the written doctrine for Forward Thrust to Chaplain Kelly on December 8, 1978. It was forwarded to TRADOC and approved for implementation. Chaplain Kuehne went to the major Army centers to brief the new doctrine and its implementation in the revision of TOEs.

In Europe in the mid to late 1970's, the major emphasis was on "Interoperability." While the concept initially involved weapons systems and troops, the chaplain programs also became involved. The objective was "to relate USAREUR's religious program to the Bundeswehr and Federal Republic's civilian clergy." 65 This was in effect a continuation of policies that Chaplain Ettershank and earlier staff chaplains had implemented in building relations with their German counterparts. The chief obstacles in Interoperability for chaplains was the barrier of the language used to conduct religious services.

Upgrading Field Grade Positions

As part of its reduction process, the Army also initiated a program to downgrade many officer positions. Most of these actions took place during "TDA Scrubs." This meant that garrison positions were most vulnerable. Since most chaplain field grade authorizations were in garrisons, they suffered disproportionately. Additionally, many commanders adopted the philosophy that the Chief of Chaplains would assign field grade chaplains even though they were not authorized. Consequently many commanders offered up chaplain positions for reduction rather than line positions. By 1975, even though the Program Budget Guidance allowed over 100 colonel positions, there were only 53 authorized in official TAADS documents. Because the Army was moving toward allowing only those positions authorized in official documents to be filled, the chaplaincy was threatened with a reduction of over 50 colonel positions and proportionate numbers of other field grade positions.

The Chief of Chaplains tasked his staff to determine what could be done to salvage chaplain field grade strength. This important issue involved more than appearances. Loss of the authorizations would seriously affect supervision and career advancement. Thus, it was not only a technical issue, it was a morale issue as well.

After extensive coordination with the office of the DCSPER, Chaplain Scott drafted a letter for the DCSPER's signature. Major General Joseph P. Kingston, the Assistant DCSPER, signed the letter and distributed it to all MACOMs. The letter addressed the shortage of chaplain field grade authorizations as a result of TDA scrubs and other manpower actions. He provided an exception to the Standards of Grade Authorizations and stated that chaplain grades would not be counted against other field grade levels. He asked commanders to align chaplain grades with those contained in the Program Budget Guidance. As a result of the outstanding staff work by Chaplain Jerry Autry at FORSCOM, and Chaplain Max Wilk at TRADOC, by the end of 1977 the figures stood as follows: 66

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65 See endnotes at end of chapter
By 1980, USAREUR succeeded in upgrading its field grade positions to a level where the chaplain authorization documents reflected the total for the Army allowed by the Program Budget Guidance.

**The United States Army Chaplain Board**

The Army Chaplain Board, under the direction of Chaplain Wendell Wright, received a new mission statement from the Chief of Chaplains. The Board's mission would be to execute programs, collect and disseminate information, provide consulting services and assist the Chief of Chaplains in developing concepts of ministry. Among its many responsibilities were research and development, religious education, parish development, family life ministry, production of films and publication of the *Military Chaplains' Review*.

The Board also took a leading role in developing activities for the Bicentennial of the Chaplain Corps which was celebrated on July 29, 1975. Among actions taken were hosting a formal dinner, sponsoring a hymn contest and designing a commemorative plate depicting the history of the chaplaincy.

The Military Chaplain Review, established by Chaplain Hyatt, had several editors during the decade of the 1970's: Chaplains John Hoogland, Joseph Galle, and Rodger Venzke. The quarterly was distributed to all chaplains, to military and civilian libraries, and to chaplains in the Navy and the Air Force. It was consistently rated highly by chaplains of all Services.

Production of films under the leadership of Chaplain David Boyce reached a high level of excellence. In 1976 ninety-three percent of all chaplain films (447 out of 481) appeared on the Army's "Hit Parade" list. Films were obtained through the creative efforts of the Board as well as from commercial sources.

In July 1976, a Religious Resource Center (similar in purpose to the Army Chaplain Board), was established in Munich, Germany. Its mission was "to provide advanced professional leadership and training to support the command's religious program." The first director of the Center was Chaplain Donald K. Adickes. The USAREUR Religious Bookstore was moved to Munich to be collocated with the Religious Resource Center.

**Administration**

The Army began using new financial methods for planning and budgeting that greatly increased the resources available to the chaplaincy. The program that "most directly affected chaplains

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was the Army's first multicommand and multifunctional computer system (BASOPS). BASOPS became the major process for delivering Congressionally authorized and appropriated dollars for commanders' religious programs. The funds available to the religious program quadrupled as a result of the BASOPS system.

Chaplain input into the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) began with the Command Master Religious Program (CMRP). This document included all aspects of chaplain ministry, training and facilities. Information in the CMRP was based on information provided by posts, camps and stations in each MACOM. Program money made available to the Chief of Chaplains during the period 1975 to 1979 is reflected in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>$5,235,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>$6,490,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976T</td>
<td>$1,117,000</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>$8,274,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Chapels had existed in the Army since the days of General George Washington ("The Temple of Virtue" at Newburgh, New York, first used in February 1782). The oldest active chapel was located at West Point (1837). Eleven chapels built before 1900 were still in use. Of 953 chapels in the inventory, 323 were "temporary" structures built during World War II. Chapel construction was a high priority for the Chaplaincy. It was time to begin replacing temporary buildings. During the 1970s the Army constructed an average of two new chapels per year. If that rate persisted, it would take more than 150 years to replace all the temporary structures. In 1976 a program of standardization of design was developed to ensure that construction conformed to Army requirements. In 1979 a chapel design guide was distributed to the field.

Chaplain Timothy Tatum in 1978 wrote an article on the advantages of computers which triggered the beginning of the age of automation for the Chaplaincy. Later Tatum was assigned to the OCCH and tasked with the development of a reporting system for the Chaplaincy. His automated information management plan was called the Chaplain Administrative Religious Support System (CARRS). This system allowed the chaplaincy to begin managing information in the same way the rest of the Army did and to prepare it for the 21st century.

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See endnotes at end of chapter
Chaplain Personnel

Under the direction of two Directors of Personnel, Chaplains Harold Lamm and Clifford Weathers, the Chaplaincy entered into an era of automation and new techniques for managing chaplains worldwide. Part of the change was in the use of ASI and SSI as management tools. The definition of identifiers for the new management process began with Chaplain Richard Tupy. The final recording of identifiers and implementation of the program was completed by Chaplain Henry Hilliard. As chaplains were trained in specific skills, the information was verified and transferred to DACH where appropriate notations were entered into personnel records. Although the Chaplaincy was never managed exclusively by ASI/SSI, the information was helpful in matching chaplains assigned with skills required.

A major improvement in chaplain evaluations came through a change to the regulation on the Officer Evaluation Reporting System. Chaplain Tupy staffed a proposal to encourage inclusion of a chaplain supervisor in the rating chain. When approved, this allowed chaplains for the first time to be involved in rating other chaplains. It also ensured that a perspective on ministry was included in the report.

During the downsizing of the Army, the chaplaincy was forced to manage year groups for the first time. This management included controlling the number of people brought on active duty to ensure that year groups were somewhat symmetrical and that promotion opportunity remained essentially equal for all chaplain personnel.78

The personnel composition of the chaplaincy began to change perceptibly during the late 1970's. Part of the change was due to a general reduction in the Department of the Army. Some of the change resulted from shortages in some faith groups, and some occurred as a result of new faith groups represented in the Army.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1154</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1162</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1164</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution chart for 1975-1979 indicated a total reduction of 35 spaces. More significantly, the trend of losses in the Catholic category was pronounced—a reduction of 48 chaplains in five years. That was only the beginning of a major downturn in the number of priests available in the Army. The loss of five Jewish chaplains also was indicative of a growing shortage of

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See endnotes at end of chapter
rabbis. One can see also that the shortages of some faith groups meant more chaplains for other groups, particularly Protestants. At this time the rule of thumb was one chaplain for each 100,000 civilian constituents within a particular denomination.\(^7\) Denominations that had less than 100,000 members banded together to form umbrella organizations such as the National Association of Evangelicals. The military chaplaincy attempted to mirror the civilian population in its faith representation.

The increasing shortage of Roman Catholic chaplains was of great concern to the Chief of Chaplains. He assigned Chaplain John J. Cunniffe to DACH to do a special project on chaplain shortages in the Army.\(^8\) The study included all chaplains, but was specifically aimed at priests. Cunniffe compiled an 83-question survey that was completed by 240 Protestant, 207 Catholic and 7 Jewish chaplains. The results of the survey were used by the Chief of Chaplains to develop policies and programs aimed at recruiting and retaining Catholic chaplains.

Heavy emphasis was placed on education in the Army and in the Chaplaincy. Many officers felt that to be competitive for promotion they must be continually involved in professional development courses. The Chaplaincy also stressed education not solely as a means of career progression, but as an enhancement for ministry. Many chaplains were involved in full time and nonresident military or civilian education.

### CHAPLAIN EDUCATION PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chaplain Strength</th>
<th>Military Schools</th>
<th>Civilian Schools</th>
<th>Nonresident* Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1465</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1452</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>N\A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes Reservists

The chaplaincy identified 141 positions that were validated as requiring special advanced civilian education. Each year some chaplains were trained to fill some of these positions. Since a normal tour of duty was three years, a person would be trained for each position every three years. The following identifies some of the positions for which chaplains were trained between 1976 and 1979.\(^9\)

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See endnotes at end of chapter
CIVILIAN GRADUATE EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78</th>
<th>FY 79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastoral Counseling</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Psychology</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homiletics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Foundations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education General</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motion Picture Production</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptrollership</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Technology</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS                     | 28    | 17    | 19    | 27    

Other disciplines not listed above included Audio Visual Education, Social Psychology, Experimental Psychology and Instructional Psychology.

Miscellaneous System Issues:
Exchange Program with Columbia

The Army maintained officer exchange programs with many different nations. In 1978 the Army wanted to establish such a program with Colombia, South America.82 Staff officers in the Pentagon felt that exchanging chaplains might be the way to begin that program. One of the points in favor of that view was that Colombia was a strongly Catholic nation. Contacts started between the two armies and some preliminary plans were made.83 Chaplain John Scott was appointed as the Chief of Chaplains liaison officer.

Problems began to arise when the Colombians discovered that they did not have sufficient funds to underwrite the program. Additionally, there was a difference of opinion as to how chaplains should be assigned. The United States wanted Colombian chaplains and ours to be assigned to units so that all soldiers could benefit from the exchange. Chaplains of both countries would provide

See endnotes at end of chapter
direct ministry to the soldiers of the host army. The Colombian Army, on the other hand, wanted to
assign their chaplains to the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia, where ministry would
be provided to their own or other Hispanic soldiers attending the school. That arrangement was not
satisfactory to the United States. Since no funds existed in Colombia for the program, negotiations
were curtailed. An opportunity was missed that might have enriched both nations.

A Five Volume Chaplain History

Before his retirement, Chaplain Hyatt directed that a history of the Army Chaplaincy be
produced for the 200th Anniversary in 1975. Chaplain Kelly observed that Chaplain Hyatt had a great
sense of history and wanted the work of the chaplaincy to be preserved. He also wanted to ensure
that his accomplishments were chronicled for future chaplains. The work began in 1973 and was
completed in 1979. A total of five volumes was produced. The Government Printing Office printed
1,500 copies which were distributed to MACOMs, installations, military and civilian libraries,
seminaries and universities.

Authors and titles of the volumes were:

*From Its European Antecedents to 1791: The United States Army Chaplaincy*,
  by Chaplain Parker C. Thompson.

*Struggling for Recognition: The United States Army Chaplaincy 1791 - 1865*,
  by Chaplain Herman A. Norton (USAR).

*Up From Handymen: The United States Army Chaplaincy 1865 -1920*,
  by Chaplain Earl F. Stover.

*The Best and The Worst of Times: The United States Army Chaplaincy 1920 - 1945*,
  by Chaplain Robert L. Gushwa.

*Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace: The United States Army Chaplaincy 1945 - 1975*,
  by Chaplain Rodger R. Venzke.

Fees For Chaplain Services

The Department of the Army Inspector General received an inquiry in FY 1976 regarding fees
charged by chaplains for performance of religious rites and sacraments. Chaplains on some
installations were charging for their own services as well as those of other chapel personnel. In some
instances persons also were charged a rental fee for use of the chapel or religious facility. Chapel

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See endnotes at end of chapter
organizations on some installations also published fee schedules that were given to persons requesting services such as weddings.

The Chief of Chaplains established a policy that no fees would be paid to chaplains, chaplain assistants, or paid for the use of facilities. Fees required to pay for a civilian organist, or for janitorial services, were to be paid either by the individual requesting the services or from the Nonappropriated Fund.87

**The Proposed Civilianization of the Chaplaincy**

In 1976, there was a limited movement aimed at changing the Chaplaincy from military chaplains to civilian chaplains. The movement was initiated by the United Church of Christ in response to its unhappiness with the war in Vietnam. Other denominations, such as the United Methodist Church, also raised the issue at a later date.88 The Chief of Chaplains did not perceive this as a major threat since it would have been economically impossible for churches to bear the expense of a civilian chaplaincy. The Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod had tried using civilian chaplains in Vietnam and in Europe with very limited success. Transportation, logistics, access to military personnel and personal support needs made it almost impossible to provide effective ministry, particularly in a combat environment. This issue arose again in 1979 in a court case questioning the Constitutionality of the Army Chaplaincy.

**Futurism**

Planning ministry for the future became a high interest item for the chaplaincy. The world was changing at a rapid pace and it was necessary to think about how ministry would look ten to twenty-five years later. Several workshops were held in the late 1970s to help chaplain leadership plan for changes.

From May 9 to 11, 1977, a "Future Ministries Workshop" was held at Newark, New Jersey. The concept for the conference originated with the Chief of Chaplains, but the sessions were conducted by the Chaplain Board under the supervision of Chaplain Wendell Wright. The goal of the workshop was "identifying and planning for future ministries in the military chaplaincy."89 Five modules were presented by guest resource leaders:

*Ethnic Pluralism and Future Forms of Ministry* — by Dr. Grant Shockley
*Parish Pluralism and Future Forms of Ministry* — by Bishop Paul Moore
*Social Issues and Future Forms of Ministry* — Sister Rosemary Duncan
*The Religioning Process and Future Forms of Ministry* — by Dr. Earl D. C. Brewer
*Spiritual Discipline and Future Forms of Ministry* — by Dr. John E. Biersdorf

The data gained from the workshops often became a part of The Chief of Chaplains Goals and Objectives.

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Chaplaincy Ministry to Soldiers and Their Families: Chief of Chaplain's Management Philosophy

As Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain Kelly accepted all of Chaplain Hyatt's management concepts, but he also expanded them and gave them his own twist. After his first year in office he encapsulated his philosophy of management as it affected relationships at MACOMs and what he expected from management practices in the field. These principles found their way into almost everything the Chaplaincy did during those years. His management philosophy consisted of six guidelines for relating to MACOMs.90

1. Understanding our Purpose and Environment. To minister in ways that fulfill our vocation and expand its meaning and purpose.
2. Determining our Responsibilities. Avoid overlapping and conflict.
3. Reflecting MACOM Areas of Freedom. DACH will not impose arbitrary decisions.
4. Fulfilling Responsibilities. Listening to each other.
5. Exercising Authority and Resolving Conflicts. Solutions based on mutual respect and constructive conflict.

In order for chaplains to be able to perform ministry effectively, Chaplain Kelly stated the goals for supervisory management. Every chaplain should be:

- assigned clear responsibilities
- given the opportunity to sponsor significant ministry
- allowed the freedom to fail
- encouraged to use unique creative gifts of God's grace.91

Leadership and effective chaplaincy are synonymous. Chaplain Kelly developed a model of leadership that he emphasized strongly wherever he met with or spoke to chaplains. Leadership in his view consisted of three interlocking circles:

The first circle (Professional Core) represented who the chaplain was as a professional. The Relationship circle represented what those relationships meant as a personal role. The third circle indicated how one understands and operates within the system (Army). Each of these was related to the other and impacted on the other. Without all three, ministry would not be complete.

The goal of Kelly's management was to provide as many tools as possible to all chaplains so that they could do their ministry efficiently and professionally. One of the main processes he used was Management by Objectives for Results. He also sought to incorporate long range planning into his management process. He felt that eight years of continuous programming ought to be done in order

See endnotes at end of chapter
to provide continuity and to impact the system. Anything less than that would prove ineffective.

Management by Objectives for Results (MBOR)

Although the concept of MBOR was introduced during Chaplain Hyatt's tenure as Chief, it did not come to fruition until Chaplain Kelly succeeded him. The first official use of MBOR in the Army Chaplaincy began in 1976. Within fifteen days of assuming the position of Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain Kelly distributed his "Chief of Chaplains Four Year Planning Guidance (FY 77-79)." Included in the guidance were the goals and objectives that resulted from negotiations at installations and the MACOMs that were passed forward to OCCH. All of the guidance was discussed also at the Annual Command Chaplains' Conference. MBOR was seen as a decentralized and participatory form of management. Each MACOM and installation was free to modify the guidance to meet its own specific needs. Management was by planning at the Chief of Chaplains level, by objectives at the MACOM level, and by results at the installation level.

The purpose of the Chief of Chaplain's Planning Guidance was to provide "information and guidance toward common goals for ministry in the U.S. Army Chaplaincy." The guidance consisted of three parts: the Total Army Goals; general directions to the Major Commands including which programs will be monitored by OCCH; and the OCCH Key Results Areas (KRA).

The Total Army Goals formed the basis for Chief of Chaplains planning. In 1978 The Total Army Goals were:

**THE READINESS GOAL** prepare the Total Army for rapid transition to combat

**THE HUMAN GOAL** provide highly effective, morally responsible personnel

**THE MATERIEL GOAL** develop, field, maintain balanced war fighting capabilities

**THE STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT GOAL** improve deployment capability

**THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT GOAL** improve equipment, concepts, technology

**THE MANAGEMENT GOAL** use resources more efficiently

The Chief of Chaplains eleven Key Results Areas in FY 1978 were: Religious Services; Pastoral Concerns; Religions Education; Professional Development; Research and Development; Administration and Management; Manpower and Procurement; Women's Issues; Chaplain Support Activities; Force Development and Manpower Management; and Reserve Components.

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See endnotes at end of chapter
Each KRA consisted of a description, a list of objectives with resources needed, a method of evaluation, the point of contact and the Army Goal to which the KRA related. An example of the KRA IV, "Professional Development," follows:97

**Professional Development**

Provides an integrated system for the professional development of active duty and reserve component chaplains, staff specialists, enlisted assistants, and DA civilians.

**Objectives:**

1. To ensure that all AERB chaplain spaces are reflected by code on TAADS by 30 Sept. 1978.
   OCCH Resources: 50 hours; $1,000.00
   Evaluation: Project Completed POC: Ch Jernigan

2. To insure that TAADS reflects all chaplain positions by SSU/ASI.
   OCCH Resources: 50 hours; $1,000.00
   Evaluation: Current files completed by 30 September 1978 POC: Ch Hilliard

3. To provide support and professional assistance to the Academic Board, USACHCS, MACOMs and installations on the implementation and evaluation of the Professional Development Plan.
   OCCH Resources: 275 hours; $20,475.00
   Other Resources: 380 hours
   Evaluation: Implementation and improvements to the Professional Development Plan. POC: Ch Scott

4. To develop a plan for improving the supervisory process for chaplain personnel within the Army structure at all supervisory levels through the conduct of two OCCH sponsored conferences.
   OCCH Resources: 150 hours; $500.00
   POC: TBD
   Evaluation: Plan completed and approved by Chief of Chaplains by 30 September 1978. Potential leadership is developed in all career stages which will improve supervisory skills appropriate to the needs at various staff levels. POC: Ch Lamm

MBOR provided the means by which the chaplaincy could identify (1) what needed to be done, (2) what resources were required and (3) how successful the effort was. It identified only those

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few critical issues that needed to be highlighted rather than many trivial actions required to perform ministry in the field.

Chaplain Professional Development Plan

One of Chaplain Kelly's greatest achievements in his leadership as Chief of Chaplains involved the enhancement of chaplain professional development. The Chaplain School was under the supervision and control of the Training and Doctrine Command, and the Chiefs of Chaplains had little opportunity to influence the curriculum. Both other professional schools, The Judge Advocate General School and the Academy of Health Sciences, enjoyed more autonomy and control.

Soon after assuming the position of Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain Kelly requested that Chaplain Albert Ledebuhr, the TRADOC Staff Chaplain, arrange a meeting with General DePuy, the TRADOC Commander. Chaplain Kelly did not expect an easy time in convincing the commander that he needed to exercise more control over the curriculum at the School. Within six minutes after Kelly began his presentation, General DePuy agreed to his recommendations not to run the School, but to influence the curriculum. General DePuy understood Chaplain Kelly's inability to lead the Chaplain Branch without some influence on what chaplains were trained to do.

Chaplain Kelly directed his Executive Officer, Chaplain Warren Truer, to send a letter to the entire Chaplaincy requesting ideas for organization and training at the Chaplain School. The responses received resulted in a "radical piece of paper" that later formed the basis for the Chaplain Professional Development Plan (PDP). An Ad Hoc Study Group at OCCH composed of Chaplains O'Shea, Tupy, Lamm and others was appointed in August 1975, "to collect more information, look at total ministry and put together a comprehensive plan covering the period from commissioning to retirement." Chaplain Kelly wanted maximum involvement in developing the PDP. A "Strawman" was sent to the field and suggestions were incorporated into the plan. The PDP was finalized on 31 August 1976, with implementation set for July 1977. A copy of the final plan was sent to General DePuy on 7 September 1976. Chaplain Kelly included a list of the significant changes:

Chaplain Professional Development

- C-20 Course.
The residential portion of the course would be reduced from nine to six weeks, with additional reading requirements transferred to the field. During the first year a minimum of four hours weekly will be spent in the field in peer groups with a training supervisor using the actual job environment and tasks, along with the chaplain's job performance, as the basis for training.

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- C-22 Course
Will be reduced significantly and two courses will be conducted annually.

The course will focus on professional development and be tailored individually for each chaplain. It will also include an assessment process prior to and after arrival at the School. Skill training will be done through “SSI/ASI producing short courses” in place of the en masse skill training currently provided.

The current graduate degree program will be eliminated in favor of accreditation of USACHCS courses for use in external degree programs initiated at USACHCS and completed at the next duty assignment.

-Chaplain School.
The USACHCS responsibility will broaden. While still concerned with residential training, it will focus more attention on the development of criteria and standards, as well as support material, for use in the installation program.

Chaplain Edward O’Shea was charged with responsibility for implementing the program. Upon his reassignment in June 1977, he was replaced in that responsibility by Chaplain John Scott who continued the implementation process.

The assumptions made in developing the PDP included the following:¹⁰²

- Spiritual Development is a major concern of the chaplain
- Pastors and parishioners are involved together in ministry
- Major emphasis will be on relationships
- Change is inevitable, but does not need to be random
- Persons are effective to the degree of their awareness

Leadership formed a critical center for the Professional Development Plan. The environment in which ministry takes place was characterized by the leader’s ability and willingness to:

- Provide personal support
- Be receptive to the ideas of others
- Expect realistic and high performance of persons
- Build a team
- Aid others in doing their work
- Involve others in decisions that affect them¹⁰³

The PDP was a very innovative document which called for some very revolutionary changes in chaplain education. It identified four specific phases of training: Basic Training, Advanced Training, ASI/SSI Training, and Continuing Education. The decision was made that training provided by the chaplaincy would be given only when actually required by a chaplain to perform current or imminent

See endnotes at end of chapter
duties. The Chaplain Advanced Course, formerly 39 weeks long, was shortened to 21 weeks.

The Chaplain School Advanced Course was modified to include three specific phases. The first three weeks involved self-assessment. Chaplains identified their strengths and weaknesses. Several psychological instruments were used to accomplish this, and resource persons were contracted to provide leadership. This period also required chaplains to develop a plan for working on their strengths or weaknesses in ministry. The second phase required chaplains to pursue training in the areas identified in the self-assessment plan. This training could be done through civilian seminaries or universities, through military courses and in some cases through individually self-directed programs. The third part of the Advance Course training centered on Army-required military subjects. The School interspersed this training throughout the 21 weeks.

The Chaplain Basic Course also was revised. Basic training consisted of three parts: the Pre-commissioning Phase; the resident 9 week Basic Chaplain Course; and, lastly, the Installation Training (Phase III). Part time training would be done for the next two years on the installations to which chaplains were assigned after completing the course. This phase of training, called Phase III Training, comprised the most innovative part of the PDP. Each new chaplain, after graduating from USACHCS, attended classes conducted by experienced senior chaplains. The new policy required that training be done at the time and place where it would most likely be used.

Chaplains specifically trained to become training managers on the installations were identified by the ASI 7E. A training program was developed in early 1977 at the Chaplain School by Chaplains John Snyder of USACHCS, Gordon Prout from Fort Carson, Roy Mathis from Fort Bragg and John Scott representing OCCH. Chaplain Mathis had been using a similar program at Fort Bragg, and provided valuable insights to the committee. Phase III training on installations began in September 1977.

Chaplain Roy Mathis envisioned the 7E Trainer as an orchestrator of training rather than one who conducted all the training himself. The PDP identified many skills that must be trained at the installation, but it also allowed discretion to meet local training needs. At Fort Bragg, in one eight month period, the following training workshops were "orchestrated" by Chaplain Mathis:

- Marriage and Family Counseling
- Race Relations
- Rape Crisis Counseling
- Suicide Prevention
- Drug and Alcohol Counseling
- Serendipity Groups
- Religious Education
- Death and Dying Classes
- Preaching
- Personal Effectiveness Training
- Child Abuse
- Marriage and Family Enrichment
- Mid-Life Crises

Chaplain Frank Jopp, the 7E Training Manager at Fort Carson, Colorado, had four to six new chaplains under his supervision for Phase III training. He led the trainees through the mandatory training subjects and shared his own chaplain experiences with them. Chaplains were provided an opportunity to raise questions that they encountered as they carried on their ministry. All of the chaplains in the program were grateful for the opportunity to learn in an atmosphere that was
nonthreatening to them. Brigade supervisory chaplains retained responsibility for providing day-to-day training and guidance. Where the system worked best, the Training Manager and the Supervisory Chaplain established a collaborative and supportive relationship.

Training managers often arranged ad hoc on-site training. If a wedding was being conducted, the trainees gathered at the chapel to observe a military wedding. They assembled likewise for a funeral or for other special occasions. When chaplains accompanied their units to the field, they practiced skills such as conducting field services which they had learned from the Training Manager.

All chaplain training, whether done at the School, on the installation, in hospitals or at civilian centers, became a part of the all-encompassing PDP. Chaplain Kelly described professional development in the following words:

First, chaplain professional development at its best involves a realization that learning and development take place over a wide spectrum of activities. It is not confined to formal schooling, but occurs as we interact with supervisory chaplains, commanders, peers and subordinates in each assignment. It also occurs as chaplains grow in their understanding of the needs of their own families and as they become involved with innovative approaches of ministry to meet the specific needs of our troops and their families. It occurs as chaplains learn to allow time for rest and reflection to explore the roots of their own faith. Professional development should occur in all parts of the chaplain's life and should continue throughout his or her life. The process cannot be merely identified with the development of any one set of skills or knowledge. It must involve the whole person.  

Chaplains, often by virtue of their calling to be servants, do not feel that they can be away from their parishioners for too long a time and without good reason. The Chief of Chaplains recognized that the ongoing nature of professional development required permission for chaplains to receive training each year. He, therefore, established a policy that every chaplain would be required to have a minimum of two weeks TDY each year for special training or a theological update. The Chief of Chaplains did not prescribe what kind of training would be received, or where. He simply stated that each chaplain should comply with the policy.

Since professional development included all training received by chaplains, there needed to be a means of assessing the effectiveness of the training and to make recommendations for changes to meet new needs. An Academic Board was established that met twice annually under the leadership of the Deputy Chief of Chaplains (Chaplain Thaddeus Malinowski and later Chaplain Kermit Johnson). Membership on the Board consisted of chaplains from the Chaplain School, the field and from OCCH. Three civilian consultants involved in education, spiritual formation and psychotherapy served as members of the Board. Meetings were held in various locations in order to observe actual training needs, training provided and to forward recommendations to the Chief of Chaplains.

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Ministry to Families

Training chaplains in civilian graduate schools for family ministry began in the early 1970s. However, specific utilization of these chaplains in positions where their skills could impact did not begin until Chaplain Orris Kelly became Chief of Chaplains. Chaplain Kelly noted that Family Life Center ministry began as an outgrowth of the fact that chaplains were spending 50% of their time in counseling families and individuals.\(^9\) Family Life Centers were established on several installations to provide full-time counseling opportunities by qualified chaplains as well as to offer educational programs aimed at prevention.

Not all commanders approved of the program. Some thought chaplains should spend all their time with soldiers, not with members of their families. One commander in Panama forcefully opposed the assignment of a chaplain to family life ministry.\(^10\) He failed to see that family relationships directly affected a soldier's morale and job performance. By 1977, twenty-one Family Life Centers were located on installations in CONUS and "over 100,000 persons were being impacted by their ministry programs every year."\(^11\) In 1979, there were 38 Family Life Centers, and nearly 70 chaplains had been trained in this ministry.\(^12\) The Chief of Chaplain's goal was to establish ten new centers in FY 1979.

The Army was beginning to identify child abuse as a serious problem, just as it was in civilian communities. Department of the Army established a Child Advocacy Program to report and deal with child abuse. The Chaplaincy supported this initiative by the Army. This meant increased responsibility for the Family Life Center Chaplains. Chaplain Kelly wrote:

During the International Year of the Child, as proclaimed by the United Nations, we can capitalize on our own spiritual heritage to touch the lives of people, build support systems and provide proactive and problem preventive actions through our family life ministry.\(^13\)

Increased emphasis on retreats for families and soldiers added a fun dimension to ministry. One-day "Duty Day With God" retreats were held throughout CONUS on a regular basis. These short programs were generally held in the unit area or in one of the installation chapels. In USAREUR and Korea, single soldier and family retreats were coordinated by the command and conducted in designated religious retreat centers. In 1976 approximately 10,000 persons attended retreats at Berchtesgaden. Another 3,000 persons participated in the International Pilgrimage to Rome.\(^14\)

Clinical Pastoral Education

Chaplain Hyatt had established a policy that every chaplain should complete one quarter of Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE). Chaplain Kelly revoked that policy when he became Chief of Chaplains because he realized that not every chaplain would benefit from the training. Additionally, some chaplains opposed CPE training on theological grounds. Kelly felt that every chaplain should

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be looked at individually and training should be provided to help those interested to be most effective in what they perceived as their call to ministry. Since then, the Army provided training only on a volunteer and "as needed" basis.

There was also a perception on one hand that CPE was the "in" thing and perhaps a road to success. On the other hand, CPE chaplains complained that they were not being considered fairly for promotion. This became a serious problem for CPE supervisors who served in repetitive supervisory positions. Some commanders did not understand CPE or anything that was not a part of the operations system and therefore rated CPE chaplains lower than others. Several years of hard work by staff action officers in OCCH, particularly Chaplains Richard Tupy and Henry Hilliard, led to inclusion of an appendix in the Officer Evaluation Report regulation and guidance to promotion boards that drew attention to the critical need of this ministry in the Army.

In 1976, 13 CPE training centers operated in the Army. They were located at USACHCS, 4 Medical Centers (Walter Reed, Brooke, Fitzsimmons and Letterman), 7 CONUS installations, and one in USAREUR. In CONUS, creative ministry was being introduced at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, by Chaplain Carl Stevens. Stevens won the support of the commander and began working with the doctors and hospital staff to provide holistic ministry for patients. The first CPE training in USAREUR was held in September 1975, at the Heidelberg CPE Center. Five students completed one unit of CPE. Training Centers were also established at Stuttgart, Nuremburg, and Frankfurt, where training began in 1976. Three day workshops on PET were also conducted throughout USAREUR by the USAREUR Chaplain Counseling Teams.

In the late 1970s, Chaplain Danny Burttram reported to OCCH as an action officer. One of his major challenges was to evaluate the current CPE centers and determine the actual training needs of the system. Until his assignment at OCCH, general supervision was provided by the Chaplain School. As a result of Burttram's recommendations several centers (including those at two Medical Centers) were closed. The Community Model CPE became the main means for training chaplains for other than hospital ministry.

Organizational Development and Parish Development

Chaplains first used Organizational Development under Chaplain Hyatt. The chaplaincy was the first branch in the Army to use this management methodology. Hyatt recognized that chaplains often avoided administration and management, yet these were critical to making ministry work. The terms Organizational Development and Parish Development were often used interchangeably even though there was a different focus for each.

The effectiveness of the program caught the attention of Army leadership as well as commanders in the field. They particularly saw the value in terms of leadership competencies and the team concept. General Bernard Rogers, the Chief of Staff, saw the possibilities of OD for training officers and noncommissioned officers. He adopted the program and renamed it "Organizational Effectiveness (OE)." The Army established an OE school at Fort Ord, California, and provided training for officers and noncommissioned officers for many years. Chaplains normally served on the

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staff and faculty of the School. Chaplains Gaylord Hatler and Cecil Ryland were among the first to be trained and utilized in this specialty.

Ministries on the Edge
1975-1979
Sinop, Turkey: The Lost Detachment

When Chaplain (Major General) Orris E. Kelly assumed office on 1 August 1975, as the Army's 14th Chief of Chaplains, most of the attention given to overseas deployments centered on Europe and the Pacific. Yet from August through December of that year rather dramatic diplomatic initiatives by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger helped keep Turkey, on the southern flank of NATO, securely within the Western alliance. When Turkey had invaded Cyprus the previous year, Congress voted to curtail all military aid to Turkey. In retaliation, the Turkish government ordered operations to cease on most of the American-Turkish bases. The American soldiers and their chaplains at Sinop, Turkey, some 8,000 miles away from the United States, followed the developments closely in the Stars and Stripes as the newspapers were flown in from Germany. For a week they felt like "a lost detachment" on the Black Sea. No one dreamed at the time that it would be eight years before the issues over Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey would finally be stabilized.

President Ford, Senator Mike Mansfield, and Secretary of State Kissinger successfully persuaded Congress in October to reconsider its position on aid to Turkey. The terms Congress set for the agreement included allowing Turkey to buy up to $185 million in arms "as long as the cease fire in Cyprus held." On December 12, Secretary Kissinger and Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri reached an agreement in principle in Brussels which permitted the reopening of the 26 joint Turkish-American bases. The date for the restoration of mission status for the bases was to be determined later.

Christmas on the Hill

By mid-December the people of Sinop were on much better terms with the soldiers on the hill at Diogenes Station. The labor disputes between the Turkish workers had been resolved, the United States had agreed to supply Turkey with arms, and there was free movement and resupply for the installation. As a sign of good will, the Turkish people brought 30 Christmas trees to the Chapel and a truckload of evergreen wreaths to decorate the post. Christmas dinners were served in the town by the Mayor of Sinop for the American Commander, Lt. Col. John Norris, and his staff. Local officials were reciprocally entertained at the Diogenes Station Officers Open Mess Club (DOOM Club) on the installation.

The chapel services at Christmas featured a great deal of cooperation between the Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Latter Day Saints congregations. Chaplain Paul Haefner, a Roman Catholic chaplain of the Franciscan Order, had replaced Chaplain Logue, who was reassigned to Fort

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Hood, Texas. Both of the Roman Catholic chaplains played key roles in organizing religious support at Sinop, for they were not only the senior chaplains, but also the personal chaplains for Lt. Col. Norris who was Roman Catholic.

In order to present a special Christmas music program, Chaplain Haefner and Chaplain Brinsfield recruited everyone who could help regardless of faith group. The Christmas choir was comprised of Protestants, Roman Catholics, Latter Day Saints, and some soldiers who did not know what they were. The choir director, Specialist Tom Harris, was Roman Catholic. The pianist was a member of the Jewish congregation who volunteered to help the Christians celebrate. All of the Jewish people (four in number) were invited to the Christmas program, and all of the Christians were invited to celebrate Hanukkah. During most of the rehearsals and during the performance itself, the congregation was filled not only with American, but also with Turkish friends who came to enjoy the music.

By Christmas week the chapel was fully decorated. A cross and a tablet marked the door. A statue of Mary and the baby Jesus stood just inside. Christmas trees lined the walls and the front of the sanctuary. Even those who missed their families came to the Chapel as a place of warmth, love and hope. It was too small a post to draw hard and fast denominational lines; and, anyway, there was not much else to do.

A Tragedy and Support on Christmas Eve

Late on Christmas Eve, after almost everyone except the MPs had gone to bed, a Red Cross message came in for a soldier named B.G. The Red Cross Officer who received the message found Chaplain Brinsfield and asked him to notify the soldier. The message said that B.G.'s wife and infant daughter had both been killed the night before in an automobile accident on icy roads in the United States. Chaplain Brinsfield and Chief Warrant Officer Crosson, the Red Cross Officer, alerted the pilots at the nearby airfield for an emergency flight to Istanbul. Then they went to B.G.'s barracks to tell him. B.G. was in deep sleep, but after he understood the message and had prayer with the chaplain, he went to the chapel to try to call his in-laws in the United States. "It was the hardest job I had to do in the chaplaincy," Chaplain Brinsfield recalled, "for we walked with our arms around B.G.'s shoulders to the chapel, past the statues of Mary and the Infant Jesus, to try to get through on the phone. B.G. told me his whole family was gone. He was an orphan. His wife and daughter were his family."

After the painful call was made, B.G., Chaplain Brinsfield and Mr. Crosson started out of the chapel to get a duffel bag and meet the pilots for the flight to Istanbul. There was about an inch of snow on the ground and the night was totally dark. Nevertheless, when the chapel door opened, all of the soldiers of Detachment 4, Diogenes Station, lined both sides of the sidewalk. They came to attention as B.G. and the chaplain walked down the line. Some whispered words of encouragement, some saluted. It was a beautiful tribute.

Thirty days after B.G. left on emergency leave, he returned to Sinop. He could have been stationed in the States, but he wanted to return to Diogenes Station because "that's where my friends were." B.G.'s courage and dedication provided a clear example of "the stuff our soldiers were made

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of." It was the right stuff.

The Women of the Chapel: Other Ministries of Grace and Encouragement

One of the most active groups in the chapel at Diogenes Station was the Women of the Chapel. Perhaps a third of the population on the installation was comprised of female soldiers, and wives of civilian contractors, principally from the Boeing Company. The Women of the Chapel met weekly to sponsor the two Turkish orphanages, plan chapel dinners, recruit people for religious retreats and tours throughout Turkey, and perform other ministries involving the Chapel Council, the choirs, and worship. Mrs. Lois Cole, a Boeing spouse, was the President.

During a visit to the Girls' Orphanage in downtown Sinop, some of the Protestant women noticed the Turkish children slept in large rooms with the windows open and with but one blanket for each two girls. Even though the girls slept together, the women were sure they must be cold. There were frequent gale winds from the Russian side of the Black Sea which blew directly against the buildings of Sinop. plainly, the girls needed more blankets.

At the next Chapel Council meeting a series of special offerings and fund raising projects were proposed and approved to buy the orphans more blankets. The Post Exchange furnished all the blankets they had at the cheapest price. After three weeks the Women of the Chapel had purchased 30 blankets. The blankets were delivered to the directors of the two orphanages who received them with polite, but puzzled thanks.

On the next trip downtown the women visited the orphanages to see how the children were doing. The blankets were in a closet. The children still had only one blanket for each bed. When asked to explain, the director said proudly, "You see we have children who become close brothers and sisters even though they have no real family here. If they share everything including their blankets, they must think of their brother or sister as they think of themselves. Also, the air is good for them. They have no sickness." The Chapel Council and the chaplain learned a great deal from the Orphanage Project.

An Unusual Ministry for Turkish Families

Lieutenant Colonel Norris was anxious to extend every courtesy to the Turkish people since part of his mission was to work harmoniously with allies. One day in the Spring of 1976 a Turkish man came to Diogenes Station asking for a priest and an American doctor to come to his home and removed a spell which he thought had been placed on his daughter. She had become paralyzed, he said, and must have an evil spirit. Lieutenant Colonel Norris approved the request. Chaplain Brinsfield was the only chaplain on post so he and Captain Robert Love, the Army doctor, rode down into the village to see the man's daughter. Fortunately, they took an interpreter. Chaplain Brinsfield also took some candles, a cross, incense, a big Bible, a robe, and a prayer book. Although he was not accustomed, as a United Methodist, to conduct exorcisms, neither was he forbidden to try somehow

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to heal the woman's spirit. Had Chaplain Brinsfield been more experienced, it is doubtful that he would have even remotely considered such an attempt.

When Dr. Love and Chaplain Brinsfield reached the home, they found ten or twelve family members and neighbors around the cot. The woman, about 30 years of age, refused to open her eyes. She was fully clothed but had not gotten up in two days. Her mother told the interpreter that she had gone to bed when her father forbade her to marry and leave home. After Dr. Love took her blood pressure and temperature, he decided that she was possibly throwing a tantrum. Accordingly, he told the family he could not do any more unless she could be transported to the Diogenes Clinic for blood tests.

Next it was Chaplain Brinsfield's turn. Given the circumstances of her "illness" and recalling that devout Muslims believe that Allah's will is irresistible, Chaplain Brinsfield set up a big brass cross, put on a black robe, set fire to the incense, read from the Prayer Book and the Bible, spent several moments in silent (and sincere) prayer for the woman, her family, and for Dr. Love and himself if anything went wrong. He told the interpreter to say in a loud voice, "Woman, Allah wills you to be happy!!!" With that, the exorcism was over. The woman did not move, but the Turkish father seemed very thankful and pensive. It seems that it was not the daughter's spirit that was changed, but rather the father's. Dr. Love and Chaplain Brinsfield returned to their "regular" duties with the hope that things would turn out for the best.

Two days later the Turkish interpreter brought a message from the town. The stricken woman had fully recovered after her father promised to let her get married. When Lt. Col. Norris was briefed on all that had take place, he looked at Dr. Love and Chaplain Brinsfield and said with a grin, "I had heard that the people in Sinop held our doctor in high esteem. Now it appears they have added our chaplains to their list. Thanks, guys!"122

Athletics and a Revival for Jesus

As the summer of 1976 approached, many of the soldiers began to get more restless. They had been sitting "on the hill" for almost a year, suffered through water and food shortages, irregular mail deliveries and boredom. A renewed interest in the consumption of alcohol was creating discipline problems. At one time there were at least nine bars set up in the clubs and in the barracks.

Several constructive alternatives were proposed to the Commander by the Morale Support Officer and the Post Chaplain. For some reason, Morale Support had received hundreds of colorful windbreakers to give away as prizes to the soldiers. Therefore, a series of tournaments featuring a wide range of competitive, but healthy, sports seemed in order. The Chapel community sponsored one team, the Officers Club sponsored another, and the various work sections sponsored others. Activities included tennis, basketball, racquetball, volleyball, chess, checkers, soccer, and track. The chapel also opened a coffee house with freshly baked cookies provided by one of the female chaplain assistants.

The highlight of the sports season was a touch football tournament. The DOOM Club recruited the most players, including an excellent pass receiver. The Chapel recruited mostly MPs and

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Navy detachment personnel. When time ran out, the score was tied, but the decision was given to the DOOM Club because the Chapel had committed too many penalties!

On the spiritual side, the Chapel Council sponsored a revival complete with altar calls and any "old familiar hymns." The principle text for the week-long meeting was, "You must be born again." Sergeant Jim Little, an ordained Lutheran pastor, shared the services with Chaplain Brinsfield. Many of the soldiers enjoyed the experience of a revival on an isolated site. Five MPs were baptized in the Black Sea in a reaffirmation of faith.

**Diplomatic Fixes: Turkey Remains in NATO**

At the end of the summer of 1976, replacements arrived for both Protestant and Catholic chaplains. Most of the soldiers who had served through the long, hot summer of 1974, and winter of 1975, left before or with the chaplains.

Negotiations between the United States and the Republic of Turkey dragged on for 3 years until Sinop was restored to full mission status in 1978. In Washington, President Gerald Ford presided over the 200th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. While soldiers who served at Sinop did not know much about the celebration until mail finally came, they had performed exceptionally meritorious duty for their country—a fitting 200th Birthday gift. The 7,000 American military personnel in Turkey had stood watch while the diplomats repaired the NATO alliance and relationships with some key allies. Like their counterparts in Korea, Panama, and West Germany, they learned the meaning of "selfless service." Without exception, the chaplains who were there said it was a blessing and a privilege to serve with them.

**Deaths in Guyana:**

**Ministry to Medical Personnel**

Chaplain Terry Dempsey was still very new to the Army when he reported to his assignment with the 44th Medical Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in June of 1978. He knew that the medics were always subject to deployment, but neither he nor they were prepared for the mission they would be given in Jonestown, Guyana, just before Thanksgiving.

The Reverend Jim Jones, leader of the People’s Temple, had moved 400 members of his congregation from San Francisco to a remote village site in Guyana, a nation on the northeast coast of South America, in 1977. The People’s Temple, with a total aggregate membership of 10,000 people, had been active not only in evangelical programs, but, according to reports in The New York Times, had been active in Marxist political activism as well. Indeed, Mr. Jones viewed Mao Tsetung as one of his principal heroes.

Ministering to many economically disadvantaged families in the Fillmore section of San Francisco, Jim Jones seemed to be a religious and political messiah. With “hypnotic charisma,” Jones was skillful at mobilizing his congregation to protest, to picket, or to vote as a bloc on many

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municipal issues.\textsuperscript{128}

In the summer of 1977, however, \textit{New West Magazine} printed an attack on Mr. Jones, charging that he “performed spurious miracles that were outright trickery, that physical and mental anguish were used to enforce compliance with his orders and that members were encouraged to turn over all they owned to the Temple.”\textsuperscript{129} Mr. Jones denied all these allegations. The District Attorney’s Office in San Francisco could find no chargeable offenses, but almost immediately Mr. Jones and 1,000 of his parishioners applied for passports.\textsuperscript{130} The Temple was moving to Guyana.

After more than 400 of these people had departed, and after 8 months with but a few letters to their relatives in the United States, U.S. Representative Leo J. Ryan decided to make a trip to South America to inspect the village of “Jonestown.”\textsuperscript{131} On November 19, 1978, Mr. Ryan flew to Georgetown, the capitol of Guyana, where he met with Richard Dwyer, the second highest official in the U.S. Embassy. Mr. Dwyer, Mr. Ryan, and 17 staff members then flew to Port Kaltura where they got a truck to take them to Jonestown.

Met by Jim Jones and assured that all was in order, Mr. Ryan and his party toured the commune that afternoon. As they were preparing to leave, with nine sect members who wanted to go with them, a man with a knife rushed toward Mr. Ryan and put the knife to his throat. The assailant was disarmed by Mr. Ryan’s aides, but then there was a rush by the diplomatic party to reach the airstrip at Port Kaltura as more hostile sect members appeared.

As the group of 28 arrived at the airfield, their two small charter planes were blocked by a flat-top trailer truck pulled by a tractor from the Jonestown commune. As the party began boarding the planes, one of the sect members accompanying them pulled out a pistol and began firing into the group. More armed men jumped from the trailer-truck and began firing. The tires on one plane were shot out and flattened. Representative Ryan was shot in the face and killed. Four other staff members were murdered, and nine wounded before the second plane, loaded with terrified people, was able to take off.\textsuperscript{132}

The Guyanese Government promised a full investigation and expressed regret over the incident. The next message, however, called for support from the United States. One settler from Jonestown had walked 30 miles to report a mass suicide of at least 200 people in the village.\textsuperscript{133}

At Fort Bragg the 44th Medical Brigade was alerted on November 21 to prepare for a medical support mission in South America involving U.S. citizens. The status of security in the village of Jonestown was unknown. It would be assumed that there were men in the woods near the settlement who were armed and fanatically dangerous.\textsuperscript{134}

The soldiers of the 44th were not graves registration personnel, nor were they combat troops. There was concern among the medics, as they prepared to depart, that they might be under fire while they were trying to save an unknown number of injured American citizens.

With the arrival of the order to execute the mission, the soldiers began boarding three planes at Green Ramp, the site for deployments at Pope Air Force Base near Fort Bragg. Chaplain Dempsey was on the third plane which developed engine trouble and was forced to shut down. The medics would go to Jonestown without their chaplain.

In addition to his frustration at being left behind, Chaplain Dempsey was concerned about the welfare of his troops. He resolved never again to miss a chance to be on the lead plane.

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For a week the medical personnel stayed in Jonestown placing bodies in body bags. There was no ambush, but more than 300 people, including women and children, had committed suicide rather than submit to whatever imaginary threat Jim Jones had persuaded them to believe. Poison had been placed in paper cups and consumed with a cheap fruit punch. Mothers had given the concoction to their children first, then taken the rest themselves. Bodies left for hours in the sun were black and bloated. The stench was everywhere.

When the medics returned to Fort Bragg, Chaplain Dempsey visited each soldier daily to help them process their feelings. Horrible experiences bottled up inside often spelled trouble for soldiers later. The troops spoke of finding not Bibles but Soviet propaganda in Jonestown. There were decaying bodies of children and babies which tore at the hearts of the soldiers who were fathers. Chaplain Dempsey listened to every word, prayed with the troops, and in some cases formed groups to share intentionally their experiences and their support for one another.

Chaplain Paul H. Vruwink, the 1st Corps Support Command Chaplain at Fort Bragg, and Chaplain Philip Silverstein, the Jewish Chaplain, lent their support. Eventually fewer soldiers needed to talk; the nightmares went away. Prayer, presence, and time had done their healing work with those who had performed this mission of sadness and mercy.

Black Gold:
North to Alaska
1977-1978

Alaska, called “the last frontier” in America, was a land of great extremes: first among the states in area, last in population, coldest state in winter and potentially richest in mineral resources. One of the nation's biggest bargains since 1867 when Secretary of State William H. Seward purchased it from Russia at less than two cents per acre, Alaska a hundred years later was a region of gold, grizzlies, and oil.135

Construction on the $4.5 billion Trans-Alaska pipeline project, first proposed in 1969, was finally begun in 1974. In June 1977 oil began to flow from Prudhnow Bay on the Arctic Ocean through the 799-mile, 48 inch hot-oil pipeline to the Gulf of Alaska port of Valdez.136 With elevated prices for oil in 1977, Alaska was enjoying an economic boom. The pipeline was a state and national asset.

The mission of the 172nd Infantry Brigade, whose Deputy Commander was Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, was to defend Alaska and most particularly the oil pipeline.137 The 4,500 soldiers of the 172nd, known as the “Snowhawks,” trained in the winter to fight as ski troops, in the summer as mountain troops. One of their most famous yearly exercises usually took place in February and was entitled appropriately, “Operation Jack Frost.”138

The defense of Alaska, as conceptualized, involved more than one infantry brigade, of course.139 The Joint U.S. Alaska Command, headquartered at Fort Richardson near Anchorage, was commanded by a lieutenant general. The position was usually filled by the Air Force or by the Army. The land force, commanded in 1977 by Brigadier General Otis Lynn, was U.S. Army Alaska

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(USARAL) and had its command headquarters at Fort Richardson as well.\textsuperscript{140} Army units were posted at Forts Richardson, Wainwright (near Anchorage), and Greely (at Delta Junction).

Religious support for the soldiers and family members in Alaska was managed and coordinated as in other major commands (MACOMs). Chaplain Robert B. Howerton was the US Army Alaska Command Chaplain, succeeded by Chaplain Trevor Turner in 1978. The MACOM Chaplain’s Office was at Fort Richardson, which was staffed for direct religious support of that installation by the garrison chaplains and chaplain assistants. Among the chaplains at Fort Richardson, supporting the MACOM and garrison soldiers, were Chaplains Irwin Loud (Methodist), David Peterson (Presbyterian), John Sittler (Lutheran), Leonard Lee (Baptist), and Martin Fleming (Roman Catholic).\textsuperscript{141} At Fort Wainwright, over the course of two years, Chaplains Clement Marcantonio (Roman Catholic), Jimmy L. Young (Methodist), Don L. Gardella (United Church of Christ) and Andrew A. Shimek (Roman Catholic) covered the pluralistic religious needs of the garrison and particularly of the 222nd Aviation Company, which frequently had difficult and dangerous missions flying in Alaska’s weather.

Fort Greely, technically a sub-post of Fort Richardson, was the home of the 172nd Infantry Brigade when it was in the field. With approximately 700 soldiers and 400 military families, Fort Greely was 105 miles from Fairbanks. Located at Fort Greely were the Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC), a FORSCOM activity training soldiers to operate and survive in Arctic conditions, and the Arctic Regions Test Center, an Army Material Command activity, which tested equipment such as the Apache helicopter and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) for dependability in temperatures of -40 and -50 degrees Fahrenheit.

Support for the soldiers and family members was provided at Fort Greely by a small garrison which included two doctors, two dentists, two chaplains and one JAG officer for legal matters. Chaplain William L. Hufham was the Protestant chaplain, and Chaplains Ken J. Gilly and Alfred S. Arvay were the Roman Catholic chaplains for the 172nd Brigade from 1976-1978.\textsuperscript{142}

The religious program at Fort Greely was well attended by the command, soldiers, and families. The post chapel seated 350 people and supported a Protestant congregation of approximately 250 active parishioners, a slightly larger Catholic congregation, and a combined choir (at times) of 70 choir members. Jewish support for holy days was provided from Fort Lewis, Washington.

In addition to the worship services, choir ministry, Sunday Schools, and Christian women’s and men’s groups, there was a Soldier Fellowship scheduled each Friday night to offset the temptation by many soldiers in the remote and lonely area to spend the evening at a bar. Chaplain Gilly covered many of the field exercises conducted by the 172nd Brigade, while Chaplain Hufham provided services and counseling support for the Test Center and for the Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC).\textsuperscript{143} While ministering to the soldiers in the NWTC, Chaplain Hufham took and passed the training courses in winter survival, river crossing, glacier traverse techniques, and mountain climbing.\textsuperscript{144}

The dangers of living in Alaska without common sense survival preparation were apparent daily. Armored vehicles attempting to cross rivers on ice bridges occasionally fell through the ice, drowning some soldiers and creating serious frostbite for others. Avalanches buried troops on skis.

\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter}
Aircraft crashed into snow-covered mountains and were lost until the Spring thaw. Drivers ran out of gasoline and froze to death in their vehicles. Airborne Rangers from Fort Stewart, Georgia, while jumping into training areas, suffered broken legs when they hit the permafrost. Even at the Fort Greely dump, aggressive black and grizzly bears could be a hazard.¹⁴⁵

In general, however, most soldiers found their tours challenging and interesting. Chief of Chaplains Orris E. Kelly, Deputy Chief Thaddeus Malanowski, and FORSCOM Staff Chaplain Kermit D. Johnson, who visited Alaska in 1977-78, found morale high.

Life for ministry team members was very similar to that of frontier preachers a hundred years before. In addition to their normal religious support duties, many chaplains and assistants voluntarily assumed jobs to make positive contributions to the quality of life at their posts. Chaplain William Hufham at Fort Greely was the Scoutmaster and, with his wife’s help, supported the Bowling League, the Little League Baseball Program, and the activities at the Youth Recreation Center. For all of his work beyond normal duty requirements, Chaplain Hufham was named military “Man of the Year” for Alaska in 1978 by the Commander, U.S. Army Alaska.¹⁴⁶ Such efforts were always commendable, but they also underscored the valuable assets commanders had in their chaplain and chaplain assistant teams in support of soldiers and family members in remote locations.

Retirement and Tribute:
Realizing the Best of Times

After many years of fruitful ministry, Chaplain Orris E. Kelly retired as Chief of Chaplains on June 30, 1979. His successor, Chaplain (Major General) Kermit D. Johnson wrote the following tribute to Chaplain Kelly:

Chaplain Kelly’s contributions to the Army and the chaplaincy will long be remembered. We will associate his name with the Professional Development Plan, Management by Objectives for Results, Family Life Centers, Staff and Parish Development, Division Restructuring, Phase III Basic Chaplain Training, and Affirmative Action and Minority Recruiting. This partial list serves to remind us not only of his leadership, but of him as a person, his sincerity, warmth and openness. He has set for us an example for our ministry individually and together.¹⁴⁷

Chaplain Kelly himself was optimistic both for his own future ministry with the Division of Chaplains of the United Methodist Church as well as for the Army Chaplaincy as a whole. He noted in a forward entitled, “The Best and the Worst of Times,” which appeared in the fall issue of the Military Chaplains Review:

By maintaining our trust in God and each other, by cherishing the vision of what we are capable of becoming and by cherishing the development of the same in others, by enjoying life long intellectual and spiritual growth, by cultivating the capacity to feel

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and express love and joy, tragedy and grief, and by viewing humanity as one while respecting diversity...tomorrow [we] might be able to say, These are the best of times.\textsuperscript{148}
ENDNOTES


4. Ibid., p.23.


10. Ibid.


12. Ibid.


19. Telephone interview with Chaplain (Col.) Edward O'Shea, Fernandina Beach, Florida, 17 July 1995. Note: Chaplain Kriete was assigned to the non-resident Strategic Studies faculty, Chaplain

20. Ibid., p.23.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 15.

28. Ibid., p.16.


30. Ibid.


32. Ibid., p.18.

33. Ibid.


35. Ibid., pp.69-70.


37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.


40. Ibid., p.17.
41. Ibid., p.17.
43. Chief of Chaplains Historical Review 1975-1976, p.27.
44. Chief of Chaplains Active Duty Fact Book, 1979, p.11.
47. Chief of Chaplain’s Historical Review, 1975-1976, p.16.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p.16.
52. In later years this action came to be known as “The Midnight Move” of the Chaplain School.
53. Chief of Chaplain’s Active Duty Fact Book, July 1, 1976, p.34.
56. Chief of Chaplains Historical Review 1975-76, p.44.
58. West Point graduates who have served in the Army as chaplains include Martin Parks, Curry Vaughn, Thomas McMinn, Ed Manning, Colin Kelly III, Samuel Lamback, Kermit Johnson, Scott Davies, Michael Raymo, Charles Debney and George Pejakovich. Chaplain Joseph Beasley taught history for 9 years; Chaplain John Brinsfield taught history there for 4 years. Bishop Leonidas Polk was a graduate but served later as a Confederate general.
59. Ibid. Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Marc Abramowitz raised the funds for the Jewish Chapel at West Point in the early 1980's and was the Jewish Chaplain at the time it was completed. Chaplain Abramowitz was promoted to Colonel before his retirement.
60. Ibid.


68. Chief of Chaplains Active Duty Fact Book July 1, 1976, p.20.


72. Change of Fiscal year from July 1 to October 1 (one extra quarter in 1976)


75. Councell, p.35.


83. Chief of Chaplain’s Active Duty Fact Book, July 1979, p.16.


86. Ibid., p.33.

87. Ibid., p.34.


90. Office of the Chief of Chaplain’s Historical Review, October 76 - September 77, p.15.

91. Ibid., p.24.


93. Ibid.


96. Ibid.

97. Ibid., pp. III-6-III-7.


99. Ibid.


103. Ibid., p.52.


112. Office of the Chief of Chaplain’s Historical Review, October 68 - September 79, p.54.


122. Personal memoirs of Chaplain John Brinsfield, Protestant Chaplain, Sinop, Turkey, 1975-76.

123. A few years later Chaplain James Little came on active duty as an Army Chaplain.

124. Note: Baptisms in the Black Sea seem to have a tradition stretching back almost 2,000 years to the story of St. Andrew’s baptisms during his missions to Asia Minor (Turkey) and perhaps to Scythia (Russia). Many of the Army chaplains assigned to Diogenes Station, including Chaplains John Brinsfield and John Stake, continued the tradition by baptizing Army, Navy and Air Force personnel by immersion on the “American beach” near the installation.


127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.


133. Ibid.

134. Interview with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Terry Dempsey, April 18, 1995.


136. Ibid.

137. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) W. L. Hufham, March 31, 1995.


139. The 6th Infantry Division in Alaska had not yet activated in 1978.


143. Interview with Chaplain Hufham, March 31, 1995. As late as June of 1993 the Northern Warfare Training Center was requesting their own chaplain due to the dangerous field training they conducted.

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid.

CHAPTER IV
THE JOHNSON YEARS:
REAFFIRMING THE IDENTITY OF THE CHAPLAINCY
1979-1982

Perhaps the central issues which dominated the three years Chaplain Kermit D. Johnson was Chief of Chaplains centered on defining the Army Chaplaincy as a valid and legal ministry to soldiers of many faiths under the U.S. Constitution and reaffirming the prophetic role of chaplains in the Army. Yet there were other pioneering initiatives during this period as well which must not be obscured by the debates that evoked national publicity. Chaplain Johnson reminded the Corps, throughout his tenure as Chief, that "the soldier is our first priority." That one theme was a constant not only in the Johnson Years, but also throughout the modern history of the ministry in the Army.

Milestones:
- Defense of the Army Chaplaincy as a Constitutional Ministry to Soldiers
- Strengthening Chaplain and Chapel Activity Specialist Teamwork
- Emphasis on Catholic Chaplain Recruitment
- Raising the Ethical Consciousness of the Army
- Affirmation of Multi-cultural Ministries for a Pluralistic Army
- Initiatives in Homiletics, Parish Development, and Family Life Programs
- Mobilization and Army Reserve Coordination

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Ministries of Courage, Commitment and Compassion

Army chaplains are an essential element of the Army's morale and welfare activities. They administer a variety of programs which offer soldiers and their families the opportunity for religious worship and religious activities. This is the primary responsibility of the Army Chaplaincy.

General Edward C. Meyer
Chief of Staff
May 1982

The Cold War Heats Up

By mid-1979, the campaign for the Presidency of the United States already was picking up momentum. The race was between the incumbent Democratic President, Jimmy Carter, and his conservative Republican challenger, and former Governor of California, Ronald Reagan. This election would dramatically change the direction of the United States, for it marked a swing toward a harder line against the perceived Communist threat world-wide. This profound reorientation would be felt in international affairs, in national strategy, and would subsequently affect both the Army and its Chaplaincy.

During his four-year term in the White House, President Carter had begun to move the country toward wider social programs domestically and reduced confrontationalism in foreign affairs. He placed great emphasis on human rights issues around the globe. He had already agreed to the new Panama Canal Treaty which was ratified by a single vote in 1980. His policies, like those of many predecessors, were not always popular with the American public. Many citizens expressed deep concerns about the combative threats of the Soviet Union, and the Communist influence in Central America. Inflation, high unemployment, and skyrocketing oil prices were of greatest public interest. Carter had sought to reduce the military presence in Korea and Europe but without success. On 4 November 1979, a mob seized the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, and held 66 Americans hostage. A rescue attempt five months later ended in tragedy in the desert near Tehran. The humiliation of American citizens and the country's seeming inability to do anything about it, played a significant role in the election campaign and perhaps in the defeat of the incumbent first-term President.

Few of the current policies or conditions endeared themselves to citizens who were becoming more conservative politically and socially. The Religious Right was beginning to flex its muscle, particularly the Moral Majority, led by the Reverend Jerry Falwell. It came as no surprise, then, that Jimmy Carter was defeated by the famous actor and avid conservative, Ronald W. Reagan.

The Reagan Presidency put greater stress on fighting communism and, to meet that objective, increased spending for the military. In Central America as well as in Europe and Asia, the Reagan administration confronted any perceived threat to United States sovereignty or to the equilibrium of the Western hemisphere. Reagan's main concern in foreign policy was to contain and tame the Soviet Union. He saw Communism as "godless and immoral." Army Secretary John O. Marsh, Jr., defined

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the Army's mission as those measures necessary "to deter any threat to our National Interests and, failing deterrence, to fight and win on terms favorable to the United States."6

To ensure deterrence, the Army began a monumental program of modernization. In order to man and equip the Army to fulfill its mission, total Army allocations rose to $82 billion in FY 1982. Among the many considerations and expenditures was the development of new weapons systems and particularly delivery systems for nuclear warheads. These initiatives increased the anxiety of many Americans who were fearful of nuclear proliferation, and many entertained visions of a nuclear holocaust. Fears increased on March 28, 1979, when an accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania released 15,000 gallons of heavy water from its core, "causing hundreds of fuel rods to melt and triggering the release of radioactive isotopes."7 Many citizens were forced to move away from their homes, for there was great uncertainty as to the long range effects of the disaster.

The Army, moreover, was still struggling to meet recruiting needs following the cessation of the draft. On July 6, 1979, the Army announced that it would accept 17 year old non-high school graduates in order to meet its personnel requirements. Problems with drugs and alcohol abuse continued to plague the Army as did a high rate of disciplinary problems among soldiers. In spite of that, there were many hopeful signs on the horizon for the recovery of the Army following the still lingering effects of Vietnam.

A New Chief of Chaplains

On 2 July 1979, Chaplain (Brigadier General) Kermit D. Johnson was promoted to Major General and appointed Chief of Chaplains by Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer. Chaplain Johnson was born in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In June 1947, he entered the United States Military Academy at West Point, and graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in the class of 1951. He was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Infantry. After completing the Infantry Officer Basic Course and Airborne training, he was assigned to the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He later served during the Korean War as a platoon leader and company commander in the 2d Infantry Division. In October 1954, he resigned his active duty commission and went to the Orient where he spent two years as a lay missionary. In 1957, he entered Princeton Theological Seminary and graduated with a Master of Divinity degree in 1960. He was ordained a minister in the United Presbyterian Church, USA. Reverend Johnson reentered the Army as a chaplain and was assigned consecutively to Fort Benning, to Germany, and as the Post Chaplain at West Point. He attended Command and General Staff College in 1969, after which he was sent to the Defense Language Institute to study the Vietnamese language. He was then assigned as Senior Advisor to the Vietnamese Armed Forces’ Chiefs of Chaplains. He graduated from the Army War College in 1976, and became the United States Army Forces Command Chaplain (FORSCOM), at Fort McPherson, Georgia.8 In June 1978 he was promoted to Brigadier General and appointed Deputy Chief of Chaplains. One year later he became the Army’s fifteenth Chief of Chaplains.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) President Jimmy Carter and Chaplain Johnson salute fallen soldiers from the Iran Rescue Mission.

(Bottom) Chaplain Robert Bendick and Chaplain Johnson visit soldiers in Italy.
Chaplain Patrick J. Hessian, a Roman Catholic priest (also from Minnesota), was promoted to Brigadier General in July 1979 as well and became Chaplain Johnson's Deputy Chief of Chaplains. Immediately preceding his promotion Chaplain Hessian had served as the Command Staff Chaplain for U. S. Army Europe and Seventh Army.9

A Salt and Pepper
View of the Chaplaincy

The Chief of Chaplain's view of the Chaplaincy was formed out of his own experience, training and educational pursuits. His view of the Chaplaincy was in response to what he determined were the two basic questions: What kind of Chaplaincy do we want? What kind of chaplains do we want to be?10

Previously in his career, Chaplain Johnson had produced several important studies which impacted on his analytic vision of the ministry of chaplains. While at Command and General Staff College in 1969, he wrote "A Study of Various Role Expectations for the U.S. Army Chaplain." This was a valuable work on role identification and role conflict. It looked at how roles are perceived by commanders, chaplains and endorsing agents. He wrote a second study while he was a student at the US. Army War College, "Factors Influencing Job Satisfaction Among Army Chaplains," in May of 1976. Both of these studies provided Johnson insights into the Chaplaincy that few people had. As Command Staff Chaplain at Forces Command, he assigned his deputy, Chaplain Paul Forsberg, to complete a command-wide study on soldier perceptions and expectations for the Army's religious programs. More than 4,500 soldiers were polled with 14 key survey conclusions.11 Among these were the following observations:

1. Young soldiers are a highly diverse and mobile group seeking identity and independence.
2. Young soldiers overwhelmingly support the military Chaplaincy but question the chaplain's understanding of their religious needs and problems.
3. Young soldiers will rarely be found in the traditional chapel setting.12

Chaplain Johnson brought all these insights to his position as Chief of Army Chaplains.

His vision for the future was a Chaplaincy that operated as a team, not one in which the senior chaplain made all of the decisions alone. He directed the Chaplain Board to develop models for team ministry. Later he wrote in an introduction to an issue of the Military Chaplains Review, "we have started to bring people to workshops, and we have been training chaplains and chapel activity specialists and lay persons together—like salt and pepper in the same shaker.13

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Setting The Course For The Future

Three weeks after his installation as Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain Johnson sponsored his first Command Chaplain Conference, July 15-19, 1979. The theme of the conference was "Reaching Today's Soldier." In his written preface to the meetings Chaplain Johnson addressed the participants:

As I enter into my first year as Army Chief of Chaplains, I am filled with gratitude to God for the outstanding dedication and accomplishments of chaplains throughout the world. Your commitment to the Church and to the Army has resulted in religious ministry which is truly spiritual, professional and effective. I am proud of each of you! ... The theme for our conference this year is "Reaching Today's Soldier." This is a highly appropriate theme because the soldier is our highest priority for ministry ... Ministry always begins with persons—not programs. There is no substitute for genuinely caring ... the Spirit continues to work in preparing both the Chaplaincy and young soldiers for creative encounters in ministry. The opportunity awaits our response.¹⁴

Chaplain Johnson did not envision any immediate policy or program changes during his first year as Chief; in fact, he continued all the major programs that had been implemented before he took office.¹⁵ He favored change only when it was necessary to meet the needs of soldiers and the system, not simply for change sake. His view of the Chaplaincy was that it was an ever-changing institution with challenges to be met by chaplains fully empowered as preachers, pastors and prophets and by chapel activity specialists empowered to make important individual contributions.

Roman Catholic Issues

The first major issue facing the new Chief of Chaplains was the concern of the Roman Catholic hierarchy about the selection of the third consecutive Protestant Chief of Chaplains. The ecclesiastical leaders made it clear that their displeasure was not with Chaplain Johnson, but with the system that failed to select a priest and with the impression that priests were not receiving equitable treatment. The perception persisted that not enough Roman Catholic chaplains were being selected for high level staff and leadership positions.

In order to ameliorate the situation, the Chief of Chaplains met with Cardinal Francis Cooke in New York and later wrote to the Most Reverend Joseph T. Ryan, Coadjutor Archbishop of the Military Ordinariate, on July 16, 1981. He pointed out that he was prepared to assist the Military Ordinariate in recruiting priests. In October 1979, the Army had 1,434 chaplains on active duty.¹⁶ There were only 242 Catholic chaplains on duty compared to the desired goal of 506. Chaplain Johnson proposed the following based in part on an extensive survey of Catholic ministry issues by Chaplain John J. Cunniffe.¹⁷

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An enhanced Chaplain Candidate Program
- A Catholic chaplain assigned to visit all Bishops to recruit priests for the Army
- A raise in the age limit for incoming Catholic chaplains to age 50 (normally age 32)
- A continuation on duty for Catholic chaplains not selected for promotion
- A change in Army Regulations 210-16 and 210-50, to allow priests to qualify for two bedroom quarters
- Institution of a Ministry to Priest Program
- Development of a recruiting brochure to be mailed to 42,000 priests across the nation

Additionally, the Chief of Chaplains approved the design of a "hometown procurement program for Catholic Chaplains; greater use of auxiliary and contract chaplains; acceptance of ordained deacons, if approved by the Military Ordinariate; and an educational program for commanders, chaplains and laity to inform them about the severity of the Catholic shortage and its deleterious impact on ministry to Catholic soldiers and their families."19

In late August 1979, Chaplain Johnson and his Deputy, Chaplain Hessian, made a video tape that was distributed to the field. The tape conveyed 22 priority issues of the new leadership team.20

The major emphases were:

- The need for collegiality among chaplains.
- The Roman Catholic priest shortage and the need to recruit and retain more Catholic chaplains.
- The need to shore up chapel activity specialist job satisfaction. The 71M MOS had one of the lowest retention rates in the Army at that time. There was a need to show personal interest in the contributions of CAS team members.
- The need to make the chaplain more visible to the soldier.
- Enhancing spirituality as the "depth dimension of our lives."
- Encouraging training of the laity
- Recognition of the importance of Management by Objectives for Results (MBOR) as the means of "linking programs to funding."

Most of these priorities had been noted by previous Chiefs, but the specific circumstances surrounding them continued to present new challenges.

**Prophetic Witness As An Ethical Imperative**

Chaplain Johnson exercised perhaps more personal interest in ethical and political matters than any of his successors. This was evident in the extent of his discussions of Central American and nuclear policy issues during the Reagan Administration's first two years. His prompting in these
matters came from several directions. First, he had a deep commitment and involvement in ethical issues that may have had their origin in the Honor Code practiced at West Point, and later as a result of his theological training at Princeton Theological Seminary. Secondly, he received information on conditions in Central America from non-governmental and church organizations in direct contact with missionaries and indigenous persons who resided there at the time. Finally, in the early 1980s the churches were speaking out on nuclear warfare and reassessing Just War theory as well as raising questions concerning United States counterrevolutionary activity against the Sandinistas and other Latin American insurgency forces. All of these seemed to converge and propel Johnson to take strong positions which he felt to be correct and which often strained relationships with those who disagreed with him.

An example of Chaplain Johnson's openness in discussing ethical issues impacting on national policy appears to be a chance meeting with the former Vice President, Walter F. Mondale. On February 3, 1982, the two men were on the same Eastern Airlines Flight 185, during which time they discussed several topics of mutual interest. Johnson gave a handwritten note to the Vice President while continuing with his flight. Among the concerns he raised with respect to Administration policies in his note to Mondale were the following:

- The $25 billion in arms sales world-wide by American companies.
- The new federalism that may "encourage inequity, injustice and racism."
- The rape and desecration of the land for commercial profit.
- The widening gap between the rich and the poor. "Trickle Down Economics is precisely opposite to the Biblical concept of Justice."
- Sponsorship, support and perpetuation of military dominated regimes, especially in El Salvador and Guatemala.
- Signs that we are considering strategic and tactical nuclear warfare as possible or viable.

The former Vice President sent a two page response to Chaplain Johnson on March 1, 1982. He thanked Johnson for his "very thoughtful letter," and concluded by stating, "I am pleased to see that someone in your position cares so much about the direction in which our country is headed."

**A Constitutional Challenge**

The relative calm of the Army Chaplaincy was abruptly disturbed on November 23, 1979, when two Harvard University law students filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Chaplaincy as an establishment of religion. The action producing this disruption caused the Chaplain Corps to look deeply into its soul. A questioning of the constitutionality of the Army's religious program affected the Chaplaincy for several years. In many fundamental ways the Army's spiritual care system would never again be the same.

The two Harvard Law School seniors, Joel Katcoff and Allen M. Wieder, filed suit in the
District Court for the Eastern District, in Brooklyn, New York. Their suit against the Army named Clifford L. Alexander, then Secretary of the Army et. al., as the defendants. The suit alleged that the Chaplaincy violated the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The shock waves of this lawsuit quickly reached the most remote military outposts and caused chaplains at every level of the Army to scrutinize all religious programs and activities, as well as their own motivation for ministry in the military.

This was the first time the constitutionality of the military's religious program was questioned in a formal legal procedure. In the middle of the 19th century some Southern states had petitioned Congress to eliminate chaplains. These "Memorials," were not acted upon favorably by the Congress; consequently they were never introduced as cases to be heard in court. Other challenges dealing with state support for religion in general arose periodically and were decided in a series of court cases ranging from local state to Supreme Court levels. 24

Initially the motivation of the students for filing their suit was unclear. Some legal officials felt the suit was initiated to impress a law professor or to get classroom credit. In the November 30, 1979 issue of The Harvard Crimson both Katcoff and Wieder commented on the case but aside from observing that "The state should not take money from its citizens to support religion," they had no comment on why they filed the suit. 25 Joel Katcoff wrote later:

As best I can recall, the issue first came up after Allen Wieder and I took Constitutional Law as 2L's. The existence of a governmentally financed Chaplaincy appeared to us to be inconsistent with the principles we had just learned in Constitutional Law. We raised the topic with a number of law professors, but did not get a satisfactory justification for taxpayer financing of religious practice. Coincidentally, Allen and I were doing some research and brief-writing (on non-constitutional issues) for a public interest organization whose director was a visiting professor at the Law School. Perhaps this is what gave us enough confidence to try to be litigators despite our dearth of experience. In addition, the topic itself was sufficiently interesting to drive us forward during the third year of law school and beyond, notwithstanding the considerable amount of work involved. 26

There may have been one other factor more clearly tied to the Harvard Law School. In order to graduate from Harvard with a Doctor of Jurisprudence (J. D.) Degree rather than a Bachelor of Laws (LL. B.) degree, third year law students (3 L's) had to present a research paper or brief to the faculty demonstrating their ability to contribute to the academic study of the law. According to The Harvard Crimson (November 30, 1979) and the Harvard Law Record (December 7, 1979), Katcoff and Wieder had begun research on the Army Constitutionality issue in the Spring of 1979. 27 They reviewed cases and opinions by Justices William Brennan and William O. Douglas who was "on the record as saying the Chaplaincy is unconstitutional." 28 They corresponded with Chaplain Cliff Weathers, Director of Plans, Programs and Policies, Office of the Army Chief of Chaplains, early in the Summer requesting the number of chaplains then on duty and other seemingly innocuous

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information. By November 23 they had prepared their brief and filed the case. Two weeks later, in December, they secured approval by the Harvard faculty granting "third-year paper credit for the brief." 29

While there may have been many motives for challenging the constitutionality of the Army Chaplaincy, including intellectual curiosity, there was at least one clear benefit for Joel Katcoff and Allen Wieder. Both graduated from Harvard with J. D. degrees which were awarded in part for approved work on the Army case. One might wonder if the status of the students as "aggrieved taxpayers" was not overstated. One might also wonder if the students' legal ethics were not a bit bizarre. They opposed in theory the tax support for religious activities of benefit to a million soldiers, but they accepted indirect Federal tax support for an expensive legal case which dragged on for 6 years which was of principal benefit to only two ambitious students.

The Argumentation

The plaintiffs (Katcoff and Wieder) in the 1979 case stipulated that the Army Chaplaincy violated the First Amendment to the Constitution: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." The official court document states:

This is a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by federal taxpayers challenging the constitutionality of the United States Army's religious support program. Plaintiffs seek (i) a judgment declaring that the Chaplaincy program constitutes an establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and (ii) an injunction restraining the defendants from approving or otherwise providing funds or support in any respect to religious activities in the Army. 30

Allegations of unconstitutionality included: expenditure of government funds for chaplains' salaries, for religious facilities, programs and materials, as well as the actual conducting of religious programs, religious education and pastoral care. The plaintiffs stated that, "The United States government by design and appearance lends its prestige, influence and power to organized religion by granting commissions, rank and uniform to Army Chaplains." 31 They further alleged that denominational involvement in the selection of chaplains "constitutes excessive entanglement between church and state." Katcoff and Wieder stated that rather than enhancing the free exercise of religion, "... the Army Chaplaincy program serves to inhibit that free exercise." 32 This argument rested on the fact that chaplain representation did not include every possible denomination or faith group -- regardless of size or desire. The plaintiffs also cited the fact that the commander, not the chaplain, is ultimately responsible for the Army's religious program (Army Regulation 165-20, "Duties of Chaplains and Commanders' Responsibilities"). The "free exercise" argument did not play a major role for the plaintiffs in future proceedings. In ensuing months, the plaintiffs would argue the

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Establishment Clause while the defendants argued the Free Exercise Clause.

In place of the current Chaplaincy system, the plaintiffs advocated an "alternative Chaplaincy program which is privately funded and controlled." The students presented no studies or other evidence that supported their contention that civilian clergy could feasibly carry on military ministry. The one illustration offered (Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod) proved to be highly unsuccessful in providing ministry to soldiers of that denomination. The denomination's own leaders attested to the insurmountable problems encountered that led to inconsistency and often times ineffectiveness in providing ministry. Studies done by the Chaplaincy and other denominational groups all pointed to the impossibility of providing effective ministry through a civilian clergy program. The government effectively argued that the military environment and demands on clergy is exceedingly different from the civilian environment and pastoral responsibilities. It also reminded the court that civilian clergy serving in the military would not enjoy the protections granted to military chaplains under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions regarding treatment of prisoners of war and detainees.

The lawsuit included one hundred and twenty-three interrogatories and requests for production of documents. The interrogatories were extensive and indicated that the plaintiffs had invested considerable effort in trying to understand the Chaplaincy system. Actually, the plaintiffs received most of the information they used in filing the suit from the Office of The Chief of Chaplains. Over a period of several months they made "Freedom of Information Act" (FOIA) requests. The materials requested were not unusual and it was assumed they were intended for a research project at Harvard Law School. The Chaplaincy thus, in conforming with the law, provided the very documents that formed the basis of the suit against it.

In many instances, the interrogatories and requests for reproduction were so burdensome that the Army could not reasonably provide the documents demanded. To provide specific answers to each interrogatory would require the Army to search worldwide for information that in many cases was decades old. Interrogatory #77, for instance, requested "a detailed description of the Army's operation of devotional programs and dissemination of religious news and information through radio, TV and news media . . . Produce and permit plaintiffs to inspect and copy the transcripts of all such devotional programs." The government delayed its response for almost two years. Finally, materials were provided, but only about one third of the requests. Other answers followed at later dates.


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(succeeded later by Chaplain James Edgren). Task force members were responsible to provide information related to their directorate area of interest in response to allegations, interrogatories and requests made by the OTJAG. Army Reserve Chaplains, temporarily called to active duty, conducted historical, sociological and legal studies, and literature searches. Chaplain scholars, notably Chaplain Cecil Currey, a reserve officer and professor of history in Florida, devoted weeks to culling documents from the Library of Congress, historical archives and university libraries. These studies provided an important perspective on the Chaplaincy. Chaplain Scott analyzed the materials provided by the task force, prepared them for approval by the Chief of Chaplains, and forwarded them to OTJAG to become a part of the government's first response to the plaintiffs in January 1980. The seventy-six page document submitted by the Army outlined the history of the Chaplaincy from its origins. It also provided a succinct, but extensive and articulate summation of the legal basis and current statutory authority of the Army Chaplaincy.35

Early in the proceedings the government also raised the questions of "standing," and "political interest." They argued that the plaintiffs "have not shown requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy herein to grant standing, but merely rely on their status as past taxpayers."36 The crux of the issue was whether or not the plaintiffs were taxpayers when they filed suit. The plaintiffs responded that they were and would continue to be taxpayers. That answer did not satisfy the defendants and the issue remained a point of contention until the case ended in 1986. The government sought to invoke the two prong test of Flast v. Cohen: (a) a logical link between taxpayer status and the "legislative enactment attacked," and (b) "a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged."37 The political argument cited numerous legal opinions that chaplains have "historically been viewed to be authorized by the First Amendment."38

The legal opinions offered by the government identified modern examples of support for the Chaplaincy and the interdependency and complementary nature of the two clauses of the First Amendment (establishment, and free exercise).39 There had been times when one part of the First Amendment had to give way to the other in spite of appearances of conflict. For instance, it has been considered essential to provide for the free exercise of religion for soldiers—no one questioned that. In order to accomplish that, however, there may have been the appearance of a violation of the Establishment Clause. The government contended that, like any other citizens, soldiers are entitled to free exercise of religion. The means by which the Congress has decided to provide for free exercise of religion is the military Chaplaincy. The government also argued that, "The Institution and Maintenance of the Chaplains Corps is Important to the National Defense, and is a Valid and Necessary Exercise of Congressional War Power."40 Government attorneys argued that the Congress has the duty to raise and support armies. In many cases courts have shown deference to the military because of its unique needs. Some Supreme Court Justices at least obliquely implied that the Chaplaincy would pass constitutional muster if it were to meet the free exercise needs of the lonely soldier at an isolated outpost. The defendants also argued that the Chaplaincy met the three prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.41 Finally, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claims were not "reviewable by this court because the substantive questions they raise constitute political questions under the standards set forth in Baker v. Carr."42 It was argued later that Congress, as an independent arm of government, is not subject to the courts in these matters. The Congress, since

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1775, demonstrated that in significant and minuscule matters it continually approved and monitored the Chaplaincy. It fixed manpower ceilings, authorized pay, appropriated funds for programs and facilities, and often involved itself in matters regarding the welfare of a single chaplain or local religious program.

Rulings
1980-1984

During the remainder of 1980, numerous documents were submitted to the Court by both the plaintiffs and the defendants. Much of the maneuvering revolved around the questions of "Standing," "Production of Documents," and requests for summary judgment by the plaintiffs and the defendants. On March 7, 1980, Judge Jacob Mishler conducted the first hearing of the case. Joel Katcoff argued that there should be no military chaplains at all—under any circumstances. He further argued that civilian churches could and should provide this service. In August 1980, Judge Mishler published his opinion. He supported the plaintiffs' standing as taxpayers, and stated that the court did have jurisdiction to review the case. He also noted that sometimes the Establishment Clause must accommodate the Free Exercise Clause, particularly in the unique military environment. It appeared from the Judge's comments that the constitutionality of the Chaplaincy extended only so far as it supported the soldier's free exercise of religion. Whatever went beyond meeting free exercise rights was subject to review and possible prohibition. Some interpreted that to mean that the court under this rubric could evaluate each and every Chaplaincy program to see if it passed constitutional muster. If it did not meet the requirements, it would be disallowed or forbidden.

Judge Mishler's ruling caused serious concern throughout the Chaplaincy. There were questions about whether the government could win the case. Worse, some felt that the court would now become involved in approving programs and ministry and micro-managing the Chaplaincy from the dais. This did not happen, but the potential remained a clear and present danger as far as the management of the Chaplain Corps was concerned.

In what to some appeared as an overreaction to the Judge's decision, the Chaplaincy entered a period of intensive self-examination. Everything came under scrutiny. The Chief of Chaplains, and particularly the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, did not want to do anything that could in any way strengthen the plaintiffs' case.

As the Chaplaincy began to prepare for future legal maneuvering, Chaplain Scott recommended to Chaplain Johnson that a strategy conference be convened to include experts from all levels of the Chaplaincy and representatives of OTJAG. The Chief of Chaplains approved the idea and the meeting convened at Manressa Retreat House in Annapolis, Maryland, from 19-23 January 1981. Participants, besides active duty chaplains, included Reserve Chaplains David Heino, Israel Drazin and Cecil Currey, a representative from the Air Force Chief of Chaplain's Office, and Major Dodson from OTJAG. Chaplain Kermit Johnson attended the meeting on 22 January. The agenda included a top to bottom review of the Chaplaincy to determine what was constitutional and what

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might not contribute directly to meeting the free exercise needs of soldiers.

The Chief of Chaplains wrote:

The court challenge to the Constitutionality of the Chaplaincy is the single most critical issue facing us at this time. The future of the Chaplaincy rests on the outcome of the case, and the work done here at Manressa, hopefully, will provide material that will substantially assist us in influencing decisions made by the court. However, your conference goes beyond the court challenge and will allow us to take a serious and in-depth look at what we do as a Chaplaincy and why. It should provide this office with data for future directions and decisions.45

Chaplain Johnson also challenged the group to develop “a zero-based Chaplaincy.” His reference came from the Carter presidency in relation to zero-based budgeting. This emphasis was part of the total Army Staff’s deliberations in funding what was necessary “to accomplish the mission.” All elements of the Army Staff had been thinking along these lines.46 For the Chaplain Corps, Chaplain Johnson intended the term to refer to the basic ministerial role of chaplains:

The freeing aspect of this [concept] meant that we did not have to be bound by the past. Because of my emphasis on basic ministry, some of those oriented toward psychological and sociological tools felt that I was going to take a cudgel to these programs. I never did, and I never intended to; I only wanted to restore and emphasize first things: individual contact with soldiers, preaching, worship, care of souls, spirituality, ethics.47

Some chaplains did not understand what the Chief had in mind by the term “zero-based,” but the majority did realize that for Chaplain Johnson “the soldier was our first priority” for a ministry that was both pastorally supportive and morally challenging.

Conference participants received Issue Papers written by members of the task force. These papers proposed answers to allegations and interrogatories and provided a basis for discussions on varied topics. In spite of some bias, expressions of personal interest, and differences regarding the nature of the Chaplaincy and its future directions, considerable progress was made in developing positions on the chaplain’s role and functions, civilianization of the Chaplaincy, and the basic elements required for a viable Chaplaincy in the late twentieth century. Many of these ideas were later incorporated into court documents. Although Chaplain Johnson’s objectives for the meeting were not totally met, enough was accomplished that he was satisfied with the results.

Chaplain Israel Drazin, an Army reservist and a rabbi, favorably impressed the gathering with his legal and theological expertise. Upon returning to the Pentagon, Chaplain Scott recommended to Chaplain Johnson that Drazin be called to active duty for at least one year to help prepare for future developments in the court case. Chaplain Drazin already had done a great deal of work on the case and was willing to give it his full attention. Chaplain Drazin entered active duty and assumed total

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responsibility as the Chief's action officer upon Scott's reassignment in May 1982. Thereafter, Chaplain Drazin was responsible for representing the Office of the Chief of Chaplains to the OTJAG. He remained in that status until the conclusion of the case whereupon he was selected for a promotion to Brigadier General and appointed one of two Assistant Chiefs of Chaplains from the Reserve. Chaplain Drazin made outstanding contributions to the defense of the Chaplaincy in the court case and in other issues related to the First Amendment that arose during his active duty period, and in matters of religious practice and accommodation of religion in the Army.

During the Spring and Summer of 1981, documents from both plaintiffs and defendants flowed in and out of the courthouse. The defendants provided answers to some of the interrogatories and continued their arguments against standing for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought to compel the defendants to produce all the documents they requested. In the meantime significant changes had been made to the principals in the case. Secretary John O. Marsh, Jr., replaced Secretary of the Army Alexander; Judge Joseph McLaughlin replaced Judge Mishler; Ms Marilyn Go replaced Mr. Caro as the Assistant US Attorney, and Major Nardotti replaced Major Dodson.

Major Michael Nardotti worked closely with Chaplain Drazin and other chaplains in 1982. The teamwork between the JAG officers and the chaplains was outstanding. Chaplains Kermit Johnson, Don Shea, John Scott, Wayne Kuehne, and Israel Drazin had produced or collected an enormous file of information. Major Nardotti xeroxed every reference to chaplains in the statutory and legislative records of Congress—more than 600 pages of historic data. At times there were slight disagreements over the timing of arguments. "By 1982 every major argument was already on the table," Major General Nardotti recalled in 1995.48 "Some people wanted to ignore the standing argument and move directly to the free exercise argument, but we had to challenge the standing of the plaintiffs to prevent hundreds of other potential suits by students or others across the country."49 Eventually the chaplains deferred to the JAG officers who actually argued the case, yet both sides agreed that teamwork paid off when the work load was so large.

Debate on the taxpayer issue also continued into 1982. The government requested a dismissal of the case and the plaintiffs responded with a motion for summary judgment. In response to Chaplain Kermit Johnson's personal request, five general officers of the Army provided written statements in support of the Chaplaincy. General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, presented his views on the duty of the Army to meet the religious needs of soldiers. He stated further, "Chaplains have credibility with soldiers. Soldiers know that Chaplains share their common bond of personal experience. Perhaps most important for the soldier is that he knows the chaplain will always be there." General John W. Vessey, Vice Chief of Staff, spoke about the impossibility of civilians ministering on the dangerous battlefield. General Charles W. Bagnal, Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division wrote, "It is obvious to me that if we do not have chaplains in the Army ... we are prohibiting to a degree the free exercise of religion...we must never lose sight of this as we plan and execute our programs." General Frederick J. Koezen, Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Europe, noted that "only the Army Chaplaincy, because it is as mobile as the troops, can meet our religious support needs." Chaplain (Major General) Gerhardt W. Hyatt, USA Retired, stated that no civilian clergy had ever met the Army's comprehensive religious needs with any degree of

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success. Chaplain Kermit Johnson's affidavit was far more detailed than those of the other generals. He outlined the history of the Chaplaincy program, its roots in Congressional actions and the mechanisms by which it meets the free exercise of religion needs of soldiers. Major General Nardotti said later that Chaplain Johnson’s ability to persuade these general officers to make statements in support of the Chaplaincy as then constituted was an extremely valuable asset for the government’s case.

On June 8, 1982, Judge McLaughlin conducted a short hearing that basically dealt with the plaintiffs' request to take depositions from the five generals who submitted affidavits. He denied their request. On November 3, 1982, Judge McLaughlin conducted another hearing to address Motions for Summary Judgment, submitted by both plaintiffs and defendants. No decision was rendered until February 1, 1984. The significant conclusions provided by Judge McLaughlin included:

1. The Chaplaincy is Constitutional. He went on to say: "In its present form, then, the Army Chaplaincy is a constitutionally permissible means to a constitutionally mandated end."
2. Decided that the plaintiffs do have standing.
3. Congress has repeatedly funded the Chaplaincy.
4. The founding fathers saw no inconsistency between the First Amendment and a paid Chaplaincy.
5. The judge also noted the inability of the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod to provide effective ministry during the Vietnam War. Civilian ministry, as envisioned by the plaintiffs, would be even further negated without the substantive military logistical and transportation support provided by the Army for religious support to soldiers.

**Plaintiffs' Appeal, 1984**

Katcoff and Wieder were displeased with the determination of Judge McLaughlin. They appealed to the Second Circuit Court for a reversal of McLaughlin's decision. A panel of three judges heard the case on October 29, 1984. On January 22, 1985, the decision of the appeals court was published. The judges determined that:

1. The plaintiffs do have standing.
2. The Chaplaincy, "viewed in isolation" would fail to meet the establishment clause requirements as outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman. "However, neither the Establishment Clause nor the statutes creating and maintaining the Army Chaplaincy may be interpreted as if they existed in a sterile vacuum."
3. Defereence to Congress in matters pertaining to the military and its Chaplaincy is a well established and legitimate practice.
4. Free Exercise obligates Congress "to make religion available to soldiers who have

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been moved by the Army to areas of the world where religion of their own denomination is not available to them. Otherwise, the effect of compulsory military service could be to violate their rights under both Clauses of the First Amendment.\textsuperscript{59}

5. Assuming, hypothetically, that such a program (civilian Chaplaincy) could be launched, "it would be constantly teetering on the brink of disaster."\textsuperscript{60} "In short, plaintiffs' proposal is so inherently impractical as to border on the frivolous."\textsuperscript{61} They further stated that the feasibility of a civilian Chaplaincy "must in our view be resolved in favor of judicial deference to Congress' decisions in this area."\textsuperscript{62}

Not all of their findings were favorable to the Chaplaincy. "In a few areas, however, the reasonable necessity for certain activities of the military Chaplaincy is not readily available."\textsuperscript{63} One of the examples cited in the decision was stationing of chaplains in large metropolitan areas. Because of the court's hesitancy in this area, the case was remanded to the District Court to "determine if some activities are constitutionally permissible."\textsuperscript{64} The Court also determined that the appellees (Katcoff and Wieder) would be required to pay the costs of the District Court.

**Conclusion with Prejudice**

In January 1986, in the face of mounting financial costs, Katcoff and Wieder decided to drop the case. Eventually the government agreed to their action. Although Chaplain Hessian wanted to see the case through to its conclusion, he eventually acquiesced to Army lawyers and agreed to their recommendation to allow the plaintiffs to drop the case with prejudice. On February 7, 1986, the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate General informed the Chief of Chaplains that "On 31 January 1986, the plaintiff in Katcoff v. Marsh abandoned his lawsuit."\textsuperscript{65} More than six years had passed since the case was filed. Although many questions remained unanswered, at least the court answered the basic question of constitutionality for this case.

During the six year period of Katcoff, several other significant cases made their way into other courts that had a direct relationship to the Chaplaincy. In *Rostker v. Goldberg*, the central issue was "deference." The suit alleged that it was unconstitutional for the government to require only males to register for the draft.\textsuperscript{66} Supreme Court Justice Rehnquist wrote, "The Court has made it clear that even our most fundamental constitutional rights must in some circumstances be modified in the light of military needs, and that Congress' judgment as to what is necessary to preserve our national security is entitled to great deference." In John Garth Murray, et. al., v. Azie Taylor Morton, et. al., the plaintiffs alleged that the paid civilian chaplain in the House of Representatives was unconstitutional. The District Court in Washington, DC determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, but also cited the deference argument as reason for the court not to make a decision in the case.\textsuperscript{67}

The negative effects of the challenge to the constitutionality of the Chaplaincy were few and transient. The threat of placing all Chaplaincy programs under the scrutiny of the courts caused some

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curtailment of programs and activities and some temporary stagnation in others. The majority of the chaplains in the field continued uninterrupted in the performance of their religious duties. Soldiers' free exercise rights were not abridged in any way.

In the late 1970s, the Department of Defense established a study group to grapple with the problem of how the free exercise of religion could be respected while at the same time maintaining good order, discipline and morale. Chaplain Wayne Kuehne represented the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Committee meetings over a period of several years resulted in a principle of "accommodation." The thrust of this policy was to allow free expression of religious beliefs unless they impinge on such things as readiness, good order and discipline. The local commander maintained authority to make decisions regarding individual situations on a case by case basis, with the individual having the right of appeal to higher headquarters. This was not a major change in the way the Army operated, but it did affirm, on a policy level, the right of soldiers to freely exercise their religious beliefs.

There is little doubt that the Chaplaincy emerged from the court case as a much stronger structure and more resolved to be the instrument of government whereby the free exercise of religion is available to every soldier. There were several positive outcomes of the case. First, it forced the Chaplaincy into a healthy self-examination. It placed all of its programs and activities under the microscope. The Chaplaincy eliminated some programs that did not contribute to free exercise. Secondly, it required every chaplain to focus clearly on providing for the free exercise of religion as the raison d'être of the Chaplaincy. It furthermore made chaplains conscious that they must avoid at all cost any excessive entanglements between church and state, or any perception of violation of the Establishment Clause. Thirdly, it made clear that there are certain vulnerabilities to the Chaplaincy as an institution. There also may be limits to what the Chaplain Corps can do and retain protection under the Constitution. While the threat of the courts evaluating every program has been reduced, it undoubtedly will surface again in any new court challenge. The future of the Chaplaincy, as well as its past, will rest squarely on the support and good will of Congress, and on the Chaplaincy's ability to remain focused on providing for the free exercise of religion for soldiers as the legal basis for the existence of a uniformed ministry in the military.

Chaplaincy Goals

Chaplaincy Goals and Objectives for the fiscal years 1983-1984 were established by Chaplain Johnson in February 1981. The future direction of the Chaplaincy was promulgated in the "Chief of Chaplain's Guidance to MACOMs and Installations." The following specific priorities were declared:68

1. Explore means of enhancing chapel activity specialist job satisfaction and career opportunity
2. Prepare for mobilization
3. Emphasize recruitment and retention of Catholic chaplains and ministry to Catholics
4. Reaffirm religious pluralism in the Army

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
5. Provide moral and ethical impact on decision-making
6. Reach the unchurched in the Army
7. Increase soldier contact with chaplains
8. Develop closer denominational ties
9. Increase dialogue to decrease racism/sexism
10. Empower lay persons for ministry
11. Develop programs for spiritual formation and mission
12. Develop a Chaplain Support System (ministry to pastors)
13. Expand Family Life Ministry
14. Use the skills and education of chaplains and rely less on outside civilian consultants.

Each of these priorities was critical to maintaining the strength and viability of the Chaplaincy program. Leadership and supervision, particularly at the middle management (brigade) level, had been determined to be one of the weakest links in chaplain leadership. The U.S. Army Chaplain Academic Board reported in March of 1981 that “there was nothing in the Basic or Advanced courses which taught a chaplain how to be a brigade chaplain or how to supervise.” Increased training in this area would be provided by the Chaplain School. As noted elsewhere, preaching and worship were not considered high priorities by many commanders and their chaplains. Consequently, preaching often did not receive the attention it deserved. Division '86, the “heavy division doctrine,” was well on its way to implementation. It would be a larger division with more tanks, armored personnel carriers and other equipment. The Chaplaincy needed to make changes on how it would operate under this doctrine on a modern, highly mobile and exceedingly lethal battlefield.

In his goals for fiscal years 1984 and 1985, the Chief of Chaplains again began setting the course for the future. His major emphases were on Leadership and Supervision, Homiletics and Worship, preparing the Chaplaincy for implementing the Army's Division '86, and how religious requirements would be integrated into the new Army structure.

President Jimmy Carter introduced the concept of zero-based budgeting to the Congress and to the American people. Chaplain Johnson felt that the Chaplaincy could use this concept as a means of prioritizing missions and programs that the Chaplaincy wished to pursue. His notion was that we should not just continue programs because we had always done so, but should always be looking for new ideas and discarding old unworkable ideas and programs. The Katcoff case helped to refocus the Chaplaincy on those ministries that were clearly within the purview of the First Amendment, and provided a catalyst to discard those that were not. Chaplain Johnson, therefore, used the First Amendment as one measure by which programs or policies could be approved or disapproved.

**Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)**

A Defense Officer Personnel Management Act Policy (DOPMA) was implemented on 15 September 1981. DOPMA amended Title 10, US Code, the basic laws governing the Army and

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Department of Defense. The policy created a single promotion system for all field grade officers. It replaced the old duality of regular Army and USAR ranks. The Chaplaincy was one of the nine "competitive categories" created by DOPMA. Chaplains selected for promotion to major were automatically integrated into the Regular Army. This change generally meant that field grade chaplains could serve for longer periods than they could have under the old USAR system.

DOPMA also provided the opportunity for "selective continuation" in three year increments for chaplains who were not selected for promotion to either captain or major. It also accorded officers "continued individual promotion consideration and eligibility as long as he/she remains on active duty."

The continuation policy was particularly helpful in retaining chaplains for shortage denominations or faith groups.

Along with the changes in DOPMA, the Army also instituted a Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Originally there was space for only eight chaplains per class, but this was later expanded and all chaplains between four and nine years of active duty, and graduates of the Chaplain School Career Course (C-22) were expected to attend. The course had two phases: Phase I, a 120-hour nonresident preparatory course, and Phase II, a 9 week resident course. The course focused on leadership, management and tactical subjects.

Another major change in education occurred in the rewriting of AR 600-101. It "transferred to the various Army Schools primary responsibility for setting educational and skill standards" for officers, warrant officers and enlisted soldiers. This, in effect, meant that the Chaplain School would have greater input to its curriculum for chaplains. It also meant that responsibility for training chaplain assistants would be transferred from the Army Administration School, to the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School.

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**Ethical Leadership throughout the Army**

Concern about ethical and moral behavior has been a part of Chaplaincy history from the very beginning. Every Chief of Chaplains in every era has had to deal forthrightly with this issue. All did it with effectiveness. With the conclusion of the war in Vietnam, the wrenching social unrest, the discussions concerning strategic and tactical nuclear warfare, and the general moral disorientation in the United States in the late 1970s, setting ethical standards became more crucial to the Army and to the Chaplaincy.

The Chief of Chaplains was himself steeped in ethical matters. His interest in institutional ethics began as a cadet at West Point, and was later deepened by theological and philosophical studies at Princeton Theological Seminary. By the time Chaplain Johnson was assigned as a student at the Army Command and General Staff College (1969), he was already writing on ethical subjects. He continued his interest in ethics during every assignment he had in the Army. He gave a major address at a Chief of Chaplains Conference in Europe on the subject of ethics. While assigned in 1974 as Post Chaplain at Carlisle Barracks, home of the Army War College, he wrote an article for *Parameters*, the official publication of the War College, on the "Ethical Issues of Military Leadership." The article was very well received throughout the Army, and Chaplain Johnson received many accolades from

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senior officers and from distinguished civilian ethicist as well. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, U.S. Navy, told Chaplain Johnson, "You said what I've been trying to say for years." 76

Likewise, in 1974 Chaplain Johnson persuaded Colonel William E. Rawlinson, Director of Personnel Management Studies at the Army War College, to invite a series of distinguished lecturers to teach 12 modules on ethics to the War College students in early 1975. The lecturers included Dr. Arthur J. Dyck and Professor Ralph B. Potter from Harvard University; Dr. George W. Petznick from the American Medical Association; Chaplain (Major General) Gerhard Hyatt, Chief of Chaplains, USA; Monsignor Joseph A. Dunne, Chief of Chaplains, New York Police Department; Mr. Lewis Van Dusen, American Bar Association; and Major General DeWitt Smith, Commandant of the U. S. Army War College. 77 The course was exceptionally well received by the students and faculty alike. By the end of 1975, Chaplain Johnson was widely regarded as “the Army’s Ethicist.”

In 1978, Chaplain Johnson wrote an article for the *Chaplaincy* magazine, entitled "Ethics in the Military." 78 He pointed out that the Honor Code at West Point was a time-honored vehicle for ethical reasoning but that it was limited when complex issues required more sophisticated decision making. He placed himself among the reasoned fora lists, indicating that there are some ethical considerations which are always important: "it means certain elements of actions are always intrinsically right or wrong in themselves."

In a letter to Dr. Arthur J. Dyck of Harvard Divinity School, Chaplain Johnson declared:

> The whole ethical area is so very important. So many matters of life and death are before us precisely at a time when theological and philosophical bases have been so thoroughly eroded, that few dare speak with any authority. I personally believe that unless universals exist, we have absolutely no basis for making ethical judgements and everything is up for grabs. 79

Johnson’s mission, and Dyck’s as well, was to “cut through this relativistic jungle in order to arrive at a more human or humane position.” 80

Chaplain Johnson advocated that the commander and the chaplain should act as an ethical team. "The conclusion of all this might be expressed in theological terms. We are ultimately driven to a feeling of weakness, to the forgiveness of sins, to the renewing of life, to the grace of God. In my scale of values, ethics proceeds out of the context of faith—and it is my belief that because of this faith, every chaplain has something unique to contribute to ethics in the military." 81

Chaplain Johnson’s background was ideal for the needs of the Army at that time. The Army Staff was struggling with the question of defining ethics for the Army, as well as who should have proponency for ethical training. In 1980, Chaplain Johnson wrote to the Superintendent of West Point, Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster, on the subject of ethics and the need to create a course at the Academy on professional ethics. General Goodpaster responded, on 30 December 1980, by thanking Johnson for his recommendations. 82 Shortly thereafter, a “core course” in ethics was inaugurated for all cadets under the proponency of the English Department.

The Army Staff continued to wrestle with the meaning and relevance of ethics in the Army.

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Chaplain Johnson wrote a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), "Integrating Values/Ethics into the Army." He argued for a definition of the ethical values the Army was seeking to instill in young leaders. "A value for Army leadership is selflessness; but, how does a personnel and recruitment system which is basically entrepreneurial, working by self-interest and self-development," interpret this to leaders? He concluded his memorandum by stating:

To summarize, if values and ethics are to mean anything in the Army, our highest leaders must articulate what those values are and the behavioral modes which reflect those values. Then doctrine developers need to incorporate this into their training materials for the Army and throughout the schooling/training systems, appropriate to the level of learning persons. Another effort should be directed horizontally and vertically to life as it is lived in the units, installations, headquarters, families, etc., to see whether articulated values square with operating values. Finally, based on reality feedback, decisions will have to be made and remade, as to whether you adjust rhetoric (stated values) to what is, or change what is (operating values) to new ways of operating, behaving, or doing to conform to a value you are willing to pay a price for.84

Brigadier General Mitchell of DCSPER wrote a note saying "This is the most insightful three page paper I've yet seen in this building (the Pentagon)."85

Chaplains throughout the Army were dealing with ethics in their daily ministry. Some, particularly Service School Chaplains, were involved with ethical matters on a daily basis. The Military Chaplains Review during the Johnson years continually published articles on ethics. In his introduction to the Spring issue in 1982, Chaplain Johnson noted that, while proponency for ethics in the Army was assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Combined Arms Center also provided leadership in this arena. Johnson wrote, "the U.S. Army Chaplaincy role in the area of ethics has been and remains that of providing resources and inputs." Articles by many other persons appeared in the Military Chaplains Review, including: Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale; Chaplains John W. Brinsfield, Donald W. Gover, John A. Rasmussen, and Ross B. Jackson.

Chaplain Johnson's personal interest in professional ethics included assigning chaplains to teach ethics throughout the Army. One of the Chaplaincy's most compelling lecturers at that time, Chaplain Joseph H. Beasley, was teaching the history of ethical and religious thought at West Point. During his nine years at the Academy, Chaplain Beasley had developed introductory and advanced courses in World History, the History of Western Ethics, the History of Western Religious Thought, and the History of Asian Religions. He also was one of the most popular professors with both cadets and colleagues in the Academy's long history. More than 300 students signed up for his lectures in ethics which had to be held in the North Auditorium. He had many humorous anecdotes to illustrate his lessons. During the serious investigation of a cheating scandal involving more than 100 cadets in 1976, he also served as an advisor to the faculty and cadets and later was appointed as a member of

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West Point Chaplain Professors:

Chaplain Joseph Beasley
Associate Professor
History Department
1971-1980

Chaplain John W. Brinsfield
Asst. Professor
History Department
1980-1984
the Superintendent's Committee on Professionalism and Ethics.\footnote{87}

When Chaplain Joseph Beasley announced his retirement as Associate Professor of World History at the U.S. Military Academy in 1980, Chaplain Johnson approved sending not one but two chaplains to replace him.\footnote{88} Chaplain Loren Pugh, a Presbyterian, was already in the History Department at West Point functioning as the Course Director for American History and associated electives. Chaplain Pugh had been named to succeed Beasley, but Pugh decided that he did not wish to remain at the Academy beyond his normal tour. Chaplain John Brinsfield was sent then from the Chaplain Advanced Course to replace Chaplain Beasley.

Chaplain Brinsfield reported to the U.S. Military Academy in July of 1980. He was assigned to the International History Division to teach World History, under the direction of a former Rhodes Scholar and distinguished professor, Colonel Paul L. Miles. Brinsfield eventually developed a popular course on "The History of the Ethics of Warfare: From Plato to NATO." Some of his material was later introduced into the curriculum at the U.S. Army War College by Chaplain Don Davidson, whose own work and book on the churches and nuclear deterrence had received national attention.

At the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Chaplain Max Wilk asked Chaplain Henry Ackermann to develop a series of workshops in teaching methods for chaplains assigned as instructors in service schools. Ackermann designed workshops ranging from the strategies for teaching ethics to the integration of audio visual support in the classroom.

In order to be certain that chaplain instructors modeled a Multi-cultural ministry, Chaplain Johnson assigned Chaplain Janet Y. Horton to be the first female faculty member at the U.S. Army Chaplain School. Chaplain Horton worked for Chaplain Thomas H. Norton in Program Development. Concurrently, Chaplain Donna Weddle was assigned to teach ethics at the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and in 1982, became the Chaplaincy's first female chaplain instructor in an Army service school.\footnote{89}

A new concern in ethics began to arise in the early 1980's which focused on biomedical issues. In 1978, Chaplain Sanford Dresin had introduced an elective course at the Chaplain School primarily for chaplains interested in serving as hospital chaplains. Chaplains Jim Travis and John Rasmussen, both in the Reserve Component, published articles on medical ethics from 1980 to 1982 in professional journals. By the end of 1982, the Chief of Chaplains had sent two chaplains to study ethics at civilian universities, one at Harvard, and one at Rice.

**Values Clarification**

Chaplains in Europe sought to meet the need for moral and ethical training through the Values Clarification program. The program was officially called PET II. The University of Maryland had received a contract to develop lesson plans on values and to provide five teams of two civilian instructors each. The teams were required to teach classes twice each week with 30 students in each class. More than 5,000 soldiers went through these classes.\footnote{90}

The Chaplaincy did not endorse the so-called humanist philosophy of those who developed Values Clarification, but merely adopted the effective methodology to aid soldiers in identifying their

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true values. The program was criticized by conservative religious and political leaders as being a form of "secular humanism." They saw it as a threat to traditional Christian values. Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina was one of those who objected most strenuously to the program. He objected to a program that did not distinguish "moral from nonmoral value issues," and which seemed to encourage ethical relativism. Chaplain Johnson was disturbed because the Chaplaincy was being attacked in the press for teaching secular humanism. He felt that those who objected did not know what they were talking about, but were being misled by some of their staff members. He requested a meeting with Senator Thurmond.

During their meeting at the Senate Office Building, Chaplain Johnson responded to the Senator's questions and pointed out that one reason the program was chosen was because "it is not the role of government to intervene in the soldier's political, religious, or social attitudes." Chaplains wanted a "noninterventionist" and non-prescriptive way of dealing with values. To teach one religious viewpoint in a command-sponsored program for all soldiers would be an establishment of religion and, by definition, would be unconstitutional. Johnson concluded his response by stating:

Chaplains will continue to meet (soldier) needs through the very incisive ministries they have to offer, all of which draw their power and life-changing resources from the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Torah or Law of God, the sacraments and ordinances of churches and denominations, and the simple love and caring we can offer. None of this is done by constraint or in violation of anyone's conscience but in the atmosphere of free exercise of religion.

The meeting concluded with the issue closed, to Chaplain Johnson's relief. Interestingly enough, the same constitutional arguments which had justified the existence of the Chaplaincy had been used by the Chief of Chaplains to protect the freedom of conscience for soldiers.

Homiletics

Under Chaplain Orris Kelly's leadership (1975-1979), the need for good preaching and innovative worship in the Army had continued to surface. Attempts to meet this need intensified when Chaplain Johnson became Chief of Chaplains. Johnson had a strong personal interest in homiletics as well as the need to meet the worship needs of the military community effectively. It was felt by many chaplains that good preaching was seldom rewarded by commanders. They wanted their chaplains out in the field with the troops and in chapels as little as possible. Consequently, preaching was not a high priority for many chaplains. Chaplains Kelly and Johnson attempted to correct that perception and to reward in some way the creative pulpit talents of their chaplains. The officer efficiency report regulation was amended to encourage raters to reflect the importance of preaching.

Materials on homiletics were produced by the Chaplain Board for each of the three major faith groups. Products included preaching aids, films, tapes of good sermons and the distribution of texts

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on homiletics. Homiletics workshops were conducted, particularly under the leadership of Chaplain Rodger Venzke, as well as several civilian consultants.\(^95\) In 1981, the Chaplain Board conducted regional homiletics workshops in six CONUS locations. Moreover, a "Homiletics Strategic Planning Group" was convened in June 1982 to determine problems and solutions in the area of homiletics and worship in the Army Chaplaincy.\(^96\)

Parish Development
Family Life Ministry and Minority Ministry

Parish Development continued as a major Chaplaincy program. However, in 1980 a new model was introduced called the "Parish Development Training Program (PDTP)," in which civilian consultants were replaced by military chaplains.\(^97\) In 1981, the Chaplain Board sponsored three Parish Development workshops. Chaplains conducted the programs and wrote the training materials. The Chaplain Board entitled the workshops: "Leadership Skills for Chapel Ministry;" "Management by Objectives for Results for Chapel Ministry;" and "Empowerment Skills for Chapel Ministry."\(^98\)

In 1981, the Chief of Chaplains contracted with the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency to conduct a study called "Pre- and Post-Marital Chaplain Ministry to Military Personnel and Korean Nationals." The study was designed to provide more effective strategies for ministering to the growing needs of Korean spouses and their husbands.

In Europe, a Family Life Center was established for every military community having a high school. By the end of 1980, Family Life Centers had been established in Stuttgart, Nuremberg and Mannheim. Others were planned to open as resources became available.\(^100\)

The Chaplain Board, under the leadership of Chaplain Gene Allen and Chaplain Richard Stenbakken, placed heavy emphasis on marriage and family life ministry in FY 81. Chaplain Board staff personnel conducted workshops and specialized training on many Army installations. The Chaplaincy also participated in the Army Family Symposium, held annually in Washington, DC. A total of 185 chaplains were trained in "Understanding Us." This program was designed to foster understanding of families and included a Theological Update and materials on dealing with sexism. A family ministry update conducted by the Menninger Clinic was provided for chaplains in family life ministry. Additionally, Chaplain Thomas Smith established a pilot training program at Fort Knox, Kentucky, combining civilian education and chaplain supervision. This became the model for future chaplain training in family life studies.

In 1980, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains contracted with Silver Strands Systems, Inc., of New Haven, Connecticut, for a special minority ministry workshop. The program "Project Milestone" was conducted in Cleveland, Ohio.\(^102\) The project grew out of the need to develop chaplain skills, attitudes and understanding in meeting the Multi-cultural needs presented by soldiers in the Army. Subjects discussed included: Scales of Prejudice, Racism, Communication Barriers, Paternalism and Sexism. To inject realism into the training, each chaplain participant lived with a minority family during the training. In this way they learned about the environment, the needs and the peculiar circumstances of each family. These experiences were explored during the sessions led by

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facilitators from Silver Strands. MACOM chaplains ran similar experiential programs in their commands. Reports from MACOMs indicated uniformly positive results from the training and new determination to work harder to ensure equal opportunity and treatment for all minorities and persons from diverse cultural backgrounds.

A Minority Ministry Training Course was conducted in Atlanta, Georgia, from 24-30 April 1982. The theme was "The Challenge of Cultural Ministry Amidst Multi-cultural Needs." This training event built upon the lessons learned and the experiences of Project Milestone. Key leaders in these discussions were Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman, later the 18th Chief of Chaplains, and Chaplain Calvin H. Sydnor, III, later the TRADOC Staff Chaplain.

Chaplaincy Studies

The Office of the Chief of Chaplains conducted several studies designed to enhance chaplain ministry in the Army. Each of these studies was completed by different civilian contractors. The first study "Recruitment, Retention, Mobilization and Training of the Woman Chaplain," was completed in FY 1980-81. The study was designed to address how the woman chaplain fits into what had been formerly a male-dominated system. Because of a high turnover rate, special emphasis was placed on methods of recruiting and retaining female clergy.

A second study, "Role of the Chaplain in Ministry Related to Psycho genetic Diseases," was completed in FY 81. Special emphasis was being placed on holistic healing in military as well as in civilian hospitals. This study was intended to develop methodologies and modalities for chaplain integration into the healing team.

The third study, "Social Aspects of Chaplain Ministry," was completed during the same time frame. The objective of the research was to identify religious activities in which soldiers were most interested. The data was to be used by OCCH to design programs "to meet contemporary religious needs of soldiers and their families."

Chaplain Candidate Program

The Chaplain Candidate Program, formerly called the Staff Specialist or Seminarian Program, was changed in FY 81. Prior to that time the program was funded through the Reserve Personnel Army Budget Program. The change resulted in the program being transferred to RPABP 3300, which "allows for proper resources for training and procurement of future chaplains." The consequence of this change was that the Chaplaincy was able to enhance its procurement of candidates, and provide new training programs which hitherto were not possible. Of special significance was the option of training at sites other than the Chaplain School, such as military installations and hospitals.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Reflecting Goals:
Command Chaplain Programs and Events

Throughout the major commands, senior chaplains implemented the Chief’s goals and priorities. In Germany, the U. S. Army Europe Staff Chaplain’s Office was very busy with its normal abundance of worship services, conferences and retreats for soldiers and family members. Two family counseling workshops were held, one in Nuernberg and the other in Stuttgart, to provide an update on techniques used in family counseling. In Berchtesgaden the Military Council of Catholic Women held its 25th Anniversary Conference in 1980. Since the MCCW was founded in 1955, approximately 500 women had met each year to share program ideas and enhance their personal spiritual growth.\textsuperscript{108} In soldier ministry, some 5,000 troops went through the PET II (Values Clarification) program to increase motivation, self-image, and positive behavior traits. The target audience was confined to E4 soldiers and below.

Chaplain authorizations in USAREUR went up from 298 to 303 positions. Since there were only 278 chaplains assigned, there was a real increase of 24 possible assignments. Chaplain Jack Ettershank requested more black and Hispanic chaplains to meet a goal of establishing a Black Gospel or Hispanic worship service in every major military community in Europe.\textsuperscript{109} On November 16, 1980, the U. S. Army Europe Roman Catholic community turned out in record numbers when Pope John Paul conducted an evening Mass at Finthen Army Airfield. It was estimated that approximately 300,000 persons attended the Papal Mass.\textsuperscript{110} Chaplain John P. “Jack” Ettershank, who served as VII Corps Chaplain before he became the U. S. Army Europe Staff Chaplain, was succeeded in the summer of 1981 by Chaplain Charles McDonald who continued the programs of his talented predecessor, but with special additions of his own.

At Headquarters, U. S. Training and Doctrine Command, Chaplain Max Wilk, the Staff Chaplain, was given the temporary authority to place chaplains where they were most needed, without regard to normal staffing criteria.\textsuperscript{111} During FY 1981, authorizations and personnel distribution plans were changed at five TRADOC installations due to manpower shortages. A Multi-Ethnic/Cultural Religious Education workshop was conducted by the TRADOC Chaplain from June 15 to 18, 1981, with 34 chaplains and directors of religious education in attendance.\textsuperscript{112} This workshop was part of the command’s ongoing programs to include all personnel in the religious program. A TRADOC/FORSCOM training conference was held from October 13 to 16, 1981.\textsuperscript{113} The theme of the Conference was "Ministry in Combat." A lay sermon was delivered by General Donn Starry, the TRADOC Commander, whose contributions to AirLand Battle doctrine had changed the Army.

The Military District of Washington (MDW) conducted numerous religious services in government facilities. Services were held at the Pentagon, the Harkins Building, the Hoffman Building and at Cameron Station.\textsuperscript{114} The Pentagon Pulpit Series featured nationally renowned speakers at six special services each year. The services were normally conducted on the Pentagon Concourse. Eucharistic lay ministers assisted with 255 daily masses at the Pentagon, and the Arimatheans assisted with 163 funeral masses in MDW chapels and at Arlington Cemetery.\textsuperscript{115}

\[\text{See endnotes at end of chapter.}\]
Mobilization Planning and Coordination

By 1980, heavy stress was being placed on mobilization planning. The Army and the Chaplaincy recognized the need for plans, policies and training for mobilization. The Chief of Chaplains had nonconcurred with the first draft of the 1980 Department of the Army Mobilization Plan because it placed the Chief under supervision of the DCSPER and made chaplain personnel management the responsibility of the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). The Army then developed a slightly modified mobilization system and operational document to which OCCH provided an annex to explain how chaplains would be mobilized. The instrument was an evolutionary study that changed as the Army and the Chaplaincy gained more information and experience.

The Chief of Chaplains conducted a major mobilization conference from April 30 to May 1, 1981, led by Chaplain Paul Forsberg and Mr. Jim Barton from the Chief of Chaplains Office. They were joined by representatives from FORSCOM and the numbered Armies, including the Army Reserve. The agenda focused on the following topics:

- Peace-time Planning Documentation.
- Relationship/Authority/Cross-leveling.
- What assets are available to whom?
- Reporting requirements.
- Who is in charge?
- Equipment available and required.
- Handling problems of family members residing in isolated areas.

In December 1981, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains sponsored, and FORSCOM hosted, the first Mobilization and Army Reserve Chaplain (MARCH) Coordinators Workshop in Atlanta, Georgia. MARCH Coordinators from all mobilization stations, CONUSAs, Reserve regions, and major commands attended. The conference was effective in providing guidance, information, and definitive instructions for mobilization preparation. One of the results of the workshops was to recommend that chaplain kits be issued rather than stocked. On May 27, 1982, the U.S. Army Equipment Authorization Review Activity authorized chaplain kits to be issued to chaplains upon entry to active duty thereby precluding massive stockpiling for mobilization.

Gospel or General Protestant Services?

One issue which emerged in 1980, and which finally required a decision by the Chief of Chaplains in 1982, was whether Gospel Services would be continued in the Army. In November of 1980, Chaplain Calvin H. Sydnor III, then assigned to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, wrote a decision memorandum for Chaplain Johnson’s consideration. Chaplain Sydnor’s recommendation was that the name of Gospel Services be changed to General Protestant or denominational services.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Sydnor had found that it had become routine for installation chaplains to assign "unit black chaplains to pastor the Gospel service program as an additional duty." Some black chaplains from liturgical backgrounds, Episcopalians, Luthers, and some Methodists, did not feel that a Gospel Service was part of their religious heritage. They felt pressured to lead the Gospel Services merely because of their race. Others wanted to be involved with Gospel Services exclusively to the detriment of other programs. In both cases, the title "Gospel Service," in Chaplain Sydnor's opinion, tended to be "divisive and separatist."  

In September of 1981, a Gospel Service Conference was held in Atlanta, Georgia, for military chaplains. The Conference was attended by chaplains representing DACH and various commands in the Army including FORSCOM, TRADOC, and U.S. Army Europe. After due deliberation, a Conference committee recommended to Chaplain Johnson that "Gospel Services be designated General Protestant, that chaplains who are white be 'tuned up' to participate in and conduct Gospel Services, and that all chaplains be reminded of their care for all soldiers and their families regardless of race."  

After more discussion, Chaplain Johnson issued his decision on March 18, 1982. He continued with the name "Gospel Services," but directed installation chaplains to staff and support them fairly. Chaplain Johnson wrote the following concerning the recommendations of the Gospel Service Conference of 1981, "I have followed the recommendation that Gospel Services, led by chaplains, should have equal scheduling and financial support as any other General Protestant service. This is a decision." Chaplain Johnson believed that Gospel Services were meeting a need and should remain an option for soldiers in the Army. Thereafter a number of chaplains without regard to race did sponsor, though not always lead, Gospel Services.

The Air Florida Crash: Defining Religious Support by Example  

If some chaplains, in light of the Constitutionality Case, were questioning what role they would play in future ministry, there was no identity crisis in 1982 for the chaplains at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. At four o'clock on Wednesday afternoon, January 13th, Air Florida Flight 90, with 79 persons on board, crashed into the Potomac River. Even though the twin-engine Boeing 737 had been de-iced continuously while awaiting takeoff from Washington's National Airport, it did not achieve enough thrust from its engines to remain in the air. As the jet left Runway 36, it failed to climb quickly enough. The landing gear hit five cars, crushing four of them, on the northbound span of the 14th Street Bridge between the Pentagon and the Jefferson Memorial. The jetliner rolled over nose first, knocking out a chunk of the bridge, and burst into flames as the fuselage began settling into 20 feet of water. The accident was over in 8 seconds. Four people on the bridge were killed and four others injured as cars were smashed and toppled into the river. Seventy ticketed passengers, three infants, one Air Florida employee, and five crew members were on the plane.  

Among the first agencies to respond were the Metropolitan Police, the Coast Guard, the Park Police, and by special request, the 902nd Engineer Company from Fort Belvoir. Army, Navy and Coast Guard divers were summoned to help recover victims and (hopefully) survivors. As the first
The helicopters began circling the area, pilot Donald W. Usher, a Vietnam veteran, noticed a man in the water pushing people to safety. "That guy was amazing...I've never seen that kind of guts. He decided that the women and the men who were bleeding needed to get out before him, and even as he was going under he stuck to his decision," M.E. "Gene" Windsor, a paramedic aboard Usher's helicopter, told reporters. The hero, one of many, was Arland Williams, 46, from Georgia. He saved four others before he disappeared into the water, a victim of hypothermia.

Chaplain Donna Weddle, the Assistant Brigade Chaplain for the Engineer Brigade at Fort Belvoir, was in the field at Fort A.P. Hill with three of her five battalions when the accident happened. Requested by her commander to accompany elements of the 15th Combat Support Hospital to the site to provide medical and counseling support for the military divers and rescue personnel, Chaplain Weddle flew back to Davidson Army Airfield at Fort Belvoir and then drove her car to the bridge.

The Metropolitan Police Chaplain, the first clergy person to reach the accident, remained at the site for 12 hours before retiring to rest. The temperature was between 7 and 10 degrees above zero, the visibility in the water not more than 18 inches. Chaplain Weddle, who had to repel down a rope from the bridge to reach the tactical operations center (TOC), was the first and only military chaplain to be continuously on the site for the 9-day recovery operation.

Of the 79 passengers on board Flight 909, only five survived. Most of the others were still strapped in their seats below water in the wreck of the aircraft. The military divers had to locate many of them by touch in the murky darkness. Chaplain Weddle took a rubber raft out to the diving platforms where she gave instant encouragement and spiritual support to the young divers as they brought the bodies, men, women and infants to the surface.

After a few dives, the military divers would go to a warming tent to get coffee before resuming operations. The doctors felt it was important for the divers to discuss their feelings immediately, lest they be overcome with emotional fatigue in the extremely dangerous water. Chaplain Weddle accompanied the divers and other rescue personnel and helped them process their feelings. Since the water was so cold, most of the bodies were preserved with blood frozen near wounds. For the Vietnam veterans the condition of the bodies sometimes brought flashbacks to their war-time experiences. Chaplain Weddle's ministry was even more important for them—to prevent reactions which might immobilize them.

To help Chaplain Weddle maintain her own spiritual and physical strength, Navy Chaplain Lawrence A. Shoberg, a clinically trained hospital chaplain, met with Donna periodically before she went back to the diving platforms. "It was great to have him there," Chaplain Weddle recalled, "he was an excellent person to talk to."

On the second day of the recovery operation, Chaplain Kermit Johnson, the Army Chief of Chaplains, called Chaplain Weddle at the TOC to see if she needed any help. Chaplain Weddle was working with some patients when she got a message that Chaplain Johnson was on the telephone. She called back, "Tell him I'm too busy doing ministry. I'll call him when I can. He'll understand." An hour later Chaplain Weddle returned the Chief's call. "Whoever would have thought that you would be in that situation," Chaplain Johnson said to his fellow Presbyterian chaplain and colleague. "But Sir, if not here, surely I'd be doing ministry somewhere; this is what we are trained for,"

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Weddle replied.

After nine days all of the bodies were recovered and the operation was over. Seventy-nine people had lost their lives. The memorial Service was conducted on Super Bowl Sunday by Chaplain Weddle and Chaplain John L. Blake, the Roman Catholic Chaplain from Fort Belvoir. Some 170 of the 200 men and women on the rescue team met in a GP tent for the service. The Salvation Army provided music as it alluded the people who had died and gave thanks for those who had lived through the terrifying ordeal.

At the Pentagon, Chaplain Johnson and his staff were very proud of the tasks Chaplain Weddle had assumed and performed in such a stellar manner. They were equally proud of the other chaplains and chapel activity specialists from Fort Belvoir who had helped cover the Engineer Brigade, spread out from Fort A.P. Hill to the Potomac River. In the midst of mass casualties, chaplains had gone to the edge of death to reaffirm, with noteworthy courage, the power of life, faith, compassion, and teamwork. They had made a difference.

**Breaking Out of the Box: Response of a Soul to God**

*Patriotism is not limited to those in the military services, however. I have been impressed by persons who work for a better country by drawing attention to the lawlessness of our nation...I likewise marvel at the many gifted people who pass up the lucrative rewards dispensed by the military - industrial - scientific - academic - complex working instead for pittance and principle.*

Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Kermit Johnson
USA Retired

*Realism and Hope in a Nuclear Age (1988)*

During the winter of 1981 and the spring of 1982, security problems in the Western Hemisphere and in Western Europe received increased attention. Factional strife in El Salvador, tensions between Nicaragua and Honduras, and Russian and Cuban intervention in the region, either direct or by proxy, created a threat that required a sharpening of regional priorities and an allocation of appropriate resources.¹³⁴ Helicopters, trucks, weapons, and communications equipment were dispatched to El Salvador under the Foreign Military Sales Program. U.S. military teams were sent to help the government of El Salvador develop a national military strategy; and training was provided by the U.S. Army, both in El Salvador and at the School of the Americas in Panama, to assist the government's efforts to deal with escalating insurgency.¹³⁵ In Europe the Army deployed three battalions of Abrams M-1 tanks, new Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Stinger missiles, and the first UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. Plans for the deployment of additional nuclear missiles in Germany and in other NATO countries were underway. USAREUR's capability to accommodate reinforcements from the United States was improved with the pre-positioning of a fourth division set of equipment.¹³⁶

Not all of these developments went unnoticed by critics of American defense policy. Since 1977, a civil war involving more than 17,000 Popular Revolutionary Bloc insurgents, mainly peasants, Roman Catholic priests, workers and students, had sparked periodic violence and guerrilla activity

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
against the government of El Salvador. Scores of nuns and priests, including Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980, had been murdered for what Chaplain Johnson saw as their pastoral and prophetic stance in identifying with the poor and advocating justice and reconciliation. "Priests in El Salvador, as throughout Latin America, were greatly influenced by liberation theology," Chaplain Johnson noted, "and more specifically, negotiated settlement was seen as treasonous support for the enemy. Not until very late in the game when elements of the Salvadoran Army (but not all) and the U.S. were convinced they could not militarily defeat the FMLN—was there any change in this position—and then, only begrudgingly."¹³⁸

Some Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries from the United States alleged that the United States Army was training and equipping government soldiers who, in turn, terrorized their own people. These charges related not only to the government of El Salvador but to Guatemala and Honduras as well.¹³⁹ The Mary Knoll Catholic missionaries from New York reported the gruesome statistics:

Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated on March 24, 1980 while celebrating Mass in San Salvador. On Dec 2, 1980, two Mary Knoll sisters, a Mary Knoll lay associate and an Ursuline sister were murdered. Later six Jesuits, their housekeeper and her daughter were taken from their houses and shot on the grounds of the University of Central America in San Salvador. Each of these murders involved soldiers trained at the School of the Americas run by the U.S. Military. In the past 40 years, over 57,000 soldiers have trained there, some of whom have committed assassinations, coups and massacres in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Argentina, Columbia and Peru.¹⁴⁰

In March of 1982, in response to moral critiques of U.S. military policy which had appeared in the press, General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, asked his staff for a paper on the moral issues related to nuclear war and to the conflict in El Salvador.¹⁴¹ In view of his many qualifications, Chaplain Kermit Johnson received the task. As a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, where the strategy had been practiced for decades, Chaplain Johnson knew that if he wanted to challenge a commander's policy without direct confrontation, one asked very pointed questions which could lead to uncomfortable but honest conclusions. "I figured the best way to raise issues was by submitting Socratic questions in the context of Just War criteria," Chaplain Johnson wrote, "but when this paper reached the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, (Lt. Gen. William Richardson), it angered his "Iron Majors."¹⁴²

In his Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, "Subject: Moral Issues of Nuclear War and of Conflict in El Salvador,"¹⁴³ Johnson outlined four traditional positions regarding war:

- The Pacifist Position (no war)
- The Crusade Position (holy war)
- Just War (prevailing Christian position)

See endnotes at end of chapter.
The Nuclear Pacifist (new position on use of nuclear weapons)

His treatise dealt mostly with Nuclear Pacifism and indiscriminate killing. His memorandum was “obviously intended to raise the consciousness of the Chief of Staff of the Army and others to the ferment in churches and elsewhere over nuclear policy and El Salvador.”

Johnson’s Memorandum contained statements by numerous ecclesiastical dignitaries and other national leaders. In Tab C, he raised numerous questions about El Salvador. Each question was related to one of the conditions of the just war theory (Justifiable Cause, Legitimate Authority, Just Intentions, Public Declaration of Causes and Intentions, Reasonable Possibility of Success, Due Proportion, Last Resort, and Just Means). It was clear that he did not feel that the El Salvador operation met these criteria.

Chaplain Johnson also was particularly incensed when the United States started to train El Salvador soldiers in the United States. He was concerned because it “would only help soldiers to kill people more effectively.” He was also angered that Salvadoran soldiers had “killed Archbishop Romero.” Romero was an outspoken advocate of liberation theology and the revolution of the poor and disenfranchised. Chaplain Johnson said he could not close his eyes to the issues; and, as a result, he and the Director of the Army Staff, Lieutenant General James Lee, “went head to head.”

These staff officers let it be known that not only was Chaplain Johnson out of his element, but he was playing in left field. To question the results of high-level Administration policy, for which the Army was but the action agency, was not in the Army’s ballpark. In his March 31 memorandum, Chaplain Johnson wrote to General Meyer on the nuclear issue, "Religious leaders, together with laity, believe they are struggling with issues of life and death, perhaps on a 'last chance' basis for a human civilization. Thus, cavalier and caustic comments... (by administration officials) are bound to be regarded as insensitive evasions of the moral issues at hand.” General Richardson agreed these issues should be faced, and asked his staff to reconsider Chaplain Johnson's paper.

Over the course of Chaplain Johnson’s Army career he had undertaken what was, in effect, a pilgrimage of moral leadership. From "grass roots" issues of morality, relating to interpersonal integrity, to mega-ethics, why policies which hold 50 million people hostage to a threatened nuclear attack might also be wrong, Chaplain Johnson had moved from being the Army’s Ethicist to becoming the Army’s Moral Theologian.

The issues which he overlooked or ignored as a major could not be overlooked or ignored as a major general. Chaplain Johnson reflected, "...even if we want to crawl in a foxhole to get out of this field of Macrolethics, some sensitive, deeply committed Roman Catholic Christian like General Meyer will come along and tap you on the shoulder and ask you to get involved."

In his heart-of-hearts, Chaplain Johnson did not embrace the role of a prophet glibly. He knew that professional loyalty strictly prescribed what comments he could make as Chief of Chaplains. Because he so strongly and honestly disagreed with the policies of the Reagan Administration, not only in Latin America and in Europe but in addressing issues of poverty and the environment in the United States, he was "boxed in" by the conflict between his role as a prophetic ethicist and his role as Chief of Chaplains.

Chaplain Johnson fully understood where such role conflicts could lead. He had written a

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
study of that exact subject while a student at the Command General Staff College in 1969. Yet, as early as January 1982, Chaplain Johnson sent a personal note to General Meyer describing his discomfort at remaining solely inside the pastoral role "box", when his calling to speak prophetically outside the "box" was so strong. "Even though much of my work is inside the [pastoral] box and I consider it to be important...increasingly I am seeing the impossibility of taking such a compartmentalized view. I cannot content myself with only looking inside the "box.""149 Chaplain Johnson was concerned not only with people within institutions, but with the policies of those institutions.

Ironically, Chaplain Johnson's views on the evils of supporting, even unintentionally, Central American death squads or his views on the impossibility of waging a just war with nuclear weapons were neither totally radical nor completely new to the military. Other general officers had made similar statements, though usually in retirement.150

When Chaplain Johnson wrote to General Meyer that 1) "In no way could a strategic nuclear war be considered a just war," and 2) "people of the third and fourth world, who I believe would rather not identify with communism, are nudged that way by our cold shoulder," he was being neither disloyal nor unprofessional.151 Given the fixed mind-set of some of his associates at the Pentagon, however, Chaplain Johnson knew that his opinions were unfashionable and that he was increasingly being perceived as "out of step" with the Army and with many of the senior leaders in the Chaplaincy who totally supported the policies of President Reagan as the surest and strongest deterrence to "the evil empire" of Communism.

Faced with his own "inner struggles" but confident that his "widening awareness" was of God, Chaplain Johnson announced in May that he would retire on June 30, 1982, one year before the conclusion of his four-year term as Chief of Chaplains.152 His role conflict between loyalty to an institution he had served for 35 years, and the liberty to speak out in prophetic love to make that institution even better, was resolved.

Many of the senior chaplains did not understand what Chaplain Johnson was doing, hence they could not appreciate his wrestling with his own conscience and with his own loyalties. At his retirement, however, his close friend and former classmate at West Point, General Edward C. "Shy" Meyer presented Chaplain Johnson with the Distinguished Service Medal for outstanding service in two wars and for his leadership at every echelon of the Army, to include service as the 15th Chief of Army Chaplains.

From 1983 to 1986 Chaplain Johnson served as Associate Director of the non-governmental Center for Defense Information in Washington. Thereafter he served as a member of the Central America Working Group in the Washington Office of the Presbyterian Church, USA.

On April 3, 1995, The Washington Times reported a series of charges against CIA-supported Central American Army officers for killing more than 100,000 people "in the early 80s" in Guatemala. Other news stories in 1994-1995 included investigations into the conduct of 24 officers in El Salvador charged with murder and assassination during the period 1980 to 1989. All were allegedly graduates of the U.S. Army's School of the Americas.153

In May of 1995, as the Keynote Speaker at the Chief of Chaplains Unit Ministry Team

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Conference in St. Louis, Missouri, Chaplain Johnson received a warm welcome and a standing ovation from more than 300 of his fellow chaplains, chaplain assistants, and directors of religious education.
ENDNOTES


16. OCCH, *Annual Historical Review*, FY 70, p. 36.


20. OCCH, *Annual Historical Review*, FY 80, p. 16.

22. Letter from Vice President Walter F. Mondale, March 1, 1982, in the Personal Papers of Chaplain Johnson.


24. The Harvard Crimson, November 1, 1979, p.1. At the time Harvard Law students filed their case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court was deciding an issue of prayer in public schools.


31. Ibid., p.6.

32. Ibid., p.8.

33. Ibid., p.10.


35. ”Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment,” January 12, 1980.

36. Ibid., pp.20,21.

37. Ibid., pp.22,23.

38. Ibid., p.30.


41. *Ibid.*, p.62. *Lemon*, “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion’.”


44. Active duty participants at the Manressa Conference included: Chaplain (Col.) Douglas Jones, USAF; Chaplain (Col.) Charles Kriete, Army War College; Chaplain (Col.) Richard Tupy, Commandant of the Chaplain School; Chaplain (Col.) Edward Christopher, Fort Ord; Chaplain (Col.) Harold Lamm, Armed Forces Chaplain Board; Chaplain (Col.) John Deveaux, DARCOM; Chaplain (Col.) Richard Martin, Fort Myer; Chaplain (Col.) Ivan Ives, DACH, Chaplain (Col.) John Scott, DACH; Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Wayne Kuehne, DACH; Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Rodger Venzke, Army Chaplain Board; Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Ronald Bezanson, DARCOM; Chaplain (Maj.) Herman Keizer, Chaplain School; Chaplain (Maj.) Richard Goellen, TRADOC; Chaplain(Maj.) Sanford Dresin, DACH; Chaplain (Capt.) John Brinsfield, USMA. Mrs. Lee Cherepes, secretary in Plans, Programs and Policies, was recording secretary.


51. "Memorandum and Order" February 1, 1984 (Judge McLaughlin). Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.
52. Ibid., p. 2.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p 24.

55. Ibid., pp. 33-35.


57. Ibid., p. 23.

58. Ibid.


60. Ibid., p. 27.

61. Ibid., p. 28.

62. Ibid., p. 29.

63. Ibid., p. 31.

64. Ibid., p. 32.

65. DAJA, "Final Dismissal of Constitutional Challenge to Army Chaplaincy -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM" February 7, 1986.


69. OCCH, Annual Historical Review, FY 81, p. 9.

70. OCCH, Annual Historical Review, FY 82, p. 14.


72. OCCH, Annual Historical Review, 1980-81, p. 28.


83. MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, SUBJECT: “Integrating Values/Ethics into the Army,” March 18, 1982, from Chaplain Kermit Johnson.


88. Another outstanding chaplain assigned to West Point during the early 1980’s was Chaplain Marc A. Abramowitz who led the successful effort to build the Jewish Chapel there.


91. *Congressional Record*, p.1451.

93. Congessional Record, p.1451.

94. Ibid., p.1453.


96. Ibid.


98. Ibid., p.33.

99. Ibid., p.7.


101. Ibid., p.32.


105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., p.7.


108. USAREUR and Seventh Army Historical Review, FY 1980, p.482.

109. Ibid., p.484.


112. Ibid., p.2


115. Ibid.

116. OCCH, Annual Historical Review, FY 80, p.12.


118. Department of the Army Historical Summary, FY 82, Compiled by Karl E. Cocke, et. al., Center for Military History, Washington, D.C., 1984, p.89.


120. Memorandum dated November 5, 1980, File 701-01 (Chaplain Instruction File) “Gospel Services” (81), National Archives Suitland, Maryland.

121. Ibid., p.1.

122. Ibid., p.2.


127. Ibid.

128. Ibid., p.1.

129. Mr. Williams' body was recovered on Saturday, January 16, 1982. The Arland D. Williams Bridge, where the crash occurred, bears his name.


131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Department of the Army Historical Summary for FY 82, p. II-6.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid., p. II-5.


142. Ibid.


145. Ibid.


147. Kermit Johnson, "Macroethics," p.1

148. Ibid., p.2.

149. Kermit Johnson, Realism and Hope in a Nuclear Age, p.109.

150. General Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in 1947, "We need an organized effort that will remove war from the category of the inevitable into its proper position as an evil subject to
prevention." Dr. Cyril Falls, Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford University, said in 1949, "Technology has outrun morality and has put weapons of appalling character into the hands of statesmen with lower moral and mental equipment than some of their predecessors. The best possible counter to atomic weapons would be improved ethics." General Douglas MacArthur told the Texas Legislature in 1951, "I am a 100 per cent disbeliever in war. In war as it is waged now, with enormous losses on both sides, both will lose. It is a form of mutual suicide; and I believe that the entire effort of modern society should be concentrated on an endeavor to outlaw it." Quotations from Eisenhower, Falls, and MacArthur as cited in John W. Brinsfield, "From Plato to NATO," Speech for the Command Group, U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army, 1986, p. 11, 16. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.

151. Kermit Johnson, Realism and Hope in a Nuclear Age, pp.111-112

152. Ibid., pp.13-14.

CHAPTER V

THE HESSIAN YEARS:
BRINGING THE CHAPLAINCY ON LINE
1982-1986

In the Army Chaplaincy’s Second Revolution after Vietnam, the theory and practice of ministry to soldiers and their family members shifted from a garrison to a battlefield model. Installations became sustaining bases for the mobilization and deployment of soldiers. For the first time in recent history, teams of chaplains and chaplain assistants devolved Chaplain Corps doctrine from operational concepts to the publication of field circulars, field manuals, and regulations in order to bring the Chaplain Corps on line with the Army’s AirLand Battle Doctrine.

Milestones:
- Development of the Unit Ministry Team
- Chapel Activity Specialists redesignated Chaplain Assistants
- Publication of Field Manual 16-5
- Assignment of a Chaplain to the National Guard Bureau
- Ministry after the Gander Tragedy
- Operation Urgent Fury, Grenada

Creating a New Battle-Focused Model for Ministry

After the end of the Vietnam War in 1973, the Army Chaplaincy defined its role in peacetime largely in terms of a garrison model. Chaplains were pastors, counselors, and preachers. Clinical pastoral education and the emphasis on parish development contributed to the organization and delivery of religious support for the soldier and family members on installations. Chapel Activity Specialists, as chaplain assistants were known after 1977, were linked to the post chapels in building maintenance and office administration. By 1983 less than fifty percent of the chaplains on active duty had had any combat experience. Responding to the Army’s need for religious support in both heavy and light divisions in the early 80s, leaders throughout the Chaplaincy turned their attention once again to formulating doctrine for the ministry on the battlefield.

Chaplain Gordon Schweitzer, Director of Combat Developments
U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, 1981-1983

See endnotes at end of chapter.
The years from 1982 through 1986 constituted a "hinge period" for the history of the Army Chaplaincy. Many concepts for ministry which had been developing since the end of the Vietnam War were synthesized into doctrine. The concept of the chaplain and the chapel activity specialists as a religious ministry team in the chapel environment was dramatically altered to form unit ministry teams of chaplains and chaplain assistants capable of operating either in a garrison or in a combat environment. The role and involvement of Reserve Component chaplains and assistants grew to include direct support for active duty missions on a large scale. The inclusion of ministry to soldiers suffering from battle fatigue as a part of Chaplain Corps doctrine helped make the unit ministry team both more relevant and more valuable to the unit commander. As the first joint operation in combat since Vietnam, Operation Urgent Fury generated an upgrade in readiness training as a result of lessons learned during the deployment of religious support personnel to Grenada. With these and other changes in policy, doctrine, and training, the Chaplaincy "put on its Battle Dress Uniform" for the decade of the 80s.

Chaplain Patrick J. Hessian

Chaplain (Major General) Patrick John Hessian was appointed the Army's 16th Chief of Chaplains on July 1, 1982. As a former semi-professional ball player, a European handball champion, and a Jump Master in the XVIII Airborne Corps, Chaplain Hessian combined a deep spirituality with a strong competitive nature and natural athletic ability. His career advancement had been meteoric, with all of the implications of brilliance and fire characteristic of the metaphor.

Born in Belle Plaine, Minnesota, in 1928, Chaplain Hessian attended St. Paul Seminary and was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1953. After spending five years in the Army Reserve, Chaplain Hessian entered active duty on August 29, 1963. Sixteen years later he became the Deputy Chief of Chaplains and would spend more time as a general officer than any other Chief of Chaplains in the preceding twenty years.

Chaplain Hessian's first duty assignment in 1963 was to the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas. The battalion he was to cover was the 2/81st Armor, commanded by Lt. Colonel George Patton, son of General George S. Patton, Jr., of World War II fame. Chaplain Hessian recalled reporting to Lt. Colonel Patton at his office for their first meeting:

So I went in there and I stood at attention before his desk, but he refused to look up. He was writing, and he just kept on writing, and he wrote and he wrote and it was a very long time. Finally he got up and he walked around his desk and he walked all the way around me, inspecting me from stem to stern. A word had never been spoken. Finally he said, "What's your name?" I told him my name. He said, "What's your denomination?" By this time I was angry, and angrily I said, "I'm Catholic." And he said, "Damn good thing you are or I'd have your ass out of here. My old man never

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had anybody but a Catholic and I'm not having anybody either."

It was a tense kind of time for a person who was brand new in the Army and not very committed to the Army. I was clearly not committed to the Army then. So I walked out of there that day saying to myself, "To hell with the Army. Who needs this?" 4

Chaplain Hessian remained in the Army for twenty-four additional years, but he never forgot his first meeting with Patton. Chaplain Hessian had volunteered for active duty because he wanted "adventure." 5 He had, in retrospect, almost enough adventure his first day in the Army with Lieutenant Colonel Patton to satisfy even his most avid curiosity. 6

Beginning with his first assignment on active duty, and for fourteen consecutive years thereafter, Chaplain Hessian was constantly involved with ministry to soldiers in the field. As a chaplain in the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Chaplain Hessian had his first experience with a major training exercise. The exercise, called Desert Strike, involved 50,000 soldiers and Marines. Chaplain Hessian recalled later some of the lessons he learned:

It was in the Desert Strike exercise that I began to understand the value of field exercises for a chaplain, and for me, at least, it was my very first long road march. It took us 2 1/2 days by jeep just to get out of Texas. We kind of skipped across Arizona and New Mexico all the way to California. That was a very long trip.

When we went to the desert for six weeks straight and slept on the ground we really got to know our people. It was, I believe, as a result of that experience that I came away with the notion that any time you can go into an unusual environment with a unit it will cause cohesion in the unit. 7

Another lesson that Chaplain Hessian learned on Desert Strike involved the cost of fatigue to a unit. During the exercise soldiers got extremely tired because the scenario ran 24 hours a day. When the troops got tired they tended to lie down in their sleeping bags in the open area of the desert. Over the course of time many soldiers were run over by tanks maneuvering in the desert. Chaplain Hessian recalled, "I think in the course of this exercise something like 30 men were killed or injured." 8

At the conclusion of Desert Strike, the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division was assigned to the 1st Marine Division to practice amphibious landings. Chaplain Hessian noted:

It was my first experience with beach landings. We were assigned to the 1st Marine Division to do landings. So we were put aboard ships and then transferred at sea from one ship to another with tanks and trucks. It was very difficult. I mean there were people in the water everywhere. The little landing craft did not get in close to the shore. They dropped the front down and there were all kinds of guys throwing-up in the water. The waves were hitting them. It was a wicked exercise but it was good

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training, I guess.9

At the end of Desert Strike the 1st Armored Division had a Thanksgiving Service for the success of the exercise and a memorial service for the dead. Many of the soldiers were thankful that more were not killed. Chaplain Hessian wrote, "It was an exceedingly danger-filled exercise."10 From this experience and others like it, Chaplain Hessian developed a conviction that training exercises, particularly field exercises, were absolutely essential if chaplains were to develop the cohesion, trust and understanding necessary to minister effectively to soldiers in a unit.11

After his experience at Fort Hood, Chaplain Hessian served in Korea, in Germany, and in Vietnam. While assigned to the 8th Infantry Division at Bad Kreuznach, Germany, Chaplain Hessian volunteered for airborne training. He was not fond of jumping out of airplanes, but he felt the training was valuable. The next year, in July of 1969, he became the brigade chaplain of the 173d Airborne Brigade in Vietnam.

In many ways Chaplain Hessian's experience in the Army was a classic model of ministry to soldiers in combat units. Twice a brigade chaplain, he subsequently became a deputy division chaplain, and then post chaplain at Fort Campbell, where the 101st Airborne Division was located in 1975. By that time Chaplain Hessian was one of the few chaplains in the Army who was qualified in both airborne and amphibious infantry operations.

On the first of August, 1975, after Chaplain Hessian had been at Fort Campbell for only six months, he received a telephone call from Chaplain Orris Kelly, the Chief of Chaplains. Chaplain Hessian remembered the call well:

Monday morning at 0800, my phone rang in Kentucky and it was Orris Kelly. His first official act as Chief of Chaplains was to call me and tell me that I was being moved immediately to a new job to become the XVIII Airborne Corps and Post Chaplain at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. That was obviously a shock to me, having been at the present job only six months. But in that phone conversation he told me, "You will go to Fort Bragg and you will be there a short time. You will then go to the War College. From there you will go to a major command. And you will accomplish all of this in four years time." Every one of these steps was a part of the preparation process to qualify me to become the Chief of Chaplains. Chaplain Kelly was preparing not only me but several other people to be able to undertake this job in the event that any one of them happened to be chosen.

I did go to Fort Bragg. I was there for two years. I went to the War College and I went to U.S. Army Europe to become the U.S. Army Europe Chaplain all in four years time, so that by the time the four years were up, I was prepared to become the Deputy Chief of Chaplains. That is what happened. I was the Deputy for three more years, so I was dealing with all of the people in the Pentagon and all the people on the

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Army Staff. I had three years (ample time) to learn how the big system works, and to get acquainted with everything at all levels within our own branch. Consequently, by the time I became the Chief of Chaplains, I felt I was exceedingly well prepared.\(^\text{12}\)

By 1982, when Chaplain Hessian was nominated by President Ronald Reagan for appointment as the Chief of Chaplains, he had accumulated not only a Soldiers Medal, a Bronze Star with three Oak Leaf Clusters, an Air Medal, and a Purple Heart from his tour in Vietnam, but also a wealth of experience with soldiers in ministry at every echelon in the Army.\(^\text{13}\)

**Challenges For The Chief**

One of the first tasks Chaplain Hessian performed as the Chief of Chaplains was to prioritize ministerial plans, policies, and programs which would meet the religious needs of the Army. In that regard, like the previous Chiefs, he aligned and directed the chaplaincy to address current and future concerns.

Prioritizing the programs of the chaplaincy was no small task. The previous fall, October of 1981, Chaplain Kermit Johnson, the Chief of Chaplains at that time, had approved goals and objectives through fiscal year 1984. In total, some 86 designated programs were approved for implementation. Fifty-five of these programs had been funded at a total cost of $1,091,300. This included some $307,000 in programs approved for the Chaplain Board to implement. Chaplain Kermit Johnson had put special emphasis on three distinct areas of programming: ethics, leadership and supervision; homiletics and worship; and Division 86. The Division 86 objective involved developing policy and training for the integrative ministry requirements implicit in religious coverage at the battalion, brigade, and division levels in both combat and peace-time environments.\(^\text{14}\) In all of this planning the Chief of Chaplains, as advised by his staff, the major command chaplains, and the installation staff chaplains, strongly supported the total Army goals for each fiscal year.

The mission of the total Army in 1982, like that of succeeding years, was to "deter any attack upon U.S. national interests and, if deterrence fails, to engage and defeat any enemy in any environment."\(^\text{15}\) The threat to U.S. national interests in 1982 was vital to the Chaplaincy because the Army would configure its organization to meet the perceived threat. In essence there were both nuclear and conventional threats in Europe, as well as possible high and low intensity threats around the world. Of the many possible scenarios in 1982, however, the possibility of an attack by the Soviet Union or its Warsaw Pact Allies against NATO had the highest priority for American defense planners. "The most serious threat facing the United States Army," said Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr., in October 1982, "is a major conventional war with the Soviets, especially considering the huge imbalance in numbers of weapons systems and fighting forces." During 1982 the United States Army was determined to restore the military balance with the Soviet Union.\(^\text{16}\)

To help restore the balance of military power in Europe, the Army planned to deploy 572 U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles beginning in December 1982 in five NATO countries. This action was

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sure to receive the most attention during the Nuclear Arms negotiations scheduled to convene in Geneva in 1983. Also, President Reagan's Commission on Strategic Forces, headed by Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, a former National Security Advisor to President Ford, while endorsing the MX missile, proposed "building down" the opposing strategic nuclear forces. Other balance-restoring plans involving conventional weapons upgrades were to be set in motion.17

Meanwhile, violence and terrorism escalated on the international scene in the autumn of 1982, causing power imbalances to take on new relevance. In the Middle East, Lebanon's President was assassinated, and massacres in two Palestinian refugee camps left 300 dead. Both events placed in jeopardy an international peace-keeping force, including a contingent of U.S. Marines sent to Lebanon in September of 1982. In West Germany, the Revolutionary Cells Terrorist Group took credit for the bombing of two U.S. military bases, while in Asia there was the possibility that the war between Iran and Iraq would escalate.18

The worsening international situation at the end of 1982 increased the U.S. Army's determination to deal with its weaknesses. They included, Secretary Marsh said, in October 1982, a lack of adequate air and sealift, shortages of weapons and equipment, and frustratingly slow progress in the modernization of old equipment. During the new fiscal year the Army planned to move aggressively to shore up these weaknesses and maximize its strengths. For example, the Army planned to move forward with the AirLand Battle doctrine, which stressed extreme mobility, independent action and directed strength against enemy follow-on echelons.

The Army also intended to move forward with its High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) project involving the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, which would help produce a lean, hard hitting force--a new high technology light division. The Army planned to modernize its equipment so that it out-performed Soviet equipment and thereby would compensate, to the extent possible, for the Soviet numerical advantage. The Army also planned to make many organizational changes from the Army 86 studies. These included the modernization of 16 battalions as a result of major weapons system changes. Some battalions in armored divisions would transition to Division 86 designs during 1982-1983, using personnel and equipment assigned to the division at the time of transition. In short, the Army's modernization effort was to focus to a great extent on designing, developing and procuring modern arms and equipment for the total Army.19

The accelerated pace of modernization in the Army, especially in the areas of new technology, doctrine and organization, had many ramifications for the Chaplaincy. If chaplains were to perform meaningful ministry, they must be part of the total modernization effort. This would include not only active duty chaplains but also those in the reserve components. Chaplains in key leadership positions, especially those in plans, programs and policies and in combat developments, would have to advise the Chief of Chaplains concerning measures the Chaplaincy would have to take to remain "on-line" with the new Army of Excellence.

Keeping pace with the new modernization effort in the Army was not the only challenge that the Chaplaincy faced in 1982. There were other internal challenges as well. Among these were a shortage of Roman Catholic chaplains; the continuing Constitutionality court case; a lack of clarity

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concerning the role of the chapel activity specialist and the relationship between the chapel activity specialist and the chaplain; and a shortage of female and other minority chaplains in the Chaplain Corps. Moreover, the decision made in 1980 at the Department of the Army level to assign chaplains to battalions did not yet iron out of the problems at the installation level. In 1982 - 83 it was clear that it would take the effort of all the supervisory chaplains to work out the religious coverage requirements by TOE and TDA chaplains as this transition took place.  

**Spirituality and Training**

Of particular interest to Chaplain Hessian was the issue of the spirituality of the Chaplain Corps. In his guidance to the chaplaincy in the fall of 1982, Chaplain Hessian emphasized the following statements of encouragement:

> Personal, spiritual health is at least as important for chaplains as training and tactics and weaponry is for the tactical officer. Each chaplain is responsible for his/her spiritual well-being and must seek opportunities for theological reading, study and reflection. Chaplains are encouraged to maintain close relationships to their endorsing denomination and seek to grow theologically and spiritually through the nurture of their religious organizations.

> Spiritual nurture of the soldier is one of the principal pastoral duties of the chaplain. Chaplain contact with the soldier is essential if this nurture is to take place. Supervisory chaplains should encourage effective contact of the chaplain with soldiers and their family members through the intentional presence of chaplains in units, hospitals, homes and barracks visitation.

Chaplain Hessian said that he attempted, in every speech and in every letter he wrote for chaplains, to emphasize the spirituality theme during his tenure as chief. Above all, he took time each morning before the work day began to pray for all of his chaplains.

Another of Chaplain Hessian's personal priorities concerned the training of the Chaplain Corps. As Chaplain Hessian was fond of stating, "training is ministry." In his personal guidance to his major command chaplains, Chaplain Hessian wrote:

> As training is being done mission is accomplished and ministry is performed. General Ferdinand Foch wrote: 'No study is possible on the battle field, one does there simply what one can in order to apply what one knows. Therefore, in order to do even a little one has already to know a great deal and know it well.' It is because of our total mission that I plan to establish a major emphasis on training. When we train for the Army’s mission, we are performing ministry.

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Training, according to Chaplain Hessian, was an essential element in the mission and the preparation for mission for all chaplains.24

It would not be an accurate picture of the chaplaincy at the end of 1982, however, to focus merely on the policies and guidance issued from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Of the 1,440 chaplains then on active duty, 859 held commissions from the U.S. Army Reserve, 51 were National Guard chaplains on active duty, and 530 were regular Army chaplains. Of the 1,440, some 596 were captains and 407 majors. The largest majority of chaplains were doing the backbone religious support of the Army—performing worship services in chapels and in the field, providing counseling and religious education opportunities for soldiers and their families, performing ministries of soldier visitation and morale support, and advising their commanders on religion, morals and morale as specified in Army regulations.

In the Chaplain Corps as a whole, therefore, hundreds of chaplains were involved in both ministry and training in accord with the direction of the Chief of Chaplains. Some 249 chaplains graduated from the Chaplain Basic Course, and 85 from the Chaplain Career Course in 1982; 1,300 chaplains were enrolled in the non-resident program at the Army Chaplain School. More than 100 active duty chaplains were enrolled in non-resident courses of the Command and General Staff College. Some 41 chaplains had been selected for civilian and military residence schooling including five at the Command and General Staff College, two at the Army War College, one at the Armed Forces Staff College, six in Clinical Pastoral Education, and 19 in other civilian schooling programs. Approximately 150 chaplains were enrolled in the Combined Army and Service Staff School (CAS3). In fiscal year 1983, therefore, 1,655 different chaplains from the active and reserve components were involved in formal academic training.25

**Organization of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains**

During FY 1983, the organizational structure of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains (OCCH) consisted of the Chief of Chaplains; the Deputy Chief of Chaplains; the Executive Officer; the Administration and Management Division; the Plans, Programs and Policies Division; and the Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations Division. The U.S. Army Chaplain Board was a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of the Office, Chief of Chaplains. The following persons filled essential positions in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains:

Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Patrick J. Hessian, Chief of Chaplains
Chaplain (Brig. Gen.) Paul O. Forsberg, Deputy Chief
Chaplain (Col.) Norris L. Einerston, Executive Officer
Chaplain (Col.) Ronald S. Bezanson, Jr., Director, Administration and Management Division
Chaplain (Lt. Col.) James A. Edgren, Management Budget Officer

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24 See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Succeeded by Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Timothy Tatum in July 1983)

Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Chester R. Steffey, Logistics Officer
Mr. John C. Baer, Administrative Officer
Ms. Theresa L. Nottingham, Public Affairs
(Succeeded by Mr. Franklin Vance in June 1983)
Mrs. Norma J. Turner, Morale and Welfare
Chaplain (Col.) Leroy T. Ness, Director, Plans, Programs and Policies Division
Chaplain (Col.) Edward G. Wulffkuehler, Reserve Affairs Chaplain
Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Wayne E. Kuehne, Force Structure Plan Officer
Chaplain (Maj.) Calvin H. Sydnor, Staff/Parish Development Officer
(Succeeded by Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Roy N. Mathis in July 1983)
Mr. Roger W. Able, Plans and Programs Development
Mrs. Ida M. Butcher, Drug/Alcohol and Women's Programs
Chaplain (Col.) Israel Drazin, Special Projects
Chaplain (Col.) John T. Hoogland, Director, Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations Division
Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Wendall F. Danielson, Professional Planning and Development
(Succeeded by Chaplain (Maj.) James E. Russell in June 1983)
Chaplain (Maj.) Sanford L. Dresin, Personnel Actions
Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Donald W. Shea, Procurement
(Succeeded by Chaplain (Maj.) John A. Flaska in June 1983)
Mrs. Nellie E. Burton, Assignments
Mrs. Shirley Womack, ADP Systems Coordinator
Chaplain (Col.) Billy W. Libby, President, U.S. Army Chaplain Board
Chaplain (Maj.) Geoffrey H. Moran, Audio-Visual
Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Marvin K. Vickers, Jr., Religious Education
Chaplain (Maj.) Richard N. Donovan, Homiletics, Journalism, and Editor, Military Chaplains Review
Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Kenneth B. Clements, Marriage and Family Life
Chaplain (Maj.) Louis L. Schmit, Pastoral Planner
Sergeant First Class Aaron N. Gibson, Administration/Special Projects

In addition to the chaplains assigned at Department of Army level, other chaplain leaders included 11 major command (MACOM) chaplains, five U.S. Army chaplains, 81 post chaplains in the United States, four overseas headquarters chaplains (in Alaska, Panama, Okinawa, Puerto Rico) and the Commandant, U.S. Army Chaplain School and staff at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

Approximately two weeks after Chaplain Hessian became Chief of Chaplains, he convened the 36th Annual Command Chaplains Conference in Rosslyn, Virginia. Some 28 command staff chaplains, including the Commandant of the Chaplain School and the senior chaplain at West Point, attended the conference. The purpose was to enable the Chief of Chaplains to review and evaluate the past year's programs and policies, to outline and to discuss concepts and priorities for future

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ministry programs, and to develop revised goals and objectives to enable chaplains to perform a more viable ministry for soldiers and their families. Two of the main speakers at the conference were Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and Dr. James T. Johnson, professor of Political Science at Rutgers University. Significantly, General Richardson and Dr. Johnson highlighted the modernization effort in the Army and the ethical issues involved in contemporary defense policies.

Some of the other topics discussed at the Command Chaplains Conference included the supervision and training of chaplains, Gospel Services, homiletics and preaching, the hiring of civilians, a new field manual and a revision of regulations for the Chaplaincy, and the constitutionality case. However, the most important outcome of the conference was the opportunity for Chaplain Hessian to address his major emphases for the next four years. Chaplain Hessian stated that the order of his priorities were 1) the religious support mission for soldiers and their families, and 2) the modernization and upgrading of the Chaplaincy. Chaplain Hessian emphasized the importance of training, recruitment, and mobilization planning. Above all, the Army Chaplaincy would have to be prepared to support soldiers in any and all contingency missions, whenever and wherever they might occur.

The Total Chaplaincy Goals and Objectives which Chaplain Hessian approved for FY 1985-1986 were intended to be a mission statement, with taskings, for the following three years. They continued some of the goals from Chaplain Kermit Johnson's administration as Chief, but Chaplain Hessian put his own imprint on others. Chaplain Hessian stressed a Human Goal which would ensure the free exercise of religion for all soldiers and promote family life in the Army as well as the spiritual welfare of the single soldier. The Leadership Goal included systemic training for chaplains and chapel activity specialists as well as an emphasis on ethics to inform the conscience of the soldier. The Future Development, Materiel, Management and Strategic Deployment Goals directed efforts toward a Chaplaincy that was prepared for ministry, equipped, organized and ready to accomplish "the chaplain mission in peace and war."26

Management Issues: Chaplain Proponency

In September of 1982 two meetings were held at the U.S. Army Chaplain School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, that dealt with the management of the chaplain branch. The first meeting dealt with the chaplain specialty proponency. The second meeting was a regularly scheduled meeting of the Chaplain Academic Board.

In the final draft of AR 600-1, Specialty Proponency, the Chief of Chaplains was designated as the proponent for MOS 56A, the specialty designation for chaplains.27 The Chief exercised personnel management authority. Specific management responsibilities paralleled those delineated for the Commander, MILPERCEN, and the included structure, acquisition, individual training and education, distribution, unit deployment, sustainment, professional development, and separation for

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26 See endnotes at end of chapter.
chaplains. A proponency issues group had been established by the Chief of Chaplains and met in August 1982. Action officers from the Chief of Chaplains Office, the U.S. Army Chaplain Board, the Chaplain School, TRADOC and FORSCOM developed proponency issues that required coordination of actions. In addition, the Chief of Chaplains appointed an executive group which met in September 1982 to discuss those Proponency issues and determine the action (lead) agency responsible for each issue.

Some of the special proponency issues of interest to Chaplain Hessian included the recruitment of Roman Catholic chaplains, minority chaplains and female chaplains. Personnel shortages in these areas led Chaplain Hessian to urge "special consideration by all to provide for Roman Catholic rites and sacraments" and chaplain-led worship services for minorities which could include special training in the Spanish language for ministry to Hispanic soldiers.28

Women's issues were highlighted in the Military Chaplains Review in 1983. Some of the topics included exclusive language in worship, alienation, double standards, and fair treatment of female chaplains and chapel activity specialists. It was clear from the available research that females in the Chaplaincy often labored under false stereotypes and without a trustworthy support system.29

The Chaplain Academic Board, meeting in the same month and also at the Chaplain School, was called to discuss continuing education and training (sustainment training) occurring between the Chaplain Basic Course and the Chaplain Advanced Course, and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS 3) and its relationship to the Chaplain Professional Development Plan. Although the Chaplain Academic Board was established in April 1977 as part of the Chaplain Professional Development Plan, upon completion of the September 1982 Academic Board meeting, Chaplain Paul Forsberg, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, decided to review the composition of the Academic Board as part of Chaplaincy proponency. A decision was to be made whether to reconfigure the Board later in 1982.

The Chief of Chaplains also approved renaming the Staff Specialist or Seminarian Program. The new name was to be the Chaplain Candidate Program. Seminarians were appointed to the Chaplain Candidate Program to provide a continuing source of trained chaplains for active duty, Reserve, and National Guard service. Denominational approval was required for all chaplain candidates. Chaplain candidates were authorized up to 45 days active duty for training each year. The first year candidates had to attend the Chaplain Basic Course at the U.S. Army Chaplain School. In following years they had to train in an institution, hospital or confinement facility. Chaplain candidates wore Staff Specialist brass insignia and the words "Chaplain Candidate" under their name on their name plates.

Nuclear Issues: The Bombs, The British, and The Bishops

As part of the NATO deterrence strategy for European security in 1982, the United States completed the delivery of 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles to five European countries. The 108 Pershing II missiles initially deployed in Germany had the capability of reaching Soviet targets within

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five minutes after launching.\textsuperscript{30} An additional 96 cruise missiles were transported to the British Royal Air Force Base at Greenham Common, 50 miles west of London.\textsuperscript{31}

The Conservative Party in Britain, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was firmly committed to the emplacement of American cruise missiles, but the Labor Party under the leadership of the Honorable Michael Foot was equally committed to removing all nuclear weapons from Britain. The Conservatives argued that the missiles were necessary to maintain the nuclear balance in Europe, while their critics in the Labor Party said that the missiles would simply make it easier for the United States and the Soviet Union to fight a nuclear war without resorting to intercontinental missiles.\textsuperscript{32}

At Greenham Common, 30,000 women linked arms in a circle around the base in protest. Ms. Gillian Booth, who spent two weeks in prison for her activities at the base, explained that she "would like to see all countries get rid of nuclear weapons, including Britain." The Honorable Alex Kitson, a Scottish political leader observed, "When they talk about limited nuclear war in the States, they mean it would be limited to us."\textsuperscript{33}

London's \textit{Sunday Times} called the proliferation of nuclear weapons "the most crucial issue for 1983." Seventy-two percent of the British electorate said they were worried about nuclear weapons, and 30\% said they favored unilateral disarmament for Britain.\textsuperscript{34} The Most Reverend Dr. Robert Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury, said a full-scale nuclear war was un-winnable and "applauded those who demonstrated" against nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{35} The Church of England's Convocation of Clergy scheduled a debate in February of 1983 on "The Church and the Bomb" which seemed to look with predisposed favor upon unilateral nuclear disarmament for the British Isles.\textsuperscript{36}

In the United States various church leaders began to issue letters and statements regarding the increase in nuclear weapons in Europe. The United Methodist Council of Bishops, representing ten million church members, condemned "the use and the threat of using nuclear arms."\textsuperscript{37} The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, whose member bishops presided over 285 dioceses in the United States, began reviewing a statement on the morality of nuclear arms as drafted by their Committee on Peace and War. The Committee's Chairman, Archbishop Joseph L. Bernardin, had already written in the first draft that "any nation's first use of nuclear weapons would be irrational and immoral." The first draft also raised serious moral questions about the concept of deterring opponents through the threat of using nuclear weapons, which had been basic to United States policy for decades.\textsuperscript{38}

The possibility of a pastoral letter by the Catholic bishops condemning nuclear deterrence immediately attracted some of the most extensive news coverage in the United States. Major newspapers, television broadcasts, and news magazines ran follow-up stories from November of 1982 through May of 1983 on three different drafts of the bishops' "Pastoral Letter on War and Peace."\textsuperscript{39} President Reagan's national security advisor, William P. Clark, sought to persuade the Catholic bishops that "the Administration's policies on nuclear arms were guided by compelling moral considerations."\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{See endnotes at end of chapter.}
Army Concerns

At the highest Department of the Army levels there were concerns over the impact the Bishops' Pastoral Letter might have on service members of the Roman Catholic faith. More than 25% of the soldiers in the Army were Catholic; and, in 1983, for the first time in its history, the United States Military Academy at West Point reported that more than 50% of the cadets were of the Roman Catholic faith. Some generals wondered if Catholic soldiers assigned to Pershing missile units would refuse to perform their duties in light of the Pastoral Letter. At St. Augustine's Church in Ossining, New York, Lt. General Willard Scott, Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy and a Roman Catholic Eucharistic minister, addressed the congregation in February: "Yes, I study war, but I study war to promote and preserve peace. I tell my cadets that we will do our utmost to preserve peace."41

At the U.S. Army War College Professor John W. Coffey, a visiting scholar, wrote in *Parameters*:

... a bishop's conference has no teaching authority. Only the Pope or the whole College of Bishops with the Pope can proclaim morally binding principles for Catholics.42

However, Chaplain Donald L. Davidson, who taught ethics as a member of the War College faculty, urged that the Roman Catholic Pastoral Letter "not be overlooked," for "since 1980, churches and synagogues representing more than 100 million Americans have issued official statements that criticize nuclear weapons and U.S. deterrence policy."43

At the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain Hessian monitored the news reports and discussed the drafts of the Pastoral Letter. At the Command Chaplain's Conference in July, Chaplain Hessian invited Terence Cardinal Cooke, Archbishop of New York and Military Vicar of the Armed Forces, to address the Conference on the "Moral Responsibility of Command Leadership."44 Chaplain Robert J. Ennis, Deputy Commandant of the Chaplain School, wrote concerning the Pastoral Letter: "This statement has generated more interest on a national level in both political and military spheres than any other moral issue in the last decade."45

Ultimately, after the publication of the third draft of the Bishops' Letter in May, interest began to shift to other issues. The bishops had never advocated what some feared they might--disobedience to military orders by Roman Catholic soldiers. In fact, the third and final draft of the Pastoral Letter amended the earlier condemnation of all first use of nuclear weapons to include recognition of the role that NATO's "flexible response" doctrine played in deterring Soviet aggression in Western Europe. But the draft also urged that "flexible response" be replaced quickly with "an adequate non-nuclear alternative."46 This wording provided enough "diplomatic room" for Roman Catholic soldiers, the Army, the Church, and NATO to live with the situation. The moral issue, however, had enough force to cause many in the Chaplaincy to re-examine their own rationale for serving as uniformed clergy in a "nuclear" world.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
A Question of Identity

At Fort Leonard Wood, Chaplain Phillip J. Cassibry, CPE Supervisor and Trainer, applied for a grant from the Chief of Chaplains in 1982 to fund a Chaplains' Denominational Identity Workshop. The focus of the workshop was to stress denominational identity and relationships as a way to bridge the role conflict some chaplains were experiencing between their identity as military officers on one hand and clergy representatives of their denomination on the other. The nuclear morality issue had not helped bridge the role conflict many chaplains felt. Chaplain Hessian agreed to give the keynote address. Major General C. J. Fiala, Commanding General of Fort Leonard Wood and a Catholic Lay Eucharistic Minister, agreed to share his views on the Chaplaincy as a vital force in the military services.47

The workshop, which met in the spring of 1983, featured fifteen speakers including denominational endorsing agents, active and reserve component chaplains, Army, Navy, and Air Force chaplains. Chaplain Billy W. Libby, President of the Army Chaplain Board, spoke on "The Chaplain's Allegiance to His Church," and shared an experience he had in 1972 in which he lost faith in the morality of the Vietnam War. Chaplain John P. "Jack" Ettershank, the TRADOC Chaplain, discussed the problem of the degree of allegiance the chaplain should affirm for the military. Chaplain Jerry E. Malone, from the 93rd Evacuation Hospital at Fort Leonard Wood, discussed "The Chaplain as an Advocate of Religious Freedom."

In a sense the workshop was therapeutic for the chaplains who attended, for it showed that their concerns over role conflicts were shared and had been addressed by many of their colleagues. In fact the issue of role conflict among chaplains had had a long history. An impressive bibliography of books and articles, at least fifteen titles by ten chaplains since 1954 was available.49 For some chaplains the issues were related to unresolved feelings from the Vietnam War, for others to the possible disconnection they felt in supporting an Army on the edge of a nuclear holocaust. For all of them the issues and the responses hopefully spoke to the question, "What am I doing here?"50

U.S. Army Europe:

Addressing Issues with Programs, Conferences, and Spiritual Leadership

The European protest to the deployment of American missiles, though perhaps a minority view, was not limited of course to England. Throughout Germany, and indeed most of the NATO countries, newspapers, civic groups, church leaders, and politicians debated the issues involved in strengthening "the nuclear option" in Western Europe. Even in Switzerland, a traditionally neutral country, protests were reported in most major cities.51

Chaplain Charles J. McDonnell, the U.S. Army Europe Chaplain, decided to address some of the ethical and practical ministry issues involved in NATO's nuclear posture at the USAREUR

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Command Chaplain Conferences in November of 1982 and again in November of 1983. Supported by an outstanding staff, Chaplain Whitfield McMillan, Chaplain Tom A. Carroll, and Sergeant Major Theodore G. Huggins among them, Chaplain McDonnell chose the topic, “Ethics in an Explosive World—Peace, Presence, and Prophecy” for the 1982 Conference. The Most Reverend John J. O’Conner, Office of the Military Ordinariat and former Navy Chief of Chaplains, was the principal guest speaker. The conference was widely advertised and attended by Army, Navy, and Air Force chaplains as well as by some chaplains from allied NATO countries. The follow-on conference for 1983 was centered on the topic “Ministry in an Explosive World—Ministry to the Total Community.”

In spite of the concerns around the possibility of nuclear war, the focus of the ministry to soldiers and families in Europe remained centered on spiritual support and growth, religious education, and training leaders. During FY 82-83 more than 32 conferences and USAREUR-wide training sessions were conducted with the sponsorship and approval of the USAREUR Chaplain. A sample of the ministries addressed by these conferences included:

Spirituality and Ministry

- The Protestant Chaplains’ Professional Development Conferences, 1982-83, on Pastoral Care and Homiletics.

- Protestant Women of the Chapel Workshops and Study Conferences with emphasis on spiritual growth and training for 275 PWOC officers from communities throughout Europe. More than 700 women attended these various sessions.

- The Military Council of Catholic Women training conferences in 1982-83 featured guest speakers addressing spiritual growth and edification, organizational skills, and the rites of Christian initiation. Some 1,256 Catholic women attended.

- Four conferences for chapel activity specialists which included training sessions in team building, time management and MOS 71M-unique roles and skills.

Training Volunteers/Professional Development

- Two conferences on training volunteers in children’s ministries, youth ministries and music ministries were attended by all Catholic and Protestant Religious Education Advisors, Directors of Religious Education, and Religious Education Coordinators. More than 265 leaders were trained.

- Parent Effectiveness Training for 200 chaplains and lay leaders leading to instructor

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Bethel Bible course certification training by the German Evangelical Lutheran Church graduated 13 chaplains in 1982-83.

Two sessions of “Train the Trainer” programs for Chapel Activities Supervisors to assist in professional development of chapel activity specialists were held in Kaiserslautern and Mannheim.

Two Church Music Conferences at Berchtesgaden with 540 attendees, a 600% increase over 1981, featured multiple workshops around the central theme of “A Good Team at Work: Musicians and Chaplains.”

Religious Education

Responding to the need for USAREUR-wide coordination, a Catholic Religious Education Advisory Group was formed and held its first meeting on 7 October 1982. One priest from each of the major subordinate commands, the senior USAFE and USAREUR priests, and three Roman Catholic Directors of Religious Education were included in the membership. The group met six times from October of 1982 through December 1983 with 120 key lay leaders to discuss the “Rite of Christian Initiation for Adults.”

Eight Catholic religious education workshops conducted by the Reverend James J. DiGiacomo, S. J., trained 267 lay leaders on “the religious formation of the adolescent in today’s church.

Religious Education Orientation and Training Conferences in April of 1983 for both Protestant and Catholic RECs and DREs were held in Berchtesgaden which addressed multiple administrative and organizational issues. Guest speakers included Dr. John Westerhoff from Duke Divinity School, Sister Joyce Ann Zimmerman from the Maria Stein Center in Ohio, and Richard Avery and Donald Marsh, noted musicians from Port Jervis, N.Y. Some 317 religious educators attended.

Although it is true that the bulk of ministry in Europe in 1982-83 was centered in units, chapels and communities, the numbers of lay leaders trained by the USAREUR Chaplain’s conferences were indicators of the spiritual strength of the command. During his trips to Europe in 1982 and 1983, the Chief of Chaplains was impressed both with the implementation of the Total

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplaincy Goals and with the involvement of volunteer leaders in the ministry within most military communities.

The Development of New Doctrine

One of the initial, and most important missions Chaplain Hessian gave to his staff in FY83 was to update Chaplain Corps doctrine. The most recent Chaplain Branch Field Manual available at that time was FM 16-5, *The Chaplain*, dated 8 July 1977. Since 1977, there had been a number of new doctrinal initiatives both at Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and within the Chaplain Corps itself.

In 1978 Chaplain Orris Kelly had worked out an agreement with General Donn A. Starry, Commanding General of TRADOC, to assign "assistant brigade" chaplains to battalion level. This "Forward Thrust" doctrine, approved in 1980 at Department of the Army level, not only provided better religious coverage for soldiers, but also gained additional spaces for chaplains. Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, the Force Structure Officer, had staffed the doctrine for Chaplain Kelly on numerous trips including some to the Armor and Infantry Centers. Chaplain Kuehne was able to lay the groundwork so effectively that General Starry approved the doctrine before the concept had gone through the complete staffing procedure.55

General Starry had directed TRADOC to form a concept of how the Army should fight "the Central Battle"—the place where all combat and combat support systems would interact on the AirLand battlefield. A "concept-based acquisition system," presented in 1981, served as the mechanism to translate broad operational concepts into the necessary equipment and personnel requirements.56 In the revision of FM 100-5, *Operations*, and in the fuller Army 86 studies, combat developers were to provide integrated operational concepts which would be used to develop force structure, equipment requirements, training, personnel, and installation support.57

Division 86, the first reorganization of the Army's division structure since the ROAD Division of 1963, was conceptualized to meet the requirements of the AirLand battlefield. The Heavy Division 86 Table of Organization and Equipment provided for 19,040 soldiers supported by 30 chaplains and 30 chapel activity specialists. This was an increase of 9 religious ministry teams over the 1982 Armored Division Modified TOE (MTOE). The ratio of chaplains to soldiers in the Heavy Division 86 TOE was 1 to 635 as opposed to 1 to 713 in the Armored Division. The larger number of chaplains and their assignments to battalions was designed to provide more direct support for soldiers on the AirLand battlefield.58

In early 1982, General Glenn K. Otis, who had succeeded General Starry as the TRADOC Commander, expanded the AirLand Battle doctrine, which had appeared in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 in March of 1981, to include the concept of an "operational level of war" that existed between tactics and strategy.59 Combat developers throughout TRADOC developed joint concepts for operations on conventional-nuclear-chemical battlefields.60

At Fort Monroe, Chaplain Max W. Wilk, the TRADOC Staff Chaplain, discussed the need

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
for revised Chaplain Corps doctrine with Brigadier General D. R. Morelli, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. General Morelli suggested to Chaplain Wilk that the chaplains develop a concept for how they would provide religious support on the new AirLand battlefield. If all of the other branches were working on their doctrinal concepts, the Chaplain Corps needed to do the same if they wanted to be resourced in the future.

Chaplain Wilk appointed Chaplain Richard Goellen, a Roman Catholic chaplain on his staff, to begin the development of a concept for religious support on the modern battlefield. Chaplain Wilk was succeeded by Chaplain John P. Ettershank at TRADOC and Chaplain Goellen received orders to go to Fulda, Germany; but the project was passed to Chaplain John Hannah, who had arrived to succeed Chaplain Goellen. In July of 1982 Chaplain Hannah completed TRADOC Pamphlet 525-26, Religious Support in Combat, and had it approved both by the Chief of Chaplains and by TRADOC. Religious Support in Combat was published in March of 1983.

**Renaming Chapel Activity Specialists**

Other developments in the Army, however, soon made necessary even more extensive changes to Chaplain Corps doctrine. At Fort Lewis, Washington, the 9th Infantry Division had been designated part of a "High Technology Test Bed" for a new light division capable of defeating hostile armored divisions on the modern battlefield. In Germany, U.S. Army Europe had along been concerned about the possibility of a conventional attack by heavy Soviet armor and mechanized infantry units. Indeed this concern had caused General Donn Starry, the former Corps Commander at Fulda, to initiate AirLand Battle Doctrine.

In 1982-1983 the Soviets had 40,000 tanks in their inventory as compared to about 10,000 first-line U.S. tanks. On the NATO central front, the ratio was about 2.5 to 1 in favor of the Warsaw Pact. General Edward C. Myer, the Army's Chief of Staff, wanted the 9th Infantry Division (under its Commander, Major General Robert Elton), to develop some new concepts to help defeat hostile armor on the battlefield.

One study suggested that Russian tanks could be defeated by anti-tank vehicles if they were fifty-percent faster than the tanks and if they had a low profile. If the 9th Infantry Division could develop a light but lethal anti-tank capability and if the whole division could be air-lifted to Germany on C130 or C141 aircraft, it would give NATO an important additional asset in the event of a Soviet attack. Since the 9th Infantry was the largest division in the Army at that time, a reduction in spaces was necessary if the division was to be "air transportable."

The 9th Infantry Division Staff Chaplain, Timothy C. Tatum, was enthusiastic about the possibility of a high-technology religious ministry team accompanying the division. Chaplain Tatum had managed to secure portable computers for the chaplains in the field. They had experimented with new tents and even had some chaplains on motorcycles to deliver fast support to casualties at aid stations. He also had VHF pocket radios which were so efficient the division surgeon asked the

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
chaplains to relay messages for the medics. Indeed, the chaplains were the most technologically advanced section in the division in 1982.

The problem Chaplain Tatum encountered, which quickly became an issue for the entire Chaplaincy, was with the job description and name for Chapel Activity Specialists. In 1977 chaplain assistants had been renamed in Army Regulation 611-201 to give a more professional title for the 71 M military occupational specialty. Instead of "assistants" they were "specialists" on an Air Force model. The senior Chapel Activity Specialists (CAS) were called Chaplain Administrators.

In the 9th Infantry Division, however, there were no plans to deploy chapels on aircraft to fight Russian tanks. If the chaplain activity specialist's (CAS) job was primarily tied to a chapel, he or she was not needed in combat. To compound the problem, there was very little doctrine in print in 1982 to justify the CAS' position on the battlefield.

Chaplain Tatum had argued successfully for all 22 of his chaplain positions to remain in the new light division, but he knew he could not defend the Chapel Activity Specialists as long as they had that name. After a discussion with Chaplain Gordon Schweitzer, Director of Combat Developments at the Chaplain School, Chaplain Tatum called Chaplain Leroy Ness at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains and recommended an immediate name change for CASs back to chaplain assistants.

In spite of Chaplain Tatum's efforts, the slots for Chapel Activity Specialists in the 9th Infantry Division were lost on paper. The Division recommended the positions be civilianized. It was left to Chaplain Tatum's successor, Chaplain James Edgren, to re-justify the positions under a new name and with a different understanding of their function.

Ironically, as these developments were taking place at Fort Lewis, Sergeant Major Charles J. Durr, the senior noncommissioned officer at the Chief of Chaplains Office, had just completed a project to gain approval for new Chapel Activity Specialist insignia. Sergeant Major Durr had been staffing the project for two years. In April of 1983 the insignia, a chapel supported by two open hands, was approved for production by Chaplain Hessian.

At about the same time Chaplain Tatum's recommendation to re-name assistants came to Chaplain Leroy Ness, Chaplain Wayne Kuehne had drawn the same conclusion. When Chaplain Kuehne mentioned the proposal to Chaplain Hessian, it was immediately approved. Sergeant Major Charles Durr notified the field, and by October of 1983 TRADOC had recognized the name change.

The notion of civilianizing the Chapel Activity Specialist positions, in spite of the hasty name change, spread quickly through the Army. At Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, USAREUR resource team recommended replacing CASs with civilian secretaries. At the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Sergeant Major Durr wrote an information paper for Chaplain Hessian designed to protect the MOS. Citing AR 611-201, Sergeant Major Durr argued that since the CAS was expected to "engage the enemy with weapons" to "provide security for the chaplain," a civilian secretary would neither be a "feasible" nor a "desirable" alternative. Though Sergeant Major Durr's argument was eventually successful, it was clear that a more complete doctrinal justification for the chaplain assistant MOS was urgently needed.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Sergeant Major Charles J. Durr III
The Unit Ministry Team Concept

The concept and the term "Unit Ministry Team" had its origins in response to concerns within the Chaplaincy. In 1980, following requests from both senior chaplains and senior chapel activity specialists, Chaplain Kermit Johnson, the Chief of Chaplains, directed the Chaplain Board to develop ways and means to improve the working relationships and ministry of religious ministry team members.70 Master Sergeant Aaron Gibson, Special Projects Manager on the Chaplain Board, worked with the President of the Board, Chaplain Billy Libby, to develop a series of team building workshops. A total of sixteen separate workshops and meetings were held from 1982 to 1985 at installations which included Fort Carson, Fort Gordon, Fort Meade, and Fort Shafter.71 A consultant, the Reverend Dr. John C. Bryan of Bryan and Weir Associates in Toronto, Canada, was contracted to develop a Team Building Manual.

As Master Sergeant (later Regimental Sergeant Major) Gibson wrote:

In the early part of the team building project (April 1982), one of the major issues was to define the meaning of "team." Each unit participating in the project wrote its own definition for team as well as its own mission statement. The titles changed from "Religious Ministries Team" to "Religious Ministries Support Team" and then finally to "Unit Ministry Team."72

The focus of the team building workshops was not on the development of doctrine for the Chaplaincy, but rather on improving interpersonal relationships. Nevertheless, the research by Master Sergeant Aaron Gibson helped prepare the branch for the new concept and for the development of the formal UMT doctrine in the same time frame.73

A more important initiative, which led to the development of formal unit ministry team doctrine in Field Manual 16-5, The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant in Combat Operations, began in the summer of 1983. Chaplain James Edgren left the Chief of Chaplains Office (DACH) to become the Division Chaplain for the 9th Infantry Division. Chaplain Timothy Tatum replaced Chaplain Edgren at DACH and brought his recommendations to save chaplain assistant positions with him.

The term "Chapel Activity Specialist" was being changed in the field to "Chaplain Assistant", but there still needed to be a new and clearer description of the chaplain assistant's functions in combat. The regular quarterly meeting of the Chaplaincy's combat developers was scheduled for the fall at the Chaplain School. At that meeting the need for new concepts and doctrine would take the highest priority.

The people who comprised the Chaplaincy's "First Team for Doctrine" in the fall of 1983 brought a wealth of varied experience with them. Chaplain G. T. Gunhus was from the Soldier Support Center at Fort Ben Harrison and Chaplain Wayne Kuehne from Plans, Programs and Policies at the Chief's Office. Chaplain Gordon Schweitzer was Chief of Combat Developments at the Chaplain School74 and Major Morgan L. Flom was Chief of the Unit and Individual Training Division there. Chaplain John Hannah was from TRADOC, Master Sergeant Oliver T. "Irish" Corbett was

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the NCOIC for Combat Developments, Chaplain James Robnolt was in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Chaplain Basil L. Ballard and Chaplain Claude Newby were assigned to Combat Developments, and Sergeant First Class T. E. Hatcher was in Training Developments before moving to Combat Developments in 1984.75

Although no minutes of the 1983 meeting are known to exist, Chaplain Kuehne recalled that at one point someone noted that the chaplain assistants' positions in the 9th Infantry Division would not be secure as long as the chaplain and assistant were called a "Religious Ministry Team." Chaplain Gunhus was presiding at the meeting; after several suggestions, he wrote "Unit Ministry Team" on a piece of butcher paper.76 Major Flom from UITD, an artillery officer, thought that was the best choice because it tied the chaplain and the chaplain assistant to the unit and not to a chapel.77

Choosing a new name for the chaplain-chaplain assistant team was, of course, but a small part of writing new doctrine for the AirLand battlefield. Fortunately, there were several older versions of FM 16-5, The Chaplain, the new TRADOC Pam 525-26, Religious Support in Combat, and numerous Army regulations, manuals and special studies available. One concern was how to describe the job of the chaplain assistant in a combat environment with more functions than merely providing security for the chaplain and driving a vehicle. If the job of a chaplain assistant was a specialty which required training and justified branch insignia, there should be functions the assistant could be trained to perform that would be independent of, though supplemental to, the ministry of the chaplain. As Major Morgan Flom reflected:

The unit ministry team had to be of value to the commander of the unit. It had to have value for the commander's mission, and its functions had to be portrayed in language the commander understood. Certainly religious support in combat was important, but its components had to be described in detail.78

Selecting multiple tasks for the chaplain assistant was not difficult. Chaplain Orris Kelly had directed a task force to meet at the Chaplain School in 1976 to do a task review. The result was the addition of 50 new tasks for the 71M MOS. Yet in 1983, seven years later, the question was how to "battle focus" the tasks in a way that would justify the MOS.

One suggestion for a set of new tasks came from research. Major Flom had done on combat stress and battle fatigue casualties during the Yom Kippur War in Israel in 1973. At Walter Reed Army Medical Center, studies by Dr. Greg Belenky and Dr. Ruben Gall had indicated that battle fatigued soldiers treated near the battlefield and returned to duty as soon as possible, as had happened in 1973 in Israel, had a greater chance of not becoming casualties than those evacuated to the rear. In 1982 the U.S. Army was very interested in minimizing battle fatigue casualties, especially in a situation in which the enemy was more numerous. When a unit was out numbered, every soldier counted.

Major Flom argued that both chaplains and chaplain assistants could be trained to minister to battle fatigued soldiers. This would be an area, among others, in which chaplain assistants would

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
have independent value and relevance for the commander. Other general functions for chaplain assistants, which could produce up to 40 trainable tasks, included supporting religious services and care for the wounded, providing armed security, managing equipment and material, arranging transportation, communication and collection of information, screening counseling requests, scheduling, and analyzing key elements of information regarding the provision of religious support in a potential nuclear-chemical-biological battlefield environment.\textsuperscript{79}

At the conclusion of the meeting in the autumn of 1983, it was clear that a good deal of conceptual work would have to be done before a new field manual could be completed. Combat Developments at USACHS would take the lead in writing some training circulars on the unit ministry team. Many of the chaplains and chaplain assistants on the faculty would participate in the further development of the new doctrinal manual. The Unit and Individual Training Division at USACHS would edit and produce the manual for the Commandant, Chaplain Richard R. Tupy, and ultimately for the Chief of Chaplains' approval.

As the results of the Chaplain School meeting were being discussed at the Chief's Office, news came of an alert for units at Fort Bragg, Fort Stewart, and Fort Lewis to prepare for a "rapid deployment" to the Windward Islands in the West Indies. Reportedly some American students were being held hostage on the island of Grenada, and President Reagan had decided to commit U.S. combat forces to rescue them.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{Whirlwind of Teamwork: Concepts, Doctrine, Plans, and Products}

\textit{The Unit Ministry Team concept was the organizing principle which enabled us to articulate our materiel and force structure requirements for the Army.}

Chaplain James H. Robnolt  
Plans, Programs, and Policies Division  
Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 1984

In 1984, following the annual Command Chaplains Conference, the Chief of Chaplains approved a number of new or newly initiated concepts, programs and policies which helped the Chaplaincy meet the rapid modernization timetable of the Army. Among these were the unit ministry team concept, the strengthening of the chaplain and chaplain assistant ministries in the reserve components, the creation of the Chaplain Administrative Religious Support System (CARSS), and a review of regulations impacting on the accommodation of religious practices for soldiers. In every instance there were teams of individual chaplains and chaplain assistants who made important and timely contributions to the realization of these initiatives.

\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}
The Development of Field Manual 16-5

Since the Command Chaplains' Conference of July, 1983, a number of doctrine writers, including Chaplain Wayne Kuehne at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains (DACH), Chaplain G T. Gunhus at the Soldier Support Center, and others located principally at the Chaplain School, had been hard at work reviewing proposed doctrinal changes for a new field manual, The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant in Combat Operations. The Combat Developments Directorate had the tasking to develop concepts and studies that would relate Forward Thrust doctrine, the unit ministry team as a vehicle for the provision of religious support, and the traditional roles and functions of chaplains and chaplain assistants to the AirLand battlefield. Studies of Division 86 as described by Chaplain Stephen Gantt and Chaplain Gordon Schweitzer, Director of Combat Developments, formed an important part of the force structure framework for the development of doctrine.81

The chaplains in the major leadership positions at the Chaplain School faced the problem of personnel rotations in the midst of doctrinal development. Chaplain Richard Tupy, the Commandant of the Chaplain School, was succeeded by Chaplain Charles J. McDonnell, formerly the USAREUR Chaplain. Chaplain Gordon Schweitzer in Combat Developments was succeeded first by Chaplain John W. Schumacher and then by Chaplain Wayne E. Kuehne when Chaplain Schumacher was selected to go to the War College. Other chaplains and assistants in Combat Developments continued the work, however. Chaplain Basil Ballard, Chaplain Claude Newby, SFC. Ronald D. Romer, and Spec. 6 Jim Roberts pushed forward with development and coordination of tactical concepts for the UMT. In the Unit and Individual Training Division, Major Flom and his staff edited the various concept papers and chapters written for the manual by members of the Chaplain School faculty. Chaplain Archie T. Roberts, the Director of Training, Chaplain Ocie L. Courtney, the Director of Training Developments, Chaplain Don Gover in Training Developments, and Chaplain Robert J. Ennis, the Assistant Commandant, all lent their support for the development of the manual and for writing the new training tasks and standards being generated by the new doctrine.

In the latter part of June, 1984, Chaplain Kuehne arrived at the School to assume the duties of Director of Combat Developments. Before he left Washington, Chaplain Kuehne had been directed by Chaplain Hessian to "go up there and be prepared to write doctrine."82 Chaplain James Robnolt, the Force Structure Planning Officer at DACH, came to the Chaplain School to join Chaplain Kuehne and Major Flom in reviewing the doctrinal statements which had been developed to that time. Chaplain Jesse Thornton also arrived at USACHCS in June to be the new publication officer in the Unit and Individual Training Division, the division which had the final editing responsibility for manuals and most training publications.

There were still issues to be discussed surrounding the way doctrine was to be conceived and written. The duties of chaplain assistants related to religious support on the battlefield needed to be expanded, but some questions seemed too problematic. Could a chaplain assistant who was neither ordained nor endorsed by a denomination for ministry perform emergency baptism on the battlefield? If the chaplain assistant could do so, could he or she be trained by the Army to baptize and required

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to perform this task? Would assistants be trained to baptize by immersion or by sprinkling or by both methods?

Another issue involved presenting religious coverage requirements in language the commander could understand. Earlier doctrine had described religious coverage as unit coverage, area coverage, and denominational coverage. Major Flom wanted to "battle-focus" the language. Unit coverage became "direct support," and area coverage became "general support," artillery terms which commanders used daily. The missions were the same, but the language changed.

There were many other discussions concerning the chaplain's role as a religious leader and a staff officer, confidentiality in the counseling process, the policy of the Chief of Chaplains that "chaplains would not bear arms" on the battlefield, the chaplain's role as an advisor to the commander on world religions, and the supervisory responsibilities of chaplains and senior chaplain assistants at each echelon to mention but a few. In essence the doctrinal writers in Combat Developments, Training and Doctrine, DACH, and UITD tried to hammer out centrist positions which would give clear, logical, and legal guidance without prescribing a single, "school solution" for every situation.

The layout for the "battle-focused" manual, and for Chaplain Corps doctrine, followed a logical sequence: a statement of the history and mission of the Chaplain Corps, a discussion of religious support concepts which included Forward Thrust and the Unit Ministry Team, the inclusion of duties of chaplains and chaplain assistants (no longer chapel activities specialists), the role and duties of the unit ministry team in combat (with a chart of all of the tasks the chaplain assistant would perform), and a discussion of the ministry on installations. The manual captured enough doctrine to save the chaplain assistant MOS and to provide a rationale for resourcing the materiel, training, and personnel requirements of the religious support mission on the battlefield.

At the end of September 1984, after approval by Chaplain Hessian, the galley proofs for the new FM 16-5 went from UITD to TRADOC for printing and publication. There was a sense of real achievement both at the Chief's Office and at the Chaplain School. In announcing the new doctrinal achievement to the field, Chaplain Leroy Ness, the Director of Plans, Programs, and Policies, wrote:

The Chief of Chaplains developed a new doctrinal concept for the chaplaincy to provide direct soldier ministry in the AirLand Battle. The Unit Ministry Team (UMT), comprised of the chaplain and the chaplain assistant, will be assigned in direct support of battalions. This organizational and assignment shift provides ministry to soldiers at the forward edge of the battle, giving the UMT direct contact with soldiers experiencing battle fatigue and needing spiritual comfort in the environment of pain, suffering, and death. The UMT doctrine is applicable to every level of assignment. Teams work at Brigade, Division, Corps, and echelons above the Corps, providing general and direct religious support. The UMT's are integrated in their efforts to provide denominational coverage for larger elements and areas. In peacetime, at installation level, the UMT's provide support for all assigned and attached units, as well as an integration of the total command religious program. 

See endnotes at end of chapter.
In a sense, however, the publication of FM 16-5, *The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant in Combat Operations* in December of 1984, generated more questions than it answered about the unit ministry team. Three field circulars dealing with the unit ministry team and the duties of chaplains and chaplain assistants were written by a committee of subject matter experts in 1986 to meet this need. It was not until 1989, five years later, that a revised FM 16-1, *Religious Support Doctrine*, put a more precise definition on the "ministry tasks" the Army could and should train chaplain assistants to perform.

**Functional Review and Functional Area Assessment**

In 1983 the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Maxwell Thurman, instituted functional reviews and functional area assessments for all branches in the Total Army. The aim was to evaluate the actions needed to field new organizations in each functional area and thereby support smoother force modernization and integration. Viable organizations would integrate doctrine, organizational structure, training, and materiel requirements. The Department of the Army viewed functional area assessments, projected three years into the future, as an apt tool for the Vice Chief of Staff to assure the success of Army force integration. In late 1983 functional area assessments (FAAs) were planned for seventeen selected areas through 1985. Special Army Staff—selected categories included decision systems, standardization, and interoperability. By the middle of 1984, FAAs had been completed for military intelligence, air defense artillery, armor, infantry, ordnance, and quartermaster organizations. The Chaplain Corps' FAA was scheduled for August of 1984.

In spite of the heavy demands on his time imposed by the development of new doctrine for the Chaplaincy, Chaplain Wayne Kuehne performed the initial work for the Functional Review and Functional Area Assessment along with designated persons within the Academic Board and Combat Developments Directorate. Over a period of four months, Chaplain Kuehne organized the presentation material for a briefing for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). In order to achieve the maximum benefit from the Functional Review, planning and participation was performed with the Adjutant General, Finance, and Public Affairs proponents who would be briefing at the same time.

In August of 1984 Chaplain Jerry Reynolds, Major Morgan L. Flom, and Chaplain James H. Robnolt conducted the formal briefing at DCSPER. Included in the briefing was a review of the chaplain and chaplain assistant force structure, the training for chaplains and chaplain assistants, a review of the development of doctrine, and issues reflected in the shortage of Roman Catholic chaplains.

The Functional Area Assessment for the Vice Chief of Staff, General Thurman, was a natural outgrowth of the Functional Review. Whereas the Functional Review focused mainly on personnel issues, the Functional Area Assessment addressed specifics in the force structure and materiel areas. Work was accomplished by joint efforts of a new Manning the Force Proponent Subcommittee, the

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Combat Developments Directorate, and the Plans, Programs, and Policies Directorate of the Chief of Chaplains' Office. Chaplain Hessian and Chaplain Leroy Ness attended the briefing, but the presentation was again made by Chaplains Reynolds and Robnolt and by Major Flom.

The briefing for General Thurman examined details around the issues of civilianization, recruitment of Roman Catholic clergy, the status of the force structure in the immediate future, and applicable doctrine and force layouts on the battlefield. General Thurman, a devout Roman Catholic layman, understood immediately the importance of the Unit Ministry Team concept. The UMT could enable chaplains of one faith to be paired with chaplain assistants of another faith to extend pluralistic support on the battlefield and to help ensure the accommodation of soldiers' religious practices. Even if the chaplain and the assistant were of the same faith, the assistant now had an expanded role on the battlefield in helping to minister to potential battle fatigue casualties. General Thurman was enthusiastic about the UMT as a new idea for the Chaplaincy.

Even though Chaplain Hessian had been concerned about the briefing with General Thurman because the Chaplaincy was still working on the UMT concept, he was elated at the outcome. At the conclusion of the briefing General Thurman directed that the chaplain assistant, as part of the Unit Ministry Team, be assessed as an asset in dealing with battle fatigue at the battalion level. Second, General Thurman directed that avenues be explored to assign chaplains and chaplain assistants to units in the Reserve Components without the force constraints applicable to the active component. The Vice Chief turned to Chaplain Hessian and said, "Father, how many chaplains do you send to the War College?" Chaplain Hessian replied, "Two to the resident course, Sir." "Well," General Thurman said, "let's get some more seats." With that remark General Thurman added two additional chaplain spaces to the Senior Service College to make a total of four chaplains per year.

Since the role of the chaplain assistant had been one of the main subjects at the FAA, another of the results of the briefing was to re-examine UMT training at the Chaplain School. Although more opportunities for chaplains and chaplain assistants to work together in the field were always desirable, scheduling problems for class time and for appropriate field locations were usually present. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1984 the AIT students at the Chaplain School had their first field training exercise (FTX) to help "battle-focus" their curriculum. Likewise they got their first Drill Sergeants as "group-paced" replaced "self-paced" instruction.

Strengthening the Reserve

General Thurman's decisions sent a ripple through the Chaplaincy's personnel and force structure planning. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Reserve Components. A major change in the Army organizational structure in the Reserve Components was in progress. The number of continental armies (CONUSAs) had been increased from three to five and the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMRs) were dissolved. Staff chaplain positions were established at the newly-created Second and Fourth U.S. Army headquarters. All nine ARMR active duty chaplain positions were eliminated, but a notional force structure of 76 Active Guard Reserve (AGR) chaplain

See endnotes at end of chapter.
positions was approved by the Chief of Chaplains, with six AGR chaplain and six AGR chaplain assistant positions located at FORSCOM and in the five CONUSAs.

As a result of the Functional Area Assessment in August of 1984, unit ministry teams would be placed in all Reserve Component battalion-sized units. Moreover, policies and procedures were developed to place Reserve Component chaplains of shortage faith groups on active duty on a Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) for up to 139 days. This was the first utilization of Reserve Component chaplains in support of active component chaplain missions by regular policy. In order to further coordinate the new AGR chaplain personnel issues, a National Guard chaplain AGR position was established at the National Guard Bureau. Chaplain Philip J. Rapp was assigned to that position as the first incumbent.

**The Chaplain Automated Religious Support System**

One of Chaplain Hessian's goals in 1984 as Chief of Chaplains was to modernize the Chaplaincy's administrative and information system with appropriate computers and software programs. "We need to do something to get the Chaplaincy out of the Stone Age," the Chief told his staff. "Go find some money and get something done by the end of this fiscal year." 

Chaplain Ronald S. Bezanson, the Director of the Administration and Management Division (A & MD) at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, turned the project over to Chaplain Timothy C. Tatum, the A & MD Management Officer, for study, staffing, and implementation. Chaplain Tatum coordinated his efforts with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) to get approval for the project. When asked at DCSOPS what the modernization effort would be called, Chaplain Tatum was at a loss. "Why does it have to be called anything?" he inquired. "Because every Army program has to have an acronym," the staff officer replied. "Well, give me a moment." Chaplain Tatum said. After about 20 seconds of thought, Chaplain Tatum suggested that the program should be called the Chaplain Automated Religious Support System (CARSS). That title met the DCSOPS requirement, so the paperwork was forwarded for approval.

At approximately the same time the CARSS project was being initiated, the Chief of Staff of the Army sent a directive to each major staff agency to determine what their information system requirements would be for the near future. In order to meet this tasking, Chaplain Bezanson formed a task force to make a needs analysis and determine the information requirements for DACH and the U.S. Army Chaplain Board.

A 90-day study, the Information Systems Plan (ISP) Study, was conducted by a team of chaplains from those two organizations. The team members included Chaplain Timothy C. Tatum, Chaplain Roy N. Mathis, Chaplain James E. Russell, (all from DACH), and Chaplain Geoffrey H. Moran from the Chaplain Board. Their goal was "to set up an information system architecture prior to the procurement of hardware and the installation of a computer network." Very quickly the study expanded to include input from major command chaplains that helped in assessing the

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplaincy's larger needs.

Some of the recommendations of the ISP Study committee went beyond their charter, but were logical extensions of the analysis process. Chaplain Mathis thought the U.S. Army Chaplain Board should move to Washington to increase its contact with and responsiveness to the needs of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Other members thought the Deputy Chief of Chaplains should be dual-hatted as the Commandant of the Chaplain Center and School as was the case in some other branches. These suggestions were so controversial at the time that they were not included in writing, although within a few short years the Chaplain Board did move to Washington and assumed a new name as the Chaplaincy Services Support Agency.

For FY 1984, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved the procurement of 218 computers throughout the Chaplaincy to include major commands, installations, the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, the U.S. Army Chaplain Board, and the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Procurement of these computers was the first stage in the automation of administrative functions such as statistical data and reports, fund records, and general administrative word processing.

In October 1984, the computers were installed worldwide throughout the Chaplaincy and a training program was initiated at the Chaplain School. Installation of the system showed an immediate increase in the quantity and quality of administrative support without an increase in the number of support personnel.

Accommodating Religious Practices for Soldiers

For more than twenty years, since the first soldiers were deployed to Vietnam, the Department of the Army had received complaints, questions, and even law suits concerning the desire of some soldiers to wear beards, long hair, medals, articles of additional clothing, or even ceremonial knives with their uniforms as part of their freedom of religious expression. Many of these questions and challenges came from the Reserve Components as soldiers who were Orthodox Jews, Sikhs, or even conservative Christians were called to duty.

In response to a growing number of these complaints, the United States Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to "form a study group to examine ways to minimize the potential conflict between the interests of members of the Armed Forces in abiding by their religious tenets and the military interest in maintaining discipline." By memorandum dated October 12, 1984, the Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed a Joint Service Study Group to explore the feasibility of granting additional opportunities for members of the Armed Forces to observe the practices of their religious faiths and to prepare a report to answer Congressional concerns within this area. As Deputy Secretary Taft stated in his charge to the committee, "The Armed Forces of the United States have long held the view that morale and discipline are consistent with the vast majority of religious practices in the United States, and I charge this panel with the responsibility to recommend improvements to an already exemplary record."

The Joint Service Study Group, chaired by Lieutenant General E. A. Chavarrie, U.S. Air

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Force, directed the efforts of three internal committees. These were: 1) A committee of line officers from each service to determine military interests and impacts, 2) A committee of judge advocates from each service to provide legal evaluation, and 3) A committee of chaplains from the Army, Navy, and Air Force to determine the parameters of existent religious conflict. Chaplain Patrick J. Hessian, the Army Chief of Chaplains, served at the supervisory Study Group level, while Chaplains Israel Drazin and Wayne E. Kuehne served on the chaplain committee.¹⁰⁵

The committees endeavored to obtain a broad spectrum of information from religious organizations, academicians, and military specialists, both outside and within the government. Thirty-one interviews with leaders from a variety of religious groups including the Sikh Dharma, the American Muslim Mission, the Jewish Welfare Board, the Christian Science and Seventh Day Adventist Churches, and the National Association of Evangelicals were conducted.¹⁰⁶ A total of 3,425 questionnaires were mailed to students in intermediate and senior service schools within the military to help identify experiences of selected groups with regard to religious practices within the Armed Forces. Some 2,748 of these questionnaires were returned for a return rate of slightly over 80 percent, a high response for a mailed questionnaire.¹⁰⁷

In March of 1985 the Study Group submitted its report with 13 observations and 15 recommendations. Among these were the observation and recommendation that “the creation of a mandatory standard for accommodation of personal, religious practices in the Armed Forces runs a grave risk of undermining esprit de corps, military discipline, and the military justice system. Military policy developed in effecting accommodation should be hortatory rather than mandatory and supplemented by guidance to focus the discretion of the granting [command] authority.” Broadly stated, the Study Group recommended a review of worship, medical, dietary, dress and appearance issues and the drafting of policy which would allow the accommodation of religious practices by the commander “except when precluded by military necessity.”¹⁰⁸

In due course Chaplain Hessian directed his staff to participate with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) in rewriting Army regulations to allow a broader accommodation of soldiers' religious practices. Both the basic regulation and a Department of the Army pamphlet would establish the criteria and procedures for commanders and soldiers to deal with accommodation issues.¹⁰⁹

The Chief of Chaplains assumed responsibility for training the force in religious requirements in the areas of worship, wear and apparel, diet, and medical needs. Chaplain Hessian directed the Chaplain School to develop exportable training material for all installations and communities.¹¹⁰ On January 1, 1986, a new Army Regulation 600-20, Accommodation of Religious Practices within the Army, which contained most of the Joint Study Group’s recommendations, went into effect.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Continuing Training for Ministry

Not all of the plans and programs in 1984 were new to the Chaplaincy. The largest majority were continuing ministries which had been inaugurated and refined over the previous decade. Some programs were designed to enhance the organization or efficiency of the Chaplain Corps, while others were more directly related to soldier or family ministries. As situations for ministry changed, so also did some of the Chaplaincy's programs in order to be consistently relevant to the needs of the Army.

One of the most productive centers for the development of new initiatives and training for ministry was the U.S. Army Chaplain Board at Fort Monmouth. The President of the Board, Chaplain Billy W. Libby, had an exceptionally talented staff of chaplains, chaplain assistants, and Department of the Army civilians whose number included Chaplain Geoffrey H. Moran, Chaplain Kenneth B. Clements, Chaplain Marvin Vickers, Chaplain Thomas R. Merrill, Chaplain Richard N. Donovan, Chaplain Louis L. Schmit, Sergeant First Class Aaron N. Gibson, Ms. Bess Ballard, and Ms. Patricia M. Jennings. In FY 84 the Chaplain Board conducted 13 workshops across the United States in Parish Development, Religious Education, Homiletics and Worship, Marriage and Family Life, and Life Career Transitions—for Chaplains, chaplain assistants and directors of religious education (DRE's).

Of particular interest to many chaplains and chaplain assistants were the training opportunities in Parish Development and Basic Human Interaction (BHI). Parish Development was conceived in 1976 as a process of planned change and growth to provide skills for those who would serve as pastors, members of parish councils, lay leaders and staff members in military chapels.111 Two years later, in 1978, the Chaplain Board began adapting a one-week training experience to the unique context of the Army Chaplaincy.112 This intensive workshop, called Basic Human Interaction, was the foundation for the interpersonal training necessary in Parish Development.

By 1984 four types of Parish Development training were being conducted by the Chaplain Board:

1. The Staff and Parish Development Program, a nine-month study program which began in 1980, and which was incorporated as a regular course into the Chaplain School curriculum at the end of the year.

2. Week-long workshops in Group Development Skills and Experiential Education Design Skills taught by skilled civilian facilitators.

3. Basic Human Interaction Workshops and Training the Trainer Workshops for military chaplaincy personnel.

4. Two special workshops on "Transitions in Ministry" for chaplains and DRE’s, and "Power and Influence" training for chaplain colonels which was held in Atlanta.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Other workshops conducted by the Chaplain Board staff included nine in homiletics and worship, including one developed for the U.S. Army Europe Chaplains Training Conference; four Ministry-to-Priest Conferences to strengthen fraternal ties among Roman Catholic chaplains; four workshops on marriage and family life; and three on Life/Work Planning for senior chaplains and chaplain assistants. In the area of religious education, 50 of the 85 DREs in the Chaplaincy attended a Religious Leaders Training conference in Scottsdale, Arizona, as well. Between 1983 and 1986, the Chaplain Board programs trained more than 350 chaplains, chaplain assistants, and DRE’s per year in week-long, intensive training events.

In the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, at U.S. Forces Command, at the Chaplain board, and at the Chaplain School, Chaplain Hessian’s motto that “training is ministry” continued to generate interest in training opportunities throughout the Army. The Chief of Chaplains Multi-Cultural Training Course, held in Hampton, Virginia, focused on “Supervising a Multi-Cultural Ministry,” and featured exportable training tapes. The Chaplain Mobilization Planning Workshop in Atlanta hosted 71 chaplains and dealt with planning for full mobilization. The Chaplain Board contracted 16 workshops for 943 soldier and family member volunteers interested in youth ministry training.

At the Chaplain School, the Chaplain Training Management System was developed in June of 1984 to help installation chaplains to plan, execute and evaluate all training conducted by or for chaplains, chaplain assistants, civilian employees, and lay volunteers. Chaplain Hessian directed that each installation staff chaplain implement a long-range training plan and appoint a Chaplain Training Manager by fiscal year 1985.

Chaplain Hessian did not believe that it was possible to over-train his chaplains. He wanted, and to a large extent succeeded in securing, excellent UMTs for an Army of Excellence.

From Europe to Washington:
Pilgrimages, Anniversaries, and Dedications

In Europe, 1984 marked a number of celebrations, pilgrimages, and anniversaries. In addition to 21 conferences and workshops sponsored by the USAREUR Chaplain’s Office, which included two training conferences for chaplain assistants on the theme, “A Time for Us,” and meetings for both Protestant and Catholic women with a combined attendance of 1,130 female volunteers from nine NATO countries, there were lectures and addresses by 15 civilian professors of religion and other resource leaders on topics ranging from “the New Code of Canon Law” to “Youth Effectiveness Training.”

Chaplain Charles J. McDonnell, the USAREUR Chaplain, led 400 service personnel and their family members on a Holy Year Pilgrimage to Rome. The highlight of the pilgrimage was a Mars celebrated by Pope John Paul II in St. Peter’s Square with approximately 100,000 people in attendance. A month later, in May, Lieutenant General John D. Bruen, 21st Support Command Commander, headed an American delegation of 300 service members in the 26th Annual International

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Pilgrimage to Lourdes, France.118

The year 1984 also marked the 40th anniversary of the D-Day landings in Normandy. President Ronald Reagan and six other heads of state met for ceremonies at Utah Beach on June 6. All U.S. European Command components participated in events at Pointe du Hoc, Bernieres, Caretan, Ste. Mere Eglise, Utah and Omaha beaches.119

At the USAREUR Religious Retreat House in Berchtesgaden, Chaplain Don C. Breland and Chaplain Kenneth A. Seifried held a special 30th anniversary observance of the establishment of the retreat program in 1954 by the Commander in Chief, USAREUR. The special anniversary observance in 1984 included an elaborate display of historical photographs and memorabilia, a special worship service at the Alpine Inn Chapel, and an anniversary luncheon at the Berchtesgadener Hof Hotel.120

The Alpine Inn, the center for soldier retreats, had an interesting history as a recreational center. The Inn had been originally constructed during World War II by Field Marshal Hermann Goering as a facility for the German Air Force. Since its establishment as a religious retreat house in 1954, the Inn had hosted hundreds of retreats, conferences, and conventions attended by more than 327,000 men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces.121 Chaplain Tom Norton recalled that the Retreat House program became famous in 1973-1974 for helping soldiers stop abusing drugs, “When Chaplain Harold Summers and I were there,” said Norton, “the Jesus Movement had just attracted notice among the soldiers. So many troops converted to Jesus and laid aside their drugs that commanders would call us and ask what we were doing.”122 Subsequent religious leaders at Berchtesgaden, including Chaplain William McAllister, Chaplain Samuel Lamback and Chaplain Anthony Imberi continued the emphasis on both spiritual and moral development of soldiers.123

Dedications

In the Military District of Washington (MDW), Chaplain Clifford T. Weathers and Chaplain William C. Noble participated in the preparatory arrangements and the interment of the Unknown Serviceman of Vietnam. “It was a moving ceremony,” Chaplain Weathers recalled, “which helped bring closure for many to a painful period in our nation’s history.”124

In another MDW dedication ceremony, the Honorable Casper W. Weinberger dedicated the Pentagon Meditation Room and Center for Ministry on 13 June 1984. The Pentagon Chaplain, who was responsible to the MDW Commander for ministry to all personnel who were assigned to the Pentagon, was technically supervised by the MDW Staff Chaplain who also supervised ministry at Fort Myer, Fort Leslie McNair, Arlington Cemetery, and later Fort Belvoir.125 The funeral ministry at Arlington Cemetery was coordinated with the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force, and, in the case of Jewish personnel coverage, with the Jewish Welfare Board.126

See endnotes at end of chapter.
President Ronald Reagan and other national dignitaries pay tribute to an Unknown Soldier from the Vietnam Conflict. General William Westmoreland is at far left. Chaplain Cliff Weathers is second to the right of the President.
Year End Strength

At the end of 1984 many of Chaplain Hessian’s goals for the Chaplaincy were well on the way to realization. Field Manual 16-5 was in print, the Functional Area Assessment was a success, the chaplain assistant military occupational specialty had a new foundation, the CARSS project was being implemented, the ministry in the Reserve Components had new support, and a new regulation for Accommodating Religious Practices was in process.

At the end of the year 1,488 chaplains were on active duty. Some 114 of these chaplains were in resident enrollment at military schools, while 19 were attending fully-funded advanced degree programs in civilian institutions. The Affirmative Action projections called for 15 minority group chaplains to enter active service in FY 85. The number of Roman Catholic chaplains on active duty declined, however, from 244 to 234.

Chaplain Israel Drazin, promoted to Brigadier General, succeeded Chaplain (Brigadier General) Oral D. Nelson as the Assistant Chief of Chaplains for Mobilization. Sergeant Major Joseph A. Pino succeeded Sergeant Major Charles J. Durr in the Chief’s Office. Chaplain Henry F. Ackermann graduated from the War College and reported to the Chief’s Office to write a history of the ministry of chaplains and chaplain assistants during the Vietnam War.127

Finally, in 1984 the Constitutionality Case, Katcoff and Wieder v. Laird, took a turn for the Chaplaincy’s side. In April of 1982 Joel Katcoff and Allen M. Wieder filed a motion for a summary judgment in the District Court of New York asking that the military Chaplaincy be declared an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause. After a long series of arguments, on February 1, 1984, the plaintiffs motion was denied and the complaint dismissed on the ground that the Court should defer to Congress because the issue was considered to be a military matter.128 It appeared that the Chaplaincy’s constitutional base was solid for the foreseeable future.

Developments in the Army in 1985

Early in FY 85 the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff announced that “Leadership” would be the Army’s theme for 1985.129 All echelons of the Army planned and put into action programs and policies to promote the theme. Major program objectives for FY 85 were to staff, train, and continue modernization of the Total Army to enable it to “influence the early stages” of any conflict.130

Moreover, the Army began a concerted effort during 1985 to chart its course to the 21st century. Long-range planning was begun to concentrate effort and initiatives to provide focus and continuity as significant improvements in war fighting capabilities emerged.131 The Total Army vectors for 1985 included providing quality soldiers, fielding a modernized force across the spectrum of potential conflicts, exploiting all dimensions of AirLand Battle Doctrine, developing high technology enhancements, and improving deployability.132

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Sergeant Major Joseph A. Pino
Army personal goals included a recruited and retained force of 780,000 active duty soldiers and a total reserve strength of 724,029. A major shortfall in Individual Ready Reserve strength to meet filler and replacement needs proved troubling enough for General Bernard W. Rogers, NATO Commander and former Chief of Staff, to urge the Senate Armed Service Committee in March 1985 to reinstitute the draft. Realistic training received greater Department of the Army emphasis at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, and with continuous training in Europe with newly arrived M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. A vigorous Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinated exercise program featured 49 exercises including REFORGER in Europe, Team Spirit 85 in Korea, and Auhus Tara II in Honduras. Significant equipment improvements included the production of the M1E1 tank with a 120 mm smooth-bore gun, planning for production of 412 Patriot air defense missiles, and the allocation of $1.4 billion in new equipment for the reserve components, an increase of $500 million over 1984. Fiscal year 1985 also marked the completion of the principal phases of a major reorganization in FORSCOM’s Reserve Component Management structure. The last of the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions were eliminated and the Fourth U.S. Army was established as the role of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve in first-line national defense continued to grow.

Chaplain Corps Details

The active duty Chaplain Corps strength for FY 85 was established at 1,523. With an aggressive Affirmative Action accession plan, 20 minority chaplains entered active duty. Minority chaplains constituted 14.08 percent of the total strength. Sixteen chaplains were female. Chaplain Hugh M. Grubb from the Personnel Directorate reported a continuous, if slow decline in Roman Catholic chaplains to a level of 227 with projected losses exceeding projected gains for FY 86. Chaplain assistant strength totaled 1,562 with mid-career re-enlistment rates at 82 percent, five points higher than the Army average as a whole. Twenty-two chaplain assistants were Sergeants Major (SGM) or were in SGM positions.

Internally, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains reorganized in 1985. The Administration and Management Division became the Directorate of Information, Resource Management, and Logistics (IRML). Staff members assigned to that directorate were affectionately known as “IRMLites.” One of the major IRML initiatives, the CARSS project, continued to expand in 1985. In May the Assistant Secretary of the Army granted approval for the procurement of 63 additional compatible computer systems at the installation level to supplement the 218 computers installed in 1984. Likewise, an electronic mail procedure was installed to facilitate official communications between chaplain offices Army-wide.

Another change in 1985 affected the resourcing strategies for the Chaplain Corps. The Army standardized the organization of installations by Army Regulation 5-3 which established a Chaplain

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Activities Office and a position for a Chaplain Resource Manager.\textsuperscript{140}

Chaplains assigned to that position were called, in 1985, Pastoral Coordinators. The U.S. Army Chaplain School developed a two week functional course in resource management for chaplain and chaplain assistant Pastoral Coordinators. Students who completed the course and served a year or more in a resource management position could be awarded the Army Skill Identifier (ASI), 7F.\textsuperscript{141}

From March to July a series of meetings, reports and publications paved the way for the Command Chaplains Conference in Arlington which was to feature General John A. Wickham, Jr., the Chief of Staff of the Army, as its guest speaker. In March the U.S. Army Chaplain Board convened a Religious Education Strategy and Planning Group in Hampton, Virginia, for the purpose of examining future religious education issues of interest to chaplains, chaplain assistants, and the 85 directors of religious education in the Army.\textsuperscript{142} Task forces were organized to begin work on a volunteer management program and to discuss opportunities for professional training at civilian institutions using appropriated funds. Since the training and utilization of volunteers in religious education was a high priority with the Chief of Chaplains, a task force was selected to produce a “Volunteer Ministry Manager’s Handbook” for the Chief’s Volunteer Management Program.\textsuperscript{143}

\section*{A New Regulation}

In May, Army Regulation 165-20, \textit{Duties of Chaplains and Responsibilities of Commanders}, was published after extensive preparatory work by Chaplain Jay Jalbert, Director of IRML. A short regulation of four chapters, it did update the guidance for unmarried chaplains to secure better housing and weight allowances for household goods equal to that granted to accompanied married chaplains. In this regard Chaplain Hessian felt that Roman Catholic chaplains in particular would be relieved of unfair penalties due to previous restrictions on unmarried chaplains. The regulation also expanded the religious duties of chaplains and gave a higher priority to collective Protestant services for scheduling purposes. Chaplains could not “be required to bear arms,” although the Chief personally barred chaplains from carrying weapons at all.\textsuperscript{144}

The regulation did feature many provisions which clarified the role of chaplains, chaplain assistants, DREs, denominational service leaders, civilian contract clergy, religious resource leaders, and volunteer workers. Chaplain William L. Hufham, at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains’ Plans, Programs and Policies Division, urged that a chapter be added to implement the new moral leadership training program.\textsuperscript{145} This suggestion was approved, and the new chapter was added in the 1989 revision of AR 165-1.

Likewise, in May, the Chief of Chaplains sponsored two Multi-Cultural Training Courses, one at TRADOC, the other at FORSCOM. One hundred thirty chaplains attended. The courses featured techniques for making demographic and needs assessments and for setting goals in the military community. A follow-up survey by the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization at the Chaplain School produced an unclear result on how many participants actually initiated multi-cultural

\footnotesize{See endnotes at end of chapter.}
assessments following the courses.\textsuperscript{146}

The NTC

In June of 1985 a number of chaplains and chaplain assistants received their first taste of "realistic training" at Fort Irwin, California. The National Training Center (NTC) had been designed in the mid-1970s to simulate realistic battlefield conditions in the desert.\textsuperscript{147} Brigades from most combat divisions in the United States were sent to train under unforgiving tactical conditions. Most units were "killed" in their first training rotation.

Some of the problems Brigade Chaplains encountered at the National Training Center seemed to be no less severe than one would expect in actual combat. The weather and terrain in the High Mojave desert were not "user friendly." Units from the active or reserve components without chaplains or chaplain assistants presented general support (area coverage) challenges. There was always the possibility that soldiers would be killed or injured during training. Unit ministry teams had to be prepared to stop training and do emergency ministry at any time.

Chaplain Ronald N. Johnson, who trained twice at the NTC from July 1985 to January 1986, reported that he was intent "on adherence" to FM 16-5, The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant in Combat Operations. "Saturated coverage, to include denominational coverage, before and after battle, in the tactical assembly area (Dust Bowl), while drawing equipment, at the end of hostilities, or during reconstitution," Chaplain Johnson wrote, meant "daily Protestant and Catholic services" and "pastoral care to all soldiers."\textsuperscript{148}

Some unit ministry teams, indeed the majority in 1985, were "killed" by the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) sensors several times during the force-on-force phase of the war games. Forward Thrust doctrine seemed to place many UMT's in the combat trains where they were exposed to direct fire, artillery, gas attack, and nerve agent attack.\textsuperscript{149} Chaplain Curtis Heydt of the 4th Battalion, 64th Armor, reported: "I learned two lessons: I must be more tactically minded, and I must be harder on myself."\textsuperscript{150}

Chaplain Jesse Thornton from the Chaplain School spent three weeks at the NTC observing unit ministry teams in training. Chaplain Thornton was assigned to the Unit and Individual Training Division at the Chaplain School and charged with the responsibility of publishing skill qualification manuals and soldiers’ manuals for chaplains and chaplain assistants. He wrote of his experience at the NTC:

Units are beginning to develop combat scenarios that include missions and tasks for the Unit Ministry Teams. When unit ARTEPS include scenarios for the UMT, a vital opportunity is grasped for the training and evaluation of ministry.\textsuperscript{151}

Colonel Richard F. Keller, Commander of the First Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fort Carson, agreed with Chaplain Thornton about the potential value of NTC

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
training for unit ministry teams.

Chaplains are God's constant reminder among us of his care for us all. That is why, on the battlefield, chaplains must be at the right place and at the right time—with soldiers—for ministry.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

Chaplain John H. Bjarnason from the 197th Infantry Brigade thought the experience led to growth, development, and learning to be of "more service to the soldier."\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} Chaplain Ernest E. LaMertha, from the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Polk, wrote that "our NTC coverage went well. I had a plan, and I was able to execute it,"\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} while Chaplain Curtis Heydt of the 24th Infantry Division said simply, "Thank you, Lord, for letting me come out here twice."

It was obvious that most UMT's received valuable training at the NTC, training that could enable them to minister more effectively and save their lives in real combat. Nothing could have, or did, prepare them better.

**Command Performance**

The Command Chaplains Conference at Arlington during the second week in July was always a time for the Chief of Chaplains to discuss goals, ideas, and initiatives for the future, especially with MACOM Chaplains. The Council of Chaplain Colonels' meetings in the preceding months had reviewed 19 issues for the Chief ranging from a report on female chaplain assignments, training, and acceptance to religious requirements of lesser known religions.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} The colonels had made numerous taskings for studies and issue papers to be written as the chaplains hammered out their goals with Chaplain Hessian

In accord with the Army's Leadership Theme and General Wickham's address, Chaplain Hessian specified in the Leadership Goal for the Chaplaincy that chaplains provide "spiritual, religious and moral leadership to the Total Army community. They inform the consciences of commanders and soldiers at all levels, provide comprehensive programs to address the issues of personal and professional ethics and the moral issues of war, identify and mentor chaplain and chaplain assistant leaders, and participate in moral leadership instruction."\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} Moreover, Chaplain Hessian decided that, "all chaplains would participate weekly in post worship services and chapel religious education programs."\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

Other topics Chaplain Hessian stressed included familiarization with the CARSS, the results of the Functional Review and Functional Area Assessment, and issues involving religious requirements and accommodation of religious practices, confidentiality in counseling and the unit ministry team doctrine.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} The last item was particularly significant because the Combat Developments Directorate at the Chaplain School, under the leadership of Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, was preparing supplemental doctrine for FM 16-5, *The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant in Combat*
Operations. The supplements were in the form of field circulars and expanded some of the concepts in the field manual. Field Circular (FC) 16-50 was entitled “The Unit Ministry Team,” FC 16-51 was “Ministry to Battle Fatigue Casualties,” and FC 16-5-4, written by Chaplain John Scott in the Department of Military Ministries, was entitled “The Unit Ministry Team, General Support: Installation.”\(^\text{160}\)

Chaplain G.T. Gunhus at the Soldier Support Center worked with Chaplain Kuehne in the production of the field circulars which were published in December 1985. Chaplain Gunhus said of Chaplain Kuehne’s efforts. “Wayne Kuehne worked for more than a decade to keep the chaplaincy on line with the Army; he was and is the father of our force structure and doctrine.”\(^\text{161}\)

The Reserve Component Advisory Committee, composed of chaplains from the Chief’s Office, the National Guard Bureau, the Army Personnel Center, and Forces Command, had been created in 1985 to advise the Chief on Reserve Component issues. The Committee, which included Chaplain Phillip J. Rapp from the National Guard Bureau, developed a chaplain and chaplain assistant Total Force Layout, including a notional force structure of 58 AGR positions, for presentation at the Command Chaplains Conference.\(^\text{162}\)

Two other items generated considerable interest at the Conference. Chaplain Henry Ackermann, who was writing the history of chaplain ministries during the Vietnam War, had designed two separate but related surveys. The first he sent to chaplains and the second to other officers and to enlisted soldiers. Both solicited opinions on how well the chaplains performed ministry in Vietnam. Chaplain Ackermann had also conducted oral interviews with 40 chaplains who had served during the Vietnam War including Chaplain (Major General) Charles E. Brown and Chaplain (Major General) Francis L. Sampson, both former Chiefs of Chaplains. Chaplain Ackermann’s history was due to be completed in FY 87.\(^\text{163}\)

In view of the work Chaplain Ackermann was doing on the Vietnam War period, Chaplain Hessian decided that the Chaplaincy needed a color slide presentation on the history of the Corps and the role and function of the Unit Ministry Team to show to chaplains and to commanders. Ms. Jessica Harding, who was on Chaplain Bezanson’s staff in IRML as the Public Affairs Officer, had requested photographs of chaplains performing ministry from 14 MACOM chaplains to support this project. Chaplain Hessian wanted this to be an on-going requirement so that the presentation would be constantly updated. Mrs. Harding and Chaplain Geoff Moran from the U.S. Army Chaplain Board began developing the presentation in July.\(^\text{164}\)

Finally, chaplain assistants in 1985 had been issued new branch insignia. The project had been completed by SGM Charles Durr, but his successor at OCCH, SGM Joseph A. Pino, received the first issue. The insignia, to be worn on the Class A uniform, displayed stylized hands enclosing a chapel and represented the support provided by chaplain assistants to all religious programs.

In a special ceremony at the Chaplain School on the Chaplain Corps’ 210th Anniversary in July, Chaplain Hessian presented SGM Pino with the first official brass insignia. SGM Pino then presented the same insignia to Master Sergeant Frank Gugudan, the Acting Sergeant Major of the Chaplain School who placed the memento in the Chaplain Museum.\(^\text{165}\)

As the Command Chaplains Conference was adjourning, an initiative from the Soldier Support

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Center (SSC), Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, was also bearing fruit. Chaplain G.T. Gunhus at the SSC had proposed to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, after proper staffing, that the Chief of Chaplains become the proponent for MOS 71 M Chaplain Assistants.\textsuperscript{166} Chaplain Hessian concurred in the alignment of the MOS under the Office of the Chief. He became the 71M proponent in FY 86, two years after he became the official proponent for chaplains.

**Proposal for a Chaplain Corps Regiment**

In September 1985 the Chief of Chaplains responded to initiatives from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the New Manning Systems Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to develop a “whole branch regiment” for the Chaplain Corps as part of the U.S. Army Regimental System. Under the Army’s new Regimental System, the Chaplain Corps would serve as the regimental designator for active duty, National Guard and Reserve chaplains and chaplain assistants, just as the numbered combat arms regiments would serve as home regiments for combat soldiers. The Chaplain School at Fort Monmouth would serve as the regimental home of the Corps and the Chief of Chaplains would serve as the Commander of the Regiment. His responsibilities would include career development, training and all matters pertaining to the ministry of soldiers. Activation of the regiment was expected to occur in 1986.

One of the questions which most chaplains had about their new regiment was what the name of the regiment would be. Some chaplains thought the name should be the Regiment of Chaplains, others wanted to remain a part of the Chaplain Corps. At the Chaplain School a proposal was made to call the new regiment the “The Chaplain Corps Regiment.” But in the official orders the name of the new regiment was simply, The Chaplain Corps.\textsuperscript{167}

In mid-September Chaplain Paul O. Forsberg, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, announced his retirement. Chaplain Forsberg had had a long and very successful career, but he said he looked forward to returning to the civilian parish.

Chaplain Forsberg’s successor as Deputy Chief of Chaplains was Chaplain Norris Einertson. Chaplain Einertson had served most recently as the FORSCOM Chaplain and as the Executive Officer for the Chief of Chaplains. Chaplain Einertson was well known for his emphasis on the pastoral role of chaplains in the ministry to soldiers and to family members. He was an excellent administrator and preacher and was already familiar with the day-to-day operations in the office of the Chief of Chaplains. Chaplain Einertson was to assume office on December 1, 1985.

\textsuperscript{166} See endnotes at end of chapter.
Ministries in Hawaii and in Germany

In 1985 Hawaii was the headquarters for the U.S. Army’s Western Command, or as it was more popularly known, WESTCOM. WESTCOM was responsible for the largest geographical area of defense in the Army. From 1982 to the summer of 1985, Chaplain John Scott served as the WESTCOM Chaplain. Chaplain Thomas Norton was Chaplain Scott’s Deputy from 1982 to 1984. In 1984 Chaplain Norton replaced Chaplain Charles R. Savely as the Division Chaplain for the 25th Infantry. In the summer of 1985 Chaplain Ronald S. Bezanson succeeded Chaplain Scott as the WESTCOM Chaplain. Chaplain Tom Carter was the Support Command Chaplain in the 25th Infantry Division. The three brigade chaplains were Chaplain Hugh Dukes, Chaplain Donald Hanchett, and Chaplain Joe R. Colley.

Even though in the 1984-85 time frame there was a very low threat in the WESTCOM area of responsibility, there was always a need for soldier ministry. Fortunately, the chaplains in the 25th Infantry Division were extremely creative and highly motivated to take care of their troops. For example, Chaplain Hanchett rented an entire amusement park on Oahu for a division family outing. Chaplain Joe Colley on occasion featured a band on Sunday evenings which he called, “Sunday Night Live.” Even though the Sunday evening worship was essentially a religious event, it was framed in highly popular language. Both the soldiers and the commanders responded enthusiastically to the ministry in the 25th Infantry Division. Colonel Jerry White, Chaplain Hugh Dukes, Brigade commander, said his chaplain coverage was the “greatest.”

One of the few crises in the 25th Division and WESTCOM occurred in the winter of 1985. Some of the planning officers suddenly realized that there was no plan for the defense of Oahu. On the 64th anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, in December of 1985, the WESTCOM staff began to review the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian islands. Since this was primarily an exercise, rather than a real world event, it generated more humor than anxiety.

In West Germany the security situation and the war planning were much more serious. There was still protest in Germany, Switzerland and other European countries over the deployment of Pershing Missiles in 1982 and 1983. Various terrorist groups continued to threaten defense installations. Following a terrorist attack on the 3/59 Air Defense Artillery on September 6, 1985, the Department of the Army requested an updated U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) security program. After terrorist threats were received against the personal safety of General Glenn Otis, the Commanding General for USAREUR, a company of infantry was stationed around USAREUR Headquarters in Heidelberg. There also were constant bomb threats against Ramstein Air Force Base near Frankfurt.

In Heidelberg the USAREUR Chaplain, Richard K. Martin, was appointed the first U.S. European Command USEUCOM Chaplain in addition to his duties as the USAREUR Chaplain. Chaplain Martin’s responsibilities were to assist and advise the United States Commander Europe on religious matters having joint services implications. Chaplain Martin’s appointment became effective on December 1, 1985.

In spite of the added security precautions, in 1985 the USAREUR Chaplains Office provided

See endnotes at end of chapter.
many and varied training opportunities for chaplains, chaplain assistants, DREs and other personnel involved in ministry throughout U. S. Army Europe. In addition to the Command Chaplains Training Conference, whose theme in 1985 was "Leadership and Pastoral Supervision," there was also a Protestant Chaplains Professional Development Conference attended by more than 500 participants. In total, the USAREUR Chaplains Office sponsored 15 workshops and conferences for chaplains, chaplain assistants, DREs, the youth of the chapel, church musicians, chaplain candidates, Protestant Women of the Chapel, and nonappropriated fund custodians in FY 1985.

In addition to these training events, many chaplains continued to conduct normal worship services but with an augmented religious retreat and recreation program for soldiers and family members. At Ramstein, Army Chaplain Irven Johnson regularly took his Air Defense Artillery soldiers on cruises down the Rhine River. At least once a year, during their training on the island of Crete, Chaplain Johnson also would take them to see places of religious significance such as the site where St. Paul was supposedly ship-wrecked in the first century. In Hanau, Chaplain Robert Covington, the Community Chaplain, sponsored at least one bus tour for soldiers and family members each month. It was not unusual for chaplains to visit 15 or more European countries during their normal rotation as retreat leaders for soldiers.170

For those soldiers who were unable to go on bus trips on any regular basis, there was always the opportunity to attend the U.S. Army Europe Religious Retreat House in Berchtesgaden. From 1985 to 1986 Chaplain Samuel P. Lambback was the Religious Retreat Director in Berchtesgaden. Chaplain Lambback and his staff sponsored numerous soldier retreats which featured a variety of activities including musical programs, Bible studies and, on occasion, guest lecturers to discuss moral leadership and the ethics involved in being a soldier.171

Year's End: Tragedy at Gander

On the morning of December 12, 1985, at 0645 local time, Arrow Airlines flight 1285, a DC-8 Charter carrying 248 passengers and a crew of 8 crashed just after takeoff from Gander International Airport, Gander, Newfoundland. All on board perished. The postcrash fire, fed by the contents of the aircraft's fuel tanks, took local firefighters nearly 4 hours to bring under control and approximately 30 hours to completely extinguish. The firefighters were hampered in their efforts by the rugged terrain.

The passengers on the ill-fated charter were U.S. soldiers; all but 12 of them were members of the 101st Airborne Division from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Most of the soldiers were from the 3d Battalion, 502d Infantry; 11 were from other U. S. Forces Command units; and one was a CID agent from the Criminal Investigation Command. They were all returning to Fort Campbell after completing a six-month tour of duty in the Sinai with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). This international peacekeeping organization, made up of contingents from 10 nations, had been established under terms of a 1981 protocol agreement between Egypt and Israel. The MFO had the

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
mission of implementing security provisions contained in the original 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. The 101st Airborne Division soldiers who died constituted one-third of the U. S. peacekeeping task force.

Perhaps no other event in its peacetime history has so wrenched the soul of the U.S. Army as did the Gander tragedy, which ranked as the worst military air disaster in the nation’s history. Colonel Barry J. Sottak, Commander of the 101st Aviation Group at Fort Campbell, called the accident “a terrible blow” to the entire nation.

Ironically there was one “survivor” of the accident. When the chartered plane touched down in Frankfurt, Germany, to refuel, First Lieutenant Chris Carlin, a recent graduate of West Point who had requested leave, remained in Frankfurt in order to visit with his brother. It was not until much later that the military authorities were notified that Lieutenant Carlin was not on board the aircraft. The actual number of soldiers killed therefore was 247 in addition to the crew of 8.

Among the casualties was Chaplain (Captain) Troy G. Carter, Task Force 3-502, from the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Chaplain Carter had been detailed to go with the soldiers from the 101st to the Sinai in the summer of 1985. Chaplain Robert Covington, the Division Chaplain, had selected Chaplain Carter because of his excellent reputation in the Chaplain School Advanced Course from which he had graduated that year. Chaplain Carter was celebrating the completion of a successful mission with his soldiers when they began their redeployment. Although he had a seat on earlier flight, Chaplain Carter insisted that his chaplain assistant take that seat. Carter’s decision to offer his seat to his team member, while apparently a small sacrifice at the time, resulted in his ultimate sacrifice.

At Fort Campbell not only were the commanders very busy helping soldiers and families to deal with this tragedy, but the chaplains and chaplain assistants also were deeply involved as well. The Post Chaplain, Chaplain Bernard F. Nass, dedicated 35 chaplains and other members of his staff to performing ministry and assisting other helping agencies. In particular a phone bank was set up to handle the enormous numbers of calls coming into Fort Campbell inquiring about soldiers on the chartered flight. Chaplain John Allen, the Division Chaplain for the 101st Airborne Division, spent all the available time and resources he had providing ministry which included the memorial and funeral services for Chaplain Troy Carter at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

At the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, several staff members prepared to assist with other aspects of the tragedy. Chaplain John Flaska, a Roman Catholic priest, deployed to Gander as part of the DA emergency assistance team. Chaplain Don Taylor provided continuous ministry at the Dover AFB mortuary, and Chaplain William Hutham served on the DA task force to coordinate assistance and to advise the Secretary of the Army on care for families.

The shock waves from the Gander crash were felt throughout the world. At the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Chaplain David Peterson led soldiers in prayer and then immediately went to Fort Campbell to visit the chaplains and soldiers at that post. At the Dover Air Force Base mortuary, 900 medical personnel, volunteer Air Force and Army service members, and chaplains prepared to receive the first bodies from the crash. Some of the remains were so badly burned that only dental records permitted identification. Chaplains and other staff members had to

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
rotate on a fairly frequent basis, for the stress and horrors of working constantly with body parts proved extremely taxing on the emotions. In Germany Chaplain Jere Kimmell, the chaplain assigned to the broadcasting ministry at Armed Forces Network radio (AFN), thought deeply about what kind of tribute he could pay to those who had perished in the disaster. So close to the holiday season, Chaplain Kimmell was moved simply to play “Silent Night” over AFN with a brief meditation about the meaning of Jesus’ birth and the promise of eternal life.¹⁷⁹

A number of the soldiers who had been killed were from small towns throughout the south and mid-west. Chaplains from Fort Bragg were called upon to help provide funeral coverage. Sergeant First Class Joseph P. Millraney, then a chaplain assistant at Fort Bragg, recalled: “We were all shocked at the news of the Gander crash. The 101st and the 82d Airborne Divisions had always felt a certain kinship between them which dated back more than half a century. Chaplain Peterson, the Corps Chaplain, in particular felt very sad over the news of so many fine soldiers losing their lives.”¹⁸⁰

A year after the Gander disaster, the Chief of Chaplains dedicated the first annual Unit Ministry Team Award to the memory of Chaplain Major Troy Carter, promoted posthumously. Chaplain Carter was one of the few chaplains to give his life in ministry to soldiers on an overseas deployment since the end of the Vietnam War. Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman, the FORSCOM Staff Chaplain, remarked:

I am often asked by my line officer brethren about the large number of awards for valor, bravery and meritorious service chaplains and chaplain assistants have won. And I am asked about the disproportionate number of casualties among unit ministry team members. These statistics help support our conviction that a special ministry is needed and is accomplished at the forward edge of the battlefield. You might say a chaplain and a chaplain assistant are, and should be, among the first line professionals at the battalion and the brigade.¹⁸¹

As the year 1985 came to a close, there was no doubt in the mind of any one in the Chaplaincy that Chaplain Troy G. Carter was both a first class professional and an exceptional troop chaplain as well.¹⁸²

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
The Year of Values:  
Modernization in Mid-Course

_The Army was in the midst of the largest peacetime modernization program in our nation’s history._

Department of the Army Historical Summary, 1986

The state of the Army in 1986 was essentially strong, with perhaps a few areas of needed improvement. The equipment inventory included a wide range of new or modernized conventional weapons envisioned by General Creighton W. Abrams a decade earlier. The M1/M1A1 Abrams tank, the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the Blackhawk and Apache helicopters, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, and the Stinger and Patriot Missile Systems were fielded in sizable numbers. With a total active duty strength of 780,000 soldiers, Department of the Army forecast a 28-division land force with a mixture of active and reserve component units. An increase of 6,000 soldiers in the total reserve force promised to accelerate the conversion of some units, such as the 29th Infantry Division of Normandy fame, to light divisions while others would be modified to conform to “Division 86” designs. Even with a reduction in the overall Defense Budget in FY86, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans predicted an increase in the Army’s divisional fighting capability of 18 percent each year through FY88.

Training initiatives had produced a record number of field exercises in 1986. In addition to the units sent through the National Training Center, four major international exercises were conducted: REFORGER 86 in Europe with 17,000 soldiers deployed from CONUS to work with NATO general defense and contingency plans; TEAM SPIRIT in Korea with 200,000 Republic of Korea (ROK) and United States troops involved for the first time with the employment of two field Army headquarters and joint/combined tactical airdrops and subsequent link up; GALLANT EAGLE, a Central Command exercise at Fort Irwin and at the U.S. Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, which involved 35,000 military personnel in joint operations; and U.S. Southern Command’s CABANAS 86 in Honduras conducted concurrently with U.S. Atlantic Command’s OCEAN VENTURE to train service task forces to protect the national interests of friendly nations. A total of 8,200 U.S. personnel, 2,400 of them from the Army, participated in the Caribbean exercises.

Yet the equipment and training of the Army of Excellence were not the only foci of interest for General John A. Wickham, the Army’s Chief of Staff, in 1986. One of the Chief’s goals was to ensure that in “the most thorough possible preparation for any future war or other contingency,” the soldiers would maintain America’s basic values. Accordingly, General John A. Wickham, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, declared 1986 to be the Year of Values. Most basic among the fundamental values of the military profession were loyalty to the nation, the Army, and the unit; personal responsibility and selfless service. These values were supported by five soldierly qualities: commitment, competence, candor, courage, and integrity.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
The Chaplaincy on Line

The Year of Values was tailor made for Chaplain Corps programs. Virtually all of the initiatives, policies, training, and projections could follow in tandem with the values and qualities of loyalty, selfless service, commitment, competence and integrity. Even though the Base Operations budget for the execution of the Army’s Religious Program through the Chaplaincy had been reduced from $15.3 million to $14.9 million in FY86, the 1,525 chaplains on active duty were generally well-supported financially by appropriated funds. Chaplain support for the Year of Values was assured through a Constitutionally legal, adequately funded, pluralistic ministry deployed world-wide to serve soldiers and their family members.

In terms of its internal Affirmative Action program, the Chaplaincy continued on course to produce a truly multi-racial and multi-ethnic ministry. In 1986, some 15.2% of the active duty force was composed of minority group chaplains. The active duty officer strength distribution goals for FY86 raised the percentage to 17% with respect to Afro-American, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, Native American, and Female categories. The Chief of Chaplains directed two Multi-Cultural Conferences be held during the third quarter of FY86 to discuss issues of concern to the entire Chaplaincy’s involvement with inclusive ministries.

Chaplains in formal resident and non-resident schooling numbered 550 in 1986. Twenty of these chaplains were studying in civilian institutions, with 11 in the discipline of pastoral counseling. Ironically, even though seven volumes of Chaplain Corps history had been written or were in production, there were no funded programs to train chaplains in modern or military history. Concurrently, as a further initiative to support the Army’s emphasis on Values, the U.S. Army Chaplain Board produced two handouts for chaplains to use in Moral Leadership training. The handouts were entitled “Responsibility” and “Loyalty” and were staffed with MACOM, installation, community, and division chaplains. These materials were to further support and expand unit ministry teams’ resources in implementing the Army theme of “Values.” In the Fall of 1986 the Military Chaplains’ Review was likewise dedicated to the same theme and contained excellent articles on values, ethics, and the Chaplaincy’s history.

U.S. Army Europe:
Ministry in Heavy Weather

The winter of 1985-1986 was one of the coldest, snowiest European winters since 1945. The combination of snow, ice, and sub-zero temperatures produced some almost unbelievable effects. Trains were frozen to their iron rails in England until British Railways could heat the tracks. Small craft in Denmark were prohibited from sailing across the channel to Sweden lest they be trapped in massive ice. In Germany, even the polar bears in the Frankfurt Zoo were brought inside to escape the wind chill.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Ronald Johnson of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), participated with his unit in REFORGER exercises in Germany that winter. After a dismounted night march in Siberian conditions, the 1st Brigade attacked and defeated the waiting opposing unit, appropriately named “The Blue Force.” It was a cold winter to say the least.

To compound the problems of providing ministry under these conditions, there was also a constant terrorist threat to USAREUR Headquarters, to General Glenn Otis, the Commanding General, and to various other facilities, airfields and bases throughout Germany. For approximately a month, a company of U.S. Infantry soldiers guarded the street intersections and the main gates of Campbell Barracks where the Headquarters of U.S. Army Europe was located.

**USAREUR Chaplain Programs**

In spite of these irritants, Chaplain Richard K. Martin and his staff at the USAREUR Chaplain’s Office, (which included Chaplain R.J. Ennis, the Deputy USAREUR Chaplain; Sergeant Major G.G. Nearhof; Chaplain G.W. Conner, the Executive Officer; Chaplain Rodger Venzke, Personnel; Chaplain Tom Lucas, Resource Manager; Chaplain Wilbur Parker, War Plans; Chaplains Sam Lambback and Tony Imberi at the Berchtesgaden Retreat Center; Chaplain R.A. Brandt and Jack Kaising at the Religious Resource Center in Mannheim, and Chaplain Jere Kimmell at Armed Forces Radio Network in Frankfurt), continued coordinating and directing an extensive ministry of worship, training, retreats and pastoral care for 250,000 soldiers and families. Among other activities, the USAREUR Chaplain’s staff coordinated a Command Chaplains Training Conference for chaplains and directors of religious education on “Strengthening Values and Valuing Strengths;” a Protestant Chaplains Professional Development Conference, attended by 500 chaplains, on the theme, “A History of Excellence;” a Workshop for Chaplains Who Are Women to discuss DA issues including recruitment and career management; a Chaplain Assistant Professional Development Conference on the theme of “Leadership;” a Youth of the Chapel Leaders Training Conference attended by 206 chapel leaders; a Protestant Women of the Chapel (PWOC) Conference celebrating 31 years of service and attended by 457 women; and an Annual Military Council of Catholic Women Training Conference attended by approximately 500 dedicated lay women and chapel workers.

One of the most popular “fun” conferences was the 1986 USAREUR Church Music Conference attended by 256 choir directors, musicians, organists, handbell choir leaders, liturgists and guitarists. The conclusion of the music conference included a talent show which some observers said was “worth the trip” by itself.

A few examples of other outstanding ministries in Europe during this period are worthy of note. Many of these were based in excellent chapel congregations, but a few reflected outstanding individual efforts of talented chaplains, chaplain assistants, and lay persons.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
AFN Radio Broadcasts

At Armed Forces Network (AFN), the radio and television facility in Frankfurt which broadcast to American servicemen and women throughout Europe, a series of chaplains trained in communications specialties had produced religious programs on the radio for soldiers for more than 12 years. In 1973 Chaplain Henry Ackermann had developed a radio media ministry of daily devotionals and Sunday worship which were exceptionally popular with soldiers. Chaplain Ackermann was succeeded by Chaplains Roy Plummer, William Kreichbaum, and Jere Kimmell. Chaplain Kimmell, who had trained in radio and television broadcasting at Michigan State University, built on his predecessors’ work to expand his daily audience to 750,000 soldiers, sailors, Marines, and Air Force personnel in Germany, England, Belgium, and Italy.199 For his excellent broadcasting work, Chaplain Kimmell became the recipient of a first place Keith L. Ware Award in Radio Entertainment and a second place award in Special Themes. It was the first time in the history of the award presentation by the Army Broadcast Service that a chaplain received an award and, in this case, was most unusual because Chaplain Kimmell received two awards.200 Just to show this recognition was no accident, Chaplain Kimmell later won two Thomas Jefferson Awards as well for excellence in broadcasting. The Thomas Jefferson awards were sponsored by the Department of Defense and presented to Chaplain Kimmell by Tom Brokaw of NBC News.201

Soldier Retreats

The retreat ministry to soldiers and family members in Europe also was a major part of the overall religious program. In many communities and chapel centers throughout Germany, religious retreats were inexpensive ways for soldiers and their families to travel and to renew their religious faith at the same time. In Hanau, Chaplain Robert Covington, the Community Chaplain, sponsored a retreat for one or more of his congregations each month.202 In Ramstein, Chaplain Irven Johnson of the 2/60 Air Defense Artillery Battalion arranged for his soldiers to take cruises down the Rhine, to visit medieval castles, and even to tour Crete during exercises there.203 In Heidelberg parishioners from Mark Twain Village Chapel and Patrick Henry Village Chapel toured Waterloo, Verdun, Amsterdam, London, Strasbourg, Florence, Rome, and Israel in 1986.204

For soldiers who were unaccompanied as well as for those with families, the U.S. Army Europe Religious Retreat House offered single soldier retreats, family retreats, and facilities for most of the conferences sponsored by the USAREUR Chaplain. Chaplains Samuel P. Lambah, Jr., and Anthony "Tony" M. Imberi, who directed activities at the Retreat House, also invited guest musicians, speakers, and retreat leaders to supplement the worship, Bible study, and devotional programs. For local touring during free time, many soldiers visited Salzburg, Austria, "The Sound of Music" city and the early home of the composer W.A. Mozart.205

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Cross Cultural Programs

In many communities chaplains and chaplain assistants participated with German religious leaders to share ideas and expertise and to increase mutual understanding and cooperation. In 1985 Chaplain Ray Strawser, the Community Chaplain for Heidelberg, initiated visits to local German churches to discuss joint holiday celebrations and charitable activities. Chaplain Strawser, a native of Pennsylvania, spoke fluent German and was instrumental in sustaining excellent relationships with local congregations. Chaplain Philip Silverstein, the Senior Jewish Chaplain in USAREUR, visited sites not only in Germany, Belgium, and Italy, but also in France to coordinate religious coverage for Jewish soldiers and to secure kosher food. Chaplain Silverstein’s facility with the German, French, and Korean languages made him a valuable asset for the USAREUR Chaplain.

On a smaller, but no less important scale, many chaplains and chaplain assistants participated in community activities to support German orphanages and other charitable activities. The 26th Signal Battalion, whose Brigade Headquarters was in Worms, held an annual Christmas party in Heidelberg at a local German senior citizens home to foster better German-American relations. The chaplain and chaplain assistant covering the 26th were always invited to be part of the planning committee.

German lay persons and clergy who worked in U.S. Army chapels likewise made important reciprocal contributions to religious work. Sir Pius Daucher, the Catholic Religious Program Coordinator at Mark Twain Village Chapel, the oldest Army chapel in Europe, served American Catholic soldiers and German civilians alike beginning in 1945.\textsuperscript{206} Herr Monsignor Gottfried Merl, a Catholic contract priest, ministered to American soldiers for forty years in Regensburg, Hohenfels, and in the border camps for the 2nd and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiments. For his work Sir Pius Daucher was knighted by the Pope; Monsignor Merl also received Papal recognition as well as the USAREUR Commander’s Outstanding Civilian Service Award in 1985-1986.\textsuperscript{207}

A Sample of Parish Activities

Within the military communities in Germany in 1986, the chaplains and their chapel congregations designed and executed a remarkable number of religious programs for soldiers and their family members. Unit chaplains recorded worship services, counseling sessions, prayer breakfasts, memorial services, soldier suppers, moral leadership discussions, religious retreats, Bible studies, coffee house ministries, adventure training, “Duty Days/Weeks with God,” and hospital visitations among their normal religious leadership duties. In some of the larger chapel communities—Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Augsburg, Stuttgart, and Mannheim, to name a few—unit ministry teams were leading and coordinating hundreds of lay volunteers, contract clergy, denominational service leaders, directors of religious education and other workers.

At Mark Twain Village Chapel in Heidelberg which served a Support Group and three major headquarters units, the chapel membership list included 1,420 soldiers and their family members.

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Some 225 volunteers from the Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant congregations administered more than 55 programs which included four choirs, two Sunday Schools, one Hebrew School, one Latter Day Saint Youth Education Program, four youth programs, Vacation Bible School, 12 family retreats, 12 single soldier suppers, three Bible studies (including those offered by the Navigators and the Officer Christian Fellowship), 12 parish suppers, a Spanish-speaking fellowship, Alcoholics Anonymous, Marriage Enrichment, Senior Citizens' Lunches, Hospital Ministry, Protestant Men and Women of the Chapel, a Young Adult Fellowship, Teacher Recruitment and Training, and worship services for all holidays and special observances. During any one week, an average of 35 different groups met in the chapel to plan, coordinate, or conduct ministry.\textsuperscript{208}

From 1973 to 1986 the USAREUR religious program produced one for the largest and busiest ministries for military personnel in the world. Although there were more troop chaplains in Europe at the end of World War II, there were more active religious congregations for military service members in 1986 than in any time in the previous 50 years. The soldiers involved in the Cold War in Europe received the best and highest quality religious support the Army Chaplaincy and its faithful volunteer lay leadership could provide.

**Hails and Farewells:**
**Continuing a Firm Foundation**

In June of 1986 the Chaplain Corps marked a number of personnel transitions which were important not only in terms of its continuity of ministry but also in terms of its historic direction for the future. Scores of chaplains, chaplain assistants and DA civilians retired in 1986. Their contributions to religious support over the preceding quarter century and beyond were significant.

Among the active and reserve component chaplains who retired between January 1\textsuperscript{st} and June 1\textsuperscript{st} were Chaplain Bobby G. Allen, Chaplain Danny W. Buttram, Chaplain Nathaniel Giannattasio, Chaplain Marvin C. Hughes, Chaplain Charles D. Bass, Chaplain George H. Fischer, and Chaplain Robert E. Southwell.\textsuperscript{209}

One of the best known and possibly best loved civilian employees to retire was Mrs. Nellie Burton, the Assignments Officer in the Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations Division, Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Mrs. Burton had served in the Chief's Office for 41 years, following the various Chiefs and their staff members from the War Department, located in 1945 in the Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue, to the Pentagon, Fort Leslie McNair, the Forrestal Building and then back to the Pentagon.

In 1941, at the beginning of World War II, there were 383 chaplains of every major religious denomination on active duty. In 1945, when Mrs. Burton arrived as a GS-2 in the Chief's Office, there were 9,100 chaplains on duty.

Among Mrs. Burton's duties were the maintenance of chaplain personnel records and a color-coded, flip chart of names for tracking the annual assignments and availability of more than 1,500

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
active duty chaplains. The 6,000 color-coded entries on “the Board” gave an instant appraisal of chaplains by worldwide assignment. “The Board,” replaced by computerized records, was retired with Mrs. Burton on May 31, 1986.

When Mrs. Burton’s retirement was announced, expressions of appreciation for her almost half-century of work poured in from chaplains throughout the Army. Chaplain Kenneth V. Carpenter, 7th Engineer Brigade, wrote: “Your name is one of the first which a new chaplain associates with the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.” Chaplain Joseph E. Miller, 1st Armored Division, said, “You have made a positive impact on the Chaplaincy which will be felt for many, many years to come.” Chaplain T.W. Thompson, 777th Field Artillery, Babenhausen, Germany, related, “You have made a mark in history and will be remembered as one who has helped many of us to step out in faith for the cause of God and country.” In the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Mrs. Burton’s impact was echoed by Chaplain Hessian and his staff: “Your care for others is the measure of your greatness.”

As these transitions were taking place, Chaplain Norris L. Einertson’s Presidential nomination to become the Army’s 17th Chief of Chaplains was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on 18 June. Chaplain Patrick J. Hessian bade farewell to the Corps as he hailed his successor:

I attempted to be a rallying point around which and through whom your efforts would be facilitated, God’s grace would flow to His people, and we would all bring glory to His name. I know it has not always been easy. You have tolerated my views even when they seemed to be bizarre. You supported me as your Chief and stuck with me faithfully. You have been my strength. I leave thinking and feeling that we’ve been a good team, and have succeeded in doing God’s will for the people He entrusted to us. Each of us contributed, in some significant way, to that success. My heart will be with you always.

Chaplain Hessian’s retirement dinner was held on June 25, 1986, at Fort Myer followed by a retirement parade two days later hosted by General John A. Wickham, the Army Chief of Staff. General Wickham saluted Chaplain Hessian’s leadership with the following comments:

Chaplain Pat Hessian has served the Army and the Country since 1958 in the Army Reserve and in the Active Army. A combat-decorated, master parachutist, General Hessian has been a chaplain in three brigades and two divisions and at XVIII Airborne Corps, U.S. Army Europe, and 8th (US) Army in Korea. His ministry has always been characterized by a passionate concern for the needs of soldiers.

As Chief of Chaplains, he insisted that the chaplain and chaplain assistant, as a “unit ministry team” be deployed to the most exposed elements of the battlefield so that soldiers in combat might have the best pastoral care. On his watch he successfully defended the Constitutionality of the Chaplaincy and was instrumental in the assignment of the first chaplain to the National Guard Bureau. Chaplain Hessian has

See endnotes at end of chapter.
all the qualities of a great priest. He is never afraid to stand up for what he believes on major moral, spiritual, and ethical issues. General Hessian lived up to a memorial to a minister in the eighteenth century: 'He taught them how to live and how to die.' Soldiers can ask no more of their spiritual leaders.⁵¹²

General Wickham's remarks constituted a high tribute for Chaplain Hessian's leadership, but they also reflected the accomplishments of many chaplains and chaplain assistants who helped standardize training, doctrine, and policies throughout the Corps so that the ministry to soldiers and family members might rest on a firm foundation for the decade ahead.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
ENDNOTES


3. Chaplain Frank A. Tobey served as Deputy Chief from 1954-1958 and Chief from 1958-1962, a total of 8 years.


5. Ibid., p. 34.

6. Ibid.


8. Ibid., p. 25.


12. Doctor William J. Hourihan, "Oral Interview" with Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Patrick J. Hessian, 27 May, 1986, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, p. 4. The other three chaplains selected by Chaplain Kelly as potential, future Chiefs of Chaplains were Chaplain James Murphy, Chaplain John McCullough, and Chaplain Art Craig. Chaplain Hessian thought it was a very fair thing for Chaplain Kelly to give a number of people a chance at being the Chief of Chaplains. See Dr. Hourihan's interview with Chaplain Hessian dated 10 February, 1986, p. 94.


15. Ibid., p. 3.


18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., pp. 1-4 & 1-5.


21. Ibid., Note: These statements are almost identical to similar advice given to the Corps by Chaplain Orris Kelly in 1977.


26. OCCH, Annual Historical Review, 1 October 1982 - 30 September 1983, p. A2. The Total Chaplaincy Goals reflected Total Army Goals as well as Army initiatives such as the Army Family White Paper signed in August of 1983.

27. OCCH, Annual Historical Review, 1983-1984, p.17. Other regulations which reflected this responsibility included AR 600-3 and AR 105.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.


48. See the *Military Chaplains Review*, Fall 1983, for the published Fort Leonard Wood Papers.


50. The legal crisis in the Chaplaincy, which had begun with the Constitutionality Case in 1979, received some encouragement in 1983 when the Supreme Court ruled that the Nebraska state legislature was not violating the Constitution’s separation of church and state by having an official chaplain. See “GOP Decides to Keep Capitol Hill Chaplains,” The Washington Times, 3 January 1995, p. A4.

51. Personal interview with Sergeant First Class Joseph P. Millraney, who was the NCOIC in 1983 for the Heidelberg Community Chaplain, 18 January 1995.


53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., pp. 466-470.

55. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Wayne Kuehne, DACH, 2 May, 1994. In fact, General Starry approved part of it at lunch with Chaplain Kuehne at the Fort Lee Officers’ Club!

56. John L. Romjue, Prepare the Army for War, p. 12.


58. Ibid., p. 22.

59. Ibid., p. 55.

60. Ibid.


63. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Timothy Tatum, DACH, 28 December 1994.

64. Ibid.

65. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Wayne Kuehne, 2 May, 1994.

66. “This issue had been under discussion in the Corps for some time, but this event got things moving...” Chaplain (Col.) John Scott, February 1995.
67. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Tim Tatum, 28 December 1994.

68. TRADOC Chaplain *Annual Historical Report*, October, 1983.


70. Master Sergeant Aaron Gibson and Dr. John Bryan, "Team Building and the Army Chaplaincy," *Military Chaplains Review*, Fall 1985, p. 95.


73. The team building manual, *Skills for Team Building*, was published by the Chaplain Board in 1985.

74. Chaplain (Col.) Gordon Schweitzer, USA, Rtd., was a founding member of the St. Hereticus Society which was instituted at Fort Lee, Virginia, in 1972. In response to the St. Barbara's award given by the Artillery, the St. Hereticus Society recognized universal skeptics. St. Hereticus Day was April 1st and always featured cake and the motto, "Remember Pompeii." (The theory was that Pompeii was destroyed for ignoring St. Hereticus.) The secret sign of the Hereticians was crossing the middle finger over the index finger whenever saying anything. It is not known if the Society is still active. Information comes from an interview with Chaplain Schweitzer, Reno, Nevada, 30 December 1994.


76. Interview with Chaplain Kuehne, 29 December 1994.

77. Interview with Major M. L. Flom, 2 January 1995.


80. Chaplain Knox Herndon, who participated in Operation Urgent Fury, pronounced Grenada like grenade, not like Granada which is a city in Spain.
82. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Wayne Kuehne, 2 May 1994.

83. Personal interview with Major Morgan L. Flom, USA Retired, 2 Jan 1995. Note. For his contributions to Chaplain Corps doctrine, the Chief of Chaplains awarded Major Flom the Aaron and Hur award in 1988.

84. Some chaplains who had served in combat in Vietnam against guerrillas that observed no "rules of warfare" were not enthusiastic about an absolute prohibition against chaplains bearing arms on the battlefield. The Geneva Conventions do not require chaplains or other religious personnel assigned to hospitals to serve in combat without arms. Medical personnel are entitled to carry side arms to protect themselves against unprincipled marauders, and chaplains are included in the Geneva Conventions under the topic of medical personnel. However, in consideration of the pacifist position taken by many civilian denominational endorsing agents, Chaplain Hessian reinforced the World War II JAG opinion that chaplains should not bear arms lest they lose their status as non-combatants. Chaplain (Col.) James E. Pierce, USAR, a Vietnam veteran, reflected simply, "Chaplain Hessian made chaplains quit carrying guns." (Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) James E. Pierce, Valley Forge, Pa., 1 Jan 95.)


87. Ibid., p.103.

88. Ibid., p.104.


90. Ibid., pp.16-17.


92. Ibid.


94. Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Norris Einertson, letter to Chaplain (Col.) John Brinsfield, 2 May 1995. Copy in Chaplain Corps Archives. This changed to three per year in 1996 due to downsizing of the Army, the War College, and branch quotas.

96. Ibid.

97. OCCH, Annual Historical Review, FY 84, p.18.

98. Ibid. Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Philip J. Rapp was assigned to the National Guard Bureau in April of 1984. He was succeeded in May of 1989 by Chaplain (Col.) George Schwantes who helped furnish National Guard UMT support for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, JTF Guantanamo, and Operation Andrew. He was succeeded in turn in December of 1994 by Chaplain (Col.) Donald Hill.


100. OCCH, Annual Historical Review, FY 1984, (Chaplain (Col.) James Edgren's draft), p.7. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.


104. Ibid., p. iv.

105. Ibid., p. ii.

106. Ibid., Conference Report, September 26, 1984, p. 25. Rabbi Lapp represented the Jewish Welfare Board while Rabbi Landes represented the Conservative Rabbinical Assembly.

107. Ibid., p. 27.

108. Ibid. Executive Summary, p. xiii. Other specific recommendations were also made with regard to the need to develop special combat rations, permission for chaplains to wear religious accoutrements with the uniform in the performance of worship and practices distinct to their faith group, and the use of administrative actions as a means of conflict resolution.

109. Ibid., p.15.

110. Ibid.


120. USAREUR and 7th Army Annual Historical Report, FY 1984, p. 392.


123. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Samuel P. Lamback, 7 December 1993.

124. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Cliff Weathers, USA Retired, 19 February 1995. The ceremony at Arlington Cemetery was held on 28 May 1984.


127. Office of the Chief of Chaplains, *Annual Historical Review*, 1 October 1983 - 30 September 1984, p. 8. Chaplain Ackermann had begun a highly successful radio ministry at Armed Forces Network in Germany in 1974. Thereafter he trained many chaplain service school instructors in audio-visual techniques as well as in “content” courses, such as ethics and effective communication, while he served in the TRADOC Chaplain’s Office in 1977 and 1978.


131. Ibid.


133. Ibid., p. 1-4.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid., pp. 1-6, IV-6.

136. Ibid., p. VI-7.


140. Ibid., p. 6.

141. Ibid.

142. Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Annual Historical Review, 1 October 1984 - 30 September 1985, p. 19. DRE positions were popular. Some 105 qualified applicants were on file in 1985 to fill any vacancies which might occur among the 85 DRE incumbents.

143. Ibid., p. 20.

144. Department of the Army, AR 165-20, paragraph 1-5 (d).


146. The OCCH, Annual Historical Review, FY 85, p. 16, reported that 50% conducted post-course assessments. However, DOES reported to Chaplain Hufham a 10% result. See Chaplain (Lt. Col.,) William L. Hufham, Information Paper for the Council of Colonels, 1985, p. 1. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.

147. The NTC concept was developed at TRADOC in 1976 by General Gorman and his staff. The first force-on-force maneuvers were conducted in 1982.


158. This policy was not popular with some chaplains who normally had no parish responsibilities due to their positions on staffs or on school faculties. Chaplain Hessian did not like for chaplains to ignore the needs of post chapels, however, and would ask chaplains occasionally on staff visits what they did on Sundays.

159. OCCH, *Annual Historical Review*, FY 85, pp. 7-8.

160. *Ibid.* , p. 16, and personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Wayne Kuehne, 19 April, 1995. Chaplain Kuehne stressed the importance of the work others did in the production of these field circulars.


166. OCCH, *AHR* FY 85, p. 17.

167. Ibid., p. 17.


171. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Samuel P. Lamback, Jr., U.S. Army Retired, 7 December 1993.


Carolina.
182. At the Army Chaplain School a special Memorial Service was conducted for Chaplain Carter. All students and staff and several post representatives attended.


185. Ibid., p. III-10.

186. Ibid., p. I-1.

187. OCCH, Active Duty Fact Book, 31 March 1986, pp. 2, 3, 4, 12. For example a new Chapel Center in Yongsan, Korea, was projected for FY86 at a cost of $2.3 million and 53 additional chapels and religious educational facilities scheduled for construction during 1987-1992. During 1985 only two chapels were demolished, one at Fort Polk, the other at Fort Lewis.

188 On January 31, 1986 Joel Katkoff and Alan Wieder abandoned their lawsuit, *Katkoff v. Marsh*, with prejudice, thus ending the constitutional challenge to the chaplaincy. The Second Circuit Court held that chaplain activities “reasonably relevant and necessary to the furtherance of our national defense” were constitutional. See Major General Hugh R. Overholt, the Judge Advocate General, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, 7 February 1986, in the Chaplain Corps Archives.


190. Ibid., pp. 8-9. The other fields of study included religious education, homiletics, ethics, educational technology, general education, comptrollership, and church management.


195. Personal memoir of Chaplain Brinsfield. Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John Trapold, the Senior Chaplain in Mark Twain Village, provided a Roman Catholic ministry for some of the soldiers on guard. In addition, the Catholic and Protestant women in the chapel made cookies for the troops.
Chaplain Trapold was General Otis’ personal chaplain.

196. In the summer of 1986 Chaplain (Col.) Donald W. Shea succeeded Chaplain Richard Martin as the USAREUR and EUCOM Chaplain. Others who joined the USAREUR Chaplain’s staff in 1986-1987 included Chaplain (Col.) H.L. Schaffer, Deputy; Master Sergeant D.E. Beistline, Chaplain (Maj.) Michael L. Broyles, Executive Officer; Chaplain (Col.) Otto Reinbacher, Personnel; Chaplain (Maj.) Donald G. Hanchett, Resource Manager; Chaplain (Col.) B.H. Lieving, Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Thomas R. Smith, and SFC Gary Powell in Mannheim; and Chaplain (Maj.) G.E. Tyson in Berchtesgaden. See HQ, USAREUR and 7th Army Historical Review, 1984, 1986, 1987 at the Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.

197. Ibid., 1985-1986 USAREUR Chaplain Activities, pp. 7-80 to 7-82.

198. Memoir of Mr. Ed Matthiessen, Music Director, Mark Twain Chapel.


200. OCCH, 1 January 1986 Chief’s Newsletter, p. 1. The Ware awards were named for Major General Keith L. Ware, Chief of Public Affairs, killed in Vietnam in 1968.


204. With the support of the chaplains at these two chapels, Chaplain Stan O’Laughlin, Chaplain Richard Goellen, Chaplain John Lincoln, and Chaplain John Brinsfield among them, some 55 parishioners visited Jerusalem, Galilee, the Dead Sea and other Israeli sites in 1986. The security precautions included flying in an unmarked airplane from Munich to Israel and return. Mr. John McQueen, Major Jesse Cornet, Lt. Col. John Prysbylski, Mr. Ron and Mrs. Daisy Koehn, Mr. Ed Matthiessen, and Mrs. Charlotte Kroger of Mark Twain Chapel were instrumental in organizing and supporting many of the retreat and fellowship programs in 1986.

205. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Samuel P. Lamback, Jr., Installation Staff Chaplain, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, 7 December 1993.

206. Mark Twain Village Chapel held it 40th Anniversary in 1986. Chaplain Robert Covington, a former pastor, was one of the guest speakers.

207. OCCH, Public Affairs Files, 1985-1986, Letter from Colonel Donald L. Scott, Hohenfels Training Area to CINC, USAREUR and Seventh Army. The project officer for Merl’s award was Chaplain (Capt.) David G. Reynolds.
208. Mark Twain Village Chapel Directory and Parish Council Organization, Heidelberg, Germany, 8 June 1986, pp. 1-2. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives. Mr. Ed Matthiessen, the Choir Director at Mark Twain Chapel, organized and led one of the finest parish music programs in Europe.

209. OCCH, Chief of Chaplains Newsletters, 1 January - 1 July 1986.


211. OCCH, Chief of Chaplains Newsletter, 1 June 1986, p. 1.

Sergeant Major James Schonefeld receives the Chaplain Corps colors from Chaplain Charles J. McDonnell, Commandant
As the Cold War ended and the nuclear threat to the United States diminished, the Army began the painful process of reducing its forces overseas and at home. One of the challenges the Army Chaplaincy had to meet was how to reshuffle its personnel and materiel resources to meet increasing demands for ministry even as the total force decreased in size.

Milestones:

- Establishment of the Chaplaincy as part of the Army Regimental System
- Standardized designs for Army chapels
- U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency established
- Directive for Accommodation of Religious Practices
- Training in Medical Ethics approved
- Operation Just Cause, Panama

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Ministry at the End of the Cold War:  
Pastoring the Army, Preserving the Chaplaincy¹

After twenty-eight years of keeping the world divided, the Berlin Wall came down in November of 1989. World-wide tensions have decreased and the prospects for peace increased. The Army will get smaller and so will the Chaplaincy. In times of adversity the Army has rallied around its Chaplaincy for support - most obviously on the battlefield. But as the Army enters uncharted waters, drawing down a quality, all volunteer force, the Army will again rally around the Chaplaincy for support.²

Chaplain (Major General) Norris Einertson  
Chief of Chaplains, U.S. Army

Although in retrospect the years immediately preceding the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, and later the Warsaw Pact, appear to mark the slow disintegration of the Soviet Union, such conclusions were not yet clear in 1986. There was still a possibility of at least a tactical nuclear confrontation in Europe and talk in Washington of funding President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative or "Star Wars" program from the record $1 trillion Federal budget.³ The Army was facing fiscal constraints because Congress knew that the domestic economy was much less vibrant than it appeared. In 1985 America had become a debtor nation, importing more than it exported, for the first time in history. Although 18 million new jobs were created in the United States, most were temporary, low paying positions which went to women.⁴ At a time when 20 percent of babies born in America were born to single mothers and an estimated 350,000 Americans were homeless, it seemed incongruous to speak of a "booming American economy."⁵

The challenges which faced the Chaplaincy on 1 July 1986, when Chaplain Norris Einertson became the 17th Chief of Chaplains, may be consolidated into responses two questions:

1) How can the Chaplaincy address the needs of the Army most effectively in a time of uncertainty?

2) How will the Chaplaincy defend and manage its own resources to make effective ministry possible?

Strong religious leadership, pastoral care, and determined stewardship of resources were traits which the Chief of Chaplains and his senior staff members had to model for, and inculcate upon, the total Chaplain Corps. The seven Total Chaplaincy Goals which dealt with leadership, human concerns, future development, materiel, readiness, management, and training were an important focus for the Chaplaincy in answering these vital questions.

Chaplain Norris Einertson, incidentally the third consecutive Chief of Chaplains born in

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Minnesota, entered active duty in 1961 after graduation from Luther Theological Seminary and ordination by the American Lutheran Church. His assignments, prior to his selection as Deputy Chief of Chaplains in 1985, included service with the 1st Infantry Division, Ft. Riley; the 34th Engineer Group in Vietnam; the U.S. Army's VII Corps at Stuttgart; the 1st Armored Division at Ansbach; the U.S. Army Signal Center at Ft. Gordon as the Post Chaplain; Executive Officer, DACH, and U.S. Forces Command at Ft. McPherson as the FORSCOM Staff Chaplain.  

Chaplain Einertson saw his role as Chief of Chaplains as one application of his primary role as an ecumenical pastor, enabling chaplains and chaplain assistants to facilitate the free exercise of religion in the Army. Defined ecumenically, Chaplain Einertson had been a pastor for 25 years, from the first day he entered active duty.  

Chaplain Einertson was also a dedicated manager and visionary, courageously stubborn in his defense of resources for the Chaplaincy, and very persuasive with his fellow general officers.

Very early in his career, Chaplain Einertson realized that effective ministry required not only preparation, motivation, and training, but also the careful stewardship of resources. While assigned to the Division Artillery, 1st Infantry Division at Ft. Riley, Kansas, in 1962, Chaplain Einertson's supervisory chaplain dutifully submitted a "productivity report" outlining the results of a one day religious retreat the number of "commitments to Christ" and "rededications to Christ." His Jewish commander made a wry observation in the form of a hand-written comment at the bottom of the report: "Chaplain, is there any way you can determine the number of souls saved per pew-hour preached?"  

Even though the results of much of the work of unit ministry teams in the religious support of soldiers were hard to quantify, Chaplain Einertson learned that the Army always looked for measurable results in its resource management.

Command Chaplain Issues

The Command Chaplains Conference for 1986 was held the second week in July. Several chaplains in new leadership positions were numbered among the participants including Chaplain Donald Shea, the U.S Army Europe and European Command Chaplain; Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman, the U.S. Forces Command Chaplain; and Chaplain Charles Clanton, who would become Commandant of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School in September. Others, including Chaplain Roger Venzke, the Chief's Executive Officer who set up the conference, had been in place long enough to provide continuity as Chaplain Einertson moved from Deputy Chief to Chief of Chaplains.

Perhaps the most immediate topic of interest was the establishment of the Chaplain Branch as a Regiment in the U.S. Army Regimental System. The Regimental System, a reflection of the older British model, established a regimental name and a home for each branch of the Army. Under General John A. Wickham's order of 30 May 1986, the regimental name of the Chaplain Branch, effective on 29 July, would be "the Chaplain Corps." The home of the Chaplain Corps was established at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey. The Chief of Chaplains was the regimental commander of the Chaplain Corps.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Above) Chaplains Charles McDonnell, Commandant of the Chaplain Center and School, and Norris Einertson, Chief of Chaplains, troop the line at Ft. Monmouth
(Above) Chaplains James Robnolt and Don Taylor with Chaplain Corps crest and flag
(Above) Chaplain Einertson presents a portrait of former Chief of Chaplains Patrick Hessian to the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School at Ft. Monmouth. Chaplain Tom A. Carroll, Director of Training and Doctrine, stands in front of the replica chapel to Chaplain Einertson's right.
(Above) Chaplain (BG) and Mrs. Israel Drazin, Chaplain Alfred Brough and Chaplain and Mrs. John Hoogland attend ceremonies
As the Chaplain Corps was reaffirming its old name in a new system, the Chaplain Assistant Proponency staff at the Chaplain School was drafting some content materials for AR 611-201 which would recognize the official name of soldiers in the 71 M MOS as "Chaplain Assistants." Other provisions of AR 611-201 would address the grade structure, qualifications, and duties of chaplains assistants.

One of the ongoing issues in 1986 for the conference was the reduction of the Chaplain Corps' base operations budget by $386,000. The Base Ops budget provided for the support of 657 chapels and chapel facilities worldwide, which was staffed by 1,523 active duty Chaplains.

In the spring of 1986 two new chapel facilities had been dedicated at Ft. Jackson, South Carolina. Senator Strom Thurmond was the principal guest speaker at ceremonies marking the dedication of the first joint-use chapel, religious education and child care center built by the Army (at a cost of $5.2 million). From FY 87 to FY 90, if money was still to be budgeted, 16 more standardized, joint-use chapel facilities were planned.

Finally, after all of the other personnel, policy, and administrative issues had been addressed at either the Council of Chaplain Colonels meeting, or at the Command Chaplain Conference, Chaplain (Brigadier General) Israel Drazin noted that the Department of Defense was still wrestling with questions concerning the accommodation of religious practices. In March of 1986 the Supreme Court had deferred to the Air Force on the request by Rabbi Simca Goldman to wear a yamulke while on duty as a clinical psychologist at a base in California. Chaplain Drazin reminded the Chaplaincy of Army Regulation 600-20 (1 January 86) which gave commanders greater flexibility and guidelines for accommodating soldiers' religious practices. "Military chaplains are dedicated to provide for the free exercise of religion and must do all in their power to assist commanders in finding ways to accommodate all religious practices," Chaplain Drazin wrote. "This is the reason for our existence as a military branch and this is the hope and dream of our country."

Regimental Establishment Ceremonies:
Some Things Old and Some Things New

The ceremonies on July 29, 1986, at Fort Monmouth, recognizing the "reorganization of the Chaplain Corps as a part of the U.S. Army Regimental System," as well as the 211th anniversary of the Army Chaplaincy, lasted for three hours, not including the time it took to rehearse for the parade and for the various presentations. The weather was good; the participants were excited.

At 0900 there was a military review of troops by Chaplain Einertson and Brigadier General Harry G. Karegeannes, Deputy Commanding General of the Army Communications and Electronics Command. The new Chaplain Corps flag, designed by the Army's Institute of Heraldry from a concept developed by Chaplain James Robnolt and Chaplain Donald Taylor, was presented to Chaplain Charles McDonnell, the USACHCS Commandant, by Command Sergeant Major James Schonefeld. The new Chaplain Corps Regimental Insignia (or Crest), from the same design as the flag, was presented by Chaplain Einertson to several chaplains and chaplain assistants representing

See endnotes at end of chapter.
the various divisions of the Chaplain Center and School.\textsuperscript{15}

At 1110 hours in Watters Hall, Chaplain Einertson dedicated a replica of a World War II cantonment chapel, a portrait of his predecessor, Chaplain Patrick Hessian, the 16th Chief of Chaplains, and a sculpture, the "Sky Pilot," by Mr. James Lykins, a Vietnam veteran who wanted to express his thanks for the ministry of chaplains in Vietnam. The sculpture depicted a Roman Catholic chaplain anointing a dying soldier cradled in the arms of a chaplain's assistant.

The dedication ceremony included a welcome by Chaplain Tom A. Carroll, Director of the Department of Military Ministry; a scripture reading of Psalm 91, "General Washington's Psalm," by Mr. Ralph Van Syckle, a World War II chaplain's assistant; a prayer of dedication by Chaplain Max H. Daina, USA Rtd.; an address on "The Religious Significance of Chapels," and a ribbon cutting by Chaplain Einertson; Chaplain Museum Association Announcements by Chaplain John Scott; and a benediction by Sergeant First Class Willie P.M. Collie. It seemed both appropriate and inspirational for the many attendees from throughout the total Chaplaincy.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Initiatives at DACH}

In addition to the work Chaplain James Edgren, Chaplain Don Taylor, and others were doing in drafting plans for 118 new installation and unit chapels through FY 1993, the Information, Resource Management and Logistics Directorate (IRML) completed the establishment of electronic mail accounts among chaplain offices throughout the Army. Software application programs were developed for CARSS which included Gemini Boards to provide IBM compatibility.\textsuperscript{17}

The Chaplain Corps strength report from the Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations Directorate (DACH-PER) indicated an actual strength of 1,509 against a projected end strength of 1,546. Mindful of Chaplain Einertson's admonition, "While money for Chapel construction and programs are important ... our most important resources are our personnel; we must defend personnel spaces with all the energy and intelligence that God gives us," DACH-PER put a major effort into the recruitment of chaplains to fill all of the positions possible.\textsuperscript{18} Against an anticipated loss of 145 chaplains, there were 148 gains.\textsuperscript{19} Some 20 minority and female chaplains were recruited under the Chaplaincy's Affirmative Action Plan. At the end of the fiscal year there were 213 Catholic Chaplains, 24 Jewish Chaplains, nine Orthodox Chaplains, and 1,300 Protestant chaplains on active duty.\textsuperscript{20} Even during the Army's drawdown, the total Chaplaincy actually increased by 54 slots due to strong justifications for chaplains in units which had had no positions authorized previously.\textsuperscript{21}

As part of the Chaplaincy's program to increase multicultural understanding and deal with minority issues, especially among minority chaplains and chaplain assistants, the various Chiefs of Chaplains had funded conferences each year for more than a decade. Some of the Multicultural Conferences had been planned for a year in advance with nationally known guest speakers. Others seemed to be constructed in a rather serendipitous manner. In order to facilitate planning for these events, Chaplain William Huffham, from the Plans, Policy Development and Training Division, proposed a five-year plan for future multicultural training with the following themes:

\textsuperscript{See endnotes at end of chapter.}
1987 - The Unit Ministry Team
1988 - Worship Activities
1989 - The Installation Religious Program
1990 - New/Emerging Religious Groups
1991 - Assessment and Planning22

In addition to the obvious advantage of dealing with multicultural issues, the conferences also supported the Chaplaincy's primary Human Goal of considering ways to facilitate the free exercise of religion, denominationally and culturally, for soldiers and their families. The other Total Chaplaincy Goals were considered as well and met through various plans and programs from the DACH Directorates.

Other projects from PPDT in 1986 included research on Family Strength and Family Values for the Army Study Program, information on women's issues affecting the 22 women chaplains on active duty, and the preparation of a Chaplain Mobilization Handbook by Mr. Roger Able to consolidate mobilization documentation and provide chaplain mobilization planners with policies, guidance, and planning assumptions. All three of these projects were important in light of prospective deployments of UMTs and soldiers in the future.23

At the U.S. Army Chaplain Board, Chaplain William Noble taught a homiletics training workshop in Panama and planned five others for FY 87, in addition to serving as the editor of *The Military Chaplains Review*. Chaplain Tom Merrill led religious education training workshops from Ft. Lewis, Washington, to Berchtesgaden, Germany, with the help of Master Sergeant Ronald Bowren. Chaplain Richard Adams and Chaplain Ignatius Butler continued work in Marriage and Family Life and Catholic Priest Retention respectively while Chaplain James Herndon and Master Sergeant Bowren dealt with audiovisual ministries, organizational leadership training, and chaplain assistant special projects.24

U.S. Army Chaplain School:
Describing Tasks for the UMT

At Fort Monmouth in the summer of 1986, Chaplain Charles McDonnell, the Commandant of the Chaplain School, directed the Unit and Individual Training Division to conduct a Joint Task Selection Board (JTSB) to update and describe the tasks chaplains and chaplain assistants should be trained to perform. This was the first JTSB to be convened in the recent history of the Chaplain Corps and was composed of chaplains, senior chaplain assistants, and some Department of the Army civilian experts from throughout most of the major commands worldwide.25

The mission of the JTSB was to select tasks which reflected the current (actual) and doctrinal duties of unit ministry team members and to indicate the appropriate site for training these tasks, whether at the Chaplain School, on installations, or in units in the field. There were more than 100 tasks related to unit ministry team duties ranging from typing a military letter to performing battle

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22 See endnotes at end of chapter.
fatigue ministry in combat. Each task had a task statement, a condition and a standard to which it would be trained. It was the duty of the Unit and Individual Training Division (UITD) to prepare the task list for JTSB consideration.

The staff of the UITD dedicated to the analysis mission included Major Morgan Flom, Chief of UITD; Chaplain Herb Kitchens, Chief of the Concepts and Analysis Branch of UITD; Chaplain Carl W. Holtz, Mrs. Christine Hunt (GS-11), and Sergeant First Class Robert Flowers and, toward the end of the project, Major Michael W. Hobson. 26 Chaplain Jesse Thornton, Chief of the Publications Branch, and his staff, as well as the Division Secretary, Ms. Jennifer Roman, assisted as needed.

In order to provide the JTSB with a current picture of the tasks chaplain assistants were expected to perform, Chaplain Kitchens and Mrs. Hunt utilized the Army Occupational Survey Program (AOSP) conducted by the Soldier Support Center, National Capital Region. 27 The AOSP surveyed chaplain assistants by rank and position to determine what tasks they were required to perform, with what frequency, and under what conditions. This was a very valuable tool for the JTSB's deliberative process.

Chaplain McDonnell urged UITD to push the ministry tasks the chaplain assistants could perform "as far as you can" to further reinforce the independent validity of the 71M MOS, especially under emergency battlefield conditions. 28 These battlefield tasks included ministry to battle fatigued soldiers and, in extreme circumstances, emergency baptism of the wounded or dying.

When Chaplain Charles T. Clanton succeeded Chaplain McDonnell as Commandant on 9 September 1986, he continued to emphasize the development of the chaplain assistant role in the UMT. Chaplain Clanton thought emergency baptism would have to be a voluntary ministry by a chaplain assistant in response to a soldier's request, since the Army could not require nor train tasks which some religious denominations regarded as faith-specific sacraments or ordinances. With regard to the vast majority of tasks, however, Chaplain Clanton continued the emphasis on enlarging the role of assistants.

In the Chaplain Assistant Personnel Proponent Office at the Chaplain School, the finishing touches were added to input for AR 611-201 which was produced in October by the Soldier Support Center. 29 The new regulation recognized the name change of chapel activity specialists to chaplain assistants, set a new grade structure, established chaplain assistant E9s (Sergeant Major) at Corps Level, upgraded brigade-level assistants to E6 (Staff Sergeant) and battalion-level assistants to E5 (Sergeant). Chaplain assistants were required to 1) maintain the highest moral and ethical behavior, 2) demonstrate a typing speed of 25 words per minute, 3) participate in firearms training and bear arms, 3) support all religious faith groups approved by the command, 5) attain a high school diploma or its equivalent, 6) qualify for a secret security clearance, 7) complete required resident schooling before award of the MOS in either active or reserve components. 30

In order to further enhance the validity of the Proponency mission to manage the 71 M MOS for the Chief of Chaplains, Sergeant First Class Thomas Prost was selected to join the Proponency staff at the Chaplain School. SFC Prost became both the NCOIC and a project manager in the 71M Personnel Proponent Office, succeeding SFC Mike Pukansky, the project manager for career progression and professional development in the life-cycle management of the MOS. 31

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Sergeant Major Douglas Carpenter
New Faces in the Pentagon

On October 1, Chaplain Charles J. McDonnell became Deputy Chief of Chaplains. Chaplain McDonnell wrote to the Corps:

I will do everything in my power to support you as members' of the Unit Ministry Team while I am here. Our common mission is to provide pastoral and religious support to the greatest people in the world, the soldiers and soldier families of the U.S. Army. Since the Unit Ministry Team is central to our work in the Army, I want to focus our attention on the role of the Chaplain assistant as a vital and integral member of that team. I am convinced we can wait no longer to prepare the total Unit Ministry Team to function effectively in giving soldiers the quality ministry they richly deserve.32

Chaplain McDonnell knew, as had every Chief and Deputy Chief for a decade, that the effectiveness of the Chaplain's ministries in garrison or in the field depended directly on the quality and commitment of chaplain assistants. By 1986 the Chaplain Corps had possibly spent more resources, time and energy to upgrade the training and status of its enlisted personnel than had any other branch in the Army.

As if to make the point at DACH, on October 31 Sergeant Major Joseph A. Pino retired from the Army and was replaced by Sergeant Major Douglas R. Carpenter as the Senior Staff NCO in the Chief's Office.33 SGM Pino had played a pivotal role in supporting and implementing UMT doctrine and excellence.

A Parting Shot

As the year 1986 drew to a close, a short memorandum reached Chaplain Venzke's desk at DACH from the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG) in the Pentagon. The 10 December 1986 Memorandum reviewed an article in the Yale Law Journal entitled "Military Mirrors on the Wall: Nonestablishment and the Military Chaplaincy" by a Yale law student named L. S. Kaplan. Somehow, Ms. Kaplan secured discovery materials submitted to the Court of Appeals during the Katcoff vs. Laird case.

Ms. Kaplan, in the view of the Office of the JAG, raised "two powerful issues worthy of careful consideration: whether military encouragement of religious activity goes too far beyond that necessary to assure free exercise; and whether the chaplaincy is intended to foster a 'military vision of religion' in preference to opposing views." Captain Chester P. Beach, Jr., the litigation attorney who reviewed Ms. Kaplan's article, concluded that while there was no "persuasive rationale for a new attack on the general constitutionality of the chaplaincy, the author does raise concerns about the permissible limits of chaplain activity that should be taken into account in formulating and promulgating policy and doctrine."34 The limits, reduced to one sentence, were simple in the view

See endnotes at end of chapter.
of *Yale Law Journal* (as interpreted by the OTJAG): "The Government may not provide chaplain services for any other purpose ... than to preserve the right of service members to the free exercise of religion, and especially not to implement a military vision of religion that enhances secular military values such as morale, patriotism, and the national interest."

While no action was required by this memorandum, it did remind some of the chaplains in the Chief’s Office that there was often a gap between what commanders desired of unit ministry teams—to help instill proper values through moral leadership training for example—and in what some constitutional legal scholars (at Harvard and Yale for example) thought were the limits of chaplain involvement with soldiers. As Chaplain James Robnolt reflected after he attended one of the District Court sessions during the *Katcoff v. Laird* case, "The judges who had actually served in the military had a much broader tolerance for the range of chaplain ministries than did those who argued from the base of theory alone. I remember that one judge, who was a Navy veteran, became quite irritated with one of the plaintiffs and lectured him on what military life, wherein everyone in a unit does everything possible to support the mission and one another, was really about." 35

**Pluralism and Personnel Issues—1987**

From 1970 to 1985 there was a virtual explosion in the number of independent religious denominations in America. 36 At the end of World War II there were perhaps 50 major denominations of Protestants, Catholics and Jews in the United States. By 1980 there were 87 denominations with memberships of 50,000 or more. 37 Many of the "new" religious groups had their origins in the social and sexual revolutions of the 1960s and early 1970s, in the increased importation of indigenous religions from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East and in the backlash of conservative, evangelical Protestants who felt increasingly alienated, for multiple reasons, from mainstream Protestantism. 38

As a reflection of the larger American religious community, the Army Chaplaincy likewise in the early 1980s began to experience changes in its denominational composition. The denominations which traditionally furnished the most chaplains for the Army began to offer fewer candidates, while the number of applications for active duty from independent evangelical clergy increased. Buddhist and Muslim religious leaders also began to send inquiries to the Chief’s office about service as Army chaplains. Whereas 200 years before, during the American Revolution, the chaplains of the Continental Army represented 7 denominations, and whereas the Army chaplains in World War II represented approximately 40 faith groups, in 1987 there were chaplains on active duty in the Army from 109 different denominations. 39 The Navy Chaplaincy from 1945 to 1987 showed the same trend, increasing from 25 denominations represented by Navy Chaplains in August of 1945 to 83 faith groups represented in October of 1983, to more than 90 by 1987. 40

In the Office of the Chief of Chaplains there were issues generated by the growth in the number of faith groups represented in the Chaplaincy and by the variety of theological views held within those groups. The issues concerned a variety of topics: accommodating religious practices, proper terminology to use when describing faith groups, assignment policies, recruitment and

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THE EINERTSON YEARS

retention policies, and even the question of what would be appropriate insignia for a pluralistic, multi-faith, and multi-cultural Corps of Chaplains. These issues were not only of interest to Chaplain Einertson but also to the Director of Plans, Policy Development and Training (PPDT), Chaplain Gary Bowker; to the Director of Personnel (PER), Chaplain Hugh M. Grubb; to the Executive Officer, Chaplain Rodger Venzke; and to the other action officers involved. Chaplain James Robnolt in PPDT thought that pluralism would either "make or break" the Chaplaincy depending on how the issues were handled at that time and in the future.41

A review of strength reports from 1987 suggests that the "pluralism problem" actually referred to differences in theology between liberal and conservative Protestants more than to any other single issue. Of the 1,524 Army chaplains on active duty in 1987, some 1,277 were Protestant, 217 Catholic, 21 Jewish, and 9 Orthodox. Twenty-three of the active duty chaplains were male Caucasian and 7 Afro-American.42 In other words, 1,254 or 82% per cent of the active duty chaplains were male Protestants. The question was how the Protestant chaplains, some of whom came from denominations which did not practice infant baptism, recognize the ordination of women, nor participate in ecumenical worship services, would work with other groups and with one another.

In the Officer Basic Course, U.S. Army Chaplain School, chaplain instructors would ask chaplains just coming on duty if they could help a soldier of a completely different religion practice his or her faith "without qualms of conscience." New chaplains were also asked if they could cooperate with chaplains of other faiths in implementing joint religious programs without compromising their beliefs. Most of the new chaplains thought they could accomplish these tasks. The few who could not returned to their home churches.

Accommodating the requirements of various faith groups in the military was not always a simple matter of cooperation. For years Jewish soldiers, many from the Reserve Components, had sought permission to wear the yarmelke (cap on the crown of the head) with their military uniforms as a mark of reverence for God. Likewise, soldiers of the Sikh faith asked permission to wear turbans, long hair, beards, and to carry sacred daggers as required by their religion.43

After a Congressional study of two years, monitored carefully by Chaplain Ford G' Segner in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and by the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, both the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation in January and in February, 1987, which permitted the wear of "items of apparel not part of the official uniform."44 The conditions imposed required that the article of apparel be "neat, conservative, and not interfere with the performance of a member's military duties." Chaplain William Hufham, PPDT, advised the other members of the Chief's staff that such legislation would possibly permit the wearing of yarmelkes but not turbans.45

Accommodating religious practices, whether involving the uniform, dietary restrictions, holy days, sites and times for worship, medical or burial requirements, or other matters was largely a command decision, with chaplains as advisors to the commander. Such advice presupposed some knowledge of various denominations and world religions, so the Chaplain School reinstituted a course in World Religions (which had not been offered for several years) for chaplains in the Basic and Advance courses. Likewise, various manuals and training materials on the practices of various religious groups were provided to chaplains and to senior chaplain assistants.46

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Such a response was timely, for in 1987 the Buddhist Churches of America became the first faith group outside the Judeo-Christian tradition to be recognized as an endorsing agency for military chaplains.47 Other faith groups also indicated an interest in placing chaplains in the military—The Church of Ancient Wisdom, The Universal Life Church, The Hare Krishnas, the B’hai, The Center for the Study of Islam, and the Echankar among them.48 Chaplain Hugh Grubb, Director of Personnel at the Chiefs Office, reported that he would have to ask for more codes for denominations in order to keep an accurate record of all the faith groups represented in the Chaplaincy.49

Struggling for Balance: Spaces and Faces

In mid-January 1987, Chaplain Gary Bowker, Director of PPDT, advised the Chief of Chaplains that the Department of the Army would be seeking significant reductions in personnel authorizations, especially in TDA positions.50 U.S. Army Personnel Command would seek to apply a 15% reduction in every branch, which in the Chaplaincy would result in a loss of 86 chaplain slots Armywide. Chaplain Charles McDonnell, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, arranged to meet with General Maxwell Thurman, Vice Chief of Staff, on 10 March to discuss the reductions. Chaplain James Robnolt, an action officer from PPDT, prepared a list of TDA/TOE spaces for consideration.51

In fact, as Chaplain Einertson later reported, the collapse of the Soviet Union had been foreseen and the Army was already preparing for reductions to include between one and six per cent of the officer strength.52 Chaplain Hugh Grubb, Director of PER, observed that the Chaplain Corps was always "ducking bullets" on space reductions because PERSCOM always started their action with the assumption that small branches, such as the Chaplain Corps, could afford the same percentage cuts as larger branches.53

On 3 April, General Thurman asked the Chaplaincy to prepare a force structure analysis and audit of chaplain positions. Chaplain Robnolt had developed a data base of 692 total TDA chaplain authorizations which revealed that, of the 692 positions, only one location reflected an overstructure: the garrison in Stuttgart, West Germany.54 Chaplain Einertson concluded in a memorandum for General Thurman that "it is impossible to identify 86 chaplain spaces for elimination and not adversely affect mission support requirements. These 86 spaces represent 6% of the Chaplaincy authorizations and (if lost would) remove wartime and peacetime mission capability."55

A week after Chaplain Einertson's response, the Chief of Staff of the Army, reduced the spaces to be eliminated in the Chaplaincy from 86 to 54, and spread out the reduction over two or more years. Chaplain G. H. Pingel, PPDT, working with Chaplain Robnolt, noted that the reductions for the first two years were "theoretically" paid by a 1% decrease the first year and a 2% decrease the second year.56 Chaplain Einertson expressed his thanks to Chaplain Robnolt "for the monumental job" he did in helping to assure adequate chaplain spaces.57

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
The Catholic Problem: Shortage of Priests

An associated personnel issue, though involving recruitment and retention rather than the size of the force structure, dealt with the shortage of Roman Catholic chaplains in the Army. In July of 1987 the estimated need for Catholic chaplains was 548, of the 1500 force strength. Yet there were only 222 Catholic chaplains on active duty, leaving a shortfall of 326, or 60%. "Because of the shortage, priests must work longer hours and sometimes travel extensively from post to post to provide wide-area coverage," Chaplain McDonnell observed. "This puts a burden on the server and the served." 

The shortage of Catholic chaplains in the Army was only a part of the shortage of Catholic clergy in the United States. Some analysts argued that the root causes were the celibacy requirement for priests, the over-worked condition of most priests in parishes, and the decline in religious vocations in a "secularized" America. In fact, in the late 1980s, most "mainline" Protestant seminaries showed a marked decline in male applicants as well. The shortfall of male clergy in some Protestant churches was masked by an increase in applications by women who wished to study theology and enter the ministry. Since this was not an option in the Catholic Church, the shortage of priests appeared in even greater contrast.

Whatever the causes, the shortage of priests was of major concern to the Army in 1987. There were an estimated 475,000 Catholic soldiers and family members being supported by 222 priests, a ratio of 2,100 per chaplain. The Navy at the same time had a shortfall of 142 Catholic chaplains and a similar ratio of 2,100 parishioners per chaplain. The Air Force in 1987 was short 59 with a ratio of 1,800 to 1.

At the Office of the Chief of Chaplains a number of experiments were proposed to help alleviate the shortage. Chaplain Jack Kaising and Chaplain Philip Thoni were able to get publicity in the National Catholic Reporter and in The Catholic Review for a program which required only two years of active service before the priest could return to his diocese as a Reservist. Another initiative called for the recruitment of priests up to age 50 (as opposed to a cutoff at age 42 by the Air Force and 55 by the Navy.) There was a proposal (by Chaplain McDonnell) to recruit non-ordained seminarians and then return them to their bishops. There was even a proposal, somewhat tangential, to add warrant officers to the Chaplain Corps to help with counseling and other "para-ministerial" duties. This latter idea was discarded when it was learned that chaplain slots would have to be used for the assignment of warrant officers.

The most productive approach, over time, was personal contact with eligible priests and their bishops. One bishop in Rhode Island had allowed five of his priests to serve on active duty and two others to serve in the Reserves. A number of Irish and Filipino priests, some studying or teaching in seminaries, also responded to the call from the Army. Unfortunately, in spite of all efforts, including a trip to appeal to Pope John Paul II by Chaplain McDonnell, the numbers of Catholic chaplains continued to decline.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
The Protestant Problem: Proper Identification

In the 1980s the Chaplaincy was also faced with demands from some Protestant chaplains, but more often parish councils, that they be recognized as a faith group distinctive from others under the over-all "Protestant" designation. The traditional solution to Protestant worship for more than 40 years had been the "General Protestant" or "Collective Protestant" service. More and more soldiers from evangelical and charismatic faiths, from particular ethnic groups, and from Episcopal and Orthodox traditions, demanded their own worship services and, at times, their own separate denominational fund accounts. Scheduling and supporting these without favoritism became a problem even as Chaplain James Edgren began to revise AR 165-1, the basic regulation for the Chaplaincy which dealt with such matters.

As early as 14 January, 1987, Chaplain Rodger Venzke, the Chief's Executive Officer, requested that the directors review the term "Collective Protestant Worship." Chaplain Grubb reflected that neither "Collective" nor "General" were popular adjectives. Chaplain Robnolt, tongue-in-cheek, said he had never met a Collective Protestant and did not wonder that most people questioned why the service was so named. The "Faith Balance Rule" used by PER for assigning chaplains to installations, where possible, called for Catholic coverage, Jewish chaplain "availability," and the assignment of conservative and liturgical Protestants and Orthodox priests. The terms "conservative" and "liturgical" in the field were quickly translated "adult-only baptizers," and "baby-baptizers" for practical purposes.

At the end of 1987 Chaplain Edgren published the Chief's policy guidance for the denominational issues:

1. To protect and enhance the free exercise rights of soldiers and family members, all "distinctive faith groups" have equal claim upon Chaplaincy services.

2. Religious groups desiring to worship separately in denominational services may be viewed as distinctive faith groups and should receive an equitable share of resources, including appropriated funds.

3. These issues will be further clarified in AR 165-1 to be published in FY 88.

In many chapels around the world "Collective" and "General" Protestant services were advertised simply as "Protestant" worship. Denominational services were then advertised separately.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Other Identity Issues

With the "explosion" of distinctive faith groups and other than Judeo-Christian religions in the military, the Armed Forces Chaplain Board (AFCB) in May of 1987 requested ideas from the three services with regard to a "third insignia" for newly accessioned chaplains who were neither Christian nor Jewish.\textsuperscript{70} The request soon added a joint dimension: Could there be an insignia which Army, Navy, Marine, Coast Guard, and Air Force personnel would recognize as signifying a chaplain regardless of the chaplain's denomination?\textsuperscript{71} Otherwise, with the number of religious faiths in the world, military personnel would need a published "guide for chaplain insignia," along the lines of "a birdwatcher's handbook," as Chaplain Grubb termed it.\textsuperscript{72}

At first there were all sorts of symbols proposed to the AFCB Personnel Advisory Group. There were flames of fire, symbols of chapels, the sun's rays, an open book, and praying hands. Perhaps the most practical was a suggestion that each chaplain be allowed to print "CHAPLAIN" on his or her name tags and tapes.\textsuperscript{73}

Eventually the suggestions were returned to the Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Chaplains. Since in 1987 there were no chaplains on duty who were not either Christian or Jewish, the issue was left to the services to consider when appropriate.\textsuperscript{74}

Finally, in the United States Army Reserve all Civil Affairs chaplain titles were changed to "Religious Relations Officer." Affecting approximately thirty USAR chaplains, the change signaled a "branch immaterial" approach to the positions. Many chaplains serving in Civil Affairs units had performed direct religious support for their soldiers, but some had functioned primarily as experts in indigenous religions in order to advise commanders about the effect of religion on missions in the area of operations. The change in title did not result immediately in the transfer of chaplains out of those positions, but it did make possible the assignment of an officer, other than a chaplain, as a Religious Relations expert.\textsuperscript{75}

Continued Attention to Training

At the Command Chaplain's Conference in mid-July, General Carl Vuono, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, was the featured speaker. Chaplain Einertson's goals for the Chaplaincy in 1987, "The Year of the Constitution," centered (as ever) on ministry to soldiers. As implementing goals Chaplain Einertson wanted to highlight the training of chaplains and chaplain assistants to "minister during the drawdown," construction of new worship and religious educational facilities, and the efficient management of personnel and materiel resources.\textsuperscript{76}

Certainly in the Chaplain Corps there was a tremendous emphasis on training for ministry, as there had been for a decade—emphasis on everything from computer skills to survival on the battlefield. In the Chief of Chaplain's Office, Chaplain James Edgren and Chaplain Louis R. Trebus from IRML monitored training in the Chaplain Activity Religious Support System (CARSS), in electronic mail, and in other automated systems, not only in the United States but also in Europe, Korea, Japan, Hawaii and Alaska.\textsuperscript{77} At the National Training Center, Ft Irwin, Chaplain Richard

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Whaley sent progress reports to the Chief's Office and to the Combat Developments Directorate at the Chaplain School on the performance of unit ministry teams in training for desert warfare. Chaplain Cliff Weathers, Director of PPDT in September, sent Chaplain Whaley's observations to all MACOM Chaplains. As an extension of this type of ministry to those who must learn to survive, a chaplain also was assigned as an observer at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas, in 1987.

At the U.S. Army Chaplain School, training, plans for training, and the production of training materials continued with imagination and energy. In the spring and summer of 1987, Chaplain John Scott, Assistant Commandant of the Chaplain Center and School, appointed a committee to revise the curriculum and organization of the Advance Course (C22) to permit small group instruction. Following a TRADOC Mandate, Chaplains Robert Vickers, Jerry Malone, John Patrick, Harvey Brown, John Brinsfield, and Major Al Swilley from the Military Skills Division of DOTD, examined every block of instruction and then reconfigured the Advance Course (C22) curriculum for the Commandant's approval. Chaplain Charles T. Clanton, Commandant since September of 1986, approved the concept and the appointment of Chaplain Jerry Malone to be the C22 Course Director. Virtually everyone at the School, students and faculty alike, thought the small group model was a vast improvement over large group instruction.

In the Unit and Individual Training Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Chaplain Peter Telencio, a veteran of the Grenada operation in 1983, and Mrs. Christine Hunt, assigned to the Analysis Branch as an analyst, supervised planning for a Task Review Board for chaplain and chaplain assistant tasks. SFC Elmer Castro and SFC Richard Geiger took the lead in UITD in collecting and developing chaplain assistant tasks for the board's consideration.

The production and distribution of training materials from the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at USACHCS in 1987 likewise continued at a lively pace. Chaplain Tom Carroll, Director of DOTD, monitored the production of military qualifications standards manuals, soldiers manuals, job books, field manuals and reference books from the Unit and Individual Training Division. Materials for non-resident instruction, frequently distributed under the supervision of Mr. Frank Spang in DOTD, made important contributions to Reserve Component UMT readiness by fielding doctrinally-based training materials.

### Standardized Designs for Army Chapels

"On 1 July 1987, Mr. John Baer from IRML announced that the Department of the Army Standardization Committee had approved the model of standards for unit chapels."

Chief of Chaplains Staff Minutes, July 1987

Prior to the mobilization for World War II, only seventeen of the 160 Army posts in the United States had permanent military chapels. As a result of the mobilization, 604 temporary wooden

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cantonment chapels were hastily erected. Most soldiers remembered them as their churches away from home. When the Vietnam War ended in 1973, over a third (323 out of 953 chapels in the inventory) of these "temporary" structures continued to house chapel congregations throughout the Continental (CONUS) Army. A total "buyout," replacing six cantonment chapels per year at the Army standard rate of two percent per year would take 54 years.

With so many other pressing problems facing the Army in the 1970s, replacing old chapels with new ones was not a high priority. New chapel construction lagged as military construction, Army (MCA) dollars were dedicated to building barracks and foreign station projects. For the twenty-year period prior to 1987, the U.S. Army constructed an average of approximately two new chapels per year. That average slipped to less than one per year during the Reagan years. The old wooden cantonment chapels with a single, one-toilet latrine, no hot water, the absence of religious education classrooms, and a lack of fellowship space failed to meet congregational and family needs.

Other important changes in American religion impacted on the Army's chapel communities. Less than one fourth of all Army chaplains came from fundamental, evangelical, or conservative Protestant denominations in the early 1970s. Fifteen years later less than a third of all chaplains represented Catholic and mainline Protestant faiths. This dramatic flip-flop reflected the steady decline in clergy, membership, and interest experienced by the once popular mainline churches. Besides recruiting and retention problems for personnel, the reversal also created a definite need for architectural change in chapels; for few had immersion baptistries, central pulpits, or adequate activities rooms.

The Chapel of the Year Program

To address these trends the Chief of Chaplains and the Chief of Engineers announced a "Chapel of the Year" (COTY) Program. It granted senior chaplains more flexibility in defining religious facility needs and allowed each Major Army Command (MACOM) the opportunity to submit project nominations to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

Usually in early spring a board met to select two nominations for COTY designation. Board members consisted of senior chaplains and representatives for the Assistant Chief of Engineers' (ACE) and DCSPER's offices. COTY projects received the advantage of having design costs assured from ACE funds, but they still required congressional authorization and appropriation in the MCA bill. The first COTYs entered the MCA process in FY 88. The program was successful in raising awareness of chapel needs and contributed to getting eight chapel projects funded from FY 88 through FY 92.

Standardized Designs

During the mid-1970s the Army established criteria for designing community-type facilities. A design guide for chapels was completed in 1979 that attempted to meet the newly emerging needs

See endnotes at end of chapter.
of military congregations. The design was modernistic with a tetrahedron shape (all seven built had serious roof leaking problems). Few people liked them. The concept may have been a good idea, but it was ahead of its time and any available technology.

Chaplain James A. Edgren, who served as Director of IRML from 1985 through 1991, captured the good ideas from the 1979 design guide and modified the rest. He established a series of standardized designs for constructing religious facilities. Chaplain Edgren represented the Chief of Chaplains in the Army Facilities Standardization Program. He chaired the Chief's subcommittee on standardized designs for chapels, and coordinated supporting work from the Architectural and Programming Branch of the Headquarters, Army Corps of Engineers; and from Ware Associates, a commercial architectural firm in Chicago that specialized in designing churches.

Chaplain Edgren's leadership and guidance resulted in ten definitive standardized facility designs, including two sizes of large Army chapels, two sizes of small chapels, two sizes of chapel family life centers, three types of religious education facilities, and interior packages for each type design. His foresight set a precedent for the entire Army, as the Chaplain Corps established a model for the complete Army standardization program. In fact, the Corps of Engineers made a training video featuring standardized designs of religious facilities to demonstrate how the program worked.

Standard designs did not come easy. One problem was how to design a facility capable of meeting the religious requirements of over a hundred faith groups in any one religious building. Even the external appearance of the building could not convey preference for one faith over another. The new Army chapels featured a pyramid roof line, movable interior walls for maximum configuration of worship arrangements, fellowship space and religious education classrooms. In their work each member of the Chief of Chaplain's Standard Committee for Chapels and Religious Education Facilities considered the faith requirements of a very wide range of distinctive faith groups, and honestly attempted to provide religious facilities that would make it possible for all their needs and practices to be accommodated.

Depending on the interior arrangement, each standard Army chapel could seat from 200 to 600 people. The two small chapel designs were drawn primarily for sites outside the U.S. and for depots in CONUS. The designs for chapel family life centers gave commanders a place for community activities as well as for religious education. Because many older chapels did not need replacing, three types of religious education additions were made available to modernize them.

While COTY and standardized designs assured a high level of interest in chapel construction, getting individual projects through all the hurdles of the MCA process was another story. Dedicated IRML chaplains worked the system. They spent many hours performing a "ministry of presence" at long meetings to ensure religious facility projects were not canceled or delayed. Their effective negotiating skills and intentional staff work tracked projects from MACOMs through Construction Requirements Review Committee meetings and "murder boards" at ACE, HQDA and Department of Defense (DOD) levels to Presidential budget and Congressional Committees.

During the fiscal years 1987 through 1993 the overall MCA budget declined significantly. But during those years, as a result of the combined emphasis of the COTY program, standardized designs, and superb staff work, twenty-one religious facilities were funded by Congress, more than

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twice the number than had been constructed in the preceding decade.

The United States Army
Chaplaincy Services Support Agency

The U.S. Army Chaplain Board was organized at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, (near the Chicamaga National Battlefield), in 1945. The mission of the Chaplain Board, which shared a building with the Chaplain School at Fort Oglethorpe, was to report to the Chief of Chaplains on any matters as might be referred to it for the improvement of the chaplaincy.

One of the first Board projects was the development of the Character Guidance Instruction program, complete with scripts and films, to support the moral improvement of soldiers. In its subsequent forty-two year history the Board undertook a number of other projects for the Chief of Chaplains to enhance ministry in the Army. Among these were family life programs, parish development, homiletics workshops, audio-visual resource production and procurement, religious education, Roman Catholic chaplain recruitment, chaplain assistant training workshops, multicultural religious education, and the publication of the Military Chaplains Review.

In late 1987 Chaplain Norris Einertson made the decision to redesignate the Chaplain Board as the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency and to move it from Fort Monmouth, N.J., where it had been located for almost seven years, to Washington, D.C. In a letter to the Director of the Army Staff, Chaplain Einertson said:

I propose to restructure the agency to respond more efficiently to my mission requirements by relocation and reorganization. The restructured agency is to be more responsive to soldier and family needs ... to streamline proponent issues ... and to focus on future issues.

Chaplain Einertson's proposal was approved by the Army Chief of Staff and on 1 December 1987 the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency was activated by General Orders Number 70 as a Field Operating Agency of the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

The Deputy Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain McDonnell, was named Director of the newly established Agency. Chaplain John Hoogland, the former President of the Chaplain Board, was named the Deputy Director and charged with supervising the day-to-day operations. Seven chaplain positions and six support positions were included in the new organization. The major functional areas included soldier ministries, Family Life Enrichment, Religious Education, Proponent Support, Homiletics and Journalism Research, Audio-Visual, and Recruitment. In March of 1988 the Agency moved to offices on K Street in Washington, D.C.

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Of all of the geographic areas of interest to the United States toward the "end" of the Cold War, none appeared more challenging than that of the Korean border. The bulk of the North Korean ground forces were deployed well forward, 65% within 75 miles of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Less than 4,000 meters separated U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) border units from North Korean troops. Numerically the North Koreans could count 850,000 soldiers, 3,000 tanks, 5,000 artillery tubes, 2,000 multiple rocket launchers, and the world's largest, most capable special operations units in their offensive inventory. North Korea had expended 20% of its annual gross national product for military purposes since 1970 and possessed the third largest army in the Communist world.

Opposing this threat were approximately 600,000 U.S. and ROK soldiers reinforced, as needed, by the 25th Infantry Division from Hawai‘i and other units from Japan, Alaska, and Fort Lewis, Washington. The annual "Team Spirit" deployments to Korea in 1986-1987 were the largest Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed Field Training Exercises (FTX) in the world. More than 53,000 U.S. Army; 26,000 U.S. Navy; 23,000 U.S. Marine Corps; and 32,000 U.S. Air Force personnel participated in the joint exercises. For the first time in 1987 a complete U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade, including the command group, trained with ROK forces—the 2d ROK Marine Division—and with the soldiers of the 2d Infantry Division, U.S. Army.

Religious support for thousands of these soldiers, both those stationed in Korea and those participating in exercises, was comprehensive and inspirational. There were so many worship services, retreats, and counseling services provided by the 55 chaplains, 60 chaplain assistants, and volunteer lay leaders that Chaplain Wesley V. Geary, the Eighth Army Staff Chaplain, found it a challenge just to keep count of the total number of soldiers served. In his 1987 annual historical report, Chaplain Geary could truthfully list the following achievements in soldier ministries:

1. In 1987 more than 372,321 people worshiped in U.S. Forces Korea chaplain-led religious services. On any given weekend approximately 165 services were conducted with a total estimated attendance of 6,800. The USFK Family Life Center in Hannam Village, Yongsan, provided services for more than 300 family members on a regular basis.

2. Total religious education attendance for 1987 was 159,648 throughout U.S. Forces Korea and Eighth Army. Eighty-five per cent of the religious education classes were held in or near Seoul and Taegu.

3. Pastoral counseling cases reported by all chaplains totaled 22,163.

4. Some 37,000 military personnel and invited guests used the Eighth Army Religious

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Retreat Center, a 23% increase over 1986. These figures included soldiers from Hawaii deployed on "Team Spirit," and one day, "Duty Day with God" retreats implemented by the 2d ID unit ministry teams.

5. The EUSA Family Life Center in Yongsan counseled 859 people in 1987. This low figure represented the success of many unit ministry team programs implemented in the division and brigades to help soldiers cope with stress, family separation, and other personal issues. Chaplains and chaplain assistants also offered suicide prevention, assertiveness training, and bilingual and cross-cultural marriage programs which paid big dividends for soldier, family, and unit cohesion and readiness.

6. A new South Post Chapel at Yongsan, built at a cost of 1.9 million dollars, with a seating capacity of 650 people was dedicated on 27 September 1987.


Obviously the ministry to military personnel in Korea was impressive, especially the ministries of "presence" by unit ministry teams at each site. Given the figures in Chaplain Geary's report, each of the 55 military chaplains in USFK ministered to an average of 200 different soldiers in three worship services, eight counseling sessions, one religious education or Bible study class, and countless brief retreats, unit and hospital visitations, moral leadership classes and staff meetings each day. The effect of these unit ministry team programs for soldiers, as well as the impact of chaplain and soldier support for orphanages and other charitable projects for the Korean people, was hard to measure. At the least, the religious support efforts by the unit ministry teams in Korea in 1987 showed the largest growth in soldier and family attendance in 40 years both in worship and retreat center activities. In a study conducted the same year of soldier awareness of religious support personnel and programs available for them, approximately seventy-five per cent of the soldier/family respondents had knowledge of, or personal experience with, the services provided by their unit ministry teams.  

Ruffles and Flourishes

Toward the end of 1987 Ms. Jessica Harding, the Public Affairs Officer in the Chief of Chaplains Office, listed the chaplains and chaplain assistants who had been recognized for outstanding achievements in ministry during the year in her PAO file. Ms. Harding did not intend to exclude the hundreds of unit ministry teams whose ministries were outstanding in every respect throughout the Army. She simply collected and saved, for the historical record, the press releases and news clippings regarding chaplains and chaplain assistants whose service had been reported in the media. The list

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gives an interesting snapshot of the many talents which chaplains possessed and dedicated in their lives of service for God, for Country, and for soldiers.

**Historical Achievements**

1. The year 1987 was officially designated "The Year of the Constitution" because it marked the 200th anniversary of the signing of the Constitution of the United States, the oldest democratic constitution in the world and the document which every soldier swore to defend and protect upon entry into military service. It was and is the legal guarantor of basic human rights for all Americans including the right to worship freely, to publish freely, to speak freely, to live in a society of law, to be liberated from any threat of tyranny or slavery, and to vote, to petition, to assemble, to hold office, and to possess the blessings of liberty without fear of usurpation by any sovereign power. In celebration of this commemoration and of the values implanted within the U.S. Constitution, the United States Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution in 1987 established a series of ceremonial events and a number of awards for individuals making noteworthy contributions in support of this national observance. One of these national awards went to Chaplain William Noble, U.S. Army Chaplain Board, Editor of the *Military Chaplains Review*, for the Fall 1987 issue of the *MCR*. Chaplain Noble's work in creating an outstanding anthology of articles on the relationship between religion, government, the Chaplaincy and the Constitution for wide dissemination earned him a well-deserved award. A copy of the Fall 1987 issue of the *Military Chaplains' Review*, subtitled "The Constitution," was placed in the Archives of the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps.

2. Chaplain John Brinsfield, Chief, Unit and Individual Training Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USACHCS, was presented the TRADOC Commander's Award for Outstanding Contributions to the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution. Chaplain Brinsfield wrote two articles and gave five addresses on the free exercise of religion and the history of the Army Chaplaincy for each of the CONUSA Chaplain Training Conferences, which hosted more than 1,500 chaplains and chaplain assistants throughout the United States.

3. Chaplain Robert G. Garrett coordinated a rededication ceremony for the Memorial Chapel at Fort Eustis, Virginia. The Transportation Corps thereby became the first regiment, under the Army's regimental system, to record a Regimental Memorial Chapel with the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

4. Chaplain Lawrence E. Hayworth, former Red River Army Depot Staff Chaplain,

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dedicated the Veterans Honor Park at that Texas installation. In his keynote address, Chaplain Hayworth honored all veterans especially the POWs and MIAs who served their country.100

5. In a special article on Afro-American Chaplains during February, Black History Month, Chaplain John Allen DeVeaux and Chaplain John A. DeVeaux, Jr., were honored for their service as father and son chaplains in the Corps. Chaplain John A. DeVeaux, Jr., was the first black Corps and MACOM Chaplain in the history of the Chaplaincy.101

Pastoral and Soldier Ministry Awards

1. Chaplain Wesley V. Geary, Staff Chaplain, Eighth Army, Korea, received the Roy Wilkins Meritorious Service Award given by the NAACP. He was cited for devoting his ministry of 24 years to soldiers and families and for resolving racial tensions in the Army in the 1970s.102

2. Chaplain Vance P. Theodore and Specialist Dwayne L. Charlton were honored as the UMT of the year by Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman, the FORSCOM Staff Chaplain, for their ministry to soldiers and family members at Fort Ord. Chaplain Theodore and Specialist Charlton collected more than $22,000.00 and provided meals and gifts for more than 700 needy soldiers families during the 1986 Christmas season.103

3. Chaplain Fred L. Maddox, Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Augusta, Georgia, was honored for the Staff Chaplain's Program in Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention. Of the 612 soldiers and 297 spouses treated at Eisenhower AMC in this program, 71% returned to full duty status. Chaplain James Robnolt, from PPDT, paid special tribute to Chaplain Maddox and his staff for establishing a spiritual "role relationship" with the patients which helped lead to their recovery.104

4. CSM James J. Schonefeld, U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Ft. Monmouth, received a Great American Family Award for 1987 for volunteer help during blood drives, food basket drives, and retiree support. CSM Schonefeld and his family exemplified the principles of "going the extra mile" to help the Army "take care of its own."105

Certainly there were many other honors which could have been mentioned as well as transitions during the year 1987.106 In tribute not only to the hundreds of unnamed unit ministry teams whose selfless service helped transform the lives of thousands of soldiers, but also to the

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stalwart leadership of Chaplain Einertson and his staff in a year of controversy over many essential issues, Chaplain Richard Martin, former USAREUR Chaplain, wrote:

Leadership is not an automatic response to external forces. It is a hard, reasoned, planned process of thought and action, of personal values applied to organizational challenges. A worthy goal is to be the effective leader that a Chinese philosopher described, "when his work was done, his aim fulfilled, the people will say, we did it ourselves."107

Hail to the Chief

One award just before Christmas stood above the rest and signaled the Department of the Army's recognition of, and respect for, the work of the Total Chaplaincy. On December 16th General Art Brown, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, awarded Chaplain Einertson the Distinguished Service Medal as an impact award for his exceptionally meritorious service over the 20-month period from December 1985 to October 1987.108 Chaplain Einertson's achievements as Deputy and then as Chief of Chaplains reflected the hard work of scores of chaplains, chaplain assistants, and Department of the Army (DA) civilians in the common effort of performing and providing religious support to the Army.109

Yankee Go Home: Panama, 1988

The Republic of Panama, edging ever closer to sovereign control of the Panama Canal, presented an increasing problem for the United States government and, by extension, for the U.S. Army in 1988. After a lengthy investigation, Central Intelligence Agency sources confirmed that General Manuel Noriega had made contact with leaders of several drug cartels in Colombia, including Pablo Escobar, presumably for the purpose of offering Escobar a headquarters site in Panama to support illegal drug trafficking.110 While it was true that Noriega had been an informant for the CIA earlier, he had played a dualistic, manipulative role in taking money from the U.S. as well as from the enemies of the United States. President George Bush wanted Noriega removed from power in Panama. In February a Federal grand jury had indicted Noriega for drug trafficking, following the testimony of some of his former associates in the Panama Defense Force.111 President Bush, a former Director of the CIA, placed economic sanctions on Panama which gave Noriega the opportunity to blame the United States for all of Panama's economic problems.112

Life was not easy for the 13,000 American soldiers and family members in Panama.113 Subject to constant harassment by the native press and by Panamanians on the street, most elected to remain on the U.S. Army installations as much as possible. After 12 years of existence as the 193rd Infantry Brigade, U.S. Army South (USARSO) had been reactivated as a major command in Panama on 4 December 1986.114 The new joint headquarters, U.S. Southern Command (U.S. SOUTHCOM) was

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located at Quarry Heights (Ancon Hill) overlooking Panama City. Both the position and the presence of US SOUTHCOM rankled Noriega who had the local press portray American soldiers as "AIDS carriers, rapists, and alcoholics."\(^{115}\)

From January through March of 1988, a series of senior chaplains from the Chief's Office and U.S. Forces Command visited Panama to offer spiritual encouragement to the soldiers and to gather information on the developing problems in the country. In January Chaplain Quincy Scott from DACH joined Chaplain Eduardo Spragg, Chaplain of the 193rd Infantry Brigade and Pastor for the Gospel Service at Fort Clayton, in a service commemorating the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In the third week of February Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman, the FORSCOM Staff Chaplain, led a revival at Fort Clayton's Gospel Service during Black History Month.\(^{116}\)

On March 24, distressed by the reports he had received from Panama concerning not only the anxiety of Americans but also the poverty of the Panamanian people, Chaplain Norris Einertson sent the following message to all staff chaplains and chaplain fund custodians worldwide.

As many of you are aware, the people of Panama are facing a severe crisis due to the deteriorating economic situation within that country. The USARSO Chaplain has announced an assistance program to provide aid for families in crisis. As Chief of Chaplains I extend to each of you this opportunity to provide assistance to these needy families. I would recommend the use of designated offerings for this purpose.\(^{117}\)

In July of 1988 the Army Emergency Relief dedicated some of its campaign funds to Panamanian relief. By June of 1990 Army chapel congregations had donated a total of $134,000.00 to support humanitarian relief efforts in assisting homeless and otherwise disadvantaged Panamanian people.\(^{118}\)

**Plans, Issues and Decisions:**

**Office of the Chief of Chaplains**

At the same time Chaplain Einertson was appealing for help for Panama, his staff was setting the agendas for the 1988 Chief's Conferences. Among these were the Command Chaplain's Conference, the Mobilization Conference, the Multi-cultural Conference, and a new addition: the Trans-cultural Families (TCF) Conference.\(^{119}\)

In 1987 Chaplain Gary Bowker, Director of PPDT, had designed a study by Dr. Gary L. Bowen and Dr. Barbara Janofsky of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (called Caliber Associates) to examine "family values and expectations across racial/ethnic groups and rank" among military families. The goal of the study, which was published in January of 1988, was to assist chaplains in planning for ministry to military families of mixed cultural and ethnic composition. The study, which polled 174 Army members and 88 "civilian" spouses, concentrated on Hispanic, Black and White racial/ethnic groups primarily in the grades of E1 to E6. The recommendation of the study, to use a Values-Behavior Congruency Model of Family Adaptation as a counseling and

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enrichment tool by Army chaplains in Family Life Centers, would be explained and discussed at the TCF Conference. Mrs. Ida Butcher of PPDT would monitor the progress of these plans.

Among the many agenda items for the Command Chaplains' Conference in July was the final draft of AR 165-1 which Chaplain Edgren, Director of IRML, had prepared. This revision of the Chaplain Corps' basic regulation was critical because it addressed "core issues" such as priorities for the scheduling of worship services, the duties of chaplains and chaplain assistants, the status of chaplains as noncombatants, and the moral leadership program's concept and design.

The retirement of Chaplain (Brigadier General) Israel Drazin, USAR, Assistant Chief of Chaplains for Mobilization, in March also was recognized. Chaplain Drazin had entered active duty in March of 1981 to help prepare the defense for Katcoff vs. Marsh, the lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Chaplaincy. Chaplain Drazin performed many other duties in an outstanding fashion. Chaplain Einertson awarded him the Legion of Merit upon his retirement and return to civilian ministry and to the practice of law. Chaplain Drazin was succeeded by Chaplain (Brigadier General) George Field, a distinguished educator, clergyman, and Reserve Component Chaplain.

Other new arrivals in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains in FY 88 included Chaplain Robert E. Lair, Jr., the Reserve Advisor; Chaplain Jerry W. Black in PER; Chaplain Quincy J. Scott in PER; and Chaplain Frederick C. Smith, the Pentagon Pastor. Mrs. Norma J. Turner, one of the key civilians in the Chief's Office, announced her impending retirement in July. Mrs. Turner completed 38 years of service to the Chaplaincy during the terms in office of eleven Chiefs of Chaplains. As a specialist in ecclesiastical relations she was a major part of the "institutional memory" of the Chaplain Corps.

Of the duties which the members of the Chief's staff performed in the spring of 1988, perhaps none was so extraordinary as the symbolic burial service Chaplain John J. "Jack" Kaising performed at Arlington National Cemetery for the Family of William F. Buckley. Mr. Buckley, the Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Beirut, Lebanon, was killed on 3 June 1985 by his captors. He was a retired Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserve and the recipient of two purple hearts and two silver stars for service in Korea and Vietnam.

On Friday, May 13, Chaplain Kaising read the burial service, "Lord hear our prayer: Welcome our brother to paradise and help us to comfort each other with the assurance of our faith. Give him eternal rest, O Lord," as a headstone in memorial section 1 at Arlington was dedicated to Buckley's memory. Among the many distinguished Americans who were present to pay their respects were Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh; Director of the CIA, William H. Webster; Ms. Peggy Say, sister of hostage Terry Anderson; and Ambassador Bruce Laingen, former hostage in Iran. Lieutenant Commander William Beck, USNR, who served with Buckley in Vietnam, said that "in Arlington we naturally think of heroes. Many served our country and died, but few served our country as many times or as often as Buckley."

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The Timeless Topics:
Accommodating Religious Practices,
Managing Careers, and Building Chapels

In the weekly staff meeting at the Chief of Chaplains Office on 19 August 1987, Chaplain Rodger Venzke, the Executive Officer, had recommended that a file of "timeless topics" be set up so that the Chaplaincy could stop "reinventing the wheel" every five years. As the author of the volume of Chaplain Corps history which spanned the 30-year period after World War II (1945 - 1975), Chaplain Venzke was well qualified to make that recommendation. Even a casual survey of Chaplain Corps archives would reveal about 20 topics which kept appearing each five to ten years. Among those topics were the constitutional-legal basis for uniformed chaplains paid by the government, the justification of TDA chaplain (and chaplain assistant) positions, the consolidation/collocation of chaplain schools from the three services, and a wide variety of questions concerning pluralism, facilitating the free exercise of religion, and accommodating religious practices.

One example of a "timeless" and recurring issue came to Chaplain Einertson's attention early in 1988. On February 3, the Department of Defense published DOD Directive 1300.17 on the accommodation of religious practices in the military. In paragraph g(6) the Directive indicated that in some situations "a complete prohibition on the wearing of any visible items of religious apparel may be appropriate under unique circumstances" which included "basic and initial" military training when "absolute uniformity is necessary to instill military discipline and indoctrinate new members in the requirements of military service." Chaplain Einertson was opposed to the complete prohibition on the wearing of religious apparel by basic entry soldiers since it would effectively deny Jewish soldiers the right to wear a yarmelke (cap on the crown of the head) and thereby discourage the inclusion of Jewish soldiers, as one example, in future national military requirements. Moreover it suggested that the military regarded issues of conscience among basic trainees to be of lesser importance than among soldiers with more time in service. Chaplain Einertson thought this was an incorrect perception and a departure from the Army's policy "to approve requests for accommodation of religious practices when they will not have an adverse impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, standards, health, safety, or discipline or otherwise interfere with the performance of the soldier's military duties." Accommodating religious practices, within such constraints, was encouraged and supported by all chaplains and by the Army itself as part of the free exercise rights of all soldiers in matters of religion.

In discussions with Chaplain Ford G'Segner who served on the staff of Lt. Gen. Allen K. Ono, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and on the Army's Committee for the Review of the Accommodation of Religious Practices at DA level, and with Chaplain William Hufham, PPDT, Chaplain Einertson decided to request a change in Army Regulation 600-20, paragraphs 5-6, which was in the process of revision. The paragraph in March of 1988, which reflected the wording of the 3 February 1988 DOD Directive 1300.17, read as follows:

6. A complete prohibition on the wearing of any visible item of religious apparel may be appropriate under unique circumstances in which the soldier's duties,

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the military mission, or the maintenance of discipline require absolute uniformity. Examples of this include but are not limited to: the wear of historical or ceremonial uniforms, participation in review formations, parades, honor or color guards, and while undergoing basic or initial military skills training (other than during designated off-duty hours) when absolute uniformity is necessary to instill military discipline and indoctrinate new members in the requirements of military service.\(^\text{132}\)

Chaplain Einertson thought the simplest change, to protect the rights of basic trainees, would be to delete the words ". . . and while undergoing basic or initial military skills training . . . to instill military discipline and indoctrinate new members in the requirements of military service." On 18 March 1988 Chaplain Einertson recommended this change to Brigadier General John a. Renner, Director of Military Personnel Management, whose office was responsible for drafting changes to the regulation. Chaplain Einertson told Brigadier General John A. Renner that he felt "deleting these two phrases brings the Army more in line with the intent of the legislation (by Congress) than the DOD Directive does."\(^\text{133}\)

Two months later, the Hon. Frank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, received a letter from Senator Frank R. Lautenberg asking about the Department of Defense position on the religious apparel question, which would be addressed in an amendment to the 1988 DOD Authorization Act.\(^\text{134}\) Mr. Carlucci's staff had taken a conservative position upholding the possible prohibition of the wearing of visible religious apparel during basic training as reflected in DOD Directive 1300.17. A letter reflecting this position, in reply to Senator Lautenberg's question, was staffed through the Pentagon. At the Armed Forces Chaplains Board, Chaplain John L. Mann, USAF, the Executive Director, issued a nonconcurrence with the conservative position. "Relevant to the discussion is the issue of conscience," Chaplain Mann wrote, "also the Army does allow basic trainees to wear visible religious apparel while on duty during basic training, so I am informed."\(^\text{135}\)

At his office Chaplain Einertson was determined to keep the Army in the lead on this issue. In June he heard that the Navy and the Air Force wanted to support the more conservative DOD position and were trying to influence Lt. Gen. Allan K. Ono, the Army's DCSPER, to concur with them. Chaplain Einertson called Lt. Gen. Allan K. Ono and kept a handwritten record of the conversation in his notebook:

I found out . . . that the DCSPERs of the Navy and AF are putting pressure on General Ono for the Army to join them in forbidding the wearing of religious accouterments during initial entry training. I talked with General Ono and he confirmed that this subject was discussed at breakfast this morning.

The Army has been the leader in accommodating religious practices, and to cave in to the other services on this issue would be in my opinion a giant step backward.

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The Army has already said in this regulation by implication that the wearing of these items would not be detrimental to good order and discipline. The net impact of forbidding it now would be to say that issues of conscience are of lesser importance during basic training.

I am prepared to discuss this (subject) at any length or with whomsoever I must to lay out the important issues involved. At its base, it is a readiness issue which will loom large for the Army particularly during full mobilization.136

Lt. Gen. Allan K. Ono concurred with Chaplain Einertson's position and issued a memorandum through the Chief of Staff of the Army for the Secretary of the Army on 24 June 1988. The memo was entitled, "Affirmation of Policy on Wear of Religious Apparel in Initial Entry Training."137Lt. Gen. Ono observed that "the Army's current position" allows commanders to make the final decision and is "vigorously" supported by the Chief of Chaplains and endorsed by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower. He concluded, "I recommend that the Army maintain current policy" as the Office of the Secretary of Defense prepared a unified service response for Congressional inquiries.138

On September 29, 1988, Mr. Carlucci, the Secretary of Defense, rescinded the complete prohibition on "the wearing of visible items of religious apparel while in uniform by military members undergoing basic and initial training." Secretary Carlucci ordered the deletion of words in paragraph 6, DOD Directive 1300.17, which referred to initial entry training (the same words Chaplain Einertson had suggested in March to Brig. Gen. Renner) in order to have full compliance with "this policy change."139

Chaplain Einertson thought it was one of his "proudest moments" during his tenure as Chief of Chaplains. The Chaplaincy had protected, once again, the free exercise of religion for all soldiers in the Army.140

More Alligator Issues141

One would think that after such a long and involved discussion over accommodating religious practices, the other issues for the Chief of Chaplains' consideration would be much simpler. Yet in August some of the staff members at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel suggested that PERSCOM take over the personnel management of the Chaplain Corps. This suggestion got Chaplain Einertson's attention immediately.142 If followed, such a realignment would return the Chaplaincy to a mere part of the personnel branch as had been the case in the 1880s!

Chaplain Einertson very patiently explained to ODCSPER that the endorsing agencies would never tolerate control of chaplains by line officers, that chaplains were best qualified to handle pluralism and professional development issues, and that without personnel management there was no need for a Chief of Chaplains. Brigadier General Putnam from the DCSPER staff decided that "we

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don't want this mission," and the DCSPER himself directed his staff "to put this issue to bed." The Chaplaincy would be managed by the Chief of Chaplains.

While Chaplain Einertson was addressing issues of policy and management in mid-1988, his staff was answering yet another involved inquiry concerning the construction of faith-specific chapels. In April the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints had requested permission from the Secretary of the Army to build a Mormon (LDS) worship center at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, to meet the needs of LDS soldiers and family members. A second request, to build an LDS "private house of worship" on the Plain at West Point, was made at about the same time.

Since these requests had gone to the Secretary of the Army, then to the Assistant Secretary, and then to the Chief of Staff, the Director of the Army Staff had to task an agency to answer them. The Office of the Chief of Chaplains received the tasker. Chaplain Gary Councell was the point of contact at OCCH, while Chaplain Donald G. Wilson, the Post Chaplain at West Point, was the action officer for the U.S. Military Academy.

In as much as both the Roman Catholic and Jewish congregations had their own chapels at West Point, the issues involved in answering the Mormon request included a fair assessment of the needs of LDS members at West Point and the facilities and resources available to meet those needs. The same considerations applied at Dugway.

For more than three months the chaplain project officers researched and wrote information papers and formal studies on the current population, religious demographics, and utilization of current facilities at West Point. Chaplain Councell and Chaplain Wilson agreed that, "while the Army has provided sufficient space for religious activities of all groups on par with the same level of support given other community activities, the type of space provided for religious education needs in the Latter Day Saints program is not functionally adequate." They recommended the initiation of a construction project in FY 92 to provide a permanent education/family life facility for all faith groups at the U.S. Military Academy. Since there were no married cadets at West Point, the "family life facility" applied mainly to faculty members. The facilities at Dugway were deemed to be adequate to meet current needs.

In a letter drafted for the signature of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, and addressed to Mr. Robert D. Hales, The Presiding Bishopric, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Chaplain James Edgren, Director of IRML, noted that the construction of private churches on military installations might open the door to charges of favoritism and establishment. The plan to construct a religious education facility at West Point, one of 55 needed in the Army world-wide, was obviously "long range in target." Until such time as further consideration could be given to priority funding, it was felt that "sufficient military resources can be provided to meet the religious education needs of all faith groups at West Point." The conclusions involved in this study were not quickly nor facilely derived. The LDS church was a vital endorser of ministry to military personnel. More than 35 LDS chaplains served in the active Army in 1988, including some at the highest levels in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Yet, in the case of the U.S. Military Academy, the 59 cadets (1.5% of the Corps of Cadets) and the 80 other members of the LDS community (from the faculty, retirees, and surrounding town areas) were

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using classrooms in Thayer Hall and in the Youth Activities Center. Five other religious denominations (of the 10 Protestant faith groups at West Point) were using rooms in six other buildings. There was simply not enough space for every denomination to have its own private facility.

Developing Ministries:
Innovations in Specialized Settings

U.S. Army Europe

In 1987-1988 the ministry in U.S. Army Europe was characterized and enhanced by a number of innovations which expanded opportunities for even greater service to soldiers and family members. Chaplain Donald W. Shea, who had served for two years in a dual role as command chaplain both for Headquarters, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, was able to transfer his duties for USEUCOM in 1988 to Chaplain Raymond H. Dressler, Jr., USN, who became the first full-time USEUCOM Command Chaplain. In 1987, "The Year of the Constitution," and in 1988, when the Army's annual theme was "Training," the USAREUR Chaplain's Office adopted some new public media ministries, innovations in automation, modifications in organization, and sponsored, as usual, a wide variety of training conferences for chaplains, chaplain assistants, directors of religious education, and other volunteers. In Frankfurt, for example, the Broadcast Ministry Team provided ministry through the broadcast media of AM and FM radio and television in 1988 to an audience of more than 625,000 military and civilian personnel. Two ongoing programs, the daily "The Word in the World," and the music program, "The Sounds of Sunday," were exceptionally popular. "The Word in the World" won first place in the Radio Information Series category for the Army-wide Keith L. Ware Competition for 1988 and second place in the same category for the Department of Defense Thomas Jefferson Competition. Beginning in October 1988, a radio-TV producer was contracted to work on religious radio and TV spots with the Broadcast Ministry Team.

In 1988, following the purchase of Zenith 248 microcomputers, the USAREUR Chaplain's Office began the use of fax machines, autodial MODEMs, and lap-top computers as well as getting funded for Local Area Network (LAN) use. The USAREUR Chaplain's Bulletin likewise began to be published.

Name changes also reflected some new developments. The Catholic Religious Education Advisory Group, which had been formed in 1987, added a Director of Lay Development in 1988 and changed its name to the Catholic Lay Development Advisory Council. The USAREUR Command Chaplains Training Conference had for years conducted separate annual training for chaplains and chaplain assistants. In November 1987 the USAREUR Chief of Staff approved a USAREUR Unit Ministry Team Training Conference to combine training for chaplains and chaplain assistants. This combined training was first held in October 1988.

In the retreat ministry, soldiers throughout USAREUR were allowed annual 5-day permissive TDY to participate in chaplain-sponsored religious retreats. This program was "field tested" for

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one year, May 1987 - May 1988, and found to be beneficial for soldiers whose leave time could be reserved for family events.

The conference schedule in USAREUR in 1987 - 1988 continued to be comprehensive in providing training for ministry. Of 18 conferences and four retreats sponsored by the USAREUR Chaplain's Office, four were targeted for chaplains; four for approximately 420 chaplain assistants; five for religious education directors and coordinators, 225 in number; one for Chaplain Candidates; one for Youth Leaders; 1 for Church Music Leaders; and the rest targeted for general attendance by military families. Two of the most popular were the international pilgrimage to Lourdes with more than 500 military personnel taking part, and the 11th Annual Ecumenical Conference for the Armed Forces in Bossey, Switzerland.154

Medical Ethics:
Health Services Command

For many years U.S. Army hospital chaplains had been dealing with issues of medical ethics as they ministered to patients and members of health care teams including physicians, nurses, medics, administrators, and other staff members and as the chaplains were trained in the clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) Program155. In the early 1980s both active and reserve component chaplains began to apply for and utilize advanced individual training in the specialized field of medical ethics.156 Between 1978 and 1980 Chaplain Sanford L. Dresin offered several elective courses in bioethics at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, the first of their kind in the Chaplaincy.157 In 1980 and in 1982 Chaplain James Travis and Chaplain John Rasmussen, both reserve component chaplains, published articles on medical and biomedical ethics in chaplain journals.158 In 1986 Chaplain Dresin was assigned to the Army Surgeon General's Human Subjects Review Committee.

With the growth of interest in medical ethics both in civilian and military communities in the United States, Chaplain Einertson decided that Army Chaplains as a whole should be given the opportunity for advanced study in the field.159 In consultation with Chaplain Dresin, then assigned to Walter Reed, Chaplain Einertson approved the concept for the training of chaplains in medical ethics in December of 1988.160

1989: The Year the Wall Came Down

As soon as the people heard the sound of the trumpet, the people raised a great shout, and the wall fell down flat, so that the people went up into the city

....Joshua 6:20

In his newsletter to the Chaplain Corps in January of 1989, Chaplain Einertson urged all chaplains to be as influential as possible in every area of Army life. "We cannot afford to be perceived

See endnotes at end of chapter.
as 'marginal' to the system," he wrote, "We owe it to our people to be part of the 'fabric' of the unit. We must speak out with a 'prophetic voice' on the significant issues of the day."\textsuperscript{161}

Indeed in many areas of ministry, chaplains were addressing issues of importance to the Army. In late 1988 and early 1989, for example, Chaplain Timothy Tatum, Director of Ethical Program Development, U.S. Army War College, joined General William Westmoreland, Peter Jennings of ABC News, and other dignitaries in a panel discussion of ethical issues in the military which was televised nationally. The total ten part series, entitled "Ethics in America," appeared on the Public Broadcasting System beginning the last week in January. Chaplain Tatum had flown to Boston for the taping session which lasted for four hours with no breaks and no advance questions. His only requirement for participation was that he appear in uniform, be recognized as an Army Chaplain and that any comments would be his own and not the official position of the U.S. Army. "I would not hang up my cross," Chaplain Tatum emphasized, "and that was our agreement."\textsuperscript{162}

In February the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Carl Vuono, initiated a monthly Soldier Forum to discuss significant issues impacting on soldiers and their families and ultimately on individuals and unit readiness. Examples of the most important issues included the impact of first term soldier pregnancies, child care plans, and exceptional family member programs on deployability. Chaplain Einertson felt that the Soldier Forum was an important colloquium for the DCSPER, the Chief of Chaplains, the Judge Advocate General, the Inspector General, the Surgeon General, and representatives of other agencies and offices to discuss overall soldier welfare. If Chaplain Einertson could not be present personally, he always tried to have a senior member of his staff represent him at these meetings.\textsuperscript{163} The Council of Chaplain Colonels presented issues at times for the Chief to relate to the Forum.

In some cases Chaplain Einertson's desire to have chaplains involved in the basic "fabric" of a unit or organization did not work out immediately. For years various Chiefs of Chaplains had tried to convince the Superintendents of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point to recommend that a military chaplain, rather than a civilian minister, be appointed as the Cadet Chaplain.\textsuperscript{164} Even though the President of the United States actually made the appointment, the Superintendent's recommendation was influential. Chaplains Orris Kelly, Kermit Johnson (U.S.M.A. '50), and Norris Einertson all made trips to West Point to discuss their desire for such an appointment, to ensure that when Cadets entered active duty they would know the difference between a chaplain and a campus minister. Cadets, in the view of the chaplains in the Pentagon, needed to know "what a chaplain can do," before, during, and after combat in support of the command, the soldiers, and their family members.\textsuperscript{165}

The problem with communicating these desires to the Superintendent and his staff at the Military Academy was that the Academy's senior chaplain, the Rev. Richard P. Camp, was an outstanding preacher and pastor and was very popular with faculty and cadets alike. Appointed by President Jimmy Carter, Chaplain Camp and his staff ministered to the American hostages from Iran when they landed at Stewart Army Airfield, near West Point, in 1981. A former football quarterback, Chaplain Camp related exceptionally well to cadet athletes (who enjoyed the highest peer standing in the Corps of Cadets) in the 1980s. In spite of the theoretical views of the various Chiefs of Chaplains, the idea of replacing an excellent DA civilian minister\textsuperscript{166} who gave continuity and

See endnotes at end of chapter.
guidance to the whole religious program at West Point with military chaplains of various denominations (who might rotate each three or four years) did not seem advantageous to the West Point leadership. After discussions with Lieutenant General Palmer and his Chief of Staff, Chaplain Einertson's request of the Superintendent to support the nomination of a military chaplain as the senior chaplain at West Point was not approved at that time.\textsuperscript{167}

A similar type problem arose with the staff chaplain position at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Early in March the CENTCOM Commander, General George D. Crist, U.S. Marine Corps, approved the conversion of the staff chaplain's slot to that of a Regional Affairs Officer. All three Chiefs of Chaplains—Army, Navy, and Air Force—opposed this action. They pointed out that CENTCOM's area of operations, the Middle East, was "heavily religious" and that without a staff chaplain there would be no coordination for coverage of American soldiers of various faiths.\textsuperscript{168}

The staff of the CENTCOM Commander had to be reduced, however, as part of the strength reduction of the Armed Forces. There were enough Air Force chaplains at McDill to provide direct support for the staff. In the event of war, CENTCOM's plans called for augmentation which included the addition of a staff chaplain. The commander's decision stood.\textsuperscript{169}

On the 17th day of March 1989 the issue went to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the incoming new CENTCOM Commander, decided that he needed the Regional Affairs Officer (MOS 94G) on his staff and that later, if war occurred, he could add a staff chaplain. If he needed a chaplain for an immediate crisis, he would ask the Air Force to supply one. General Schwarzkopf "fought this issue hard," Chaplain Einertson recalled, and did convert the chaplain slot.\textsuperscript{170} The Director of the Army Staff closed the issue for the Army by noting that "CINC's can configure their own staffs."\textsuperscript{171} This decision would later create problems during the early phases of Operation Desert Shield (1990).

\textbf{Aloha USARPAC}

Possibly the most successful initiative to keep the Chaplaincy fully woven into the fabric of the Army came with the reorganization of WESTCOM. In the summer of 1989 Western Command changed its designation to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), a title which had been used earlier, before the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{172} The name change was not the main subject of note, however. The most important change was that USARPAC assumed command supervision of Alaska (from U.S. Forces Command), Japan, and Okinawa.\textsuperscript{173} USARPAC was thereby responsible for more than 100 million miles of area coverage, to include cold weather training in Alaska and field training as far away as Australia. Seven of the world's ten largest armies were located in the USARPAC area of responsibility.\textsuperscript{174} There were even special "expanded relations" missions in Southeast Asia, including a program to build elementary schools in Laos, for example.\textsuperscript{175}

Chaplain Ronald Bezanson, the last WESTCOM Chaplain, was succeeded by Chaplain Timothy Tatum as the USARPAC Chaplain in the summer of 1989. Chaplain Tatum, assisted by an excellent staff, including Chaplain Phil Touw and Chaplain Wilbur Parker, functioned as a MACOM...
Chaplain, a CONUSA Chaplain (since USARPAC managed its own reserve components) and, when so directed, as the senior joint staff chaplain in U.S. PACOM (U.S. Pacific Command). The duties of the USARPAC Chaplain and his staff included sponsoring regular training sessions for unit ministry teams from units deployed throughout the Pacific area, reviewing the religious support annexes to war plans, and supervising religious support, personnel and resource management. The USARPAC Chaplain also would frequently fly to Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juno, or to Fort Greeley, Alaska, in order to offer guidance and encouragement to the division responsible for defending "the northern approach." Chaplain Tatum regarded the I Corps Chaplain, Tom Norton, as his most important contact for reinforcing religious support in the event of a crisis in the Pacific. Chaplain Jack Kaising, the Community Support (Installation) Staff Chaplain for the Hawaiian Islands, managed direct religious support for all soldiers and family members assigned to units in the islands.

Chaplain Robert Loring, assigned to the 1/21 Infantry Battalion ("The Mighty Gimlets") of the 25th Infantry Division, recalled a series of training deployments by his unit which included troop movements to Korea, Thailand, and Australia. Chaplain Loring's chaplain assistant, Sergeant Michael Kang, was particularly interested in the exercises in Australia where there were "24 varieties of deadly snakes" and a few other certain "attention getters." The deployments to Korea ("Team Spirit"), Thailand ("Cobra Gold") and Australia ("Diamond Dollar") were excellent opportunities for ministry in very different geographic environments. The ministry to soldiers, including field services, Bible studies, retreats, a puppeteer/clown ministry in garrison, and holiday observances helped them immeasurably in overcoming "Rock Fever," the feelings of isolation and boredom common to remote tours.

Other creative ministries in the 25th Division included evangelistic work by the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, organized and sponsored by the succeeding Division Chaplains, Herman Keizer and James D. Masteller, and by the project officer, Chaplain Philip T. Guistwite. Frequently football players in Hawaii for the "Pro Bowl" would offer their Christian testimonies to encourage soldiers in their own religious development.

The religious support program in Hawaii, the largest in geographical area coverage in the Army, plainly kept chaplains involved in the "fabric" of their units. In the opinion of many commanders, the deployment missions of the 25th Infantry Division would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, without the unwavering support of the unit ministry teams and their supporting chaplain and chaplain assistant supervisors.

Command Chaplain Issues:
Questions of Plans and Standardization

The command Chaplain's Conference for FY 1989 featured reports of solid achievements, insightful initiatives and a few disappointments. The Chaplains' revised regulation, AR 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army, was practically finished in its staffing phase and due for publication and distribution to the field by 30 September. Chaplain James Edgren, Director of IRML, and Chaplain Don Hanchett, from the same directorate, were requesting any final "corrections,
clarifications, or updated information" for evaluation and clearance, if not for the present edition at least for future "updates."184

Plans for a worldwide, Total Chaplaincy Mobilization Conference, to be conducted in the fall, were underway. Preliminary steps included revising and reviewing mobilization plans at MACOM and DACH levels and integrating Senior Reserve Component unit ministry team members at every level of the review and advisory process.185 The entire FORSCOM Chaplain's staff, working with Mr. Roger Able from DACH, participated in one way or other in preparing for this conference.

Chapel construction plans, drawn according to the new standardized plans, were continuing apace, although there were some reports that Congress might cut construction dollars in the near future. Training of unit ministry teams to minister during the "drawdown" was being implemented at the Chaplain School and in the field in Phase III training. With the announcement that Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman had been selected to be the new Deputy Chief of Chaplains, thereby vacating his position as the U.S. Forces Command Chaplain in August, Chaplain Einertson nominated Chaplain Charles T. Clanton to succeed Chaplain Zimmerman at FORSCOM and Chaplain Bernard Windmiller to succeed Chaplain Clanton as the Commandant of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School.186

**Directors of Religious Education**

One of the most interesting studies to be initiated in the summer of 1989, and discussed in broad outline at the Command Chaplain's Conference, was an analysis of Director of Religious Education (DRE) positions in the Army. Mr. Edward J. Horan, a Roman Catholic DRE working at the Chaplain Services Support Agency, wrote a comprehensive report concerning the DRE career life-cycle, the distribution of DRE positions, and some of the problems which needed to be addressed for the future in the general area of religious education leadership in the Chaplaincy.

Mr. Horan noted that the 75 DREs on duty in 1989, all of whom had graduate degrees and experience in religious education, were holding General Schedule (GS) civilian positions ranked from GS 9 to GS 11. Their scope of responsibility included recruiting, training, and supervision the large volunteer work force that staffed the Chaplaincy's world-wide religious education program.187 Since the first Army DRE was hired in 1956 by the USAREUR Chaplain in Germany, the profession had grown to become an integral and essential part of the Chaplaincy's leadership in providing comprehensive religious support to soldiers and their family members.

There were, of course, some problems of standardization which needed to be addressed in the future. In spite of the fact that in 1989 the Army was the only branch of service to recognize and make extensive use of DREs on chaplaincy staffs, there was a lack of guidance to civilian personnel offices concerning DRE unique classification and grading.188 There was no standard definition of "religious education," differing job descriptions and job titles for DRE's from post to post, and some historical aberrations, or "hiccups," in the distribution of DREs on installations.189 The mobilization sustainment role of DREs on installations during deployments also was unclear.

Upon publication of Mr. Horan's report, the issues he raised were reviewed by both the

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Deputy Chief of Chaplains and the Deputy Director of Chaplaincy Services Support Agency. Chaplain Zimmerman tasked Chaplain Keizer to direct the Commandant of the Chaplain School to add a separate block of instruction on religious education to the Basic and Advanced Courses and a block of instruction on the supervision of DREs to the curriculum for the Installation Chaplain Course.\textsuperscript{190} AR 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army, contained a section on DREs which was reviewed for content and completeness. While Mr. Horan did not indicate a wide dissatisfaction among DREs with their positions or ministries, he did feel that "The Chaplain Corps would be well served by the standardization of DRE job descriptions" and grading criteria.\textsuperscript{191}

\section*{Catholic Shortages and Retirements}

Some minority chaplain quotas were desired by Chaplain Einertson to ensure a future comprehensive ministry to all ethnic and gender groups in the Army. Shortages, especially the shortage of Roman Catholic Chaplains, continued to plague the Chaplain Corps. Chaplain Charles E. Gunti, recruiter for Catholic priests and seminarians at the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency, wrote:

Like the weather, the decline of Catholic priests in the U.S. is an interesting focus of attention. The forecast is not comforting. By the year 2000 there will be 50% fewer priests in the United States and the number of theology students will decline.\textsuperscript{192}

\textit{The New York Times} had reported in March that although "Catholics make up 24.5 percent of the Army," Catholic Chaplains comprised only 13 percent of the Chaplain Corps, or 201 priests for 189,630 Catholic soldiers.\textsuperscript{193} Chaplain Gunti confirmed that Roman Catholic chaplains comprised only 13 percent of the chaplains on active duty, a shortfall, for the immediate future, of 250 priests.\textsuperscript{194} In America, as a whole, the number of priests in active ministry declined from 62,000 in 1965 to 56,000 in 1989, although there were more than 4,000 married priests who might have served in parishes if they could.\textsuperscript{195} The forecast for the Chaplaincy's future indicated a predicted loss, by age, administrative requirement or retirement, of 119 priests by the year 2000.\textsuperscript{196}

On the side of positive initiatives to help make the ministry to Catholic soldiers and family members more efficient, Chaplain D. J. Donahue, the United Nations Command and 8th Army Chaplain in Korea, had encouraged some experiments in the utilization of Catholic laity in sharing ministry in the Catholic parishes on Korean "rear area" installations. Chaplain Wayne L. Schmid, the Division Chaplain for the 2nd Infantry Division, had attempted some utilization of lay ministers at Fort Leavenworth before his assignment to Korea. Working with Father Finian Meis, Director of Lay Ministry for the Archdiocese of Kansas City, Chaplain Schmid helped develop a course in lay ministry which he used both at Fort Leavenworth and at the 19th Support Command in Taegu, South Korea.\textsuperscript{197}

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Publication of FM 16-1: 
Religious Support Doctrine 
The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant

By the fall of 1989 there was a great deal of activity taking place in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Chaplain School, as the final draft of Field Manual 16-1 was being prepared for delivery to TRADOC's Soldier Support Center at Fort Eustis for publication. After approval by Chaplain Bernard L. Windmiller, the new Commandant at the Chaplain Center and School, the manual's camera ready pages, mounted on cardboard, were carefully stacked and loaded into boxes for delivery to Fort Eustis. The completed project had to arrive at the Soldier Support Center by 1600 hours on Friday, 30 September, or the funding for the manual would expire with the end of the FY. At approximately 0600 on 30 September, two officers from the Unit and Individual Training Division at USACHCS left Fort Monmouth in two sedans (in case one broke down) for the seven-hour, 350-mile drive to Fort Eustis. The manual was in the trunk of the lead car.\textsuperscript{198}

The mission to produce a new field manual for the Chaplaincy had originated early in 1987 with a request from Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, Director of PPDT at the Chief's Office, to the Commandant of the Chaplain School. Chaplain Kuehne had been collecting references to the role, functions, and duties of chaplains and chaplain assistants in various Army regulations and field manuals for use in writing justifications for force structure and policy. He noticed that the training circular (which he helped write at the Combat Developments Directorate) and the old FM 16-5, The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant in Combat Operations, needed a stronger section defending (doctrinally) the installation UMT BASOPs positions as "sustaining" positions during mobilization and deployment. A newly revised manual could combine all of the "pieces" (training circulars, TRADOC pamphlets, and field manuals) into a single "battle focused" doctrinal publication that would justify not only unit ministry teams in maneuver battalions, but also UMTs on installations and in hospitals, sustaining the soldiers deployed and the families at home stations. At about the same time, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine (DCSDOC) at TRADOC directed all branch service schools to consolidate their branch doctrinal literature. In effect, both DACH-PPDT and DCSDOC wanted the same task accomplished.

The mission to consolidate, revise, edit, and publish the new doctrinal manual went first through Chaplain Wayne Lehrer, the Assistant Director of Military Ministries, to Chaplain Theodore Sirotko and other chaplains and staff in DMM including Chaplain David H. Tessman, Chaplain Peter K. Christy, Chaplain Dwight C. Jennings, Sergeant First Class Peter O. Dissmore, and Mrs. Mary Anna Lewis for execution. The first draft of the new manual was submitted for staffing late in 1987.

In 1988 the project was transferred to the Directorate for Training and Doctrine (DTD) for additional work. Chaplain Tom A. Carroll, Director of DTD, assigned the mission to the Unit and Individual Training Division in August. For more than a year the UITD personnel collected, edited, and circulated drafts of Field Manual 16-1. At least 35 individual chaplains, chaplain assistants and line officers wrote chapters and parts of chapters.\textsuperscript{199} Major Michael Hobson, Chief of the Publications Branch, worked with each author to standardize the submission according to TRADOC guidelines.

\textsuperscript{198} See endnotes at end of chapter.
Major Don Kiszka from UITD reviewed content for combat arms consistency. No less than 700 editorial and content changes were made to the first coordinating draft by Major Hobson and his staff, Mrs. Doris Ryan, Mrs. Judy Lyons, Mrs. Karen Dooney, Master Sergeant Richard Geiger, Staff Sergeant Gary Ouellette, and Mr. Jack Stern.

The major parts of each of six chapters were assigned to senior subject matter experts. Chaplain William Eberle, Assistant Director of DMM in 1989, revised Chapter One, Chaplain James Robnolt, Director of Combat Developments, and Chaplain Lou Scales from DCD wrote Chapter Five; Chaplain Peter Christy from DMM wrote most of Chapter Six; Master Sergeants Richard Geiger, Lou Guilianello, and Thomas Prost wrote Chapter Four on the duties of chaplain assistants; and Chaplain John Brinsfield, Chief of UITD, coordinated the input for the rest from two dozen chaplains including Chaplain Charles T. Clanton, the Commandant from 1986 - 1989, Chaplain Basil Ballard, the Director of DTD, Chaplain Douglas Pond, Chief of Military Skills, DTD, and later Executive Officer for the Commandant, and from both Chaplain Wayne Kuehne and Chaplain Gil Pingel (DACH-PPDT), who spent a week each at the Chaplain School reviewing every page of the manuscript for doctrinal content.

As a final review before submission to Chaplain Windmiller and then to Chaplain Einertson for approval, Chaplain Ballard convened a committee to resolve any differences between subject matter experts. Chaplains Robnolt, Pond, Brinsfield, Christy, Sergeant Geiger, Major Hobson, and others who had written or coordinated sections were invited to attend. Just before he left to become the FORSCOM Chaplain, Chaplain Charles T. Clanton approved the content, including a new list of duties for chaplain assistants, for Chaplain Windmiller's consideration.

The new FM 16-1, reviewed prior to publication possibly by more chaplains, chaplain assistants, TRADOC and other MACOM and integrating center personnel than any other Chaplain Corps document in recent history, was sent to Chaplain Einertson and approved for publication in late July. In August, Chaplain Ballard and Mrs. Marylou Corcoran, Assistant Director of DTD, funded the rapid production of the camera-ready mechanicals by commercial contract. At 1300 hours on 30 September, Major Hobson and Chaplain Brinsfield delivered the manual "on time" (with three hours to spare) to Fort Eustis, Virginia.

From Russia with Love

One of the discussions that chaplains and chaplain assistants conducted throughout 1989 was whether the Cold War was over; and if so, would there still be PCS moves to Germany? When had the first signs that the Soviets were truly in trouble been evident? Those who did some reflecting may have recalled many treaties, confrontations, and other clues which stretched over the entire quarter century from the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis to the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. It seemed almost irrefutable, however, that the crumbling of the vast Soviet economy and all of the tangible walls, fences, and barriers began with the decisions of the Russians themselves to ignore resource conservation and their own sound economic plans in favor of gargantuan military expenditures.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Professor, historian, and statesman Eugene V. Rostow believed that "the revolutionary cycle" which transformed the Communist World began in China during the early 1980s when Deng Xiaoping "announced" a far-reaching program for shifting China to a market-oriented economy, and began to allow its people more freedom of speech, of assembly, and of travel than before.\textsuperscript{201} Chinese students and professors, in increasing numbers, began to study at foreign universities. Air travel to China for European, Japanese, and American business executives, not to mention ordinary tourists, became common place. Deng's agricultural reforms began to show positive results.\textsuperscript{202} Soon other Communist countries, including Vietnam, were seeking the golden fleece of Western investment.

When Russian Premier Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he conveyed the sense that he was leading a revolutionary movement intended to transform the Soviet Union as well into a free and humane society, faithful to the rule of law.\textsuperscript{203} After President Reagan's first trip to Moscow, news correspondent John Chancellor exclaimed, "The Cold War is over and we have won. All that remains is to declare victory, bring home the troops, and have a parade."\textsuperscript{204}

Yet behind the scenes in Russia, where most things in 1985 - 1988 were behind the scenes, there was evidence that Gorbachev and his colleagues were maintaining if not accelerating Soviet defense expenditures. Russian plans called for a public policy of "giving up expansion and cutting both arsenals and military expenditures."\textsuperscript{205} In fact, according to plans approved until the very end of Gorbachev's rule, the gap between Soviet military power and that of the West would have continued to increase.\textsuperscript{206} From 1973 to 1988 the United States had fallen behind the Soviet Union in terms of nearly every index of military power; and until 1988 that gap widened.\textsuperscript{207} In the final days of Gorbachev's authority, Soviet military spending was projected to rise from 18 to 21 percent of the G.N.P. to 25 percent while the military share of the American national income fell from 6 to about 4 per cent.\textsuperscript{208} Even that estimate may have been conservative, for in March of 1992 the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences suggested that defense industries in 1989-1990 constituted 60 to 80 percent of the Russian G.N.P.—an astonishing revelation for Western Strategists.\textsuperscript{209}

With this excessive emphasis on military spending and preparedness in the Soviet Union came historic quotas on production by farmers and workers throughout the U.S.S.R., quotas which had increased steadily since the days of Stalin to shore up the vast military capstone of the state. Personal loyalty, careers, and well-being of party members were measured by the percentage of quotas met. Agricultural production quotas depleted the land, oil wells were over-pumped until salt water fouled the oil, and rivers were hopelessly polluted in the quest of meeting industrial out put goals.

In the satellite countries, Poland in particular, the plight of workers was ignored as they were urged to produce more with less. Machinery was obsolete and broken, wages poor, and housing for laborers barely survivable. The alcoholism rate from vodka consumption, one of the few cheap commodities in Central Europe, went up and created the ultimate communist conundrum: "why does production go down when the workers' quotas go up?" The answers in Poland fell on deaf ears until, surviving threats and the temporary imprisonment of the workers' leaders, the Solidarity labor movement emerged to serve as the voice of the people and the base for political and economic reform.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
If Poland was somewhat successful in embarrassing the Soviet Communist leadership, whose 60-year dominance was based on its claim to be "the party of the workers," other Central European Countries quickly emulated the Poles' success. "Decay of the Communist World started with the liberation of satellite countries of the Soviet bloc," wrote Professor Antoni Z. Kaminski, Director of the Department of Strategic Studies, Polish Ministry of National Defense, "and then went through the disintegration of the USSR." If disintegration "always chaperons the end of a social order," reintegration "must accompany the appearance of a new order." The creation of "new orders" in the satellite countries, unfortunately, involved the reawakening of old ethnic conflicts and the obliteration of artificial boundaries which had been imposed at the end of one or both of the twentieth century World Wars.

As the fever of liberation spread to East Germany, the Soviet strategists devised an interesting rationalization for supporting German reunification. If they could insist that German reunification proceed only with the proviso that Germany withdraw from NATO and establish itself as a neutral country, the goals of Soviet policy since 1945 would be realized. As Professor Rostow observed: 

The neutralization of Germany, now a country of 85 million people, would destroy NATO, force the United States to withdraw from Europe, and leave former NATO allies, to say nothing of China and Japan, incapable of self-defense. Under such circumstances the American nuclear guaranty would lose all credibility.

In essence Russia would rule, rule the area, with its nuclear and conventional forces, from Dublin to Vladivostok, and succeed where Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin had all failed.

Yet this Russian fantasy, a denuclearized and neutral Central Europe, itself failed because again the Communists had lost touch with their own people, in a sense a loss of touch with reality. When a new Hungarian government tore down the barbed wire fence between Hungary and Austria in 1989, intending "only a friendly gesture in the spirit of the Hapsburg past," tens of thousand of East Germans began to "take vacations" in Hungary, then Austria. Soon they overwhelmed the German Embassy with requests to enter West Germany. "The movement became a flood," wrote Professor Rostow. "Gorbachev had no chance to stop it without a large-scale use of force. so the miraculous unification of Germany within NATO took place, an event no student of European politics would have predicted as even a remote possibility without war.

For even the hard of hearing, the "tectonic plates" of the old Soviet bloc, had groaned and shifted. A new order was at hand. Ironically, in response to pressure from the East rather than threats from the West. The doors to freedom in the Berlin Wall opened near the Brandenburg Gate on the night of November 9, 1989. Not long after, the search began for East German leaders charged with crimes against their own people. In answer to the questions of American soldiers, to include chaplains and chaplains assistants, there might not be as many soldiers rotating to Germany as in the past; but it was certain that there would be some.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Operation Just Cause

While many Americans watched their televisions in amazement as East Germans poured into the West, other areas of the world began to demand a share of attention as well. In Panama Major General Marc Cisneros, commander of U.S. Army combat forces, conferred with General Maxwell R. Thurman, the SOUTCOM Commander, over operation plans which he and his troops had rehearsed in August. There had been some dangerous confrontations between the 5th Panama Defense Force Rifle Company and the U.S. 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment during military movements in the "neutral zone" at Fort Amador. General Thurman, everyone knew, did not maneuver his troops without a reason.

At Bolling Air Force Base near Washington, D.C., Chaplain Norris Einertson, Army Chief of Chaplains, was having Sunday dinner. Earlier that morning, President George Bush had attended worship services at Fort Myer Chapel. It was said by some people that when the President worshiped at Fort Myer, there was likely to be a job for the military soon. Chaplain Einertson noticed that the dinner host, Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly, JCS Director of Operations, was conspicuously absent. Although it might not signal anything, the absent friend was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

The next morning at the Pentagon there was a briefing on the situation in Panama. Units from Fort Stewart, Georgia, to Fort Lewis, Washington, were placed on alert. Seventy-two hours later Operation Just Cause began.

Ministry of Vision and Challenge: 1990

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Russian author and Nobel laureate, wrote that no matter what restraints may be placed on the human spirit, "God has laid on man the duty to be free." In numerous places and for a variety of reasons, including the worldwide availability of instant communications, the urge to challenge old boundaries and to assert ethnic and nationalistic aspirations seized many societies from the Baltic to the Caribbean Sea. Above all, the perception of Soviet weakness and lack of resolution fed the separatist opportunism of the time. In America President George Bush's advisors began to speak not of a "balance of power," but of a "new world order."

At the Office of the Chief of Chaplains in the Pentagon, Chaplain Einertson challenged the Chaplaincy in his March 1990 newsletter to consider the events of the previous year:

Without the luxury of historical distance, world happenings are passionately lived and experienced, not impassionately reflected upon. We are caught up in the swirl of world-changing events. The Berlin Wall came down. Perestroika and Glasnost raced

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1See Part Two for more information on the role of chaplains and chaplain assistants during Operation Just Cause in Panama.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
through the Soviet Empire dismantling Eastern bloc governments faster than anyone could have predicted. Jews desiring to leave the Soviet Union have increasingly been able to do so. The Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute signaled serious ethnic problems facing the Soviet leadership. The threat to the free world changed. America sent troops to Panama. Nelson Mandela was freed after 27 years in prison; apartheid is unraveling. The Sandinistas were voted out at the ballot box. The Congress and the Administration examined base closings, reassessed procurement priorities and troop reductions. The Peace Dividend became the target to identify and redistribute. Macro-forces and events demanded our attention and got it. What is God up to?

Chaplain Einertson's question was both a challenge for thought as well as a statement of faith. The events of 1989-1990 seemed to verify John Chancellor's comment made five years earlier, "The Cold War is over and we have won." For many people the hand of God was evident in history, but the future "new world order" remained to be defined. Chaplain Einertson counseled the Chaplaincy to be patient in a remark both insightful and humorous:

Allowing God to work his wonder in a life is testimony to our faith ... God's education processes when viewed in our terms are slow. God's time cannot be hurried. God educated Israel by wilderness wanderings, captivities and occupations. Forty years in the wilderness is a long time to teach one lesson.

Yet even in patient waiting, the Chaplain Corps needed to make plans and preparations for the future. The lessons learned by UMTs during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada and Operation Just Cause in Panama revealed that one never knows when "the balloon may go up." The questions which followed the Chief's Newsletter in March of 1990 were "what's next?" and "when?"

The UMT Vision Conference

If there is one thing that Chaplains seemed to enjoy, it was talking with one another about their experiences in ministry. In order to capitalize on this willingness to share and in order to take advantage of the thinking of some of the most perceptive chaplains and chaplain assistants in the Corps, Chaplain Einertson and Chaplain Zimmerman directed Chaplain Herman Keizer, Deputy Director of the Chaplaincy Services Support Agency, to support, organize, and coordinate a Unit Ministry Team Vision Conference in the spring of 1990. This was not a solo initiative, for the Air Force Chaplain Service had prepared an issue paper on "Chaplain Ministry in the 1990s" for their Command Chaplains Conference at Homestead Air Force Base in April. The opening paragraph in the Air Force publication was a story about the British philosopher, John Stuart Mill, which seemed to summarize the challenge of efforts to think analytically about the future:

John Stuart Mill is reported to have awakened one morning with an overwhelming

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feeling that he had come upon the answer to "the question of the ages." Unfortunately, he forgot what it was. So he placed a paper and quill beside his bed. A few mornings later he awoke with a similar feeling. This time, however, he found on the paper in his own handwriting, "think in different terms."  

There was no questions that the ministry in the 1990s would require new thinking about past experiences and new opportunities. The mission of the UMT Vision Conference, which met at the Appleton Inn in Tinton Falls, New Jersey, the first week in May 1990, was to put some detail to these generalities.

In preparing for the Vision Conference, Chaplain Keizer and his staff at USACSSA, located then on K Street in Washington, D.C., gathered issues from UMT's worldwide and then prepared packets of informative articles from a wide variety of civilian and military publications. In response to requests from Chaplain Gary Perkins and Chaplain Maria Snyder, who were serving on Chaplain Keizer's staff at the Agency, MACOM chaplains forwarded input addressing the vertical, horizontal, and transitional dimensions for thinking about the future of the Chaplaincy. As Chaplain Keizer defined the terms, the vertical focus related to present projects, programs, and activities. The horizontal focus included normal functions, and roles and missions that were "always part of our business." The transitional focus related to "things moving, changing, shifting, or needing to be established."

The response to Chaplain Keizer's request for ideas from the MACOM staff chaplains was impressive though mixed. Chaplain G.T. Gunhus, the USAREUR Chaplain, forwarded a packet in April containing 23 pages of reflections from 10 senior chaplains and chaplain assistants. From Fort Ord the senior chaplain assistants replied with one page which, though brief, was packed with thoughtful suggestions for the 71M MOS.

To supplement these UMT responses, Chaplains Perkins and Snyder gathered articles from the Air Force Chaplain Service, the U.S. Navy Chaplaincy, the World Future Society, the Barna Research Group, the Center for Christian Leadership at Dallas Theological Seminary, the Office of the Secretary of the Army, and from many other sources. All suggested trends and ideas for the future, not only in military and religious organizations but in civic, educational and business institutions as well. Each participant at the conference received a packet which was the size of a small telephone directory! The ideas included in the packet, however, were excellent stimuli for thought.

The participants at the Vision Conference were the senior leaders of the Corps: Chaplain Norris Einertson, the Chief of Chaplains; Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman, the Deputy Chief; Chaplain Don Shea, the DACH Executive Officer; Chaplain Herm Keizer and his staff from the Agency; Chaplain Bernard Windmiller, the Commandant of the Chaplain Center and School, and Chaplain Douglas Smith, the Deputy Commandant; Chaplain Billy Libby from the National Defense University; Chaplains Wayne Kuehne, John Scott, and James Edgren, Directors of PPDT, PER, and IRML respectively from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains; Chaplain George Schwantes from the National Guard Bureau; Chaplain George Fields, Assistant Chief of Chaplains (USAR); Chaplain James M.

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Hutchens, Assistant Chief of Chaplains (ARNGUS); SM Oliver "Irish" Corbett, Senior Staff NCO at DACH; and CSM Aaron Gibson, Regimental Command Sergeant Major—to mention but a few. 230

On 30 April the Conference met for devotions and a three-hour discussion led by Chaplain Libby on "constructing" the recent history of the Chaplaincy since 1960. Some 65 major events in the history of the Cold War, the United States Army, and the Army Chaplaincy were placed on a timeline. At the bottom of the timeline the years and the figures for active duty chaplain personnel strength were listed: 1960 (1,000 chaplains); 1962 (1,100); 1968 (1,900); 1977 (1,475); 1982 (1,450); 1990 (1,575). 231 Chaplain Libby observed that a cyclical history of the Chaplain Corps would present a view of ministry in terms of organizational (and program) life cycles, charting personnel strength, appropriations, and programs on a single graph. In general, the personnel strength of the chaplaincy of recent history rose during Vietnam and then leveled off between 1,450 and 1,550 for approximately 15 years (which paralleled the cap on active Army end strength of about 750,000 during the same time frame.) It would normally be expected to drop after 1990 with the downsizing of the Army.

The one function which was not graphed was an estimate of the level of brilliant or inspired leadership in the Chaplaincy over the course of 15 years, although most participants thought the trend was "upward" in the last decade. 232 Leadership may be independent of any life cycle measurement. "Hopefully it is trained at every echelon of the chaplaincy to emerge whenever it is needed," Chaplain Libby observed. 233

The subsequent topics discussed at the Conference were equally lengthy and fascinating with enough material to fill a small book. Briefings were given by Chaplains Einertson, Zimmerman, Shea, Kuehne, Scott, Edgren, and representatives from the Reserve Components, USACHCS, USACSSA, and Command Sergeant Major's group on enlisted issues. On the last two days the Conference discussed "Building a Corporate Vision," "Strategic Issues in Priority," and "Making Commitments: Integration of Plans." 234 The final product from the Conference was not a list of prioritized program initiatives, although those had been discussed. The final product was a commitment to the fundamental principles of "continuing to provide quality ministry and spiritual leadership to meet the challenging demand or the future" and plans to produce a brochure, comprised of the accumulated vision statements, as a corporate vision of the Chaplaincy for use by the new Chief of Chaplains. 235 The measure of success for the Conference, however, was not quantified in a final product as much as in the analysis process and in the enthusiastic response of the participants. 236

The Medical Ethics Conference

Ten days after the UMT Vision Conference adjourned, another exceptional conference convened in San Antonio, Texas, for chaplains, physicians, nurses and health care providers. The title and theme for this assembly of health professionals was "Medical Ethics and the Health Care Provider Team on the Battlefield." Sponsored by Chaplain Robert Campbell, Health Services Command Chaplain, and coordinated by Chaplain Gerald Conner and Chaplain David DeDonato, the Conference hosted more than 300 participants including Chaplain Norris Einertson, the Chief of Chaplains, who

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gave the opening address on "Medical Ethics and the Soldier."

Chaplain DeDonato, the Conference project officer who did the largest share of preparatory work for the gathering, had done pioneering work as the Chaplain Instructor at the Academy of Health Services in teaching medical and clinical ethics to both officer and enlisted personnel. Chaplain DeDonato also served as the medical ethics advisor to the Brooke Army Medical Center Bioethics Committee, the Health Services Command Staff Chaplain, and the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency.247

The list of exceptionally well qualified speakers authors and seminar leaders included Major General William L. Moore, Jr., Commander, Brooke Army Medical Center; Colonel James G. Van Straten, USA Retired, Dean of Allied Sciences, University of Texas Health Science Center; Chaplain John Brinsfield, U. S. Army Chaplain School; Chaplain Albert Isler, U. S. Army Chaplain School; Major Michael E. Frisina, Philosophy Department, U. S. Military Academy; Lt. Col. Catherine Call, Army Nurse Corps; Chaplain Kenneth M. Ruppar, Academy of Health Sciences; Dr. Robert Mosebar, Academy of Health Sciences; Chaplain Thomas J. Naughton, Deputy Post Chaplain at Carlisle Barracks; Father Douglas F. Bailey, Campus Minister at Florida Institute of Technology; and Chaplain Melvin G. Brinkley, U. S. Air Force, to mention but a few.

The issues discussed for five days at the Medical Ethics Conference ranged from the Practice of Battlefield Health Care to Euthanasia and the Right to Die. Chaplain Libby and Dr. Van Straten, who gave exceptionally informative and moving accounts of their ministries, were equally engaging with regard to their own fields of expertise.

Fortunately, as a service for the Army Chaplaincy as well as for many other organizations, institutions, and libraries, Chaplain DeDonato had collected the Conference papers and had videotaped the presentations. In the spring of 1991 Chaplain Granville E. "Gene" Tyson, Editor of the Military Chaplain Review, and Chaplain David DeDonato, who edited the Conference papers, combined their skills to produce a special issue of the Military Chaplains Review dedicated to the theme of Medical Ethics.238

The Training Strategy

A project as complex and as lasting as the Medical Ethics Conference, but done at a less hectic pace, was the production of the chief of Chaplains Training Strategy in 1990. Tasked by Chaplain Bernard Windmiller, the Commandant of the Chaplain Center and School, to research and write a detailed plan for "bringing a system and some organization to the training of all chaplains and chaplain assistants in the corps," Chaplain Donald Crippen of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine knew he had a full-time, year-long job.239 Since the new AR 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army, stressed the supervision and implementation of training at every echelon in the Chaplaincy, Chaplain Crippen's mission was of interest not only to the Commandant but also to Chaplain Kuehne in PPDT and to the Chief of Chaplains as well.

With support from Chaplain Windmiller, Chaplain Basil Ballard, Director of Training and

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Doctrine; and Chaplain Stan Esterline from PPDT at the Chief's Office, Chaplain Crippen conducted more than 25 interviews and collected an impressive collection of documents in his office in the Unit and Individual Training Division of DTD. Chaplain Crippen's post-graduate work in Educational Psychology at Vanderbilt and his experience with airborne soldiers, at Fort Bragg during a previous assignment, combined to make him a "natural" for this task.

As the project developed, Chaplain Crippen enlisted the help of other chaplains and chaplain assistants to write short sections on their areas of responsibility if they impacted on training. Chaplain Janet Horton from the Directorate of Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations at DACH, for example, wrote a brief paper on personnel regulations, selection boards and training opportunities for chaplains. Chaplain Stan Esterline spent several days at the Chaplain School helping Chaplain Crippen incorporate items of special interest to Chaplain Kuehne and to the Chief of Chaplains.

When the Training Strategy was completed and had been staffed as thoroughly as possible, it was approved by both the Commandant and by the Chief of Chaplains as a signal contribution to training management in the Chaplain Corps. Eventually the Chief's Training Strategy became the guide and checklist for training at MACOMs and on installations throughout the Chaplaincy.240

**Downsizing Challenges**

In spite of the burst of creative energy evident in much of the Chaplaincy's leadership in the spring of 1990, there also were some warning shots of base closures and personnel reductions which must inevitably occur as part of the end of the Cold War and of the United States' forward deployed force strategy. For example, in the winter of 1989-1990, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Installations and Facilities, chaired by Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado), selected the Army's request to build chapels, religious education facilities, or child care centers as specified in the standardized chapel design program. The committee reported that it deleted these projects "because, in times of tight budgets, such facilities are of lower priority. Members of the military can attend religious services in the communities surrounding bases. Moreover, the committee has a certain hesitation about using public funds for the support of religious activities."241

Chaplain Einertson was informed by the Director of the Army Staff that the House Subcommittee had deleted all FY 90 religious facility construction.242 Yet the Senate Subcommittee had voted separately at the same time to authorize all chapel and religious education facilities which the Army had requested. Chaplain Edgren and Chaplain Councell immediately began work to help the Chief reverse the House Committee report's impact and implement damage control measures.243 Contacting Senators Jack Armstrong (Colorado), Dan Coates (Indiana), and Sam Nunn (Georgia) to rally some sympathetic support on Capitol Hill, Chaplain Einertson and Chaplain Edgren worked through the National Conference for Ministry to the Armed Forces (NCMAF) to alert Senators, Congressmen and, by extension, the American people that service members from all over the United States might soon be denied suitable religious facilities for use by themselves and their family members. Chaplain Cliff Weathers, U.S. Army Retired, one of Chaplain Einertson's former staff members, represented the NCMAF. Chaplain Weathers wrote to several congressmen and senators

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indicating that the House Subcommittee's action was inappropriate. Chaplain Weathers reminded them that the NCMAF had a constituency of 140 million Americans, the membership of the denominations which endorsed chaplains and which were, in turn, represented by his organization. That figure always attracted attention in Congress!

One representative who was on the House Subcommittee, Congressman Dave K. McCurdy of Oklahoma, was troubled by the expenditure of federal funds for religious facilities. He asked Chaplain Einertson, "How long has the Federal Government been financing religion in the Army anyway?" With a twinkle in his eye Chaplain Einertson answered respectfully, "For over 200 years, Sir." 244 Senator Armstrong thought there were some contacts which could be made to help the chaplains, especially through Senator Nunn who was Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee and who would be working on appropriations with his colleagues in the House of Representatives. "If all else fails," Senator Armstrong reportedly said, "We can build a fire under Pat Schroeder in Denver." 245

Evidently, enough Congressmen got the message, for one day in the late spring of 1990 a call came to the Chief from Representative Schroeder's office asking that "Chaplains call off their dogs. We do not need any more mail to get the point." In June of 1990 the Congressional mid-year emergency appropriations restored everything that was lost and "favorable language applauding the role of chaplains appeared in the supplemental bill." 246

Unfortunately the closure of some other facilities in 1990 could not be avoided. In his annual historical report for 1990, Chaplain G.T. Gunhus noted that while a construction contract for one chapel (at Giebelstadt) was awarded, another (planned for Vilseck) was deleted by Congress at least until FY 1991. Even though the Retreat House in Berchtesgaden finished calendar year 1989 with the largest number of retreats in its 35-year history, and hosted 28 additional retreats and five conferences in the first five months of 1990, the BASOPS support was withdrawn. The Religious Retreat House Ministry in Berchtesgaden was therefore discontinued on 22 June 1990. 247

The closure of facilities also brought some additional pressure on community chaplains to justify chaplain assistant positions. Community commanders and installation commanders in the States, under pressure to reduce strength levels, reasoned that if the unit is being reduced and there is no chapel, there also must be no need for a chaplain assistant. Some chaplains thought that "our Chaplain Corps doctrine covers this," but Chaplain Gary Perkins, studying the issue at the Agency, warned, "Since the Chief of Chaplains does not hold any protective authority for chaplain assistants, battles are won or lost at the local level of command. If civilian authorizations are accepted in return for loss of chaplain assistants spaces at any level of command, the use of chaplain assistant in TDA organizations is seriously undermined." 248

Ironically, at the same time that chaplain assistant positions were coming under review (again), many chaplain assistants were demonstrating outstanding performance of duty in tribute to the upgrading of the 71M MOS which had begun in 1984. In Stuttgart for example, Master Sergeant Thomas J. Prost had been selected to serve as the first U.S. Army chaplain assistant in the Joint Billet of the Executive to the Command Chaplain of EUCOM. 249 Master Sergeant Prost was at that time a recent graduate of the Sergeant Majors Academy. In the same month, Sergeant First Class Charles

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Butts, famous for years for his physical fitness instruction at the Chaplain School, was initiated into the Sergeant Morales Club, a signal honor for any noncommissioned officer in the Army.

Retirements: Turning Another Corner

As mid-summer approached, the lists of retirees began to be released by the Chief's Office. In July, 13 field grade chaplains retired including Chaplain Wesley V. Geary, Chaplain James D. Masteller, Chaplain George H. Gray, Chaplain Dorsey E. Levell, USAR, and Chaplain Philip L. Olsen, USAR. One general officer also said farewell, Chaplain (Major General) Norris L. Einertson, the Army's 17th Chief of Chaplains.

It was with sincere regret that the Chaplain Corps fell in line for Chaplain Einertson's retirement ceremonies and parade. As he noted in his last official newsletter to the Corps:

My ministry as an Army Chaplain has spanned the entire period of the Berlin Wall. While I will retire from the Army Chaplaincy, I will not retire from the ministry. I was a pastor when I entered the Army, have been one during the past 29 years, and will be a pastor as I leave. I ask for your prayers as I ask God to make me sufficiently flexible to remain faithful to my call to ministry.\footnote{250}

Before Chaplain Einertson left the Pentagon, General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army, presented him with his retirement award, a second Distinguished Service Medal. General Vuono cited Chaplain Einertson's "remarkable foresight, unique ability to perceive key issues, and firm leadership during this tenuous period which resulted in a stronger and even more dedicated branch, revitalizing religious programs and providing uninterrupted ministry to soldiers and families worldwide."\footnote{251}

At the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Chaplain Einertson bade farewell to the staff and faculty and to the students. After his retirement parade, selected members of the faculty led by Chaplain Basil Ballard and Chaplain Al Isler put on a slide-show skit, "This is Your Life, Chaplain Einertson."\footnote{252}

Chaplain Einertson's pastoral concern for all soldiers and families and for every member of the Total Chaplaincy had left a profound impression on all who met him. Yet if there was any higher quality upon which he had to draw as Chief, it was the quality of moral courage. Chaplain Cliff Weathers, Director of PPDT in 1988, said that Chaplain Einertson's tenure as Chief was marked by "years of battles" to defend and preserve the Chaplaincy from those who wanted to reduce its size, deny its funding, and manage its personnel. Chaplain Einertson personally stood "toe to toe" with senior officers, even those who outranked him, on important issues. "He was a pastor with a backbone of steel," Chaplain Weathers reflected. "Chaplain Einertson's character could be described in three words: integrity, integrity, integrity."\footnote{253}

Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman, who succeeded Chaplain Einertson as Chief of Chaplains on 1 August 1990, wrote of his predecessor, "Under Chaplain Einertson, the Chaplaincy did not just

\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}
survive a difficult period ... we are stronger today than we've ever been in our history. We are ministering better, counseling better, preaching better, being better staff officers and NCOs, and training smarter than we have ever done before. And, given the challenges of the "build-down times" in which we find ourselves, we have an unquestioned need to continue down the trail already blazed and blessed by my and your predecessors. We owe them an enormous debt of gratitude for their stewardship."\textsuperscript{254}

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ENDNOTES

1. The editor is aware that the word "pastor" is a noun. The semantically constructed participle "pastoring" was, however, in common use in the 1980s.


3. Mary Luthi, "The American Politician: The Second Oldest Profession," Drew University Magazine, Winter, 1994-95, p. 27. "Star Wars" was a space-based anti-ICBM defense system which was proposed for development to shoot down possible incoming Russian missiles.


5. Ibid, p. 61.


9. Department of the Army, General Orders No. 24, 30 May 1986 as cited in OCCH Newsletter, 1 July '86.


11. Other joint use facilities based on this standardized model were built at Forts Rucker, Sill, Belvoir, Sam Houston, Leavenworth and Yuma PG. OCCH Newsletter, 1 June '86, Sect. III.

12. OCCH, Active Duty Fact Book, 30 Sept '86, p. 3.

13. OCCH Newsletter, 1 July 86, pp. 2-3.


15. Ibid, Including Chaplains John Rasmussen and Don Turkelson and Sergeant Barbara Taylor.


19. FY 86 Strength Report, 6 Sept 86. Among the retirees were Ch (Col.) Leroy Johnson and Ch (Col.) Roy Peters, Commandant of the Chaplain School in 1980.


22. OCCH, Active Duty Fact Book, 30 Sept 86, p. 16. Later Chaplain Einertson received special recognition from General Max Thurman for the 5-Year Plan Chaplain Hufham developed.


25. OCCH Newsletter, 1 July 1986, p. 2.


27. OCCH Newsletter, 1 July 1986, p. 2.

28. Personal interview with Chaplain Herb Kitchens, 29 Dec 93.


30. Ibid.

31. OCCH Newsletter, 1 Jan 87, p. 2 and Ibid., 1 April 88, p. 11.


33. OCCH Newsletter, 1 Nov 86, p. 1.

34. Captain Chester Paul Beach, Jr., Memorandum Through Executive, OTJAG, For Executive OCCH, 10 Dec 1986, pp. 1-3. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.


Actually, America was pluralistic in its origins and perhaps not as "Protestant" as "revivalist."


40. Ibid., p. 81.

41. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) James Robnolt, 11 July 1993.


43. A religion founded by Guru Nanak in India about 1500 Common Era.


45. Ibid. 13 May 1987.

46. Chaplain Ted Sirotko in the Department of Military Ministries approved such courses at USACHCS in 1987. Chaplain John Brinsfield was the first instructor followed by Chaplain Joanne Knight upon her graduation from Princeton. One course also was provided for chaplain assistants.


49. OCCH Staff Meeting Minutes, 4 Feb 1987.

50. OCCH, Staff Meeting Minutes, 14 Jan 87.

51. Ibid., 24 Feb 87.

52. Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Norris Einertson, 27 May 1994; OCCH Staff Minutes, 4 Feb 87, report by Chaplain Jerry Reynolds, PER.

53. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Hugh M. Grubb, 4 March 95.
54. Memo for the Vice Chief of Staff, SUBJECT: Officer Scrub, 8 May 87. Appendix to OCCH Staff Minutes, 13 May 87.
55. Ibid., p.2.

56. OCCH Fact Book, 31 March 87, p. 15. (Chap Pingel's Information Paper on p. 15 was written after 14 May 87.)

57. OCCH Staff Minutes, 13 May 87, p. 2.


61. OCCH Staff Minutes, 28 July 87 and Jerry Filteau, loc. cit.

62. OCCH Staff Minutes, 18 March 87, p. 1.

63. Personal interviews with Chaplain Hugh Grubb, 4 Mar 95.


66. Ibid.

67. OCCH Staff Minutes, 14 Jan 87, p. 1.

68. Personal interview with Chaplain Hugh Grubb, 4 Mar 95.

69. OCCH Newsletter, 1 Jan 88, p. 5.

70. OCCH Staff Minutes, 13 May 1987.

71. Ibid., 28 July 87.

72. Personal interview with Chaplain Hugh M. Grubb, 4 March 95.

73. During Operation Desert Storm in 1991 chaplains in their protective suits (MOPP gear) wrote CHAPLAIN on masking tape and stuck it to the outside of their jackets.

74. The Army Chaplaincy developed a crescent insignia in 1993 for the first Muslim chaplain.
75. OCCH Staff Minutes, 18 March 1987.
77. OCCH, Staff Minutes, 30 Sept 87.
78. Ibid., 16 Sept 87.
79. Ibid. Almost prophetically, Chaplain Whaley urged more training in how to function in MOPP 4 for extended periods of time. His observation in 1987 was validated during Desert Storm in 1991. See OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 Jan 87, Attachment 10.
80. OCCH, Staff Minutes, 13 May 87.
82. OCCH Chief's Newsletter, 1 July 87. The Joint Task Review Board was scheduled for the Fall of 1988.
83. In October 1987, copies of The UMT Handbook (RB 1-1, first edition), developed by Major Morgan Flom, Chaplain Jesse Thronton, and Major Mike Hobson in UITD were distributed to each MACOM and CONUSA for every active and reserve component UMT. See OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 Jan 88, p. 3.
84. This section is taken primarily from Chaplain (Col.) Gary Councell, "Resourcing the Chaplaincy in the Post-Vietnam Years, 1973-1993," U.S. Army War College Directed Study Paper, Carlisle, PA, 1994, pp. 35-39 and OCCH Staff Minutes, 1 July 1987.
86. Ibid., p. 24.
87. Ibid., p. 27.
88. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 Dec 87, G.O. No. 70, Attachment 2.
89. Ibid., p. 27. Among the outstanding staff members were Chaplains John Hoogland, Richard Adams, James Herndon, Ignatius Butler, William Noble and Paul Vicalvi; MSG Ronald Bowren, Mrs. Patricia Jennings, Mrs. Bess Ballard, and Ms. Beth Armstrong.
90. Ibid., In 1992 the Agency moved to OCCH in the Pentagon as a cost saving measure. Chaplain Herman Keizer succeeded Chaplain John Hoogland as Deputy Director and was, in turn, succeeded by Chaplain Tom Smith.
91. Chaplain (Col) James B. Lonergan, Deputy FORSCOM Staff Chaplain in 1993, suggested this title.


95. Ibid., p. 15-13, or 41.2 persons at each service.


97. Ibid., p. 15-14.


100. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 Jan 1988.


102. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 July 1987. The award was presented in New York City on 8 July 1987.


105. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 Jan 88, p. 6.

106. For example, Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John Lincoln, one of the most dedicated Catholic chaplains in USAREUR, died of a heart attack while playing softball with his parish members on 27 May 1987. SGM John Rainey retired and Chaplain J. L. Goudreau entered active duty.


109. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 Jan 1988, p. 1. Among the specific achievements mentioned in the award of Chaplain Einertson's DSM were supervision of the development of a 5-year training plan for multi-cultural ministry, the fielding of UMT Training Doctrine, Chaplain Mobilization Training, an audit of all chaplaincy spaces, and a comprehensive study to help alleviate the shortage of Roman Catholic chaplains.


112. Ibid., pp. 4, 35.


114. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 Dec 86, p. 4. USASO was deactivated in Oct. 74 and reactivated in Dec. 86.


118. OCCH, Chief's Newsletters, 1 July 1988 and 1 July 1990.

119. OCCH, Staff Minutes, 23 March 1988. Chaplain William Hufham, PPDT, noted that the Chief spent $16,000 on conferences in 1987, but had budgeted $35,000 in 1988.


122. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 April 1988.

123. Ibid., 1 July 1988.

125. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 June 1988, Attachment 4.


132. AR 600-20, para 5-6, 1988 draft, p. 97.


134. Letter from the Secretary of Defense to Senator Lautenberg, Einertson Papers, Chaplain Corps Archives. (The letter was undated but was written after 6 May 1988.)


137. Copy in the Einertson Papers, Chaplain Corps Archives.

138. *Ibid.*, Note: Lt. Gen. Ono polled eight basic training station commanders and five installation chaplains to discover that there had been no requests by soldiers to wear religious apparel. It was a policy issue, not a problem.


141. Issues which can pop up and bite you if you don't pay attention to them.


156. Chaplain David M. DeDonato, Chaplain-Clinical Ethicist for Walter Reed Army Medical Center, distinguished between *medical ethics* which addresses any moral-ethical decision-making process including topics for research from *clinical ethics* (decisions involving patients at the bedside) and *biomedical ethics* (any medical patient care issue possibly involving the whole health care team). Personal interview with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) D. M. DeDonato, 22 April 94.

157. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Sanford L. Dresin, USA Rtd., 22 April 1994.


160. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) S. L. Dresin, 22 April 1994. Chaplain Einertson staffed the question as well with the Council of Chaplain Colonels in 1988 and received a positive response for initiating the program.
161. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 Jan 1989, p. 2.
162. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Timothy Tatum, 4 Nov 1994.


164. In the late 1980s this title changed to "the Academy Chaplain" and the old Post Chaplain position, once held by Chaplains Kermit Johnson, Al Brough, and later by David Peterson, became known as the Community Support Chaplain.

165. Personal interviews with Chaplain (Col.) Cliff Weathers, 23 Feb 95, and with Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Norris Einertson, 28 May 94.

166. Chaplain Camp held senior government service rank.

167. "At times the discussion grew quite heated and at one point required the mediation of General Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army." Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Cliff Weathers, Director of PPDT in 1988, 23 Feb 95. Chaplain Einertson concluded, as Chaplain Hessian had in 1984, "there was no way to carry on a rational discussion with West Point on the subject of the Chaplaincy," Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Einertson, 27 May 1994.


170. Ibid. In 1990 CENTCOM asked for a staff chaplain as Operation Desert Shield began. Chaplain David Peterson joined General Schwarzkopf's staff.

171. Ibid.

172. Personal interview with Chaplain Timothy Tatum, 4 Nov 94.

173. Ibid.


175. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Wilbur Parker, 25 May 94.

176. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Timothy Tatum, 4 Nov 94.

177. Ibid.

178. Ibid.
179. Personal interview with Chaplain Robert Loring, Ft. Belvior, 8 Mar 95. The 1/21 Infantry historically was the first unit deployed in Task Force Smith during the Korean War.

180. Ibid.

181. Ibid.

182. Chaplain Loring's wife, Peggy, had refined both a puppeteer and a clown ministry for soldiers children. Personal interview, Chaplain Robert Loring, 8 Mar 95

183. Ibid.

184. OCCH, Chief of Chaplain's Newsletter, p. 2.

185. Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Norris Einertson, 27 May 94.

186. In retrospect, this was an excellent shift for the Chaplaincy's mission during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, for both Chaplain Zimmerman and Chaplain Clanton were intimately familiar with the organization and functioning of U.S. Army FORSCOM.


188. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

189. Ibid., pp. 7, 58. Ft. Belvior, for example, had three DREs while Ft. Hood and Ft. Bragg had two each.

190. Ibid., p. 47.

191. Ibid., pp. 18, 23.


196. Chaplain Gunti, Op. Cit., p. 28. Even if young priests volunteered in record numbers, they would not be able to immediately replace older priests, such as Chaplains Richard D'Arcy and Charles D. Logue who retired in July, 1989, in terms of experience in the Army.

198. Major Michael W. Hobson, Chief of the Publications Branch, UITD, and the Inspector General for USACHCS, drove the lead car which was rented from "Rent-a-Wreck" in Eatonton. Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John Brinsfield, Chief of UITD, followed in his own station wagon.

199. Including Major Mike Hobson, Chief of UITD’s Publications Branch and Major Don Kiszka, Chief of UITD’s Analysis Branch.

200. Mrs. Ryan, Mrs. Dooney, Master Sergeant Geiger and Major Hobson worked on FM 16-1 more or less constantly for a year. Other UITD personnel, in a true team spirit, helped, whenever they were asked, to do whatever needed to be done.


203. *Ibid*.


206. *Ibid*.

207. *Ibid*.

208. *Ibid*.


211. *Ibid*.


214. *Ibid*.


220. A. I. Solzhenitsyn, a veteran of service in the Soviet Army from 1941-1945, was imprisoned and then exiled for anti-Stalinist remarks. He wrote 3 novels denouncing censorship and government oppression. In 1970 he was awarded the Nobel Prize in literature. Norma Dickey (ed.) *Funk and Wagnalls Encyclopedia*, 1986, v. 24, p. 105.

221. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 March 1990, p. 1.


223. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 March 1990, p. 2.


225. Chaplain Einertson wrote in 1995, "Chaplain Herm Keizer was a strong right arm for me while he headed the Agency. He and Wayne Kuehne worked extremely hard and smart together on many systems issues. Herm's work reflected great intelligence, dedication and integrity. Einertson letters to Chaplain Brinsfield, 16 May 1995, p. 2.


227. *Ibid.*, "Memorandum for Chaplain (Col.) Herman Keizer, 13 April 1990. "Responses were from Chaplains Ron Benzing, J.L. Young, Roger Schalm, Lawrence A. Kelly, Sanford Dresin, Master Sergeant E. S. Pippin, Don Turkelson, Gary Mayer, David O. Davis and Jerry D. Reynolds.


235. The UMT Visions Conference was the first Chaplaincy-wide UMT Conference, although Chaplain Shea had used that title in USAREUR in 1988. Later Chaplain Zimmerman "rebaptized" the Command Chaplains Conference as the Chief's UMT Conference.

236. Ibid., Chaplain Herm Keizer, Vision Conference Papers, Friday 4 May. Three months after the Conference, Chaplain Edgren suggested a reality check on the issue of money to publish the brochure. In a memo to Chaplain Keizer dated 17 August 90, Chaplain Edgren advised, "Because of the current Mideast crisis & Gramm-Rudman-Hollings—the Army is curtailing all dollar authority for anything they view as non-mission essential ... will have to hold on to this [brochure] until the new FY."


239. Personal interview with Chaplain Stan Esterline, Pentagon Chaplain, 16 March 1995.

240. In addition to these duties, Chaplain Crippen wore a second hat as a Branch Chief in UITD at the Chaplain School. As evidence of his "team" spirit, he took a break from his Training Strategy work to help edit and proof the final copy of FM 16-1, Religious Support Doctrine.


244. Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Einertson, 27 May 94.

245. Ibid.

246. Chaplain Gary Councell, loc. cit.


248. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 July 1990.

249. Biographical sketch, Sergeant Major Thomas J. Prost, Jr., Chaplain Corps Archives.

250. OCCH, Chief's Newsletter, 1 July 1990.

251. Chaplain Einertson's DSM Citation, 11 May 1990. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.
252. Chaplain Einertson told humorous stories about two "Hittites" named Sven and Olle from his home state of Minnesota. These stories could not offend any ethnic group, Chaplain Einertson reasoned, because the Hittites presumably have been extinct for 3,000 years.

253. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Cliff Weathers, USA, Rtd, 23 Feb 95.

PERSONNEL CENTER TEAM

Chaplain (COL) Henry L. Hunt

Chaplain (COL) Eugene S. Peterson

Chaplain (LTC) Stephen W. Leonard
Personnel Management Officer

Chaplain (LTC) James D. Bruns
Chaplain Candidate Program Manager
CHIEF'S TEAM

Chaplain (BG) Paul G. Durbin
ARNG Special Assistant

Clifford T. Weathers, Coordinator
National Conference on
Ministry to the Armed Forces

Chaplain (COL) Robert E. Lair, Jr.
Reserve Affairs Advisor
CHAPTER VII

THE ZIMMERMAN YEARS:
SUPPORTING AND SUSTAINING SOLDIERS
ON RAPID DEPLOYMENT MISSIONS
1990-1994

After fifteen years of modernization and training, a new Army had come into existence. Much better motivated, educated, and technologically equipped, the United States Army was ready for worldwide deployment. In every sense of the word, this was a fortuitous development; for within the two years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, American soldiers were scattered over ten thousand miles of the earth’s surface, punishing aggression, feeding migrants and refugees, and rebuilding cities devastated by natural disasters. In every instance, from Saudi Arabia to Antarctica, wherever soldiers went, unit ministry teams accompanied them.

Milestones:

Religious Support During…

• Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
• Joint Task Force Guantanamo
• Operation Andrew
• Hurricane Iniki Relief
• Los Angeles Riots
• Operation Restore Hope—Somalia

See endnotes at end of chapter.
MINISTRY IN THE MIDST OF GLOBAL STRIFE:
Bringing Peace to the World and
Spiritual Strength to the Army

The American success in the Cold War is our most important achievement, at least since World War II. Everything was at stake for the United States and the world in the Cold War. Not surprisingly, it dominated U.S. foreign policy, national security strategy, major defense decisions, including alliances and defense budgets, and some key domestic issues. Despite occasional lapses, we maintained our military strength ... and we applied the containment strategy over a long time. Our success in the Cold War was achieved at enormous costs. We should recognize and honor this achievement.

Zalmay Khalilzad
Assistant Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
1990/1993

We have drawn a line in the sand.
President George Bush
on the deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia
1990

We have the finest Chaplaincy, in the best Army, in the world.
Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Matthew A. Zimmerman
Retirement Address, Fort Myer, Virginia
1994

From the end of the Vietnam War to the end of the Cold War the United States Army went through a 15-year period of reorganization, modernization and reformation in every aspect from weapons development to moral leadership. The Army was prepared to serve in any climate, at any time, in any place, and to fight if necessary, at any intensity the President and Congress might direct. The combat service support branches, to include the Army Chaplain Corps, followed suit in modernizing doctrine, equipment and training.

Beginning in 1989 and lasting through 1994, the strategic environment in which the Army had to plan for operations changed dramatically. The Berlin Wall cracked in 1989, followed by the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union itself in 1991. The Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah Komeini died in 1989 and Kim Il Sung of North Korea in 1994. Libya and Cuba were left to stand alone as major foes of the United States. The greatest threats to the security of the American democracy seemed to be its own domestic crime rate and its ever-mounting deficit.

Yet the fall of the Soviet Union and the temporary confusion in other nations was a mixed blessing. Although 9,000 strategic nuclear warheads were no longer targeted on American cities after 1994, neither was the Red Army a dependable force for law and order within the bounds of former

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Communist countries. As Professors P.A. Sorokin and Francis Beer hypothesized in their respective studies on war and peace, the absence of a strong military power may have encouraged rather than discouraged localized geographical conflict.¹

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the perception of a power vacuum in many formerly dependent regions, including ten former Soviet Republics, came a number of military adventures led largely by political amateurs. Civil war broke out in some locations along the old Soviet border as well as in the nation previously known as Yugoslavia. In satellite nations such as Somalia and Cuba, which had been dependent for years on Soviet aid, governments held on to power with desperation or not at all.

In the Caribbean, the Middle East, and in many other Third World regions, power struggles erupted between and among ethnic groups, tribes, and former neighbors. In some cases ethnic wars were waged for no purpose other than acquisition of territory and control of resources.

In order to keep a balance of order, if not of power, in parts of the world gone mad for "self-rule," the United Nations began to undertake its most active peace keeping role in 40 years. Most particularly in the Middle East and in Africa where war, famine, disease and death threatened 25 million people, the United Nations performed essentially police functions. As the largest and wealthiest single member of the United Nations, the United States found itself, in the period from 1990 to 1994, restoring and guarding borders from Korea to Kenya to Kuwait.

Spiritual Leadership for the Army and for the World

On 1 August 1990, the day Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman was promoted to Major General and assumed office as the Army's 18th Chief of Chaplains, the Army was on the brink of thirteen separate operational deployments ranging from heavy combat to humanitarian relief missions. Eleven of these deployments took place within two years, from 1990 to 1992. The leadership skills required to inspire, encourage, manage, and sustain the spiritual strength of 550,000 soldiers and 1,200 unit ministry teams deployed to every continent, including Antarctica, during this period were extraordinary. Blessed with years of hard preparation and by an outstanding staff and outstanding unit ministry teams throughout the Chaplain Corps, Chaplain Zimmerman met each challenge successfully for the spiritual benefit of soldiers, the Chaplaincy, the Army leadership, and the American people.

Throughout his 27-year career, Chaplain Zimmerman liked to refer to himself simply as "a Baptist preacher." While that self-effacing description was true and warranted a high degree of respect as would be due to a preacher of the Gospel, it was too modest. To describe Chaplain Zimmerman as "a Baptist preacher" without further qualification would be akin to describing Benjamin Franklin as "a printer," George Washington as "a planter," or Albert Einstein as "a mathematician."

Chaplain Zimmerman would be better described as one of the finest preachers in the history of the Chaplain Corps, an outstanding chaplain at every echelon in the Army, a genius at organization and conflict resolution, and a courageous and intuitive leader who rarely needed to hear the same

¹ See endnotes at end of chapter.
information twice. Perhaps one of Chaplain Zimmerman's most remarkable qualities, however, was his ability to genuinely relate to every person he met regardless of rank, gender, race, age or class. Without pretense, he enjoyed people. Throughout the Pentagon and indeed throughout the Army he was the best known chaplain in the Corps.

Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman, Jr., was born in Rock Hill, South Carolina, and educated at Benedict College and Duke University. After his graduation from Duke Divinity School where he was the first Afro-American to attain a Master of Divinity degree, Chaplain Zimmerman served as the campus pastor for Idaho State University and later for Morris College in Sumter, South Carolina. He was ordained by the National Baptist Convention of which his father was a ministerial member also. He entered the Army Chaplaincy as a captain by direct appointment in April of 1967.

Chaplain Zimmerman's initial assignments included serving as Battalion and then Brigade Chaplain of the 3d Advanced Individual Training Brigade, Ft. Gordon, Georgia; Assistant IV Corps Tactical Zone Chaplain, Vietnam; Assistant Division Support Command Chaplain, 1st Armored Division, Ft. Hood, Texas; DIVARTY Staff Chaplain, 3d Armored Division, Hanau; and Assistant V Corps Chaplain, Frankfurt, West Germany. His senior assignments later included service as the Division Staff Chaplain, 3d Infantry Division; Deputy Staff Chaplain, Training and Doctrine Command; and United States Forces Command Staff Chaplain, Fort McPherson, Georgia. Chaplain Zimmerman was nominated and confirmed as Deputy Chief of Chaplains in 1989 and as Chief of Chaplains in 1990.

At the time of Chaplain Zimmerman's assumption of office as Chief of Chaplains, the Chaplain Corps was staffed from top to bottom with many outstanding leaders. In the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, the Executive Officer was Chaplain Donald W. Shea, a Roman Catholic priest and a former Special Forces chaplain in Vietnam. Chaplain Shea's most recent assignment prior to reporting to DACH was as the U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army Staff Chaplain, Heidelberg, West Germany. When Chaplain Shea became the Deputy Chief in November, he was succeeded in due time by Chaplain Henry F. Wake, previously the 1st Infantry Division Chaplain at Fort Riley. Chaplain Wayne E. Kuehne, also a Vietnam veteran and a War College graduate, was the Director for Plans, Policy Development and Training. For more than 15 years Chaplain Kuehne had worked on force structure and doctrinal issues for the Chaplaincy. Chaplain Kuehne's staff included Chaplain Gilbert H. Pingel, one of the principal contributors to FM 16-1, Chaplain Stanley R. Esterline, one of the project officers for the Chief's Training Strategy, and Mr. Roger Able, the Mobilization Plans Officer. Chaplain John C. Scott, formerly the WESTCOM Chaplain in Hawai'i and later the Assistant Commandant of the Chaplain School, served as Director of Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations with the excellent assistance of Chaplains Gregory P. Sykes, Janet Y. Horton, Hugh L. Dukes, Jr., and Ms. Shirley Womack. Sergeant Major Oliver "Irish" Corbett was the Chief's Senior Staff NCO.

The Director of Information, Resource Management and Logistics was Chaplain James A. Edgren who had secured the standard design for Army chapels and who had authored AR 165-1, the basic regulation for the Chaplain Corps. Chaplain Edgren's staff included Chaplains Gary R. Councell and Donald G. Hanchett. At the United States Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency, Chaplain Herman Keizer, Jr., served as Deputy Director. He was assisted by Chaplains Winfield D. Buzby, Robert J. Richter, John A. Wells, Samuel B. Cooper, Maria J. Snyder, Granville E. Tyson, Paul M.
Bomba, Ms. Patricia M. Jennings, and Ms. Bess Ballard.


On the Reserve side of the Chaplaincy, Chaplain David W. Hoh was the Staff Chaplain at ARPERCEN; Chaplain Robert E. Lair, Jr., was the Reserve Affairs Advisor to the Chief; Chaplain George W. Schwantes was the National Guard Bureau Chaplain; and the CONUSA Chaplains were Chaplain Richard L. Adams (First Army), Chaplain Gerald M. Mangham (Second Army), Chaplain Phillip P. Cassibry (Fourth Army), Chaplain Michael G. Ortiz (Fifth Army), and Chaplain Henry L. Hunt (Sixth Army). The Third Army Chaplain, from the U.S. Army Reserve, was Chaplain Dan O'Conner.

Within the Pentagon at other commands were Chaplains Jack N. Anderson (ODCSPER), Thomas R. Smith (The Pentagon Chaplain), and Meredith R. Standley (Executive Director, Armed Forces Chaplains Board). The senior Army chaplain at West Point was Owen J. Mullen, a Roman Catholic priest from the Army Reserve. Chaplain John W. Schumacher served on the faculty of the U.S. Army War College. Mrs. Jody Dunning was the Chaplain Corps' Public Affairs Officer at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

All in all, as General Carl Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff, promoted Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman to Major General on 1 August 1990, there was much about which the Chaplain Corps could be pleased and proud. In his first address to the Corps on 1 August, Chaplain Zimmerman wrote:

As I assume the role as your Chief of Chaplains, I'm very much aware of both the heavy responsibility that is mine, and the many decisions which lie ahead for me. Before Chaplain Einertson stepped down and passed the mantle to me, I was quite confident that I knew the answers, or at least the directions the Chaplaincy needed to go. Today there's a different complexion on it all.4

Chaplain Zimmerman's words were more prophetic than perhaps he realized, for within 24 hours of his investiture the news arrived of potentially the greatest combat operation the Army had faced since Vietnam. In the early morning hours of 2 August, some 100,000 Iraqi troops crossed into Kuwait.1 It would not be long before American soldiers and their unit ministry teams would be on the move and the Chief of Chaplains and his staff would be in prayer for them all.

3 See Part Two for more information on the role of chaplains and chaplain assistants in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

4 See endnotes at end of chapter.
ON THE HOME FRONT

"Over the past months, both during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the ministry you have provided has been absolutely awesome. In my years as an Army Chaplain, I don’t think I have ever seen the Spirit at work in such a way.

Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Matthew A. Zimmerman
Chief of Chaplains
1 March 1991

The engines of war had scarcely come to a halt in the Persian Gulf when the task of analyzing the “Lessons Learned” began. Chaplain Donald Shea, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, was the driving force behind the collection of materials which would impact on Chaplain Corps mobilization planning, religious support doctrine, and historic appreciation for the ministries performed not only in the desert but in supporting commands as well. Initially, Chaplain Gilbert Pingel from PPDT collected and read more than 400 questionnaires from deployed UMT members. Chaplain Calvin Sydnor compiled statements from VII Corps UMT members relating to every phase of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Dr. William Hourihan at the Chaplain School conducted oral interviews of many senior participants, and Chaplains John Rasmussen and Greg Hill went to Saudi Arabia to gather responses to questions from active and Reserve component chaplains alike. Added to more than 100 oral, taped interviews of Desert Shield/Desert Storm veterans taken during the writing of the Chaplain Corps history, from 1993 to 1995, the Chaplaincy had done a creditable job in documenting its religious support efforts during the Gulf War.

For more than six months, March to September of 1991, hundreds of speeches and sermons delivered by chaplains dwelled on the military and religious experiences they had encountered in the Gulf. Chaplains Zimmerman and Shea found the statistics of great interest to their audiences. With 529 unit ministry teams in Saudi Arabia in February of 1991, the ratio of chaplains to soldiers was 1:530, one of the lowest in history. Of the 495 Protestant chaplains deployed, 10 were female, a significant but not a large number in comparison to the 40,000 women of all services who deployed to the Gulf. In final tally, the Reserve components furnished 49% of the unit ministry teams involved in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (included backfill missions in the United States and Europe).

There were, of course, “spin-offs” from the lessons of the Gulf War. In spite of the excellent performance of UMTs in the desert, Chaplain Zimmerman felt that there were some areas in which the Chaplaincy could be improved. In a briefing he gave for unit ministry teams in Hawaii and Korea in September 1991, Chaplain Zimmerman noted:

1. Data on religious support in SWA was difficult to obtain quickly and accurately. Sometimes DACH, FORSCOM, and ARCENT had different numbers to report, principally because some UMTs passed through mobilization stations without reporting to the installation chaplains.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
2. Some supervisory chaplains did not want to write reports because “they were too busy doing ministry.”

3. Some supervisory chaplains must be more aggressive in understanding and implementing mobilization plans.

4. Logistics, the supply of essential ecclesiastical items as well as resupply kits, hymn players, and worship materials, must be improved.

5. Reunion materials and a viable reunion plan must be part of the pre-deployment preparation and planning.

6. Newly commissioned chaplains must be school-trained; they must not be mobilized and deployed until they are.

In order to address some of the issues, Chaplain Zimmerman directed a review of the DACH mobilization policies and procedures. The Chief’s action officers reviewed reports from Desert Shield, the UMT Information Handbook on Mobilization, and the Army study, “Chaplain UMT Religious Coverage during Desert Shield/Storm,” and made recommendations directly to him.

Among the measures implemented during the Gulf War to address problems of immediate concern were: 1) the standardization of mobilization and contingency planning for UMTs throughout the Army, 2) the addition of chaplain Mobilization TDA (MOBTDA) spaces at Casualty Assistance Centers, 3) the design and requirements for chaplains to serve on Crisis Ministry Teams, 4) the development of multi-faith meals for soldiers with special religious dietary needs, and 5) the development of a new chaplain kit for Protestants and Catholics. These “combat contributions” were among the fastest and best responses in Chaplain Corps history to the needs of a single operational deployment.

Using The B Word

"The big word in the Army is BUDGET. Budget is driving force structure. Budget is driving personnel and strength. Budget end strength figures are revised constantly."

Office of the Chief of Chaplains
Fort Carson Update
1992

Although Operations Just Cause (1989) and Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-91) had

See endnotes at end of chapter.
provided models for how the Army would fight in the future, they were from a budgetary viewpoint actually “intermissions” in a larger political process. The end of the Cold War, with the resulting mandate by Congress to reduce the size of American military forces by 20 to 25% in order to shrink the deficit and redirect funding to other areas of the economy, was the irrepressible historical catalyst of the 1990s for the Department of Defense. In 1991 the Defense Authorization bill set the end strength slope for the Army which would reduce the active force from 710,000 soldiers and 18 divisions to 535,000 soldiers and 12 divisions in FY 1995. While Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm delayed the attainment of the FY 91 end strength, the Army was back “on slope” in FY 92.11 The parallel “slope” for the Chaplain Corps would decline from 1,551 chaplains and 1,597 chaplain assistants on active duty in 1991 to 1,212 chaplains and 1,128 chaplain assistants in 1996.12 Even these figures were subject to further revision. As Chaplain Hugh Dukes observed at the Chief’s Office in 1992: “the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is currently working on Notional Force 24. They have cranked out that many notional forces since January of 1990, better than one a month.”13

The Chaplaincy’s plans for the future, therefore, called for a ministry in a smaller, more CONUS-based and financially constrained Army. Garrison staffing would face cutbacks and increased civilianization. Unit chaplains would have to assume more family life ministry responsibilities. The composition of the Army would be expected to change as well. In 1991 the Army Personnel Command recorded 148 different religious preference codes for soldiers. Chaplains on active duty represented 111 distinctive faith groups.14 The Army was 63% white and 89% male. The Department of Defense Task Force on Human Resource Management estimated that by the year 2000, 85% of the new entrants to the national work force would be women, minorities, handicapped, and immigrants.15 Presumably the Chaplaincy would in the future have to plan for a more diverse environment for ministry.

Among the assets available to the Chief of Chaplains to help meet operational requirements were the Reserve component unit ministry teams. By mid-1991, 53% of the Total Army’s chaplain personnel and 55% of the chaplain assistants were in the National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve. Chaplain James M. Hutchens, ARNG, Special Assistant to the Chief of Chaplains, wrote in May of 1991 that “a renewed emphasis on the quality of chaplains and chaplain assistants,” accessioned, trained, and retained, would produce “the most professionally competent, technically proficient, and cohesively trained Unit Ministry Team in the history of the Chaplain Corps.”16

As with the active duty component, however, the Reserve Components had to be conscious of federal budget constraints since they too would be reducing their total end strength. In an effort to give the U.S. Army Reserve more control over the training, funding, and administration of their programs, which affected 700,000 soldiers, Congressman G. V. “Sonny” Montgomery of Mississippi initiated the concept of a new Army headquarters—the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). The new command, located initially at Fort McPherson, Georgia, began operation in June of 1991.17

Chaplain William L. Hufham, just returning from the Gulf War, was selected to be the first USARC chaplain. Among his other duties, Chaplain Hufham was given the responsibility for setting up his office, forming his staff, and writing the tasks and functions mission statement for the USARC Chaplain’s Section. Chaplain Hufham’s staff consisted of his Deputy Command Chaplain Stephen

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
W. Leonard, the first USAR chaplain to graduate from the U.S. Army War College; his Administrative Chaplain Steve Parker, just back from Korea; and Sergeant Major Rudy Naylor. Ms. Linda Vaughn was the secretary for the USARC Chaplain.  

The major tasks and functions the USARC Chaplain performed included overseeing the funding, personnel administration (including accessioning, promotion boards and assignments), and training policy and design for USAR unit ministry teams. The CONUSA Chaplains (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th U.S. Armies) were responsible for the training, evaluation and mobilization of chaplains and chaplain assistants serving in troop units.  

The USARC Commander in August, Major General Roger Sandler, was triple-hatted as the USARC Commander, the Senior Reserve Advisor to the FORSCOM Commander, and the Chief of the U.S. Army Reserve in Washington, D.C. Major General Max Baratz succeeded General Sandler in 1993 after USARC moved to East Point, Georgia.  

In due course Chaplain Leonard succeeded Chaplain Hufham as the USARC Chaplain when Chaplain Hufham was selected to attend the U.S. Army War College in 1992. Chaplain Steve Leonard’s responsibilities for ministry in 1993 included support for 21 Army Reserve Commands, nine training divisions, five exercise divisions and 13 functional commands.  

Personnel, Policy and Program Refinements  

Throughout 1991, as had been the case with all previous Chiefs of Chaplains, Chaplain Zimmerman refined and updated many of the policies and programs he had inherited. In addition, there were significant personnel changes to fill vacancies caused by retirements, promotions, and opportunities for training. The old Command Chaplains Conference was re-named the Chief of Chaplains Unit Ministry Team Conference and expanded to include a significant number of Reserve component participants. In May of 1991 the Chief of Chaplains accepted coordination responsibilities for the Army’s Family Member Suicide Prevention Program.  

A new Noncommissioned Officer Leader Associate Degree (NCO LEAD) Program was inaugurated for chaplain assistants completing advanced individual training. In June Chaplain Zimmerman reiterated Chief of Chaplains Policy Number 25: “that every chaplain on active duty, assigned to a TOE or TDA unit with responsibility for ministry to soldiers and family members will conduct a religious service at least once each week for members of the unit or activity to which he (she) is assigned.” The intent of this policy, founded in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, was to put the highest priority on ministry to soldiers and family members at the installations to which they were assigned.  

One of the key policy developments in the Chaplaincy from 1991 through 1994 involved the drafting and approval of a written policy for chaplain personnel actions—from accessioning through retirement. As early as 1990, Chaplain John Scott, Director of Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations, proposed a formal policy, staffed with PERSCOM, for personnel actions. Chaplain Jerry Black, formerly the assignments officer in “PER,” wrote his major Army War College paper on Chaplain Corps personnel policies. In 1992 various parts of a draft policy were refined by action officers at

See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top)
Chaplain John C. Scott

(Bottom)
Chaplain Timothy C. Tatum

In the area of personnel assignments there were some important changes in 1991. Chaplain John Scott, formerly the Director of PER, retired in June. Chaplain B. F. Nass was assigned as the new Director of PER. Chaplain James Edgren, Director of Information, Resource Management and Logistics, retired in September, succeeded by Chaplain Timothy C. Tatum. Chaplain Henry E. Wake assumed the position of Executive Officer, exchanging jobs with Chaplain Wayne E. Kuehne who became (again) the Director of Plans, Policy Development and Training. Chaplain James Jones, a Roman Catholic priest, was assigned to the Chief of Chaplains Office as the Logistics Officer.


On the retiree list for October 1, 1991, were Chaplains William F. Bateman from Eisenhower Army Medical Center; Max E. Burgin from Walter Reed AMC; Ocie I. Courtney, Jr., from Fort Hood; Robert R. Covington, Jr., formerly the Assistant Academy Chaplain at West Point; John A. DeVeaux, Jr., the Chaplaincy’s first African-American corps chaplain; and Gaylord E. Hatler, formerly the ARCENT Command Staff Chaplain during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Outside of the continental United States, Chaplain Anthony M. Imberi was assigned in 1991 as the dual-hatted USARSO/SOUTHCOM Chaplain in Panama, and Chaplain Elvernice “Sonny” Davis completed a tour as the only Combined Field Army Staff Chaplain in the military at Uijongbu, Korea. In Germany the USAREUR Chaplain’s staff met with ecclesiastical and military officials from Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to advise them concerning their efforts to establish military chaplaincies in their own countries.

In Korea, which constituted the last vestige of the Communist threat, there were still rumblings of anti-American sentiment. In North Korea there were complaints, which had been repeated intermittently for more than 40 years, of U.N. cease fire violations, especially at the DMZ. In South Korea students occasionally would riot, especially in the spring, in protest over some government policy which supposedly reflected evil American business or diplomatic interests.

In May of 1991, for example, some 75,000 students went on a rampage through Seoul, only to be met by 85,000 members of regular and special units of South Korean riot police. Chaplain James A. Durham, assigned to the 8th Army Chaplain’s Office, was caught on a bus in the midst of one such riot. Directed to a hotel already filled with tear gas, Chaplain Durham spent a most uncomfortable evening as the street fighting raged back and forth outside the building. Usually, however, agreements were made after a while between the police and the students and the protests

See endnotes at end of chapter.
would die down until the next student vacation. By Korean War standards, the protests were mere safety valve expressions of a democracy still in late natal stages. As a potential opportunity for terrorists, however, such demonstrations still warranted a close watch. As Chaplain Cecil Ryland, Protestant pastor and staff chaplain of the 34th Support Group, observed: “We had demonstrations almost every weekend in 1992. We had worn out our welcome after the Olympics of 1988.”

The young generation of Koreans wanted its emerging prosperity to be free of all foreign influences—including that of the United States.

By the end of 1991 the major military threats to the security of the United States had diminished. The United States and the Soviet Union had signed a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty before the latter country fragmented into its constituencies. The military forces of Iraq had been driven out of Kuwait in a confused rout. Yet in Third World countries there were pressures which were leading to confrontation and conflict. In 1991 Serbian forces invaded Croatia, and in Haiti hundreds of Aristide supporters fled to the sea in boats. At U.S. Forces Command, the modern era of “operations other than war” took form with Joint Task Force Guantanamo in November and December of 1991.

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**From California to Croatia:**

**Rotating Ministries in a Switchback Year 1992**

*Upon arrival in South Florida you could feel a cloud of shock and depression. I had never experienced such devastation. Over 2,000 soldiers from 1st COSCOM were deployed to provide fuel, trucks, maintenance, medical services, laundry and baths for the XVIII Airborne Corps soldiers and disaster victims. Many lessons on flexibility and readiness were learned in the deployment of combat forces for humanitarian aid ...*

Staff Sergeant Judy Pukansky
Chaplain Assistant, 1st COSCOM
Joint Task Force Andrew, 1992

In some mountainous areas of the United States there are roads which go directly down a mountain side in a series of “switchbacks.” The path will go in one direction for a half mile and then make several 270° turns back and forth to zig-zag to the bottom. In a sense, the history of ministry in the Army in 1992 involved a series of changes in direction, though not so often in theory or doctrine as in mission and geography. From May of 1992 through July of 1994, Chaplain Corps unit ministry teams were deployed to California, Florida, Hawaii, the Midwest, Croatia, Antarctica, Somalia, Macedonia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Cuba, among other locations. Missions for the Army in these “operations other than war” ranged from humanitarian relief to peace enforcement...

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*See Part Two for more information on the role of chaplains and chaplain assistants in Joint Task Force Guantanamo.*

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*See endnotes at end of chapter.*
to preparation for combat. In some cases the variety of missions pushed the envelope of doctrine and experience with specific community restoration/nation building/law enforcement challenges.

In the midst of these constant deployment requirements, which kept U.S. Forces Command exceptionally busy with often overlapping missions, the Chaplain Corps attempted to perform its normal functional duties of religious support, doctrinal development, training and evaluation both in CONUS and overseas. The description of these efforts of “flexible response” to the needs of the Army is truly a picture of juggling diminishing resources to meet an increasing number of overseas contingency requirements while continuing to conduct “business as usual” at home.

**Building Foundations:**
**The Office of the Chief of Chaplains**

In the spring of 1992 the Directorate of Information, Resource Management and Logistics completed contracting requirements for pending chapel center construction for several new religious facilities. From 1990 to 1991, some 13 new chapels, religious education facilities, and family life centers had been built or contracted. A new standard design for small unit chapels was approved as well as a plan for replacing World War II wooden chapels with the mission designation “Project Nehemiah.”

Another “new” development in building for the future was the assignment of Sergeant Major Thomas J. Prost, Jr., as the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chief of Chaplains on May 1, as Sergeant Major Oliver T. “Irish” Corbett retired. Among Sergeant Major Prost’s objectives and interests were total support for chaplain assistants leaving active duty, compiling a history of chaplain assistants in the Total Army, and facilitating the opportunities Active and Reserve Component chaplain assistants to train and work together.

Chaplain Zimmerman had a high regard for the work chaplain assistants performed and particularly for the dedicated service Sergeant Major Oliver “Irish” Corbett had modeled during his career. At Sergeant Major Corbett’s retirement, Chaplain Zimmerman spoke of Corbett’s contributions:

Sergeant Major Oliver “Irish” Corbett is regarded as a totally professional soldier, “a lifetime member of the Corps.” Always his concern has been for the soldier. The Chief and Deputy Chief of Chaplains have relied on him for ideas. As a team NCO he has worked closely with the Command Sergeant Major at USACHCS to present a positive, unified approach on enlisted issues. Most importantly, Sergeant Major Corbett has not only espoused but modeled Unit Ministry Team doctrine. Ireland’s loss was truly America’s gain when an 18-year-old from County Galway decided to “adopt” America. It is we, the U.S. Army chaplains and chaplain assistants who have had the “Luck of the Irish” when you decided to adopt us.

Sergeant Major Corbett, one of the original committee members who had developed the unit ministry

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Sergeant Major Thomas J. Prost
team concept at the Chaplain School in 1984, had indeed demonstrated personally how teamwork could work throughout the Chaplain Corps.

Two days after Sergeant Major Prost assumed his duties, Chaplain Zimmerman addressed a conference on "Ethical Dilemmas in Military Health Care" in San Antonio, Texas. Recalling that U.S. Army hospitals had included chaplains on their staffs since 1862, Chaplain Zimmerman pointed out that "Army chaplains were instrumental in identifying the needs that resulted in the establishment of such institutions as the Army Community Service, the Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Program, and the Family Advocacy Program." Army chaplains and health care providers had worked together in MEDCENs, MEDDACs and field hospitals as a team to recognize the unique skills and talents each member contributes to the healing of the patient and to the welfare of the other team members. "Army chaplains are involved in health care and clinical ethics in two ways," Chaplain Zimmerman observed. "First, chaplains have had an important role in initiating and participating in health care ethics education opportunities for the staffs of our MEDCENs and MEDDACs. These have been interdisciplinary efforts which brought physicians, nurses, chaplains, attorneys, administrators, and allied health providers together to identify, discuss, and resolve key patient care ethical issues. The Ethical Dilemmas and the Health Care Provider Team on the Battlefield Conference, held in 1990, and this course are examples of chaplain-initiated ethics training." Army chaplains had educated themselves also in the principles of health care ethics and the resolution of ethical dilemmas at the bedside. In 1992 Chaplain Rick D. Matthis became the first chaplain to complete a one-year, full-funded Masters Degree program in clinical ethics. Chaplain Matthis was assigned to the Army Medical Department Center and School as the health care and clinical ethics instructor for the AMEDD. Chaplain David M. DeDonato, who had been a pioneer in the development of educational programs in medical ethics since 1988, was assigned by Chaplain Zimmerman to be the Chaplain Clinical Ethicist at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

Another of Chaplain Zimmerman's initiatives in the field of innovative ethics instruction was the nomination and assignment of Chaplain Thomas H. Norton as the Director of Ethical Development Programs at the U.S. Army War College. A graduate of Princeton Theological Seminary with a Doctorate of Ministry degree from San Francisco Theological Seminary, Chaplain Norton had served two tours in Vietnam as both a battalion and a brigade chaplain. In 1984-85 he was the 25th Infantry Division Staff Chaplain in Hawaii and in 1988 the I Corps and Installation Staff Chaplain at Fort Lewis, Washington. Chaplain Norton was graduated from the Army War College in 1988 and became in 1992 the sixth chaplain to serve on the faculty of the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks.

**Operation Garden Plot:**

**The Los Angeles Riots**

On April 30, 1992 the 670th Military Police Company, California National Guard, deployed to Los Angeles to assist local law enforcement authorities in dealing with riots which produced vivid images of a potential race war with both Rodney King, an African-American, and Reginald Denny,

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
a Caucasian, beaten almost to death by police officers and rioting citizens respectively. By May 3, some 60 people were reported killed in the riots. More than 2,200 were injured, 9,400 people had been arrested, 5,000 buildings had been damaged, and 20,000 other people were out of work. Damages were estimated in excess of a billion dollars. President Bush allocated $700 million in federal funds to help South Central Los Angeles riot victims.

The 49th Military Police Brigade and members of the 40th Division, California National Guard, backed up by soldiers from Fort Ord’s 7th Infantry Division, rendered excellent service in controlling looting and in discouraging further violence by the estimated 100,000 gang members in Los Angeles. “Strong animosity prevailed between the gangs and the Guard,” said Chaplain Gary Coad, a senior Guard chaplain. In spite of the high emotions evident, the Guard and active duty chaplains from the 7th Infantry Division, led by Chaplain Douglas Wooten, executed their duties well. Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman told a Reserve Training conference audience in 1992: “The California Army National Guard UMTs performed laudable duty on short notice.” Given the instances when soldiers were “shot at, harassed, and provoked, they showed outstanding discipline and control.”

The ashes of the Los Angeles riots had barely cooled and the businesses scarcely reopened when a different kind of disaster occurred on the east coast of the United States. Again, Reserve and active component Army units responded, this time to a Presidential and Department of Defense imperative when Hurricane Andrew struck southern Florida.

More Innovations

One of our shortcoming in the Chaplain Corps is that we fail to tell our story.

Chaplain (Brig. Gen.) Donald W. Shea
Deputy Chief of Chaplains
1 September 1992

As fiscal year 1992 drew to a close, several new initiatives came to fruition which held a good deal of future promise for the Chaplain Corps. In August the Chief of Chaplains established a UMT Reserve Advisory Council (RAC) to identify and resolve Reserve issues. The Deputy Chief of Chaplains chaired the Council. Among the topical issues discussed were force structure; mobilization, deployment and redeployment; demobilization; accessioning the force and unit ministry team training.

A new TDA for the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, headquartered at Fort Knox, Kentucky, placed chaplains in each recruiting region to help Army recruiters and their families deal with stresses involved in meeting recruiting quotas. Chaplain Dwane L. Ferguson served as the first Command Staff Chaplain. As support for Army recruiters stationed in remote areas in the United States, a

3 See Part Two for more information on the role of chaplains and chaplain assistants in Joint Task Force Andrew.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Reserve Chaplain Support Program was instituted to furnish pastoral and counseling ministries. Chaplains Lamar Hunt, James Rennell, and Larry Racster at ARPERCEN maintained a roster of 500 Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) chaplains who were available for this duty. Reserve retirement points were awarded to IRR chaplains who performed counseling, baptisms, marriages, or other ministerial services for Army recruiters.51

The Chief of Chaplains inaugurated a chaplain training program to help train chaplains as coordinators for the Army’s Soldier Suicide Prevention Program as outlined in Army Regulation 600-63. Some 163 chaplains and chaplain assistants completed the first iteration of training at the Menninger Clinic on 18 September 1992. The focus of the soldier suicide prevention training was on officers and NCOs. The nature of the program was multi-disciplinary to include participation by psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, emergency room staff, ward nurses and chaplains. Chaplains and chaplain assistants also emphasized programs to prevent morale problems and to help soldiers cope with stress and disappointment.52

In another type of assistance effort, Chaplain William Clark and his staff at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, established a mentor program in local elementary, middle and high schools to help marginal students improve grades, decrease disciplinary problems, and increase self esteem. Chaplain Donald Shea called the program “one of the many wonderful stories of proactive ministry by our Total Army Chaplaincy.”53

Planning to Tell a Story

By the fall of 1992, a number of histories of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm had appeared in print, but very few mentioned the role of unit ministry teams in performing religious support. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf did mention his staff chaplain in his book, It Doesn’t Take A Hero, but that was an exception. There was virtually no discussion in other works of the numbers of unit ministry teams deployed, the contributions of chaplains, or the importance of religious faith to thousands of soldiers during that conflict.

It was apparent to Chaplain Zimmerman and to Chaplain Shea that the Chaplaincy would have to tell its own story, a story that would be enlarged to include the ministries of more than 9,000 Total Army chaplains over the course of 20 years. The history of the Army Chaplaincy from 1975 to 1995 would form the seventh volume in a series that was begun by a directive from Chaplain (Major General) Hyatt.

Chaplain (Colonel) John C. Scott, USA, Retired, formerly the Director of Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, was invited to write the history. For personal and financial reasons, however, Chaplain Scott could not accept the project on a paid basis. He did volunteer to write parts of the history without payment as evidence of his interest in and support of the effort.

On a trip to U.S. Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia, in November of 1992 to dedicate a monument to Chaplain Milton Haney, a Civil War chaplain who was awarded the Medal of Honor, Chaplain Zimmerman mentioned the history project to Chaplain John Brinsfield. Chaplain

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Brinsfield had taught history at West Point and had originated the concept of the Haney Memorial, the first battlefield monument to a chaplain who had received a Medal of Honor. Chaplain Brinsfield immediately volunteered to help in any way he could.54 After several months of negotiations, including his deletion from orders to report to Korea as the Division Chaplain for the 2nd Infantry Division, Chaplain Brinsfield reported to the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency in July of 1993 with the mission of writing the history of the Chaplain Corps since Vietnam.

**Expanding the United Nations’ Presence**

_The end of the Cold War has seen the United Nations assume a more active role in resolving regional conflicts. In the last four years alone U.N. Forces have mounted over a dozen military operations, more than in the previous four decades._

William H. Lewis & John O.B. Sewall
Senior Fellows
National Defense University

It is interesting that the word “peacekeeping” does not appear in the United Nations Charter. In its initial phases of international involvement (1948-1956), the United Nations established observer missions to monitor cease-fire agreements. The first modern peacekeeping effort, the U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt (1956), was introduced to separate the military forces of Egypt and Israel.55 Subsequently, additional multinational forces were sent to the former Belgian Congo (1960), to the Sinai (1973), to the Golan Heights (1973) and to Southern Lebanon (1978).

The end of the Cold War produced a challenging international security environment characterized by the unleashing of divisive forces once held in check by superpower rivalry and by the transformation of international politics from bipolar to multilateral relations.56 As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher observed:

> Wars are not caused by a buildup of weapons. They are caused when an aggressor believes he can achieve his objectives at an acceptable price. Naked aggression by the Serbs is the root cause of the terrible civil war in what was once Yugoslavia ... which has produced a toll of 2 million people displaced and hundreds of thousands dead.57

The impact of these and similar developments worldwide increased pressure on international organizations to engage in preventive diplomacy to resolve conflicts. For instance, from 1988 to 1992 the United Nations launched 13 peacekeeping operations, roughly equal to all the missions of the previous four decades.58 The scale and scope of these operations, excluding Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, involved 54,000 military personnel and an estimated cost in 1992 alone of $3 billion.59

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Croatia

One of the first unit ministry team support missions for a United Nations operation began in 1992 with the deployment of the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) from Germany to Camp Pleso, Croatia, 18 kilometers east of the city of Zagreb. Chaplain Gary Stickney was the first chaplain deployed. The mission of the 212th MASH was to provide medical support for the U.N. Soldiers in Operation Provide Promise. Chaplain Robert Spiegel, V Corps Chaplain in Germany, provided technical supervision and support for the deployed unit ministry team(s).

Camp Pleso, a former military airfield camp, was on the edge of the Zagreb International Airport. The hospital personnel were housed in tents with wards inside a hangar. In addition to latrines, showers, a weight room, a Morale-Welfare-Recreation (MWR) tent, a library, a post office, a post exchange (PX), and dining halls, there were also basketball and volleyball courts, rugby and baseball fields, and British, Dutch, Swedish, and Norwegian bars.

The camp chapel was included in a large tent with office, library, and living areas at either end. Chaplain Stickney had equipped the chapel with an altar, pews, tables, and a shelf made by a Finnish Construction Battalion. There was also an altar cloth, a cross, a crucifix, a pulpit, Bibles, devotional literature, a coffee pot and office supplies. French, Dutch, Norwegian, British, Finnish, and American military chaplains shared the chapel. As many as 2,000 soldiers attended Catholic and Protestant services during the week, with another 170 attending choir practice and 130 in Bible study.

The mission of the MASH, which fluctuated between 85 to 350 staff personnel, was to provide medical support for soldiers from the United Nations Protection Force, soldiers from 20 nations including Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia, Nepal, Kenya, and Argentina. At any one time there could be 300 patients admitted, including some Muslim children from Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Religions found among patients in the hospital included Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist, and Atheist preferences.

Chaplain Stickney, who was a United Methodist, was joined in December 1992 for Christmas services by Chaplain Joseph P. Rappl, a Roman Catholic priest. Christmas trees were set up and international services conducted. Although there were language difficulties, most soldiers and patients communicated with the chaplains by sign language if they didn’t understand one another’s vocabulary.

One of the toughest memories Chaplain Rappl brought back from Croatia was of the large number of amputees. Various Yugoslav Guard units had mined the area after the Bosnian attack in 1991, and patients with missing legs and feet were not uncommon.

The ministry in Croatia was busy, comprehensive, and totally engaging. As it was just getting organized, a much larger deployment began ostensibly with a similar mission. The Operation was titled “Restore Hope,” and the location was in the east African country of Somalia.

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^See Part Two for more information on the role of chaplains and chaplain assistants in Operation Restore Hope.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Plans for Transforming the Army: 1993 - 1994

How does one move from intellectual change to physical change? How does one accommodate the requirement to do both simultaneously? The first step is to undertake the major surgery required to reshape the organization—to divest elements which are not needed while reshaping the remainder.

General Gordon R. Sullivan
Chief of Staff, USA
America’s Army, 1993

Two years after Operation Desert Storm ended, the Army was well on the way to a major transformation to meet the national security needs of the United States in the 21st century. As General Gordon R. Sullivan told more than 500 senior Army leaders and defense industry representatives at the Louisiana Maneuvers Symposium in Orlando, Florida, in May of 1993: “This symposium is about 21st century warfare. Do more, fight more efficiently, apply scarce resources more efficiently. Louisiana Maneuvers, in its largest sense, is the structured way for us to think about the application of scarce resources.” The publication of a new Field Manual 100-5, Operation, in 1993 fit into this transformational agenda. As the first “updated keystone operations doctrine manual” since 1986, it was hailed by the Army leadership as “a singularly important event in the development of a 21st century Army.”

Firsts and Lasts

In the Chaplain Corps, as a microcosm of events in the Army at large, simultaneous planning for the future was coupled with increasing demands to meet immediate ministry needs. From the visit of the Chief of Chaplains to Russia to the deployment of unit ministry teams to Missouri and Macedonia in the same month, 1993 was a year of “firsts and lasts.”

Among the “firsts” in Chaplain Corps history for 1993 were visits by the Chief of Chaplains to Hungary and Russia to discuss the development of ministry and the re-establishment of military chaplaincies in those countries. In February Chaplain Zimmerman flew to Budapest to attend the Fourth Annual European/North American Chiefs of Chaplains Conference. The Hungarian Ministry of Defense sponsored a formal banquet followed by meetings with leaders of major Hungarian churches and faith groups. This was the first known visit by a Chief of Chaplains to a former Communist Bloc country.

The following month Chaplain Zimmerman and Chaplain Herman Keizer from the Armed Forces Chaplains Board flew to Russia to advise the Commandant of the Russian Military Academy on the ministry of chaplains. “I recall that one Russian Brigadier General became quite angry at his own briefing officer, a lieutenant colonel, I believe, when he told us that in a recent survey of the Russian Army some 75% of enlisted soldiers and 56% of the officers desired the return of a religious presence in the Army. This was evidently not the information we were supposed to hear,” Chaplain

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Zimmerman said.\textsuperscript{72} In spite of this faux pas, the Russians did meet not only with the American chaplains and with Alexis II, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, but they also added a chaplain position on the staff of the Academy.\textsuperscript{73}

Shortly before Chaplain Zimmerman made his visits to Hungary and Russia, Chaplain George Pejakovich and Mrs. Marie Walker from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains and the Rev. Jane Heaton, DRE, and Chaplain Gary Sanford, the Installation Staff Chaplain for Fort Belvoir, Virginia, accompanied 20 ladies from various regional groups of the Protestant Women of the Chapel—USA to Omsk, Siberia. Part of the PWOC “Operation Hearts, Open Doors” program, the ladies visited soldiers and family members of the Strategic Rocket Forces at Omsk. The PWOC group presented their former adversaries with 11,000 Russian New Testaments, gifts of warm clothing, food, medical supplies, candy and school supplies paid for by donated funds.\textsuperscript{74} Mrs. Caroline Grube, Vice President of the PWOC-USA, Mrs. Nancy Smith and Mrs. Mary Wake were three of the key leaders in the PWOC mission to these new friends in Siberia.

Other “firsts” for 1993 included the accessioning of the first Muslim chaplain in the Chaplain Corps, Chaplain Abdul Rasheed Muhammad, who was endorsed by the newly created American Muslim Council.\textsuperscript{75} Chaplain Muhammad was assigned to the 28th Combat Support Hospital at Fort Bragg. In May, Chaplain Janet Y. Horton became the first female chaplain to serve as a Division Staff Chaplain (1st Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany). With her senior NCOIC, Staff Sergeant Iraida Velazquez, Chaplain Horton and her assistant also comprised the first all-female unit ministry team at Division level.\textsuperscript{76}

In October, after five years of outstanding work by Command Sergeant Major James J. Schonefeld, CSM Aaron Gibson, and staff NCOs, the NCO Academy at the U. S. Army Chaplain School was accredited for the first time by the Commanding General, TRADOC. This event was followed in December by the certification of the Army Chaplain Museum under the leadership of Ms. Renee Klish, the Curator, and Mrs. Marsha McManus, the Assistant Curator. Support for the Museum continued to be implemented by Chaplain Richard Tupy, USA, Retired, and other officers of the Chaplain Museum Association.\textsuperscript{77}

Finally, in 1993 the Military Chaplains Review ceased to be published after 21 years.\textsuperscript{78} The new publication in its place, The Army Chaplaincy, was designed as a professional bulletin with shorter articles in a more flexible format. Chaplain Zimmerman proudly called it, “our new Chaplaincy magazine.”\textsuperscript{79} Chaplain Bernard H. Lieving, Jr., Commandant of the Chaplain Center and School, congratulated Chaplain Jerry L. Leverett, the Editor-in-Chief, and Ms. Nella Hartog, the Managing Editor, on the production of the first issue. Subsequently, in the Spring issue, Chaplain John J. Kaising, the Assistant Commandant, succeeded Chaplain Leverett as the Editor-in-Chief. Ms. Hartog continued to serve as both the Chaplain School Public Affairs Officer and as the Managing Editor.

Most of the events in 1993 which affected the Chaplaincy were not, of course, first occurrences. There were a few “lasts.” For example, the chapel at Sinop, Turkey, where soldiers had worshiped since 1958, was transformed into a mosque in 1993 upon the departure of American military personnel. Chaplain Calvin Sydnor, VII Corps Chaplain, described the transition:

Closing the Sinop Chapel was a unique experience. It was built by soldiers at the field

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
station. What made the construction so meaningful [was that] their chapel became the building around which all the other permanent buildings were constructed. It was truly at the center of the installation. Last week an American soldier handed a Turkish soldier a plaque showing the chapel construction in 1958. At the end of the short ceremony, the Muslim call to prayer was sung and the Turkish soldiers began their first Friday prayer in their new mosque.80 Chaplain John J. Prendergast, the last chaplain at Sinop, was assigned to Berlin as the Brigade Chaplain.

In a positive light, most of the ministry performed by unit ministry teams in 1993 was not performed with an eye to unique historical notice but rather with the intent simply of serving soldiers. With a prescient view of that goal, Chaplain Zimmerman convened a Strategic Planning Committee to address "the perpetual white water of change" in the Chaplain Corps.81 Fifty unit ministry team members from MACOMs, USACHCS, and DACH were trained in the mechanics of Applied Strategic Planning. From this number Chaplain Zimmerman selected 13 members to serve as the first (annual) group to present a vision of the future "and develop the necessary procedures and operations to achieve that future."82 The members of the first committee included Chaplains Matthew Zimmerman, Brock Watson, Henry Wake, John Hannah, Donald Gover, Donald Shea, Wayne Hoffmann, Elvernice Davis, Lamar Hunt, and Donna Weddle. Other members included Command Sergeant Major Aaron Gibson, Mr. Roger Able, Sergeant Major Tom Prost, and Mr. Ed Horan.83

The United States Army Chaplaincy’s Strategic Plans, FY 94-99, published in July of 1993, addressed the Chief of Chaplain’s goal of developing an ongoing strategy which would carry the Chaplaincy into the 21st century. Six critical success indicators (imperatives) were developed to measure success: customer satisfaction, quality chaplaincy, pluralism, chaplaincy team satisfaction, force structure, and unit ministry team role clarification. Each of these indicators were defined with an implementation plan. Chaplain Zimmerman thought the vision was a good starting point for the future Chaplaincy.84

One of the areas of soldier support which was critical to the Army and to the mission of the Chaplain Corps was that of family ministry. As a part of future planning, Chaplain Donald W. Shea, Deputy Chief of Chaplains, addressed the 1993 Army Family Life Chaplains Conference in late March. With 3,286 chaplains and 2,560 chaplain assistants in the Total Army, and 6,263,742 soldiers and family members as "customers" for ministry, the family life chaplain unit ministry team had never been more important. Indeed the ratio of chaplains to soldier/family members in 1993 was 1:1,906. With 59% of active duty soldiers married and 81% under the age of 30, the Army had become, with respect to support requirements, a self-perpetuating population.85 In his address Chaplain Shea observed: "We must have a preventative ministry at the soldier level. Chaplains have to minister to the real issues in the soldier’s life; things like divorce, step-parenting; abdication of parental roles or single parenting. Don’t ever underestimate your ability to bring change to soldiers and their families, and thereby make a better future."86

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Come Hell or High Water

If there were two areas of the world which captured the attention of the press, the nation, the Army, and the Chaplain Corps in the summer of 1993, they were the Balkan nations of Europe and the Great Plains of the United States. As the ethnic wars continued to rage between the Orthodox Serbians, the Roman Catholic Croatians, and the Muslim faithful among the Bosnians, the United Nations, NATO, the United States and the American citizenship became weary of the killing in and around many geographic regions of the former nation of Yugoslavia. Neither the European NATO powers nor the United States wanted to become mired in the “ethnic cleansing” conflicts which seemed to be a mixture of revenge for World War II atrocities and naked opportunistic aggression.

Nevertheless, the United States deployed several Army medical units in rotation from Germany to Croatia and Macedonia in the spring and summer of 1993 to support U.N. missions. Sergeant Michael Schmiesing, Chaplain Andrew R. Mulvaney, a Roman Catholic, and Chaplain Robert Whitlock, a Full Gospel Protestant, deployed with the 502nd MASH to Zagreb, Croatia, on 28 April 1993.

The first site for ministry was at Camp Pleso, where Chaplain Gary Stickney had established a chapel program. By July Chaplain Mulvaney and Sergeant Schmiesing also were covering troops in Macedonia, part of Operation Able Sentry, twice a month. Chaplain Mulvaney said Mass for an average congregation of 21 soldiers in Macedonia. The Bishop of Macedonia, Bishop Goagim Herbut, agreed to celebrate the sacrament for soldiers when Chaplain Mulvaney was in Croatia.

One of the supporting religious leaders in Macedonia was the Reverend John D. “J.D.” Lawtum of San Antonio, Texas, whose ministry of Christian music had been known to soldiers throughout Europe for a decade.87 Reverend Lawtum was a talented songwriter and musician who had performed an evangelical music ministry from Germany to Africa. From August 15th to the 22nd, Reverend Lawtum performed his ministry of music and testimony at four concerts for more than 165 soldiers and was well received at each service.88

As the fighting in Bosnia increased in the summer of 1993, U.S. combat troops were deployed to Macedonia “to monitor, observe, and report activities along the Serbian border.”89 Chaplain John M. Stepp and Specialist David Colen deployed from Berlin with the 6th Battalion, 502nd Infantry. Chaplain John “Jack” Prendergast, the Berlin Brigade Chaplain, trained four Lay Eucharistic Ministers (LEMs) from among the soldiers to provide religious support for Catholics.90 A total of 315 soldiers deployed with the Task Force to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

Chaplain Stepp’s duties were to support soldiers at a base camp and five observation posts. He organized Protestant and Catholic worship, Bible studies, a film ministry, and retreats to Skopje and Ohrid. In working with United Nations soldiers, Roman Catholic, Byzantine Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant) in a peacekeeping operation, Chaplain Stepp concluded: 1) UMTs are peacekeepers... by working with local clergy; 2) the UMT plays a key role engendering good will with host nation civilians; 3) the UMT is essential in maintaining the spiritual fitness of soldiers... one third of the force attended spiritual fitness events and more would have if the mission requirements had permitted; 4) UMTs are mission essential in peacekeeping operations.91

See endnotes at end of chapter.
At the same time that the European-based Army chaplains were rotating through Croatia and Macedonia, chaplains from the National Guard were providing ministry in another extensive disaster area. In the summer of 1993 the Mississippi and other rivers of the American Midwest swelled with water from the El Nino rains to create a monumental flood in six states. The record rainfall caused the Mississippi River to crest at 17 feet above normal flood stage in some areas. A hundred rivers in an area twice the size of New Jersey flooded farmlands and town sites too saturated to absorb the excess water. More than 50 people died and over $12 billion worth of crops and property were lost.

Ten thousand National Guard members from nine Midwestern states, including 23 chaplains and chaplain assistants under the technical supervision of Chaplain John Hemann, fought the flood waters, 2,100 soldiers from the Iowa National Guard helped protect their state which Vice President Al Gore called another one of the “Great Lakes.” Some 4,000 Guardsmen concentrated their efforts along the Mississippi’s 580-mile border with Illinois and Missouri. More than 90 National Guard units, from medical companies to transportation detachments, responded to the crisis. Before the waters subsided, 70,000 people were displaced, 421 counties declared disaster areas, 50 towns ravaged, and 70% of the region’s levees overwhelmed for a record 80 days. The Associated Press called the Flood of ‘93 the top news story of 1993, followed by the Branch Davidian tragedy near Waco, Texas.

Reorganization, Plans and Policies

With the continual offsetting requirements to reduce personnel and strength while simultaneously supporting deployments from California to Africa, U.S. Forces Command in 1993 reviewed a number of Department of Defense concepts to promote more efficiency in the organization of the armed forces. There were essentially two force structure scenarios entitled “the TAA 2001/The Army Plan” and “the Bottoms Up Plan.” The 2001/Army Plan called for 12 active duty divisions with eight in U.S. FORSCOM. The Bottoms Up Plan called for ten divisions to execute a Win/Hold/Won strategy—fighting with a large force in one geographic area while holding with a smaller force in another area. When the large force defeated its opposition, it would reinforce the smaller force to win in that area. This scenario was very similar to the “Europe First” grand strategy of the World War II Western Alliance. The smallest number of divisions in the Bottoms Up Plan, a total of 8, assumed one major conflict at a time.

In order to further simplify the command and control functions necessary for rapid joint deployments in such scenarios, U.S. FORSCOM became the Army component of U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), based in Norfolk, Virginia, on October 1, 1993. All Joint Staff designations at FORSCOM were changed to G-Staff and all joint responsibilities transferred to USACOM.

The FORSCOM Chaplain’s concerns over these developments were numerous. Not the least of the critical questions was how to mobilize and deploy individual Reserve component unit ministry teams to meet time sensitive requirements such as had been the case in JTF Guantanamo and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Chaplain Thomas Cook, the Operations and Training Officer

See endnotes at end of chapter.
at the FORSCOM Chaplain’s Office, had often received missions at the FORSCOM Battle Staff which required a chaplain, usually Roman Catholic, to volunteer for deployment for up to 179 days. Moreover, there were sometimes less than 14 days to have the chaplain and chaplain assistant prepared for overseas movement and actually deployed.

Chaplain Eugene Ennis, who had worked on deployments at the FORSCOM Chaplains Office for more than two years, suggested that the various Reserve component chaplain personnel managers, to include the U.S. Army Reserve Command, the CONUSA Chaplains, the ARPERCEN Staff Chaplain, and the National Guard Bureau Chaplain, scan their rosters to create an equivalent Rapid Deployment Support Force of chaplains and chaplain assistants. These selected “quick start” UMTs would be volunteers, in excellent physical condition, who could deploy within 72 hours. Chaplain David Peterson, the FORSCOM Staff Chaplain, and Chaplain James B. Lonergan, the Deputy FORSCOM Chaplain, approved further study of the idea to see how such rosters could be created and continuously updated when the UMTs were assigned to different organizations.

In the spring of 1993 Chaplain (Brigadier General) Wayne Hoffmann, the Assistant Chief of Chaplains for Mobilization, visited FORSCOM and discussed the idea of creating a roster of Individual Mobilization Augmentees—chaplains who could deploy quickly. The advantage in calling up IMA chaplains was that they were already assigned to FORSCOM. At the same time these options were developing, the Chief of Chaplains gained propensity for Individual Ready Reserve chaplain assistants. This would enable IRR UMTs to be deployed quickly as well.\(^{103}\)

### Studies at DACH

One of the more exhaustive studies at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, generated by the need of the government to conserve funds and provide for a more cost effective defense establishment, was the Inter-service Training Review (ITRO) of 1993. In essence, Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) wanted to know if Army, Navy and Air Force chaplains could be trained together to do common ministry tasks, if the three Chaplain Schools could be collocated or combined, if a DoD “purple suit” chaplaincy would be more advantageous to supply religious support to the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Force, and if Chaplain Assistants/Religious Program Specialists could be trained together to learn common tasks.

Even though some of these questions were identical to those considered by Chaplain Orris Kelly, Chief of Chaplains, in 1976 and even though Chaplain Al Ledebuhr, the TRADOC Chaplain at that time, wrote a comprehensive report demonstrating that collocating the three chaplain schools was not economically feasible, such archival views were not sufficient to address the modern questions.\(^{104}\) What was necessary was to examine the questions (down to the individual task lists) to see if DoD common training was a viable alternative.

For at least six months Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, Director of Plans, Policy Development and Training, and his staff at DACH collected data which impacted on the ITRO issues. Chaplain William L. Hufham, a student in residence at the Army War College in 1993, wrote an excellent monograph entitled *The Feasibility of a Department of Defense Chaplaincy*. Chaplain Hufham concluded that

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
chaplains in all of the services could share "joint and unified training opportunities," but he recommended against a "radical restructure of the service chaplaincies into a DoD Chaplaincy" due to minimal financial savings at a great cost in effectiveness. Other materials, including approved 71M task lists, were furnished by the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School to be compared with similar Navy and Air Force lists, programs of instruction, and course descriptions.

The ITRO questions Chaplain Kuehne was addressing each had "flip" sides. The issue over whether Air Force and Army chaplains and chaplain assistants could be trained together also contained the implied question: "if not, why not?" Thus task lists, course requirements, task-condition-standard statements, training site requirements, and the expected competencies for specific missions had to be comparatively analyzed. In October Chaplain Kuehne personally reviewed 83 skill level one tasks for chaplain assistants. Only 40 of these tasks (less than half) appeared to be combat related. Without further notation, it appeared that the remaining 43 "garrison ministry" tasks could be easily trained in a combined service environment. Only specific "Army green" tasks justified separate training, and the definition of a "green" task was slippery at best in the light of the fact that Navy chaplains and religious program specialists performed ministry with "green" maneuver battalions when they were assigned to Marine Corps units.

The entire ITRO process was complicated, of course, by the planned move of the U.S. Army Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, again seen as a cost-saving move for the Army. Congress already had approved the money for new building construction through the BRAC process, but the ITRO group wanted to revisit the move if the chaplain schools were collocated. The Navy Chaplaincy in particular wanted to train chaplains near ships and the fairly shallow Broad River near Fort Jackson did not appear too practical for training survival skills such as fire fighting and boat drills.

There were many other issues which the 18-member joint ITRO Detailed Analysis Group (DAG) considered including cost analysis, a list of bases available for consolidation/collocation, plans of action and milestones. The Army representatives, Chaplain Kuehne, Chaplain G.T. Gunhus (the TRADOC Chaplain at the time), Chaplains Donald Troyer and James Daniels from the Army Chaplain School, and Master Sergeant James Roberts from DACH participated in numerous meetings at various locations including Langley Air Force Base and the Marine Corps Combat Development Center at Quantico, Virginia. Chaplain Kuehne kept Chaplain Zimmerman constantly informed concerning the status of the discussions and, in turn, received Chaplain Zimmerman's guidance on the critical issues.

Eventually, after all of the analysis was complete, it appeared that collating/consolidating the three service chaplain schools would not be cost effective. In 1994 General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, recommended against consolidation and for the planned move of USACHCS to Fort Jackson. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in his recommendations to the Armed Services Committee on the issue.

Other studies at DACH which had long-term effects included a new five-year Religious and Cultural Diversity Training Plan. The plan called for annual training for UMT's and an expansion of previous multicultural efforts to develop an awareness of lifestyles and stages of development for soldiers and their families. Much of this plan had resulted from small group discussions at the

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
September 1993 Multicultural Training Conference at Hampton, Virginia. Mrs. Brenda Sherrer from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains was the project officer and facilitated the group discussion processes.

In October Dr. Stephen D. Clement, a civilian expert contracted to examine Chaplain Corps training, reported to the Chief of Chaplains on his study entitled, “An Analysis of the Existing Chaplain Corps Training Strategy.” Dr. Clement pointed out: "it is clear that generally the extant training strategy is to prepare individuals to perform tasks and not to function in a variety of roles at a specific organizational level. The difficulty is that the sum of all the tasks inherent in a given role does not necessarily equal the totality of that role, nor does it encompass the full scale complexity of work at a given organizational level. The traditional job task analysis approach simply does not work well at the more senior levels.”

Several previous studies, notably on logistics, also came to fruition in 1993. In October Chaplain Wilfred Brewster from IRML announced the availability of a revised Chaplains’ Logistics Handbook, a Soldiers’ Book of Worship, new Combat Assault Chaplain Kits (Christian), and a field test for a Multi-Faith Ration (MFR). All of these products were most welcome in the modernized Chaplain Corps inventory.

Perhaps the biggest political question of late 1993, which, in turn, involved chaplains as “the conscience of the Army,” centered on the discussion of whether there should be a new policy for soldiers with a homosexual orientation to allow them to serve on duty. Chaplain Philip R. Touw, assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for personnel, became the proponent for the development of the policy. “For months we received mail running about 4 to 1 against making any change in the Army’s position,” Chaplain Touw recalled. “There was so much mail we could not answer much more than the Congressional issues.” When the President approved the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” policy in August, the mail dwindled a bit, but the workload increased.

For five months Defense Department lawyers lay down strict limits on when the military could initiate investigations into homosexual conduct. On February 5, 1994, some 140 pages of regulations on the policy became effective. In sum, service members could say they were homosexual in orientation “but they’d have to prove that they had no intention of acting upon it.”

Chaplain Touw had to help draft specific details informing the Army how to implement the regulations and guidelines. Chaplain Herman Keizer at the Armed Forces Chaplains Board also became involved in advising the Secretary of the Army on several issues dealing with homosexuality in the military.

Within the Chaplain Corps itself there were some endorsing denominations which opposed any toleration of homosexuality while other denominations accepted those with homosexual orientation into religious leadership roles. This split among the civilian faith groups made it difficult for the Chief of Chaplains to represent all of the various theological views on this issue. In general, chaplains remained available for counseling all soldiers regardless of sexual orientation.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Farewells

By the end of 1993 more than 30 chaplains and several senior chaplain assistants had retired. Among them were many who had served in positions of high responsibility. On the retiring colonels’ retirement list were Chaplains Charles V. Adams, Bernard F. Nass, Bernard Windmiller, Richard N. Donovan, John R. Hannah, James H. Robnolt, Robert F. Berger, George W. Gudz, Michael G. Ortiz, and Michael J. Yunk. Others included Chaplains Joe R. Colley, Gerald W. Conner, Joseph S. Lizor, David Sandifer, Louis R. Trebus, and Temple G. Matthews.117

On an even sadder note, the Chaplain Corps lost Chaplain Jerry Ambler, husband of Chaplain Linda Ambler of Fort Sill on May 8, and Master Sergeant Lynette Riding, 123rd Army Reserve Command, on September 12. Both Chaplain Ambler and MSG Riding were memorialized, along with 15 retired chaplains, at the Chief of Chaplains UMT Conference in May of 1994.118

Changing Times, Steady Leadership

The new world order seems to be long on new and short on order.

Secretary of Defense Les Aspen

There is clearly a line below which we cannot go. Our armed forces must still be able to fight and win on a moment’s notice. If you do not work to make change your friend, the nit will certainly become your enemy.

President William Clinton
West Point, New York

The future ain’t what it used to be.

Yogi Berra
Hall of Fame Catcher
New York Yankees

The world situation during the first six months of 1994 resembled the aftermath of a major forest fire. The most significant blazes had diminished, though there still were brush fires that could flare up if they went unwatched for too long.

In Europe there was talk of a “Partnership for Peace” which would open NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. There were even discussions of including in NATO some of the component countries of the old Soviet Empire—the 15 republics that had declared their independence.119 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned, however, that moving NATO into an East European/Asian power vacuum could backfire:

The European Security Conference seems the ideal instrument for enabling Russia to

See endnotes at end of chapter.
cooperate with other nations ... But when even the Russian reform leadership continues to maintain armies in nearly all the successor states ... and when these armies participate in civil conflicts—it is surely not the moment to hold out the prospect of NATO membership to Russia.\textsuperscript{120}

The Partnership for Peace, inclusive of some satellite countries but exclusive of Russia, might generate a series of endless confrontations with Russia. "If things turned out badly," Dr. Kissinger warned, there could be "the emergence of a no-man's-land between Germany and Russia, a condition that has caused many European wars."\textsuperscript{121}

Russia itself had approved a new constitution in December of 1993 which guaranteed "basic democratic rights to all Russians" for the first time since the Federation of Soviet National Republics was formed in July of 1918.\textsuperscript{122} In January of 1994 President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to re-target or disassemble more than 8,000 strategic nuclear missiles, including Minuteman III, MX Peacekeeper ICBMs, and about 336 Trident missile warheads deployed on 14 ballistic missile submarines. The process of re-targeting all strategic nuclear missiles, the first such effort in 35 years, was completed by June 1.\textsuperscript{123}

There were still security problems in Croatia, Bosnia, Kuwait, the Gaza Strip, and in Jericho where Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority police relieved Israeli officials of the city's military administration.\textsuperscript{124} The Saudi Arabian government, suffering from falling oil prices, had to ask the United States for more time to pay for $30 billion in American-made weapons it had agreed to buy.\textsuperscript{125} North Korea had reportedly manufactured enough plutonium to build one or two nuclear bombs, and the Haitians continued to build rafts, canoes, and small boats to escape from their island life of fear and poverty.\textsuperscript{126}

The greatest challenge for the Army, however, was how to complete the Congressionally mandated reductions without producing a "hollow" force incapable of meeting national security requirements. In a provocative article entitled, "Could the U.S. Win another Desert Storm?" David Eisenstadt of the Hearst News Service pointed out that in three years the Army had deactivated six divisions, downsizing from 18 in 1991 to 12 in 1994. Troop levels were reduced by 500,000 and the national defense budget by $60 billion.\textsuperscript{127} The two rounds of base closings in 1988 and 1991 had affected 61 military installations nationwide. "Right now, much less in a year or two from now," observed General Brent Scowcroft, security advisor for former President George Bush, "we could not repeat what we did in Desert Storm."\textsuperscript{128}

\textbf{Unwavering Faith}

Speaking to the Chaplain Officer Advanced Course at the United States Army Chaplain Center and School in January of 1994, Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman, Army Chief of Chaplains, observed that while the 8th Infantry Division, the VII Corps, and the 3rd Armored Division in Europe had been inactivated as well as the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Divisions in CONUS, there were still 145,000 soldiers deployed in 65 countries around the world involved "in a variety of demanding

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
and, at times, life threatening missions.” The programmed withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia in March of 1994 was a case in point.

There were still, amidst all of these changes, daily opportunities for pastoral care by chaplains and chaplain assistants. “In the majority of deployments around the world,” Chaplain Zimmerman noted, “a unit ministry team is also back at the installation—caring for families.”

Yet as the Army’s end strength declined, so also did that of the Chaplain Corps. The targets for downsizing the chaplaincy called for a reduction of 265 active duty chaplains in three years, from 1,347 in 1994 to 1,082 in 1997. Active duty chaplain assistants would draw down from 1,345 to 1,091. In the Reserve components, TPU Chaplains would be reduced from 705 to 525; but 60% of the Total Chaplaincy’s unit ministry teams would continue to be in the Army Reserve and National Guard.

In spite of these reductions, the plans and programs for the chaplaincy’s mission of ministry to the Army continued at a steady pace. At the 14th Annual Logistics, Information Management, and Financial Management (LIFT) Conference in Orlando in January, 100 chaplains, chaplain assistants, and Department of the Army civilians planned for the future logistical support of the Chaplaincy. The Directorate of Information, Resource Management, and Logistics at DACH validated the requirements for the move and construction of a new Chaplain School at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Chaplain Wayne Kuehne and his staff in the Plans, Policy Development and Training Directorate articulated the Army Chaplaincy’s roles and functions for future planning in the Joint Roles, Missions, and Functions study of the Armed Forces. A second training center for the U.S. Army Family Life Chaplain Training Program at Fort Benning was planned for June of 1994 and an enriched training program for Chaplain Candidates, with 45-day practicums in various fields of service to soldiers, was established.

One issue which generated a mound of paperwork for Chaplain Kuehne was the change in the Chaplain Corps Regimental Crest. Since there were more than 1,400 Muslims and 1,240 Buddhist soldiers in the Total Army, and since the Chaplaincy already had commissioned its first Muslim chaplain, it seemed that the Regimental Crest, which portrayed a cross and a tablet for the Christian and Jewish faiths, should be more inclusive. Rather than add a circle of microscopic symbols, due to the small size of the crest, the Chief of Chaplains approved simply an open book symbolizing God’s word from all faiths for soldiers of many faiths.

Some of the more conservative Christian denominations, led by Chaplain Jim Edgren, USA, Retired, the denominational endorsing agent for the National Association of Evangelicals, objected to the removal of the cross from the Regimental Crest. In a letter dated March 20, 1994, Chaplain Edgren suggested: “Why not give each Chaplain the option of wearing the crest of his choice—old or new? It would seem that this could meet the objections of both sides, and could defuse the issue.”

Whereas the Army is not usually keen on “uniform options,” Chaplain Kuehne had already accomplished the same result by deliberately postponing “a wear-out date” for the old crests. For the time being, there was a de facto choice available between wearing the old or the new Regimental Crest.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Green Ramp

The smell of burning flesh is something neither you nor your soldiers ever forget.

Chaplain Mary Pitts
46th Corps Support Group
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

On March 23, ten days before Easter Sunday, 1994, two hundred soldiers from the 2-504th and the 2-505th Parachute Infantry Regiments, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, waited to board a C-141 transport aircraft at Pope Air Force Base. It was a beautiful, balmy day—excellent weather for making a jump. Other airborne troops from the 1st Brigade, the 18th Aviation Brigade, the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade, Military Police, COSCOM, and headquarters units were present as well. There was a Jumpmaster School in session. Chaplain Paul Vicalvi, the Aviation Brigade Chaplain, and Chaplain Gerald Bebber from the 525th MI Brigade were waiting with their troops at the passenger shed on Green Ramp.

Above the runway an F-16 fighter jet brushed the wing of a C-130 transport while both were in the Pope AFB traffic pattern. The C-130 landed, but the F-16 crew ejected. The F-16 aircraft then struck the ground and bounced into a C-141 which was being loaded with paratroopers for a jump mission.

On the adjacent runway there was a loud booming sound as the F-16 sent flaming debris into the C-141 Starlifter and the passenger shed where many of the troops were waiting. Chaplain Paul Vicalvi saw a ball of fire billowing toward the C-141. "Run, run," he told the soldiers, pushing those near him away from the aircraft. Sergeant Daniel E. Price of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment saw the fireball too. Even though he had never met Specialist Estella Wingfield of the 525th M.I. Brigade, he threw himself between her and the explosion of the fuel-filled C-141. "After the explosion and the rounds stopped going off, he whispered in my ear, 'crawl out from underneath me.' I did and took off running." Specialist Wingfield survived the tragedy, but Sergeant Price died where he fell. "He saved my life," Wingfield said. "The soldiers who were there did everything right," reflected Lieutenant Colonel Greg Kaufmann, commander of the 1st Battalion, 58th Aviation Regiment.

In what turned out to be one of the Army’s worst training accidents, 23 soldiers died and more than 100 were injured. Most of the casualties resulted from the explosion and resulting fire. There were many heroes at Green Ramp, among them Captain Daniel Godrey and Chaplain Gerald Bebber of the 525th MI Brigade who used their hands to extinguish burning clothing worn by the soldiers caught in the blast.

As the dead were being evacuated to a temporary morgue at the airfield, every available chaplain from Pope and Fort Bragg reported for backup duty. Many of the burn casualties went to Chapel Hill or to Duke University Hospital. The 23 most seriously burned went to the Brooke Army Medical Center burn unit in San Antonio. Chaplain Steve Walsh worked with the death notification...
personnel. Chaplain Mary Pitts joined Chaplain Paul Clark, Chaplain William McAllister, the Corps Support Command Chaplain, Chaplain Ronald Van Schenkhoof, Chaplain Jerome A. Haberek, the 82nd Airborne Division Chaplain, and others in the Emergency Operations Center at Fort Bragg’s Womack Army Hospital. Chaplain McAllister directed the chaplains to stand by with their Class A uniforms in anticipation of multiple death notification missions.144

Some of the bodies were burned too badly for immediate identification. Notification teams located families with presumptive messages, only to return later with confirmations. Chaplain Pitts recalled going to the home of a 20-year-old service wife and leaving later with her shoulder soaked with the wife’s tears. For days the chaplains at Fort Bragg delayed their preparations for Easter in order to minister to those soldiers and families whose needs were immediate.

On March 29, 1994, the Honorable William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense; Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton, Commanding Officer, XVIII Airborne Corps; Major General William M. Steele, Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, and Chaplain (Major General) Matthew A. Zimmerman, Chief of Chaplains, joined Chaplain Jerome A. Haberek, 82nd Airborne Division Chaplain, and an overflow crowd at Fort Bragg’s Memorial Ceremony for the fallen soldiers. Mr. Perry and Major General Steele joined the battalion commanders from the 2-504th and the 2-505th in eulogizing the troops. Three Command Sergeants Major presented wreaths in their honor. Chaplain Haberek read from Isaiah 40: “they shall mount up with wings like eagles, they shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint.”145

A month later, at another memorial service for soldiers and airmen killed over Iraq in yet another aircraft incident, Chaplain Zimmerman delivered a homily at Fort Meyer, Virginia, which could apply to all of the service members who were killed that spring:

... not for money, not for privilege, and not for glory did these young men and women join the ranks of those who protect our Nation and its people. But, they joined because they had a “sense” of who they were, and what our Nation stands for in this world; and they, each, felt the call to do more, and to risk more, so that others might continue to live under the blessings of liberty. So honor we give them now, and honor them we will in our hearts, and though we grieve while we honor, we will not lose heart. For we who live by faith know that greater honor than we could ever give them is most certainly theirs: and that is eternal glory and our eternal gratitude.146

Chaplain Zimmerman’s words rang true for many, from the services at Fort Bragg and Fort Meyer to the service for former President Richard Nixon who was buried in California with an honor guard from the 3rd Infantry Regiment on April 27th.147 Each person that was memorialized, from Army private to Commander-in-Chief, indeed had demonstrated by his service those values, rights and human ideals which remain part of America’s promise to the world.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplains Zimmerman and Shea attend Memorial Service at Ft. Myer, Virginia, April 25, 1994, for those who perished in a fratricide incident in northern Iraq. General Shalikashvili and Dr. Perry are seated behind President Clinton.
(Top) Chaplain Zimmerman and SM Prost present UMT of the Year Award to Chaplain Herron and SSG Taylor; (Bottom) Chaplain Zimmerman and staff, DACH and USACSSA, in 1995
Summer Trips

Although there were intense and, at times, highly emotional debates in the United Nations and in the European capitals concerning the fighting in Bosnia, it was the position of President Clinton and his military advisors, including General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the insertion of large numbers of American soldiers would exacerbate rather than limit the conflict. The U.S. soldiers which were sent to Macedonia symbolized, in 1993-1994, the administration’s commitment to Europe to contain the ethnic bloodshed.

The saber rattling in North Korea over the demands by the United Nations to allow international inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, which included the implicit threat of SCUD missile attacks against South Korea, was met by a low key approach as well. A patriot ADA battalion was deployed to South Korea from the United States, and the annual Team Spirit exercises were postponed. On July 3rd, North and South Korea reached agreement on logistical arrangements for a summit scheduled for July 25th in Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{148} The proposed discussions were delayed by the death on July 8th of Kim Il Sung, President of North Korea, “the only time our alert status increased,” Chaplain Peter Christy, Eighth Army Staff Chaplain, stated.\textsuperscript{149} Nevertheless, armed conflict was averted as the discussions resumed two months later.

With respect to humanitarian operations, both active and Reserve component unit ministry teams were busy with deployments in the summer of 1994. Some fifteen chaplains and fifteen chaplain assistants, mainly from III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas went to Guantanamo Navy Base as part of JTF 160. Chaplain Reese Hutcheson from the 1st Cavalry Division and Chaplain Eduardo Spragg from the 89th M.P. Brigade were the senior chaplains. Staff Sergeants Saundra Polk-Jackson and Patricia Pruitt were the senior non-commissioned officer chaplain assistants.\textsuperscript{150}

In deploying these task force unit ministry teams, Chaplain William DeLeo, the personnel action officer at FORSCOM, had decided to short-circuit the problem of cross-leveling. He requested that the Corps with the deployment mission fill all of the personnel requirements, except those involving critical Roman Catholic and Jewish shortages which were referred to DACH. In this way the ministry teams were filled and cross-leveled by the Corps, not the MACOM.\textsuperscript{151}

On the Reserve component side, four chaplains from the 416th Engineer Command, Chicago, Illinois, deployed with their unit to Zarqa, Jordan, from May to August.\textsuperscript{152} The mission of the 416th Eastern Castle Task Force was to assist with engineer projects and construction in cooperation with the Jordanian Army. Chaplain John P. Schmeling, the Command Staff Chaplain, and his staff provided religious support for the engineers. Chaplain Jerry Reynolds, the 3rd Army (ARCENT) Staff Chaplain, provided technical advice and support.\textsuperscript{153}

In addition to these deployments there also were a number of ceremonies and observances overseas, principally World War II commemorations, which the Chief of Chaplains attended personally. On the 6th of June, the 50th Anniversary of the D-Day Landings in Normandy were observed at the American Cemetery, Colleville, France. President Clinton recognized hundreds of American veterans in whose debt America and Europe remained. Chaplain Zimmerman offered a prayer at the Point-du-Hoc Ranger ceremony and gave the invocation at the American Cemetery which included the petition “O God, we thank you for the heroes of this beach ... grant that we may

\textsuperscript{148} See endnotes at end of chapter.
be true as they were true, loyal as they were loyal, that in that final day we might join those soldiers we remember here in wearing the victor’s crown.”

From Normandy Chaplain Zimmerman flew to Berlin to deliver an address on the occasion of “closing out our military presence and our ministry in this city.” For 48 years, beginning in 1946, the Army and the Berlin Brigade had kept the window to the West open. Chaplains and chaplain assistants had performed valuable religious ministries, in whose number were Chaplains Jerry L. Robinson, Peter Telencio, John J. “Jack” Prendergast, and Sergeant D.A. Crumley among many others.

Upon Chaplain Zimmerman’s return from Europe he found some rumblings in the Pentagon concerning a possible “invasion” of Haiti. President Clinton told a group of reporters in Naples, Italy, during his European trip: “Human rights violations in Haiti are on the increase; the use of murder, rape and kidnapping as a means of maintaining political control has intensified; we have seen the gripping pictures of more people lying dead in the streets ... we have a moral stake in democracy and human rights everywhere. Our capacity to uphold our principles varies, but when gross abuses take place nearby, we can and must act.” Although President Clinton’s “moral ethic of intervention” did not differ materially from that of some previous presidents, it was not yet clear in July if Haiti would be the next destination for American combat troops.

On the same day President Clinton gave his news conference from Italy, Regent University in Virginia announced the production of a motion picture film honoring former Army Chaplain Merlin Carothers. Chaplain Carothers, whose life changed from a brash, court-martialed World War II soldier to that of a chaplain "on fire for God," had written his 106-page autobiography Prison to Praise in 1970. For 210 weeks his book, which contained a simple secret for happiness, “praise God not only in the midst of problems, but for problems”—was on many best seller lists for Christian books. In 24 years, ten million copies had been printed, many distributed free to prisoners and to military personnel. By 1994 Prison to Praise had been translated into 35 languages. Regent University President Terry Lindvall, son of former Army Chaplain John Lindvall, accepted a grant of $58,000 to help defray costs for the biographical-evangelical movie.

### Recognizing Contributions—Prizing Diversity

As Chaplain Zimmerman’s retirement as Chief of Chaplains grew closer, he took time to recognize some historic contributions to the ministry in the military by a number of individuals and organizations. He directed that copies of the new book, For God and Country, by Chaplain (Brigadier General) Israel Drazin and Chaplain (Colonel) Cecil Currey, which detailed many events in the constitutionality case of 1979-1986, be purchased and distributed throughout the Chaplaincy. He initiated discussions with Chaplain William Huffam, Deputy Director of the Chaplaincy Services Support Agency, and with Chaplain John Brinsfield, Chaplain Corps History Project Officer, on developing a plan to better preserve Chaplain Corps historical records and reports. He also gave his personal attention to the preservation of the award-winning Chaplain Museum in its move with the Chaplain Center and School to Fort Jackson.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Yet one of the major interests Chaplain Zimmerman had was the inclusive recognition of all of the people—without regard to rank, race, gender, faith group, or ethnic origin—whose ministries had strengthened the Chaplaincy and the Army as a whole over the years. As the first African-American Chief of Chaplains, perhaps it was natural for Chaplain Zimmerman to be sensitive to the contributions of minority members of the Corps. On another level, however, Chaplain Zimmerman was also the pastor and preacher for all of his people. His sense of compassion and encouragement was, in short, the greatest motivator for his interest in the whole people of God and of the Chaplaincy.

In his “Statement on Equal Opportunity,” dated May 12, 1994, Chaplain Zimmerman highlighted not only his policy but also a contribution the Chaplain Corps had made to the Army in the field of human relations:

America’s Army is ministered to by a chaplaincy that is multi-faith, ethnically and religiously diverse, and supportive of the soldier’s right to free exercise of religion. We must be a model of equal opportunity in our policies, practice of ministry, and support of every soldier and family member. The Army must continue to be the Nation’s leader, and the Chaplaincy the model of the Army.

The Army Chaplaincy affirms these Regimental Values: Integrity, Human Dignity, Spirituality, Religious Diversity, Competence, and Teamwork. We affirm the spiritual dimension of life and the legal mandate embodied in the First Amendment ensuring the right of each member of America’s Army to the free exercise of religion. We recognize the intrinsic dignity and worth of each person and the right of each to receive just treatment and compassionate care which the exigencies of life require. We celebrate the immense diversity of religious practices, gender and racial differences, ethnic and cultural traditions, and various gifts and talents among all. We pursue a vision of caring individuals and communities committed to a partnership with the Divine, creating a world of justice and peace.

Unit ministry team members will practice and enforce Army standards of conduct. We will provide an environment of mutual respect and support. Each Unit ministry team member has a right to compete for advancement based upon abilities and merit, regardless of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. Discrimination, harassment, or inequities of opportunity is not tolerated. No chaplain serving in the Army is expected to compromise the tenets of his or her religion, nor will the free exercise of any chaplain’s faith be inhibited.

We lead the way in America’s Army Chaplaincy. The full potential of every person in uniform and every family member can be realized in our ranks. The denial of equal opportunity to any one diminishes the worth of the whole Army, and ultimately the Nation.  

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Zimmerman’s policy was meticulously balanced guidance for the Chaplain Corps. It affirmed the dignity of all persons without compromising the conscience or rights of any. The challenge to the Corps was to implement and model its precepts for the Army as a whole.

Women and the Chaplaincy: The Impact of Ministries

_The erasure of distinctions between the sexes is not only the most striking issue of our time, it may be the most profound the race has ever confronted._

William Manchester, _U.S. News World Report_ October 25, 1993

For more than 200 years women have made positive and often irreplaceable contributions to the quality of life and to the mission of the United States Army. From the American Revolution in the 1770s through operations other than war in the 1990s women served in combat, combat service, and combat service support units. Others performed valuable service at installations, in volunteer organizations, and in government and industry. Most, perhaps, supported the Army and the nation as wives, mothers, sisters and daughters who held families together as millions of men were deployed overseas to difficult and dangerous places.

Prior to 1973 there had not been a female chaplain commissioned in the U.S. Armed Forces. By 1975 there were seven female chaplains: three in the Navy, two in the Army, and two in the Air Force. By 1978 there were five in the Army: Chaplains Alice M. Harris, Betty W. Pace, Delores L. Doench, Diana McNeil James, and Janet Y. Horton.

Although the contributions of the more than 40 female chaplains who served in the Army from 1974 through 1995 have been exemplary, their initial reception into the previous six battalions at Fort Sill in 1976 before a commander finally accepted “a female chaplain.” Chaplain Linda George reported to her first commander only to be told “I didn’t want a woman chaplain.” There were instances of sexual harassment, direct insults, attempts at humiliation, and loss of orders and letters of nomination relating to female chaplains as late as 1993. Some female chaplains who were also African-Americans stated that they could not tell whether the hostility they encountered from some of their fellow officers stemmed from their race, denominational identity, or gender.

At the first conference of female chaplains in the Army, held in FY 1978, the same year that the Women’s Army Corps disbanded, the focus was on some of the barriers to ministry by female chaplains and strategies for overcoming them. Topics at that and subsequent conferences ranged from providing better support group networks for female chaplains and female assistants to the use of more inclusive language in worship. By 1980, female chaplain issues were included in the Chief of Chaplains Multi-Cultural Ministries Conference. Every Chief of Chaplains to that time, to include Chaplains Hyatt, Kelly, and Johnson, had pledged to help “defeat racism and sexism in the Army.”

See endnotes at end of chapter.
In the Winter 1983, issue of the Military Chaplains Review, entitled “Women’s Issues,” Captain Linda Ewing from the Ethics Division, Directorate of Training Development, Soldier Support Center, noted:

An effective ministry must be directed at women as persons, not as stereotypes. A person-centered ministry established an environment in which issues and concerns can be communicated without sexual ranking, provides a forum for understanding these issues and concerns free of stereotypical discounting, and is actively supportive of women as persons.

In spite of these and other integrative problems in bringing more women into leadership roles in the Army and in the Chaplaincy, female chaplains performed the same duties required of male chaplains and, in some cases, performed them better. Examples of their service include the assignment of Chaplains Donna Weddle, Janet Horton, Maria Snyder and Jo Ann Knight as instructors at Army Service Schools or at the U. S. Army Chaplain School during the period 1982-1990; the deployment of Chaplain Rebecca Leckrone as the first female chaplain in a combat zone, 1990-1991; subsequent deployments of female chaplains and chaplain assistants to Operations Andrew in Florida and Restore Hope in Somalia; the assignment of female chaplains to significant hospital ministries including Chaplain Diana James to Womack Army Hospital at Fort Bragg, Chaplain Mary A. Pitts to U.S. Army MEDDAC, Panama, and Chaplain Sonja Thompson to Walter Reed AMC; service at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains and the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency by four female chaplains from 1990-1994; and the appointment of Chaplain Janet Horton as the 1st Armored Division Staff Chaplain and the first female chaplain to attend the U.S. Army War College.

Of the service of female chaplains in the Army, Chaplain Carol A. Van Schenkhof, 264th Corps Support Battalion, Fort Bragg, wrote in 1995:

I suppose I have been lucky. None of my commanders have opposed having a female chaplain. I believe female chaplains serve as positive role models for female soldiers. Many times female soldiers come and confide in me. They have said they were glad to have a female chaplain to relate to. Since I was a “Family Member” for ten years, I can relate to family members very well. I understand their situations and feelings since I was in their shoes.

By 1995 many female chaplains reported that during training and during deployments they were accepted by enlisted soldiers with no evidence of stereotypical bias. “I personally do not try to fulfill all my soldiers’ needs,” one female battalion chaplain wrote. “If they want/need to see a Catholic Priest, I arrange it for them. I refer soldiers to whoever I think can best help them.”

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Female Chaplain Assistants

Even though the 71M military occupational specialty (MOS) was awarded to enlisted graduates of the chaplain assistant course at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School beginning in September of 1967, it was not until 1973 that the MOS 71M was made an option for Women’s Army Corps personnel. In October 1972, Specialist Lorraine Doleshal of Fort McClellan, Alabama, became the first school-trained female chaplain assistant. It took almost 20 years before the first female chaplain assistant was promoted to the rank of Sergeant Major. Sergeant Major Mary Razel, USAR, Sergeant Major Susan Dahl, and Sergeant Major Jane Burris were among the first in the Total Chaplaincy.

If anything, female chaplain assistants saw more combat and humanitarian service duty than did female chaplains because there were more of them and because they were “regular” soldiers who pulled additional combat-related duties. Yet female chaplain assistants also performed critical duties in training and doctrine development. At the U.S. Army Chaplain School, for example, Master Sergeant Sadie L. Lennon served as a Drill Sergeant for AIT students as well as NCOIC for the Unit and Individual Training Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine in the period of 1988-1990. Sergeant Elizabeth Sifuentes performed administrative duties, Sergeant First Class Barbara Taylor and SFC Judith Kelly worked in the Combat Development Directorate as project officers with Master Sergeant Roger L. Clark, and Specialist Wendy England helped support retreats for AIT students in the same time frame.

Female chaplain assistants performed a wide variety of duties and, as was the case with female chaplains, they did their jobs well. Chaplain Calvin Sydnor, reflecting on his experience at VII Corps Headquarters during Operation Desert Storm, noted simply: “My assistant, Sergeant Lucille Singleton, did an outstanding job. I could not have gotten a better assistant.”

Female chaplains and chaplain assistants, however, formed only a small (though important) part of the ministry of women to the Army. The vast majority of lay ministry and administrative tasks performed by women in support of religion in the military was done by volunteers and by Department of the Army civilians. As Chaplain Zimmerman observed in a speech to a group of Christian women in 1994:

In 1977, 36% of all church workers were women. Today that number has exceeded 50%. Denominations with restrictions on how women may participate are having to stretch themselves to provide leadership.

Certainly the figures from the U.S. Army Europe Chaplain’s Office confirmed the fact that more than half of the lay ministry in the Army was performed by women volunteers. One Military Council of Catholic Women Conference in Europe had more than 1,256 participants while the Protestant Women of the Chapel in Europe had various sessions attended by more than 700 women.

In November of 1990 the 1st International Reunion and 35th Anniversary gathering of the Protestant Women of the Chapel was held in St. Louis, Missouri. Mrs. Ann Besson, Publicity Coordinator, and later President of the PWOC-USA, noted that “the event marked the first time that

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
active PWOC participants and former members had come together as a body of believers on a national scale in the United States. Through the past 34 years our conferences and retreats have been held mainly in Europe.” With troop reductions in Europe, the PWOC anticipated the need to reunite in the United States; hence the PWOC-USA was born.

Since all active duty and retired Protestant female soldiers as well as service wives, daughters and other family members are automatically members of PWOC, it is almost impossible to determine accurate membership figures. Mrs. Caroline Grube, Vice President of PWOC-USA, thought humorously that at least 40% of the Army would be eligible.

At Fort Belvoir, Virginia, where 140 women were registered as PWOC participants, Mrs. Jennie Chandler, the PWOC President, counted 20 separate projects sponsored by the chapter in 1994. Among these were newcomer orientations, retreats, Bible studies, an Easter basket program, gifts for residents of the Springfield Mental Health Clinic and the inmates of Lorton Prison, sandwiches provided to shelter residents, visits to the Fairfax Nursing Home and birthday cards to the Mt. Vernon Nursing Home, among many others. Clearly, the women had adopted their International Theme “Embrace the Cross” to include works of charity and compassion for the entire military and civilian community.

In CONUS there also was an enormous amount of work in support of chaplains’ programs at local installations directed and organized by women. At Fort Belvoir, Virginia, which in 1994 had one of the largest Roman Catholic and Jewish congregations on a U.S. Military post, Mrs. Bernice Kovel, the Jewish Director of Religious Education, taught Hebrew and religious history to children. Sister Michael Bochnowski, the Catholic DRE, led programs for more than 800 children in her parish. Sister Regina Oliver served as parish coordinator for an extremely busy group of volunteers. The Reverend Jane Heaton, the Protestant DRE, who was a former missionary to Africa and an ordained Disciples of Christ minister, not only led the religious education program but also assisted 140 Protestant Women of the Chapel with their programs. Chaplain Gary Sanford, the Installation Staff Chaplain, and Mrs. Liz Brown, the resource manager, estimated that more than 65% of the 46,000 hours of volunteer service performed in support of the Fort Belvoir chapels in 1994 were due to the service of dedicated women in their ministries of compassion, healing, encouragement, outreach and education.

At the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School virtually every office was vitally dependent on the assistance and leadership of women. Mrs. Mary Lou Corcoran had been the Assistant Director of Training and Doctrine in the critical period just before Desert Shield. She not only found critical dollars for the publication of field manuals and reference books used at that time, but also doubled as the School’s Mobilization Officer. Ms. Nella Hartog also doubled as the School’s Public Affairs Officer and as the Managing Editor of The Army Chaplaincy the professional bulletin. Mrs. Terri Newsome served as the School Librarian, Ms. Renee Klish as the Museum Curator, and Ms. Dora Tucker as the Commandant’s Secretary. Ms. Margaret Robertson, of the Combat Developments Directorate, became in 1993 the first civilian at the School to graduate from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Ms. Robertson was also an author for the chapter on Operations Other Than War for FM 16-1 (1995).

Finally, the service of women in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, in the Chaplaincy

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Services Support Agency, at MACOM Chaplain Offices, and at installations around the world not only “kept the chaplaincy running,” but also provided continuity for ministry in a world of change. At DACH, three women—Nellie Burton, Norma Turner, and Shirley Womack—each spent 40 years in government service, the majority of years in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Ms. Bess Ballard spent 20 years, Ms. Cerie Felt's 16 years, and Ms. Pat Jennings 13 years in assisting the Chaplain Board, the Agency, and DACH with numerous budgetary, administrative and personnel tasks. They exemplified the many “unsung heroines” of the Chaplaincy in whose debt thousands of chaplains and chaplain assistants remain for their dedication and commitment to the ministry of administration.

Honor Enough for Me

On 31 July 1994, Chaplain (Major General) Matthew A. Zimmerman retired as Chief of Chaplains. At his Fort Meyer retirement parade, attended by General Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff and a host of chaplains, friends, and family members Chaplain Zimmerman received the Distinguished Service Medal for his leadership during one of the most difficult and complex periods in recent Chaplain Corps history. Chaplain Zimmerman saluted the best soldiers in the world and the best chaplaincy in the best Army in the world in his retirement address. Messages of congratulations came from around the country and around the world. A special word of thanks came from General Colin Powell, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during many operations and deployments, for Chaplain Zimmerman’s pastoral leadership of the Army.

At his farewell dinner, Chaplain Zimmerman received even more compliments and farewell mementos. His immediate staff prepared a video tape of farewell messages as Chaplain Zimmerman prepared to transition to his new ministry as the Director of Veteran’s Administration National Chaplain Center at Hampton, Virginia.

Yet Chaplain Zimmerman had already written his farewell in his many accomplishments to make the Chaplaincy an inclusive professional and spiritual compass for the Army. If there was one compliment he treasured, it may have been suggested in a sermon he gave at a ceremony to honor Civil War soldiers at the National Cemetery in Alexandria, Virginia, on 22 May 1993. Chaplain Zimmerman told the assembled congregation:

One hundred and twenty-eight years from now, will people be standing over our graves, honoring our memory and our sacrifices? I pray with you that we will live the kind of lives that deserve that kind of honor. I also pray that when we have done our all, we can stand before our creator and hear the words, “Well done, thou good and faithful servant.” Those words will be honor enough for me.

Without presuming to pre-empt such a compliment, the Chaplain Corps at least reflect it in its many expressions of respect and affection for the 18th Chief of Chaplains whose leadership had covered the world.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Jack Kaising, Asst. Commandant; Chaplain Bernard Lieving, Commandant, and Chief of Chaplains Matthew Zimmerman at Ft. Monmouth on the 218th Anniversary of the Chaplain Corps
ENDNOTES

1. P.A. Sorokin analyzed 862 wars waged from 1100 AD to 1925 in his book, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* while Dr. Francis Beer in *Peace Against War* examined 63 major conflicts between world powers since 1816. Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States were the countries most frequently involved in military operations—though often for different reasons.

2. OCCH, "Biographical Sketch: Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Matthew A. Zimmerman," Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives. Note: The last seven Chiefs of Chaplains, from Chaplain Hyatt through Chaplain Shea, were Vietnam veterans.


8. UMT Brief, Hawaii and Korea, September 1991, Slide 6 and text, copy in the Zimmerman file, OCCH.


25. OCCH Information Letter, June 1, 1991, p. 4.


27. OCCH Information Letter, September 1, 1992, p. 5.

28. On June 1, 1993, Chaplain Zimmerman wrote, “The goal is to have a clear, concise, and consistent Personnel Policy ... increasing the efficiency of management [and providing] us with a policy that is in accordance with the rest of the Army. My personal thanks to the Task Force members, Chaplains George Pejakovich, Jerry Black, Jack Anderson, Greg Hill, Mike Broyles, Jesse Thornton, Sir Walter Scott, Dick Buzby, Janet Horton, Daryl Goldman, Shirley Womack, Roger Able and special thanks to Hugh Dukes, whose efforts brought all things together and made things happen.” OCCH Information Letter, June 1, 1993, p. 1.


30. Chaplain (Maj.) James W. Jones, Jr., Officer Record Brief, 940901.


35. Some chaplains and chaplain assistants from Fort Bragg and Fort Drum, for example, were deployed successively to Panama, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, Florida, Somalia and Haiti from 1989-1995. One military police unit from Fort Bragg spent four successive Christmas/Passover holiday seasons deployed away from home.


40. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

41. Ibid., p. 4 and Personal interviews with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) David M. DeDonato, April 22, 1994 and Chaplain (Col.) Thomas R. Smith, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, July 28, 1994. Chaplain Matthis studied at the University of Virginia.


44. Drew Magazine, Winter 94-95, p. 28.


46. Ibid.


49. Followed by Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii and "Operation Garden Isle" which began September 12, 1992.


52. Chaplain (Col.) George Pejakovich, OCCH Information Letter, October 1, 1992, p. 6.


54. Chaplain Milton L. Haney, 55th Illinois Volunteer Infantry, was awarded the Medal of Honor for leading a counter attack to recover Federal earthworks during the Battle of Atlanta, July 22, 1864. His granite monument was in the form of a pulpit surrounded by brass cannonballs outside the Post Chapel at Fort McPherson. Chaplain Brinsfield had written an article on Chaplain Haney for the Civil War Times Illustrated (Sept. - Oct., 1992). Chaplain Henry Wake, the Executive Officer at DACH, secured $2,500.00 for the monument. Chaplains David Peterson and James B. Lonergan at FORSCOM approved the effort. Chaplain H. P. Camillus Gott served as the project officer to secure command approval at post level. Chaplain Zimmerman dedicated the monument on November 13, 1992. Chaplain Joe R. Colley and Chaplain Jerry Reynolds, the 3d Army Chaplain, utilized the "pulpit" for the first time at the Easter Sunrise Service, April 11, 1993. The monument was produced by Mr. W.B. Rainwater of Atlanta as a special project for the Chaplaincy.


56. Ibid.


59. Ibid., p. 49.


62. Ibid., p. 8.

63. Ibid.

64. Personal interview with Chaplain (Capt.) Joseph P. Rappl, DACH, January 20, 1995.

65. Former Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, capital at Sarajevo.


72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., Note: The Russian Military Academy was established by Peter the Great and was not only a training ground for officers but it was also the site at which ballet originated in Russia. Walter Kirchner, History of Russia (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976), p.181.


77. Historically, the Chaplain Museum Association raised money to help the Museum acquire artifacts, equipment or supplies not readily available. Past officers of the Museum Association have included Chaplain John C. Scott; Chaplain James E. Pierce, USAR; Major Morgan Flom;
Mrs. Susan Flom, Dr. William Hourihan; Mrs. Margaret Robertson and Chaplain Richard Tupy.

78. Due in part to personnel reductions at USACSSA which necessitated the move of the journal/magazine to USACHCS.


80. OCCH, Information Letter, June 1, 1993, p.6.


83. Chaplain Wayne W. Hoffmann, Assistant CCH for Mobilization, and Chaplain Brock Watson, Assistant CCH (USANG), was promoted to Brigadier General on March 23, 1993. Mr. Ed Horan was a DRE assigned to USACSSA.

84. The United States Army Chaplaincy’s Strategic Plans FY 94-99, July 1993, pp. 1, 6. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.


87. Personal interview with Ms. Holli Bush, former Young Adult Ministries Coordinator, Mark Twain Village Chapel, 1986.


90. By 1993 the number of Roman Catholic chaplains in the active duty Army had dropped to 140. See Paul Mason, “Chaplain Recruiting,” FORSCOM Chaplain’s Newsletter, August 1993, p.1.


97. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
104. Chaplain (Colonel) Al Ledeubhr’s study is in the Chaplain Corps Archives at the U.S. Army Chaplain School.
107. The annual rent on the Communications and Electronics Command building in Eatontown, New Jersey, was said to be in excess of $1 million. By moving the Chaplain School, CECOM could move on the Fort Monmouth installation into old school facilities and save the government millions of dollars over the course of ten years.
109. Personal interview with Mr. Roger Able, DACH, 16 May 1995.
110. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives. The report was 92 pages in length and had been contracted by OCCH.
111. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
112. Ibid., p.46.
113. OCCH, Information Letter, October 1, 1993, IV, p. 4.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Copies in the Chaplain Corps Archives and in the Zimmerman Files, OCCH.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid. See also Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) M A. Zimmerman, “Speech at the Maine ARNG Prayer Breakfast, April 7, 1994.” Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.
132. Ibid., p.1.

133. Chief of Chaplains Speech, LIFT Training, January 31, 1994, p.1; Copy in the Zimmerman Files, OCCH.


135. Chief of Chaplain’s Speech to the Maine ARNG, April 7, 1994, p.2.


138. Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Mary Pitts, 46th Corps Support Group Chaplain, April 5, 1995.


140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid. Another soldier died nine months later of his burn injuries.

143. Ibid. Personal interview with Chaplain Pitts, April 5, 1995.

144. Ibid.


150. OCCH, “JTF 160 UMTs Deployed to GTMO” July 28, 1994. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives. This was the third deployment to GTMO by chaplains from FORSCOM since 1991.

152. Chaplains Bacon, Downing, Kilmurray, and Schmeling.


155. Ibid.


159. Ibid.

160. The Chaplain Museum Curator, Ms. Renee Klish, received a $100,000 grant to fund a traveling display of Chaplain Corps Museum exhibits.


164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.


168. Ibid.

170. Ibid.


174. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Sydnor, April 8, 1994.


179. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) Gary Sanford, St. Louis, Missouri, May 24, 1995.


181. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives, p.5.
CHAPTER VIII

THE SHEA YEARS:
DEDICATED SERVICE IN A NEW WORLD
1994-1995

America's Army is on a course of change...the Army Chaplaincy is also in transition... Trained, ready, versatile ministry teams will support families and soldiers as they have through two centuries of service... This is our pledge.

Chaplaincy White Paper, Force XXI

MILESTONES:

- Unit ministry teams deployed around the world
- Chaplain Support for Force XXI
- Publication of revised FM 16-1
- Emphasis on character development and ethics
- Operations Uphold/Maintain Democracy
- Relocation of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Envisioning Ministry for the 21st Century:
Encouraging Faith, Sustaining Hope, Serving America’s Army

What we set in motion is an entirely new era in warfare....What is changing is the very nature of modern battle.

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
21 February 1995

When General Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, promoted Chaplain Donald W. Shea to Major General and installed him formally as the Army’s 19th Chief of Chaplains at the Pentagon on 1 September 1994, there was a sense of a new mission orientation for the Chaplain Corps. Chaplain Shea’s primary interest as Chief of Chaplains, as reflected in his acceptance speech, was to model the value of “selfless service” and instill it, by example, in every member of the Chaplain Corps. Chaplain Shea’s vocation was to serve soldiers, wherever they might be assigned, in whatever danger or hardship, for as long as they or their family members needed him. Endowed with a keen sense of humor and sharp analytic insight, Chaplain Shea motivated others by his own example of total dedication to ministry.

Born in Butte, Montana, and educated at Carroll College and St. Paul Seminary in Minnesota, Chaplain Shea was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1962 for the Diocese of Helena, Montana. In August of 1966 Chaplain Shea entered active duty and was assigned to the 5th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado. Subsequently he served with the 101st Airborne Division and the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Vietnam, the 7th Infantry Division in Korea, the 15th Field Artillery Group in Vietnam, the 10th Infantry in Panama, the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis and the 1st Armored Division in Germany, where he also served as the Division Staff Chaplain. From 1985 to 1995 Chaplain Shea held a series of senior positions: VII Corps Staff Chaplain; U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army Staff Chaplain; Executive Officer, Office of the Chief of Chaplains; Deputy Chief of Chaplains; and Chief of Chaplains, U.S. Army. ¹

In addition to his incredible record of service to combat arms soldiers, Chaplain Shea held three Master’s degrees from the University of Oklahoma, Long Island University, and Central Michigan University. He was also a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. ²

Staff Support

Chaplain Shea’s supporting staff, which included those serving in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency, the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, and in other major commands around the world, reflected an incredible amount of experience and wisdom in enabling the Chaplaincy to respond to the Army’s needs. Almost all of the senior chaplains were combat veterans with extensive experience in soldier ministries.

¹ See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain (Brigadier General) Gaylord T. Gunhus, who was installed as Deputy Chief of Chaplains on November 1, 1994, was a native of North Dakota. He had attended Seattle Pacific University, the Lutheran Brethren Seminary, and Princeton Theological Seminary. After serving two tours in Vietnam (1968-69, 1972-73), he spent five years at the Directorate of Combat Developments, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. In the early 1980s Chaplain Gunhus worked with Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, Director of Combat Developments at the Chaplain School, as well as with other subject matter experts in the development of Chaplain Corps doctrine which included the Unit Ministry Team concept and the battle-focusing of doctrine and training. Subsequently, Chaplain Gunhus served as the 9th Infantry Division Staff Chaplain, the Corps Chaplain for I Corps and Fort Lewis, the U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army Command Chaplain during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and the Training and Doctrine Command Chaplain from 1992 to 1994.

Chaplain John J. “Jack” Kasing, Executive Officer for the Chief of Chaplains, had served in Germany, Hawaii, and at DACH before becoming Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School. In September of 1994 Chaplain Kasing was invested a Prelate of Honor to His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, by Archbishop Joseph T. Dimino, Roman Catholic Archbishop for Military Services.

The Directors of the major staff sections in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains included Chaplain Charles D. Camp, Director of Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations; Chaplain Wayne E. Kuehne, Director of Plans, Policy Development and Training; and Chaplain Timothy C. Tatum, Director of Information, Resource Management and Logistics. Chaplain William L. Hufham was the Deputy Director of the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency; Chaplain Willard D. Goldman the Personnel Staff Officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; and Chaplain Stanley R. Esterline the Pentagon Chaplain.3

At the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Chaplain George Pejakovich served as the Commandant; Chaplain Malcolm Roberts the Assistant Commandant; Chaplain Robert J. Richter as the Director of Combat Developments. Chaplain David Howard succeeded Chaplain Wayne Lehrer as Director of Training in 1985 when Chaplain Lehrer moved to assume duties as the I Corps Chaplain at Fort Lewis, Washington.

In the larger major commands Chaplain Henry Wake served as the USAREUR and 7th Army Command Chaplain; Chaplain Peter Christy was the United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea/Eighth U.S. Army Staff Chaplain; Chaplain Calvin Sydnor III moved to the TRADOC Command Chaplain position and Chaplain Ken Seifried succeed Chaplain David Peterson as the FORSCOM Chaplain in March of 1995. Chaplain Herman Keizer became the Joint European Command Chaplain and Chaplain D.J. Donahue the USASSETAF Command Chaplain in Vicenza, Italy.

In the Reserve Components, Chaplain Stephen Leonard continued to serve as the U.S. Army Reserve Command Staff Chaplain; Chaplain John Rasmussen was the Reserve Advisor to the Chief of Chaplains until his retirement in 1995; and Chaplains Wayne Hoffman and Burney H. Enzor were Assistant Chiefs of Chaplains for Mobilization and for the U.S. Army National Guard position respectively.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
In the CONUSA organizations, the Sixth Army area was included within the Fifth Army when the Sixth Army stood down in 1995. Chaplain Willie P. Peacock moved from the Sixth Army Chaplain position to the Military District of Washington. Chaplain Robert Vickers, the Fifth Army Chaplain, inherited Sixth Army responsibilities. At Third Army Chaplain Jerry D. Reynolds and CSM Oscar L. Crumity continued to serve as the Third Army/ARCENT Command unit ministry team.

A Chaplain for the Joint Staff

One of the personnel coups for the Chaplaincy in 1994-1995 was the assignment of Chaplain Wilbur D. Parker to The Joint Staff. In June 1995, when Chaplain Parker was assigned to the Joint Staff, his job title was “Religious Affairs Specialist.” Only in the job 10 days, he presented a position paper recommending that his job title be changed to, “Joint Staff Chaplain,” and that his office not be called the “Office of Religious Affairs,” but rather, “Office of the Chaplain.” The proposal was signed by the Director of the Joint Staff. This was just the first of many changes Chaplain Parker was to make in that position.

The second thing the new Joint Staff Chaplain did was to rewrite the Job Description. Basing this new description on the Joint Universal Task List (JUTL 4.2.7), his mission became “to plan and coordinate defense-wide religious support with the Joint Staff and the Unified Commands.” Again, the Director signed the proposal after discussing it at some length with Chaplain Parker.

Using the new job description as a springboard, Chaplain Parker launched into a multitude of tasks. He initiated training for the nine Unified Command Chaplains and their enlisted assistants and started making staff visits to their commands. In addition, he began to write Joint Religious Ministry Support Doctrine into Joint Publications. Along with this initiative, he integrated the first religious support play into the Chairman’s exercise program and provided training to teach the Unified Command chaplains how to participate in the exercises. Chaplain Parker relied heavily at times on Chaplain Herman Keizer, the EUCOM Chaplain, for assistance and advice. They made an effective team and together, made significant, lasting contributions to the development of Joint Doctrine and ministry.

Chaplain Parker early began to discover inconsistencies between his responsibilities and those of the Armed Forces Chaplain Board Executive Director. The responsibilities overlapped and were not in concert with the Goldwater-Nichols concept. The Operational line of authority and the Administrative line of authority were confused. So he drew up what he thought to be the correct lines of responsibility and discussed them with the Executive Director. His proposal was theoretically correct and together, they re-drew the lines which delineated their individual responsibilities more clearly.

As the proponent for Joint Religious Ministry Support doctrine, Chaplain Parker was asked by the Armed Forces Chaplain Board to develop a training vehicle to equip 10,500 chaplains and chaplain assistants, active, reserve, and National Guard, to provide religious support in Joint operations. This was monumental task that required great negotiating skill and coordination. The

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Navy provided Captain (Ret.) Ray Dressler, CHC, USN, for several weeks to assist with the project. He brought superb experience and expertise and was a stalwart in the project. This was the first major effort to provide Joint Training to all religious support providers.

As the Joint Staff Chaplain, Chaplain Parker served as the Chairman’s representative to the Central and Eastern European countries for Chaplaincy matters. Much of the day to day work was done by the Joint Contact Team working for the J-5 in EUCOM and the EUCOM Command Chaplain, Chaplain Herman Keizer. Occasionally Chaplain Parker visited these countries, once encountering thieves on the streets of Bucharest and frequently searching for anyone who spoke English.

The most distracting part of the Joint Staff Chaplain’s job according to Chaplain Parker, was that of being layered under the J-1 for administrative support. This proved to be a constant problem because in the Joint bureaucracy it was difficult to stay in the main stream of information. Not only was this an unaccustomed working relationship, but Chaplain Parker was without an assistant and no office help so he did everything alone. He enjoyed what he called the honor and distinction of being both the Joint Staff Chaplain and the most incompetent, least efficient and lest productive clerk typist, not only in the military, but also in the entire government service.

**Wars and Rumors of Wars**

An overview of potential areas of conflict in the world at the time Chaplain Shea assumed his new responsibilities revealed a mix of tragedy and hope. According to the National Defense Council Foundation, a research group in Alexandria, Virginia, more than 70 regional wars and insurrections were in progress in the world in the latter part of 1994, an increase of ten percent over 1993. Even though the threat of superpower conflict had diminished vastly, in its place ethnic and religious conflicts had developed. There were tribal conflicts in Rwanda, Sudan and Afghanistan, ethnic fighting in Burundi and Bosnia, religious conflict in Ethiopia, political strife in Malawi and insurgency in Sierra Leone, to give but a few examples. In Turkey some 1,000 villages had been destroyed and 13,000 people killed in the ten-year struggle between the Kurdish Workers' Party and the Turkish government. The fighting continued. In Guatemala, where more than 1000,000 people had been killed in a 34-year old civil war, firefighters reported in 1994 an average of 13 killings daily in the capital. Many of the bodies recovered showed signs of torture and mutilation. On the Bosnia-Herzegovina border with Croatia, there were 100,000 civilians killed and 5,000 homeless as the result of three years of fighting. Casualties in the remainder of the Serbian war zone continued to mount.

On the more hopeful side of current peace efforts, some serious attempts at international conflict resolution were beginning to bear fruit. Discussions in Israel, Ireland and Korea were defusing ancient antipathies. The United Nations continued its peacekeeping operations with more than 30,000 soldiers in such places such as Rwanda, Cyprus, Liberia, Lebanon, India and Kuwait. For the first time, possibly ever, 60 percent of the world's nations were formal democracies. Seven new democratic nations had been created within 1994, the largest number since the end of World War

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
II In the bloodiest century in recorded history, which included two world wars, there was hope that the flames of ethnocentric wrath would someday be smothered.

The response to the rise in regional conflicts at the international level was a combination of action and uncertainty. The United Nations had functioned occasionally in a major peace enforcement role as in Korea, in the Persian Gulf, and in Somalia, and with mixed results. The new European Order, the synthesis which must inevitably arise from the fragmentation of the old Soviet Union, was still to be defined. There were doubts that NATO could or would expand from its nucleus.

New Doctrine

In the United States Army the response was more direct and more focused. In 1993 General Gordon R. Sullivan had written a national security paper for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Washington entitled, America’s Army into the Twenty-First Century. In General Sullivan’s seminal paper, he discussed the new strategic environment at the end of the Cold War and the Army’s vision and missions in the future to include fielding a total strategic force, trained, ready, and capable of decisive victory. General Sullivan recognized that other operational capabilities, from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping, might be required as well. From 1975 to 1989 the Army participated in 147 contingency operations involving 50 or more soldiers. From 1990 to 1992 Army personnel participated in 47 of these type operations—an average yearly increase of fifty percent—at a time when six of the Army’s 18 divisions were being disbanded or consolidated, two-thirds of the Cold War Army force in Europe withdrawn, and 360 posts and bases closed around the world.

Even with a promised “end to the drawdown” and a stable end strength of 475,000 soldiers (including 1,200 active duty chaplains) by 1998, it was clear to General Sullivan that strong measures needed to be taken to avoid “a hollow army” such as had been debated at the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. General Sullivan therefore described six imperatives to achieve “the balance that must be maintained within a fiscally-constrained Army program to ensure that, whatever its size or structure, the force remains trained and ready.” The six imperatives were: quality people, leader development, modernization, doctrine, force mix, and training.

In the spring of 1994 General Sullivan issued the following statement, designed to incorporate the Army XXI vision into the Department of the Army’s conceptual thinking:

I want each of you [primary staff agencies] in the Army chain of command to develop a vision for what Force XXI means to your command. I want my staff to do the same. Identify proponency, network, challenge the processes we need to change. Take risks, encourage innovation. Send me your visions, your thoughts, your papers; send them to each other. Press the envelope...

See endnotes at end of chapter.
As a catalyst for thought, concepts and doctrine, General Sullivan approved the publication of FM 100-1, The Army, in June of 1994 and Decisive Victory: America's Power Projection Army, the Army White Paper on Force XXI, in October of the same year.

The Chaplain Corps had long anticipated changed in the Army's strategic and tactical thinking. Discussion began at the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 around revising the Chaplaincy's basic Field Manual 16-1, Religious Support Doctrine. The Director of Combat Developments at the Chaplain Center and School, Chaplain Robert Richter, had put some excellent doctrine writers to work gathering information, synthesizing lessons learned, interviewing veterans of major operations, and drafting a new manual. The project officers included Chaplain William Noble, a former editor of the Military Chaplains' Review; Chaplain Wayne MacKirdy, who had served at the Combined Military Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany; and Mrs. Margaret Robertson, formerly an analyst in the Unit and Individual Training Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

In early September of 1994, as the first draft of FM 16-1 (revised) was being prepared for review by Chaplain George Pejakovich, the Commandant of the Chaplain Center and School, Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, Director of PPDT at the Chief's Office, sent messages to Chaplain Richter and to Chaplain Pejakovich. In response to Chaplain Shea's directive for the Chaplaincy to produce a White Paper on Force XXI for General Sullivan's approval, Chaplain Kuehne began exploring ideas, concepts, and regulations as he had for similar projects since 1976. In light of the newly produced TRADOC Pam 525-5 which the TRADOC Commander felt would "lead to change for the Army," Chaplain Kuehne suggested a TRADOC Pam 525-16 which could flesh out the Chaplaincy's developing White Paper. Chaplain Pejakovich agreed that the lead for doctrinal concept development belonged to the Combat Developments Directorate, but suggested that perhaps the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the CASCOM combat developers, and students at CGSC and at the War College could help in a "Combat Developments network."

In effect the Chaplain Corps would produce a revised field manual, a White Paper, a revised basic regulation, and concept studies to capture the new Power Projection Army vision inherent in Force XXI. Among other new doctrinal concepts was a more accurate description of ministry teams -- the unit ministry team in TOE organizations and the complementary, sustaining installation ministry teams for the TDA base.

In addition to the mega-installations, such as Fort Bragg and Fort Hood, which served as power projection platforms for deploying units, there were Army and Corps headquarters organizations which could perform the same functions with USAR units if required. Third Army, I Corps, and I X Corps (17th Area Support Group, Honshu, Japan) were examples. The Chief of Chaplains White Paper, "Chaplain Support for Force XXI: A Journey... Encouraging Faith, Sustaining Hope," was written over the course of five months. Chaplain William Hufham, Deputy Director of the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency, secured the approval of both General Sullivan and Chaplain Shea in time for distribution at the Chief of Chaplains UMT Conference in May 1985. The Chief's White Paper summarized the rationale for the Chaplaincy, the goals of ministry in the military, and the relationship of doctrine and ministry to the vision of Force XXI.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Other publications highlighted developments in Chaplain Corps strategic thinking in 1994-1995 as the Chief’s White Paper was being written. At Fort Lewis the Call Forward 1994 Mobilization Exercise assessed installation mobilization capabilities. At the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a study was done on “Religious Ministry Support in Joint Operations.” At the Chief of Chaplains 1994 UMT Mobilization Planning Conference in Atlanta the focus was on “Mobilizing for Joint Operations Other Than War.” In the Spring (1995) issue of The Army Chaplaincy professional bulletin, “Operations Other Than War” was also the featured theme.

**Operation Uphold Democracy**

While some senior chaplains and chaplain assistants were writing new doctrine concerning religious support for Operations Other Than War, other unit ministry teams already were putting many of the doctrinal principles into action. As early as July of 1994 the “word” went quietly around Fort Bragg that there might either be an armed invasion of Haiti or, conversely, a mission for humanitarian relief. Supervisory chaplains in the XVIII Airborne Corps began updating their SOPs and reinforcing training for their UMTs in combat survival skills.

Haiti, a country of 6.5 million people with one of the lowest per capita income levels in the world, had a rich but often violent history. Since Jan-Claude Duvalier had been over thrown in 1986 and Jean-Bertrand Aristide driven into exile in 1991, the poor people of Haiti had existed with rising disease and mortality rates. In some areas more than half of the people had AIDS, with measles and malnutrition almost as deadly. At least 3,000 Haitians had been killed during the reign of terror by government forces after 1991.

As a desperate survival measure, whole families, including pregnant women and children, took to the sea in leaky boats bound hopefully for the United States but more likely for Cuba. In July of 1994 the population of Haitian migrants rescued at sea and detained at Guantanamo Naval Base soared to 20,000. Both the United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Gali, and President Bill Clinton tried to find a solution to the Haitian hemorrhage.

In mid-July the Haitian government of Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras had expelled United Nations and OAS human rights monitors after reports of increasing government atrocities reached the international press. In August the U.N. Secretary General ceased all efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution. In early September the Reverend Jean-Marie Vincent, a popular priest and old friend of Aristide, was murdered, ostensibly by Cedras supporters. In the same week reports reached President Clinton of the alleged murder of children from orphanages by Cedras’ soldiers.

By September 17, the President had put the Ready Brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg on alert for an assault on Haiti. The planes were ready to take off on September 18 from Green Ramp.

As a last diplomatic resort, former President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell, USA, Retired and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia flew to Port au Prince to meet with Lt. Gen. Cedras. As the talks dragged on, the planes took off from Fort Bragg. President Clinton sent a message to Carter to leave—the paratroopers would start to land in two hours. Mr. Carter asked President Clinton if

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
he could inform Lt. Gen. Cedras of that development, Clinton agreed. Within the hour Cedras accepted terms for transferring power to Aristide and for his own subsequent departure. The planes from Fort Bragg turned around and went home.

On September 20 two days after the meeting, 3,000 American troops landed peacefully in Haiti. Operation Uphold Democracy had begun.

For the first six months of the Haitian mission, a total of 22,000 American soldiers, part of a multinational force under U.S. command, deployed to the island. Joint Task Force 190, comprised of soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York; the 1st Corps Support Command, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg; and other units from six U.S. installations, had the mission of sustaining a secure and stable environment, protecting international personnel, and assisting “in establishing an environment conducive to the organization” of free government functions.

Religious support for the U.S. soldiers was provided by the unit ministry teams organic to the force. The Joint Task Force Chaplain was Chaplain Karl Willoughby, also the 10th Mountain Division Chaplain. Jesse G. Saddler, the 1st Corps Support Chaplain, and his NCOIC, Sergeant First Class James K. Flack, supervised the 1st COSCOM unit ministry teams. After 90 days the 10th Mountain Division and the 1st COSCOM were replaced by elements from the 25th Infantry Division, Hawaii, and from reserve units based at Fort Lewis, in Colorado, and in Alabama. The 3rd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, from Fort Polk, assisted the 1/21st Infantry with security.

Since the situation in Haiti was uncertain, the first chaplains and chaplain assistants deployed with full combat gear, up-to-date shot records, and at least 30 days of ecclesiastical supplies. Living conditions in Haiti were Spartan at best. The 8th Ordnance Company set up camp on a ridge overlooking Port-au-Prince with fairly rustic facilities. The 46th Corps Support Group from Fort Bragg was quartered in an old cigarette factory with cots, netting, and almost no privacy. Male and female soldiers occupied cots next to one another, often to the discomfort of all.

Religious support for soldiers, overall, was well coordinated. Chaplain Jesse Saddler had a detailed, comprehensive religious support plan, a mission essential task list, and even an in-country telephone directory for his unit ministry teams. There was frequent coordination between almost all of the area unit ministry teams to include the supervisory chaplains, Chaplain Willoughby, Chaplain Saddler, and Chaplain David Hicks, the Special Operations Command Staff Chaplain. Chaplain Karl Willoughby was able to arrange for soldiers to go on “A Duty Day with God” to a Baptist mission site in the mountains which featured an approved restaurant complete with hamburgers. Chaplain Ed Hartman from the 10th Mountain Division, and a veteran of Operations Andrew and Restore Hope in Somalia, provided Catholic Mass. Basic religious programs in the units included worship, Bible studies, counseling, and the critical ministry of presence.

The 46th Corps Support Group was comprised, for the first time in the history of the Chaplain Corps, of an all-female team. Chaplain Mary A. Pitts was the Group Chaplain assisted by Staff Sergeant Azelia Hailey. Chaplain Carol VanSchenkof and Specialist Nicole Rodriguez formed the UMT for the 264th Corps Support Battalion, and Chaplain Susan Addams, in the 1st COSCOM Main Area, was the 189th CSB Chaplain assisted by Specialist Randy Robertson. Chaplain Sung Jung Lee

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Eric Albertson and SPC Jermaine Moore with friends in Haiti
(Top) Chaplain Richard Kuhlbars and (Bottom) Chaplains James Madden and Scottie Lloyd provide ecumenical religious support in Haiti
from the 10th Transportation Battalion, Fort Eustis, which was in the 1st COSCOM, was also a female chaplain.

Chaplain Paul Clark, the Deputy COSCOM Chaplain, and Sergeant Derma Close supervised ministry for soldiers and family members at 1st COSCOM home station and provided basic support for the Forward element.\(^{36}\) Chaplain Clark and Chaplain Addams shared an increased counseling load at Fort Bragg, worked with Family Support Groups, and supported numerous family members in time of stress.\(^{37}\)

On October 15, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to Haiti after an exile of three years. He maintained a very low profile at first, appearing at church once. After he urged his supporters not to retaliate against their former persecutors, especially in the police force, the President was able to appear in public more frequently without the fear of inciting a riot of killing and looting.

By the second week in November, the first JTF contingent redeployed; most units were replaced by the second wave of U.S. troops.\(^{38}\) The new multinational force was commanded by Major General George Fisher from the 25th Infantry Division. Eventually, when all of the units arrived, there were 19 companies of Infantry, three Military Police companies, and three Cavalry troops.

Chaplain O. Wayne Smith, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regimental Chaplain and a veteran of Operation Desert Storm, thought the conditions the people of Haiti endured were depressing.\(^{39}\) American soldiers were not accustomed to stand by while people were beaten in the streets or children stood hungry and naked in the gutters. One American officer was even court-martialed for disobeying an order not to inspect or visit a local prison which was a model of inhumane treatment. Eventually American MP's, soldiers and Marines began to be more assertive. In one incident at Cap-Haitian, U.S. Marines killed 10 Haitians during an armed clash with a mob.\(^{40}\) Not long thereafter, at the request of the U.S. government, former New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly arrived in Haiti to help deal with civil organization and security.\(^{41}\) General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pressed efforts to disarm Haitian communities.\(^{42}\)

On March 31, 1995, President Clinton arrived in Haiti to mark the assumption of the humanitarian mission by the United Nations. The U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), with 6,000 troops from 18 nations, was to operate in six tactical zones with special operations forces located in each.\(^{43}\) U.S. forces, 2,400 strong, comprised more than one-third of the total military presence. Major General Joseph Kinzer, a veteran of Operation Just Cause in Panama and the officer responsible for nation-building in Panama thereafter, was appointed the U.N. Commander for UNMIH.\(^{44}\) Plans called for U.N. forces to remain in Haiti until at least 1996.

In his speech at the U.N. ceremony on March 31, President Aristide said that as a result of the U.S. intervention, "Haiti was moved from death to life; the water of violence was transformed into the wine of peace."\(^{45}\) Certainly the U.S.-led multinational force had given Haiti a fresh chance at a democratic government and perhaps had given the people a jump-start on a new and healthier life for the time in this century. During Operation Uphold Democracy, U.S. aid fed more than one million Haitian women and children; U.S. health team workers immunized 600,000 Haitian children

\(\text{See endnotes at end of chapter.}\)
against measles. It was estimated that 62,000 jobs were created or restored, 2,000 Haitian men
placed in retraining programs, and 130,000 weapons taken off the streets.\textsuperscript{46}

If there was a problem with Haiti and Operation Uphold Democracy, it was not due to the
conduct of the U.S. Army. Both the soldiers and the unit ministry teams which accompanied them
did an outstanding job.\textsuperscript{47} The problem was with the cost of the Operation. The deployment of U.S.
forces to Haiti from September 1994 to March 1995, according to the Department of Defense, cost
$594.6 million dollars, more than the 1994 deployments in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Korea
added together.\textsuperscript{48} In fact the cost of Operation Uphold Democracy ($594.6 million) was 57% of the
U.S. cost of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm ($1,040.5 million). Moreover, from October of
1993 through January of 1995, the U.S. deployed a total of 100,000 troops on 13 missions costing
$2.6 billion or 40% of the budgeted readiness money in the Department of Defense. General John
Shalikashvili warned that if the money for readiness were not re-appropriated by Congress, "the Air
Force would cut flying hours for pilots to polish their skills; the Army would cancel exercises; the
Navy would delay ship maintenance."\textsuperscript{49}

In the long view, however, the Clinton Administration, the Army, and most chaplains felt that
Operation Uphold Democracy, if it continued to be successful, would be worth the cost. Not only
were thousands of lives saved, on land and sea, but a real effort had been made to rebuild a country
and a people as a symbol of hope for the entire Caribbean.

Hot Spots

Haiti was not the only operational area in 1995, of course, where the Army Chaplaincy was
hard at work supporting soldiers. At Guantanamo Navy Base (GTMO), which had been a collection
point for Haitian migrants since 1991, unit ministry teams in Joint Task Force 160 counted more than
23,000 Haitian and Cuban refugees in need of help in August of 1994. Chaplain Reese M.
Hutcheson, the JTF Chaplain, and his chaplains and chaplain assistants from III Corps and other
FORSCOM units were on duty constantly trying to keep pace with the rapidly changing refugee
situation. A chronology of events presented an impression of the logistical, personnel, security, and
religious support challenges:

July 1994

20,000 Haitian migrants detained at Guantanamo.
Cuban refugees begin leaving Cuba for Guantanamo
Navy Base and for Florida. U.S. Army South and the
Panamanian government opened camps in Panama for
Cuban refugee overflow. The Panama mission was
described as "Operation Safe Haven." Chaplain Vern
E. Jordin II, a Southern Baptist with the 5/87
Infantry, provided coverage initially in Panama.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{46} See endnotes at end of chapter.
September 1994 Some 2,218 military and civilian family members, 287 pets and 193,000 pounds of luggage left GTMO for Norfolk. Water reserves of 14 million gallons for the 18,000 Haitians in 7 camps declined by 3 million gallons per day. More than 3,000 Cuban refugees arrived at GTMO.

December 1994 Haitian population at GTMO reduced to 4,400 as 15,000 were repatriated to Haiti following President Aristide’s return. Cuban population in GTMO and Panama rose to 21,000. Cubans in Panamanian Camps 1, 2, 3 coordinated a break-out. Some 1,000 Cubans fled to a canal. Two Cubans drowned, 978 returned, 20 were missing. Unarmed U.S. troops injured by flying rocks.

February 1995 Cuban population in Panama numbered 8,500.

March 1995 Operation Safe Haven in Panama ended. About 16% of the Cubans went to the USA, the rest back to Cuba.

Chaplain David McClary, USAR, who had served at Guantanamo in 1991 and who returned to duty to assist with religious coverage in Panama, wrote in his diary: “Some say Operation Safe Haven was a waste, but it did help the Panamanian economy and the Cubans. The cost for the Operation was estimated at $180 million dollars and employed 5,000 personnel. The chaplains worked themselves silly to give support to the troops, Cubans, and Panamanians. Ministry had priority over careers and awards. Not much publicity... a lot of giving and caring... revivals, baptisms, gifts, musicals, bibles, long hours, advocacy, services, and money/donations. The 505th has gone and the MPs are pulling up stakes. My tent is gone, but found most of my stuff way down the road in a still-standing tent. My Chaplain’s Kit is missing. Two uniforms missing. Watch broken. No electricity for troops. Hot (107 degrees), no fan, no food except “JTF stuff.” I am the only Chaplain out here. Called wife for first time in a month and half. Wife hurt in automobile crash. Bills still a problem, and not sure why. I will have to move tomorrow...will probably start in processing to out process... Could have been worse... Good just to sit here and rest, feeling a job well done.”

In Korea, where former President Carter also had helped defuse a U.S. - North Korean stand-off over a potential nuclear threat, the 64 Army chaplains, 61 chaplain assistants, 59 KATUSA augmentees, and 13 civilian administrative assistants, clerks, an auxiliary priest, secretaries, cooks, religious affairs specialists, a family life director, program coordinator, language specialist, and bookkeeper in United States Forces Korea kept up a “forward thrust ministry” with a forward deployed force. For the first time since the end of the Korean War, a unit ministry team was

See endnotes at end of chapter.
assigned to the Joint Security Area (Camp Bonifas) to support the soldiers in the Demilitarized Zone. Chaplain William H. Liptrot, Jr., assumed that position in November 1994.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

The ministry in Korea continued to be focused on the needs of soldiers in a forward-deployed, armistice environment. Training was always conducted at a high intensity level with a “real world” mission always in view.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} Major exercises throughout the year involved units at all levels of U.S. Forces Korea to include Team Spirit, Courageous Channel, and Ulchi/Focus Lens. Worship opportunities, Bible studies, family life ministries, religious education, suicide prevention training, and retreats at the Eighth Army Religious Retreat Center in Seoul, which logged more than 22,000 spiritual fitness training days annually, were examples of backbone religious support programs offered by unit ministry teams throughout the peninsula.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} Chaplain Peter K. Christy, who had succeeded Chaplain Kenneth A. Seifried as United States Forces Korea Command Chaplain in 1994, noted in May of 1995:

The South Korean Army (ROK) went on alert more often than we did. When Kim Il Sung died, the South Korean Army went on alert. Korea now is really the only show in town. We are resourced well for ministry due to the threat. We have about 71 Army, Navy and Air Force chaplains. The North Koreans are trying to bypass the UN Military Commission and South Korea to negotiate directly with the United States. The South Korean government knows if there were a reunification now there would be economic chaos. A lot of the posturing is a matter of politics and saving face, but some of it deals with economic reality. The South Korean economy is much stronger than that of North Korea. They all watched what happened to Germany when the Berlin Wall came down. They don’t want the same chaos in Korea.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

As of mid-1995 the Defense Department planned no reduction in Korea or in the rest of the Pacific Rim. Assistant Defense Secretary Joseph Nye said that the 37,000 U.S. troops in Korea, as well as the 63,000 other U.S. military personnel in the Pacific, would remain in the area “as long as they are wanted and needed.”\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

In Germany, even with the massive reductions and base closures since 1989, mission calls had increased. “U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) has become its own power projection platform, noted Chaplain James B. Lonergan, V Corps Chaplain, in 1995. “With deployments over the past several years to the Middle East, Africa, and Croatia, we are constantly sending unit ministry teams on intercontinental operations.”\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} Chaplain Henry Wake, the USAREUR Command Staff Chaplain, noted that he spent a good deal of his time furnishing advice to former Communist countries in Eastern Europe whose leadership wanted to create military chaplaincies fashioned on the U.S. model. “Chaplain Herman Keizer at European Command has frequently requested chaplain briefing teams to assist our former adversaries in Russia and in Eastern Europe,” Chaplain Wake recalled.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} Even with fewer chaplains with which to respond, the USAREUR Chaplain staff much preferred the tasks of furnishing support for humanitarian and advisory missions to those involved in preparing for total war, which had been their most frequent duty but few years earlier.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}
Statements and Studies

Although a significant part of the Chaplaincy’s senior leadership was involved with the daily discipline of performing religious support as well as with a multitude of training and deployment missions, there also were some areas of interest at the Pentagon which generated new or revised statements, policies, and studies. On March 1, 1995, Chaplain Shea published the Army Chaplaincy Statement on Equal Opportunity. As much a statement of moral leadership as policy, Chaplain Shea reminded the Corps:

The Army continues to be the Nation’s leader, reflecting the soul of the nation, and the Chaplaincy the model for the Army. The Army Chaplaincy must be a model of equal opportunity in our policies, practice of ministry, and religious support of every soldier and family member... We affirm these Regimental values: Integrity, Human Dignity, Spirituality, Religious Diversity, Competence, and Teamwork. Ministry Team members will practice and enforce Army standards of conduct. We lead the way...  

While the chief’s statement reinforced some earlier concepts such as equal opportunity, Regimental values, and free exercise of religion, some new terms replaced older ones. Diversity was preferred over “multi-cultural,” Ministry Team rather than “unit ministry team, abilities and merit” to other background considerations. The concept that the “Army continues to be the Nation’s leader” in the application of principles of equality, justice and morality, was striking as well and highlighted the many changes which had occurred in the Army since the end of the Vietnam War almost exactly twenty years earlier.

Exactly how the Chaplaincy was related to the moral leadership of the Army, how the Army was training soldiers in character development, and what impact the Chaplaincy’s programs were having on Reserve component chaplains who were also pastors, counselors and teachers in America’s civilian religious communities were approved subjects for research by senior chaplains in 1995. Although these projects had just gotten underway in 1995, some work already had revealed promising areas of interest for future study and development.

DCSPER

For more than fifteen years, active duty chaplains had served on the staff of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in the Pentagon. The duties of the chaplains who were assigned there as Personnel Staff Officers included reviewing, interpreting, and writing policy for DCSPER approval. Chaplain Ford G’Segner, who held the position in the early 1980s spent a good deal of time working on policy dealing with the accommodation of religious practices, as did his successors, Chaplains Jack N. Anderson, Philip R. Touw, and Willard D. Goldman.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
After 1991 the issue of policy for retaining homosexual soldiers in the Army also wound up on the desk of the DCSPER Chaplain Staff officer as well as on the desk of Chaplain Herman Keizer at the Armed Forces Chaplain's Board. When U.S. District Judge Eugene Nickerson ruled on 30 March 1995, that the government's "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy was not only unconstitutional but also "Orwellian" because it equated, by assumption, "sexual orientation with personal misconduct," the homosexual policy issue at ODCSPER came back to life.\(^2\) Although the Army's policies did not immediately change, pending appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the paperwork for the chaplain at DCSPER increased.\(^3\)

As a part of Chaplain Goldman's job at ODCSPER, he reviewed regulations and policies dealing with moral leadership in the Army. As early as 1976 Chief of Chaplains Orris Kelly had recommended that the Chaplaincy not be the proponent for ethical instruction in the Army even though the old Character Guidance program of the previous decade had engaged the attention of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and commanders alike. Chaplain Kelly thought, as did succeeding Chiefs of Chaplains thereafter, that moral and ethical leadership should be a command program with chaplains in the role of advisors and facilitators.

In 1993-1994 Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman had asked for staff input on a proposed new character guidance program to address, primarily, the needs of junior enlisted soldiers in values and character formation. Since the DCSPER was the proponent for ethics training in the Army, the questions and issues went to that office and ultimately to Chaplain Goldman.

The first step in considering the possibility of a new program in character development was to describe what the Army was teaching and training currently. In a comprehensive survey of the materials available to unit commanders, as well as curricula used at West Point, in R.O.T.C. programs, in the Sergeant Majors Academy, at the Command and General Staff College, and at the Army War college, Chaplain Goldman became convinced that there was no systematic horizontal and vertical integration of moral leadership or character development programs in the Army.\(^4\) Most institutions developed their own curricula or programs which generally did reflect appropriate levels of instruction, but which had not been subject to a standardized review, analysis and design process.

In early 1995 Chaplain Goldman wrote a staff study for Brigadier General R. Dennis Kerr at ODCSPER entitled, "Character Development in the U.S. Army: A Proposal to Change the Future." In his paper Chaplain Goldman proposed a strategy for a Character Development Program in the Army which would reflect "a developmental and progressive process" of training.\(^5\) Although this concept is still under review, Chaplain Goldman's proposal raised some excellent issues for consideration by both the DCSPER and the Chief of Chaplains, issues dealing with an integrated strategy for character development in the Army and for the role of chaplains and advisors in that process.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
How Does the Army Chaplaincy Impact on Religion in America?

In a completely different and much less formal study in 1994-1995, Chaplain John Brinsfield, with the approval of Chaplain William Huffam, the Deputy Director of USACSSA, began a survey of Reserve Component chaplains and chaplain assistants to discover how service in the Total Army Chaplaincy impacted on their civilian ministries. This study was generated by Chaplain Brinsfield’s research into the history of the Chaplain Corps from 1975 to 1995.

One question which had emerged from a study of Chaplain Corps history over the last 25 years dealt with the relationship between the ministry in the Army and ministry in civilian communities. How did one influence the other over the course of time? What contributions was the Total Chaplaincy making to American religious life and to American religious history? How could these be best described? Although it was clear that chaplains and chaplain assistants had ministered to hundreds of thousands of soldiers and family members who presumably returned to American communities, were there any other contributions which could be noted?

In an article in the Military Chaplains Review, the Reverend Pat H. Davis, Sr., a World War II veteran and former Director for the Military Chaplaincy, Home Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, suggested that there had been (and could be more) ideas shared between chaplains and pastors:

...Chaplains who maintain an awareness of new programs developed and implemented within their denomination might find those programs usable and beneficial within the military. On the other hand, chaplains could assist their denomination by sharing with them new and innovative programs developed within the military that might be tailored and effectively utilized within the denomination.76

Other chaplain endorsing agents and members of the National Conference on Ministry to the Armed Forces supported, and continue to support, strong ties and continuous interchange of ideas among denominations, their chaplains on active duty, and the senior leadership of the Chaplaincy.77

Wondering what positive insights chaplains and chaplain assistants would share with their denominations and with the other members of the Total Chaplaincy, if they were asked, Chaplain Brinsfield drafted a one-question survey. The question was, “How has my experience as a military chaplain or chaplain assistant assisted me in my civilian ministry?” Assuming that Reserve component UMTs were closer to “civilian ministry” than their active duty counter parts, Chaplain Brinsfield posed the question to two hundred chaplains and chaplain assistants attending training at the 6th U.S. Army Conference in Nevada in January of 1995 and to a similar group of one hundred 2nd U.S. Army chaplains at a training conference in North Carolina in March. The most frequently cited benefits of service as a military chaplain or chaplain assistant in the words of some of the respondents themselves were as follows:

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
1. Having the chance to minister daily to people where they work or go to school; “living where soldiers live and training where they train” is an experience I cannot have in my own parish.

(Chaplain Larry Hendel, California ARNG.)

2. Experiencing what a soldier’s discipline means has enabled me to understand better “what it means to be a soldier of the Lord.”

(Chaplain Anita Castillo, California, IRR.)

3. I have been given new skills (in management and leadership) and exposed to a wide variety of religious heritages and climates. This has been very valuable to me to be pushed outside my comfort zone.

(Chaplain Steven E. Cummings, IMA, Fort McNair.)

4. I use material from suicide prevention to teach within the law enforcement community. The Army chaplaincy has tremendously impacted my own personal life as well as the police ministry.

(Chaplain John South, 164th Support Group, USAR; Police Chaplain, Phoenix, Arizona.)

5. The Reserve Chaplaincy enabled me to overcome my own provincialism, to learn to minister to the unchurched, and gave me a great background in administration, pastoral counseling, and suicide prevention.

(Chaplain James R. Shell, IMA, Cheyenne, Wyoming.)

6. One word: pluralism. “I have found myself in a scholar’s heaven in the military as I was exposed to and worked with fellow chaplains from all religions.”

(Chaplain Cynthia King, 171st Support Group, North Carolina.)

7. My experience as a military chaplain has assisted me through disciplined attention to detail, through the development of self-confidence, through acknowledgment of my faith, trust, and reliance upon God.

(Chaplain Carlene Carlson-Cassem, 151st Signal Battalion, South Carolina.)

8. My experience as a chaplain assistant “challenged me to organize, procure, and lead with Be, Know, Do” attitude.

(Master Sergeant Gene Harris, 120th ARCOM, Fort Jackson.)

9. “Being a chaplain has helped me understand the needs of people outside the church.”

(Chaplain Lawrence Davis, South Carolina, ARNG.)

See endnotes at end of chapter.
10. "I've experience several occasions that only miracles of God could have saved our lives. This life bridges and overlaps the spirituality I've developed by God's help." (Staff Sergeant William Daugherty, Chaplain Assistant and Vietnam Veteran, California.)

It was clear from the many thoughtful responses that service in the Army Chaplaincy has had a positive and profound impact on clergy who serve in civilian parishes. As studies of this type may be undertaken and more fully developed in the future, one might predict an even greater body of evidence linking Army training and experience in ministry to the improvement of religious awareness and spiritual leadership in America.78

On an even larger scale, one might suggest that just as civilian denominations measure their impact on American religious history in terms of membership, numbers of churches, synagogues or temples, construction of colleges and seminaries, development of theology and doctrine, and missionary outreach, the Army Chaplaincy, though pluralistic, has contributing statistics in each one of these categories within the definition of its special setting. The Chaplaincy has, just in the period since 1941, ministered to more than 20 million soldiers, built thousands of chapels and religious education facilities, developed doctrinal, training, and devotional literature, designed curricula for every level of education, trained ordained and lay clergy and directors of religious education, and provided humanitarian and religious support to people around the world. A thorough comparative analysis, if ever done, would probably show a much greater impact by the Army Chaplaincy on religious life in America than has previously been described.

Envisioning Ministry:
A Global Chaplaincy of Excellence

At the Chief of Chaplains Ministry Team Conference in St. Louis in May of 1995, Chief of Chaplains Donald W. Shea focused his presentation on Army XXI and his vision of ministry for the Total Chaplaincy. In tracing changes in the Army since 1983, the Chief pointed out that while the Army’s missions had gone up 300%, the Army’s strength had dropped by 580,000 soldiers and $45 billion. “In that period since the Berlin Wall came down, our Army has issued over 700 Purple Hearts,” Chaplain Shea said, “and two Congressional Medals of Honor.”79

Since the American soldiers of the mid-1990s had assumed missions in social, political and technological environments significantly different and more diverse than those of the Cold War, the Chief said that the Chaplaincy had to adopt its doctrine as well.80 The approach of the Chaplaincy to provide religious support for Force XXI had been published in the Chaplaincy White Paper, “A Journey, Encouraging Faith, Sustaining Hope, Serving America’s Army into the 21st Century.” “The task of this Chaplaincy White Paper,” Chaplain Shea pointed out, was “to reach into every nook and cranny of the Chaplain Corps so the vision of the Chaplaincy can be used to focus the energy of every component.”81

The formal definition of the Army Chaplaincy Vision was that of:

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
A CHAPLAINCY DEDICATED TO EXCELLENCE, TRAINED AND READY TO PROVIDE RELIGIOUS, SPIRITUAL, MORAL AND ETHICAL SUPPORT TO AMERICA’S ARMY IN ANY CONTINGENCY; A CHAPLAINCY THAT IS DIVERSE, INCLUSIVE AND RESPONSIVE TO ARMY LEADERSHIP; A CHAPLAINCY SERVING SOLDIERS, FAMILIES, AND THE NATION.82

The key concept for Chaplain Shea in further explaining “a Chaplaincy dedicated to excellence” (to be sure there was a common understanding in the Corps) was that “excellence of God’s work and soldier care; not in a self-serving manner but in selfless service.”83 The Chaplaincy of Excellence would feature ministry teams trained and ready to do God’s work in providing religious, spiritual, moral and ethical support to America’s Army in any contingency.84

Even as he spoke to the conference, Chaplain Shea recognized that the Chaplaincy of Excellence already was being born around the world. If one started in Kuwait, where Chaplain John Powers and Staff Sergeant James Henderson formed the ministry team for United States Army Training and Support-Kuwait (USTASK), the sun which once never set on the British Empire now never set on the Army Chaplain Corps.85 In 1994-95 there were unit ministry teams in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Rwanda, Croatia, Macedonia, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guatemala, Mexico, the United States, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and Thailand, among other places.86

In describing some key words one might use in thinking about implementing the Chaplaincy of Excellence concept, Chaplain Shea told the Conference that Chaplain (Brig. Gen.) Wayne Hoffman, the Assistant Chief of Chaplains for Mobilization, had suggested that the word “VISION” was a mnemonic device. The letters stood for Venture, Intention, Strategy, Implement, Operationalize, and Negotiate. In venturing into new areas of ministry, the Chaplaincy must be clear in its intent to do God’s work, with religious support strategies for soldiers of all faiths and backgrounds, which could be implemented in any type of operational deployment depending on the negotiated resources and the priority of the mission.

Honors and Milestones

As the summer of 1995 approached, the Chaplain Corps began to focus its work more sharply on specific dates. For example, July 29 would mark the Army Chaplaincy’s 220th anniversary celebration. The U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School would begin its move by November 1 to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The Chaplaincy’s revised doctrinal publications would be distributed and the History of the Army Chaplaincy, 1975-1995, completed before the end of the calendar year. Approximately one-third of the 1,200 chaplains on active duty would change assignments; perhaps 20 or 30 would retire. The Chaplaincy, like the Army of which it was a part, was always in motion.

Some of the changes were already known by June. General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, announced his retirement. In presenting General Sullivan with the Aaron and Hurr Award for outstanding service to the Chaplaincy at a ceremony in General Sullivan’s office on

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Tuesday, May 16, Chaplain Shea thanked the Chief of Staff for his support of ministry to soldiers. Chaplain Shea also expressed his appreciation for General Sullivan’s personal concern for his Chiefs of Chaplains. “As General William T. Sherman wrote to General U.S. Grant in 1863 during the Vicksburg Campaign, ‘I knew that no matter where I was, if I needed help you would come if alive.’”

General Sullivan in turn expressed his thanks to the chaplains for their support of soldiers “deployed to places they could not even spell” over many years. General Sullivan truly appreciated his award as the Chaplain Corps appreciated the opportunity to honor him.

There were other changes and transitions, of course, which affected the Corps. The deactivation of the 1st U.S. Army and the 6th U.S. Army left only two active CONUSA’s. Chaplain Robert Vickers, the 5th Army Staff Chaplain, and Chaplain Marvin Vickers, the 2nd Army Staff Chaplain, divided the responsibilities for training, evaluation and mobilization of Reserve component unit ministry teams throughout the United States between them. Chaplain Quincy Scott, the 1st Army Chaplain, announced his retirement. Chaplain Willie Peacock, the 6th Army Chaplain, succeeded Chaplain John G. Cottingham as the Staff Chaplain for the Military District of Washington.

Other early retirements included Chaplain John Rasmussen, Reserve Advisor to the Chief of Chaplains; Chaplain Paul Mason, Reserve Affairs Chaplain at FORSCOM; Chaplain Harvey R. Brown, former Protestant pastor at Fort Monmouth, and Chaplain Richard L. Adams, XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain. Transitions at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains included the assignment of Chaplain Gilbert H. Pingel, Installation Staff Chaplain at Fort Campbell, to succeed Chaplain William L. Hufham as the Deputy Director of the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency. Chaplain Hufham succeeded Chaplain Richard L. Adams as the XVIII Airborne Corps Staff Chaplain. Chaplain Douglas L. Carver succeeded Chaplain Sir Walter Scott as the Chaplain Actions Officer in the PER Directorate when Chaplain Scott was selected to attend the U.S. Army War College. Chaplain John H. McRae from Korea succeeded Ms Shirley Womack in Chaplain Accessioning at DACH when Ms Womack retired.

Those who retired from the Chaplaincy in early 1995 represented more than 140 years of experience in ministry to the Army and to the Chaplain Corps itself. Although their places were filled, their contributions would always be unique and would be recalled by those who knew them with great respect and affection.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Clockwise from top left) Chaplains David Zalis, Jan Horton, and Bob Hutcherson at the Army War College; General Sullivan receives the Aaron and Hur Award from Chaplain Shea; Chaplain Shea presents awards to Ms. Shirley Womack and (bottom right) to Chaplain William Hufham, 1995
Chief of Chaplains Donald Shea, Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, and Deputy Chief of Chaplains G.T. Gunhus. Chaplain Gunhus saluted Chaplain Kuehne as "the father of the Chaplaincy's doctrine and force structure."
Conclusion:  
A Pause on the Journey

_The Lord our God said to us... “You have stayed long enough... turn and take your journey...”_  
_Deuteronomy 1:6-7_

As Chaplain Donald Shea’s first year as Chief of Chaplains began to reach its conclusion, so too did the effort to record the history of the Army Chaplaincy from 1975 to 1995. The history of dedicated service by chaplains and chaplain assistants alike, from the end of Vietnam to the end of the Cold War, has been marked by vision, innovation, competence, commitment and self-sacrifice. Collecting, compiling and writing this history, though laborious, was hopefully a ministry in itself for the modest illumination and inspiration of the Corps. History never ends, but sometimes one must pause in the recording of it until another, with longer perspective, takes up the pen to write again. A few observations, however, may be in order before closure.

At the beginning of Chaplaincy history, in 1775, chaplains did not join the Continental Army because they were recruited by their churches or by the government. They went to the Army because the soldiers, who were frequently from their communities and congregations, asked and expected their pastors to go with them. Soldiers did not want to die without benefit of clergy. Most of the clergy, avid supporters of the American cause, responded willingly.

The pattern of clergy responding to the needs of soldiers continued spontaneously through the Civil War and World War I. In 1920 the modern Chaplain Corps was organized with a Chaplain School two years old and a Chief of Chaplains in the grade of colonel.

The accomplishments of the Chaplaincy in World War II, Korea and Vietnam were well documented. After the Vietnam War, the question arose: what functions does the Chaplaincy perform, not just for soldiers but for the Army’s goals? In other words, can one justify the Chaplaincy from a secular, non-religious perspective?

At the conclusion of the Vietnam conflict, in 1973-1975, when the Army turned its attention to the professionalization and modernization of its forces, the Chaplain Corps responded with more than 48 programs administered from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains through the major agencies and commands to assist with those overall Army objectives. Many of these programs—Personal Effectiveness Training, Drug and Alcoholic Abuse Prevention, Family Life Centers, Instruction in Ethics and Moral Leadership, Organizational Effectiveness, and Seminars in Overcoming Racism and Sexism directly addressed the needs of Army soldiers and family members and contributed not only to the professionalism of the Army of Excellence but also translated into strengthening the readiness and cohesion of the force.

In the 1980s, at the height of the Cold War, Army chaplains helped teach ethics and moral leadership at West Point, Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and at 23 U.S. Army branch service schools throughout the United States. Army chaplains not only helped officers and soldiers think through the issues of ethics in a nuclear environment, they also served as pastors and counselors at the missile sites in Germany and in the

See endnotes at end of chapter.
United States to encourage soldiers to practice their free exercise of religion and to help them resolve any matters of conscience. At the same time the Chaplain Corps sponsored new ideas for the accommodation of religious practices such that a truly pluralistic Army could work together with the highest degree of religious freedom of expression possible and with continued mutual respect. New standardized worship, religious education, and child care facilities were built for families throughout the Army. These programs translated into strengthening the preparedness of the force for deployment and combat.

In the 1990s the Chaplain Corps furnished more than 1,000 unit ministry teams from the active and reserve components to perform ministry with soldiers involved in 20 major overseas combat, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations. Chaplains helped staff Family Life Centers, organize Family Support Groups, make death notifications, perform memorial services, staff hospitals, and create new programs in medical ethics education for physicians, nurses, medics and chaplain therapists. These programs translated into the sustainment of the force during missions for world stability.

These are but a few of the contributions the Chaplain Corps has made to supporting the Army’s mission during and after the Cold War. Other contributions, increasing the spiritual awareness of soldiers and family members by preaching and worship functions, organizing and sponsoring religious programs for retreats for men, women, youth and children, teaching the major tenets of World Religions to increase tolerance and mutual understanding, and providing religious support for soldiers from more than 100 different denominations and faith groups fall into the category of religious and spiritual leadership. They, too, are important to the Army, or should be if as General George Marshall wrote: “the soldier’s spirit is everything.”

There probably could be an almost endless list of contributions by the Chaplain Corps if all of the activities of the 12,000 chaplains and chaplain assistants who have served in the Total Army since 1975 could be recorded. Yet there is one thing that is true about history: it is that history is continuous and contiguous. Every event has a prior cause and usually an end result. If one can grasp the trends and relationships in the long series of historic events, perhaps the reasons for them will be clearer and the lessons one might learn from them will be better understood.

In the title of the Chaplaincy White Paper of 1995, Chaplain Shea described the ministry in the military as a journey for chaplains and chaplain assistants as they encourage, sustain and serve the Army. The journey, of course, is a metaphor for the internal pilgrimage of the spirit and intellect as well as for the physical trip through time and space.

The journey, the pilgrimage of the Chaplaincy, will not end as long as soldiers desire the direction, encouragement and comfort of God’s Word. It has been sometimes said that chaplains bring soldiers to God and God to soldiers. It has also been claimed that chaplains are the conscience of the Army because they are the only military service members with primary allegiance to both the Army and to the religious denominations which endorse them. Yet one might suggest that these statements need modification. Every officer, soldier and family member, if they are religious, have allegiances to God and to Country. They too, as God’s laity, are the extended conscience and soul of the Army. They have been for 220 years. The true job of the chaplain is to remind them of God’s love and faithfulness and of the balance they must maintain in serving God and Country.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
The Army contains the People of God. The history of the Chaplaincy in its best sense is the record of the religious leaders and their people journeying together to do the work of God and Country to build a stronger and more peaceful world. The history of the Army Chaplaincy, especially from 1975 to 1995, has been an illustration in detail of that calling and of that effort.90
Chief of Chaplains Donald Shea and Sergeant Major Elmer Castro honor the dead at Arlington National Cemetery
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.

3. OCCH Personnel Roster, 1994-1995. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives. The Pentagon Chaplain coordinated the Pentagon’s religious activities, served as a pastoral counselor for personnel assigned to the Pentagon, and performed other direct religious support ministries including weddings, Bible studies, and worship services. The Pentagon Chaplain provided religious resources for persons of all faiths as requested.

4. In January 1995, Chaplain Parker became the first Chaplain to be officially enrolled in the Joint Professional Management Education, Phase II, (Senior) Course at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. While there, he and two classmates, one Air Force and one Navy, were presented the McArthur Award for their research and writing project on the Falklands Campaign. Letter from Chaplain Wilbur Parker to Chaplain John Brinsfield, 4 Jan. 1997.


8. Ibid.


13. Published by the Institute in 1993 in association with Tufts University.

15. Ibid., p.29.


18. Ibid.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Rather than a massive forward deployment, the Army conceptualized (and implemented) a few mega-installations, such as Fort Bragg and Fort Hood, to serve as power projection platforms for deploying units.


25. Interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Mary A. Pitts, 46th Corps Support Group, April 7, 1995.


31. For the complete unit list see Donna Miles, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-5.

32. Interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Mary A. Pitts, April 7, 1995.


34. Ibid.
35. Interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Mary A. Pitts, April 7, 1995.


37. Ibid.

38. Some chaplains remained behind in Haiti to continue ministry there. Chaplain Randy Wendt and Chaplain Donald Wilson were two of those.


41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Soldiers, May 1995, p.5. This phase was entitled “Operation Maintain Democracy” by the U.S. Army.

44. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) William Hufham, March 31, 1995.


49. Ibid.


52. Diary of Chaplain David McClary, USAR, December 16, 1994, p.3.

53. Ibid., February 17, 1995 entry.

55. Ibid., February 17, 1995.


57. Ibid., February 14, 1995.


63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., p.2. Chaplain Peter Christy reported in May of 1995 that General Luck had a personal interest in supporting retreats at the Center.


68. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) James B. Lonergan, May 23, 1995.


70. In particular Chaplain Lindsey E. Arnold, Executive Officer, and Chaplain Michael T. Bradfield, who managed resources for Chaplain Wake, and authored numerous articles for The Army Chaplaincy on the subject.


73. Personal interview with Chaplain W.D. Goldman, DCSPER, June 7, 1995.
74. Chaplain Goldman was assisted greatly by Colonel Anthony Hartle, English Department, U.S.M.A., and by materials furnished by Chaplain Irv Wichner from Fort Leavenworth and Chaplain Thomas Norton from the Army War College. Interview with Chaplain W.D. Goldman, June 7, 1995.

75. Staff study as cited, p.2. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.


78. The remaining surveys were preserved in the Chaplain Corps Archives awaiting a researcher who might like to undertake a thesis or dissertation on the subject of the Army Chaplaincy and Religion in America.


80. Ibid., p.3.

81. Ibid., p.3.

82. Ibid., p.5.

83. Ibid., p.6.

84. Ibid.

85. Even in mid-ocean there were usually TDY flights, phone, cable and microwave transmissions carrying people and messages for the Chaplain Corps.


88. The two Chaplain Vickers were not related as far as is known. Chaplain (Lt Col.) Doug McLeroy, former 2nd Infantry Division Staff Chaplain in Korea, served as Chaplain Robert Vickers’ Deputy.

89. Chaplain Peacock’s Deputy at MDW was Chaplain Joseph L. Goudreau.
90. To paraphrase Geoffrey Chaucer, for what we may have done well will we give thanks to the Lord from whom all good things come.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX “A”
History of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School

APPENDIX “B”
Historical Milestones for the Total Army Chaplaincy

APPENDIX “C”
Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants at Work
(Top) United States Army Chaplain School at Ft. Hamilton (Brooklyn), New York; (Bottom) United States Army Chaplain Center and School at Ft. Wadsworth (Staten Island), New York
BACKGROUND

The very same day that the final U.S. Army soldiers withdrew from the Republic of Vietnam, March 28, 1973, the last Army chaplain and chaplain assistant also left that war-torn country. The departure of Chaplain (COL) Emil F. Kapusta, the MACV/USARV Support Command Chaplain and his assistant, Sergeant First Class Douglas R. Carpenter, brought to a close the involvement of the Chaplaincy in a conflict which began eleven years before when the first two Army chaplains, Chaplain (MAJ) William S. Staudt, and Chaplain (1LT) Elmore W. Lester, arrived in the Republic of Vietnam on March 3, 1962.1 The agony of the Vietnam War would not finally end until 1975, but the stains and stresses engendered by this conflict on the U.S. Army and its Chaplaincy would have a profound effect upon both of these institutions.

An important resource for Army chaplains serving in Vietnam in this period was the U.S. Army Chaplain School, the main focus of training for the Chaplaincy. During the war the school was located at Fort Hamilton, New York. Fort Hamilton was officially opened in 1825 as a defense fortification guarding the entrance to New York harbor. It was named after Alexander Hamilton. The Chaplain School moved to this site in 1962 from Fort Slocum, New York. During the Vietnam War the need for an increased number of chaplains necessitated larger classes at the school. However, the training they received "rather than being directed only toward ministry in Southeast Asia . . . continued to be geared to a ministry that would benefit the Army wherever and whatever situation a chaplain was assigned."2 Even as chaplains and chaplains assistants rotated back to the school from service in Vietnam, "the emphasis in formal instruction . . . was always focused on skills and training that would serve the chaplain and chaplain assistant in all assignments."3 As United States involvement deepened in the conflict, "seminars, training packets, and 'Lessons Learned in Vietnam,'"4 began to be included in the curriculum. Additional training in the religions and customs of Vietnam were introduced, as were classes which addressed some of the unique problems emerging from the conflict, e.g., dealing with illegal orders and the means of properly reporting real or alleged atrocities (such as the My Lai incident), the question of conscientious objectors, as well as problems associated with racial matters.5

As part of his research to write He Was Always There: U.S. Army Chaplain Ministry In The Vietnam Conflict, Chaplain (COL) Henry F. Ackermann conducted a selected survey of Army chaplains who had served in Vietnam. One of the sections in the survey dealt with the training these chaplains received at the Chaplain School in preparation for their combat ministry. Chaplain training was rated as "good" by 54 percent of the respondents, whereas 38 percent rated their training experience as only "fair." Eight percent rated chaplain training as poor. Chaplain Ackermann notes that most of the chaplains who chose "fair," were those still on active duty in 1985. Almost three-quarters of the respondents recommended that chaplain training be changed. The recommended changes included more field training, simulated combat training, and a more realistic orientation to combat ministry.6 As the Vietnam conflict began to wind down after 1969, the Army and the Chaplaincy began to try and answer the questions raised by the conflict. The answers they found
would have a profound effect upon the Chaplain School.

When the U.S. Army's direct involvement in Vietnam ended in 1973, the Chaplain School could look back on 55 years of existence as the Chaplaincy's primary training facility. The school was created out of a need to adequately train chaplains to staff the large military machine which the United States was creating in 1917, in order to fight the war in Europe. Prior to World War I, training for Army chaplains was minimal, with new chaplains essentially being informally mentored by older, more experienced chaplains. The small size of the Chaplaincy was the key reason for this lack of training school. In 1916, just 74 chaplains were on active duty in the Army. The plan for the school was developed by Chaplain (MAJ) Aldred A. Pruden. On February 9, 1918, the War Department formally approved Chaplain Pruden's plan, and the first session of the Chaplain School commenced on March 3, 1918. For its second session the school moved to Camp Zachary Taylor, Kentucky. This initial move only one month after the first formal session of the school was to be a prophetic one, since it began an odyssey of relocation which has continued down to the present day.\(^7\)

In the general demobilization which followed the end of World War I, the Chaplain School suspended operations on January 19, 1919. It was reactivated on a permanent basis at Camp Grant, Illinois, in April 1920, with a staff of fifteen and a student body of the same size. After four sessions the school was moved to Camp Henry Knox (now Fort Knox), Kentucky, in September 1921. One year later it was relocated to Fort Wayne, Michigan. It finally found a more or less stable home at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in the summer of 1924, where it would remain located for the next four years. By 1928, there were only 125 chaplains on active duty in the Army, and the school at Fort Leavenworth that year trained only one Regular and eleven Reserve Army chaplains. The next step was an obvious one -- the activities of the Chaplain School were suspended (although it was never officially inactivated), and would remain so until World War II.\(^8\)

By 1940, "all that was left of the Chaplain School...was the name, together with a fund of $101.92, two hundred pounds of records, a library of fifteen books, and ten framed pictures of past classes."\(^9\) On February 2, 1942, the school was reactivated at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. In August of that same year it was moved to Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It remained here for two years; in August, 1944, it was transferred to Fort Devens, Massachusetts. It ended the war at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia. Between 1942 and 1945, the Chaplain School graduated more than 8,000 chaplains.\(^10\)

In mid-1946, because of the deactivization of Fort Oglethorpe, the Chaplain School moved to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania — its eleventh "new" home since 1918. In 1951, it moved to Fort Slocum, New York, which was located on an island off the town of New Rochelle.\(^11\) It was a move which the school's commandant, Chaplain (COL) Joseph P. Koch, hailed as "the first step toward making Fort Slocum the West Point of the Chaplain Corps."\(^12\) Chaplain Koch felt that this site offered the best location that the school had had during its entire history. Despite this judgement, the school moved for the thirteenth time in 1961, to Fort Hamilton, New York, mainly to come to grips with an obvious need for a larger physical plant and more readily available housing.\(^13\) The next move would come in the wake of the Vietnam War, and would also find the Chaplain School a part of a program of reorganization and reform which would transform the United States Army.
REORGANIZATION AND REFORM

For the Chaplain School the process of change officially began on October 2, 1972, when General Bruce Palmer, Jr., the Acting Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, signed the document which put forward the process under which a sweeping reorganization of the U.S. Army would take place. Called Operation STEADFAST, its goals were to improve readiness; harness school and combat development activities; and improve management. This reorganization would create the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), under which the school would be aligned.14

Other important changes also took place at the school. The Department of the Army announced on January 15, 1973, that the school would be relocated from Fort Hamilton to Fort Wadsworth, on Staten Island, New York. Situated across the Verrazano Narrows from Fort Hamilton, Fort Wadsworth was the fourteenth home of the school. It was also decided that the Chaplain Board would move to Fort Wadsworth from Fort Meade, Maryland. Additionally, chaplain elements from the Combat Development Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, were sent to the school. All of these changes were completed by 1974. The end of 1973 also saw the Chaplain School formally redesignated as the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS).15 The reorganization and reform of the Army in this period had a profound effect upon the Chaplaincy. Under the direction of two dynamic Chiefs of Chaplain's, Chaplain (MG) Gerhardt W. Hyatt (1971-1975), and Chaplain (MG) Orris E. Kelly (1975-1979), these reforms and reorganizations were initiated at the school by a series of vigorous commandants: Chaplain (COL) Chester H. Lindsey (1971-1975), Chaplain (COL) John J. Murphy (1975-1976), Chaplain (COL) Clifford T. Weathers (1976), and Chaplain (COL) Charles F. Kriete (1976-1978).

On September 7, 1976, just a week before his tragic and unexpected death, Chaplain John J. Murphy submitted to General William E. DePuy, the head of TRADOC, a detailed study which looked to the future of training at USACHCS. Chaplain Murphy had appointed an ad hoc study group to look at professional development in the Chaplaincy in August 1975. It was chartered to examine all facets of training at the school. The study was completed on August 31, 1976, at a special ratification conference of major command Staff Chaplains. The process used to develop the plan was a modified Delphi process which involved every chaplain in the Army in an iterative process of sharing and expanding both written and oral insights.16

From the outset, as an integral part of TRADOC, USACHCS was tied to the training reforms developed by Generals William DePuy and Donn Starry, who headed TRADOC during this period. While the Army Surgeon General and Judge Advocate General retained schools independent of TRADOC, the Chaplaincy was the only professional branch to cast its lot with the Army's trainer and architect of the future. It was not an uncontroversial choice and it created a triangular relationship among the Commander of TRADOC, the Chief of Chaplains, and the Commandant of USACHCS. This relationship was frequently difficult.17

For example, in the TRADOC system the commandant of a branch school is the chief and proponent for the branch. However, the Chief of Chaplains remained the branch chief while the commandant of USACHCS held functional proponency for training. Additionally, as professionals, chaplain training was necessarily out of step with that of other Army officers. The Chaplain Officer Basic Course (CHOBC) was the chaplain lieutenant's first military training to prepare for service as a battalion chaplain. Other branches' second lieutenants had completed ROTC training before...
Chaplain (Colonel) Roy V. Peters
Commandant U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School

Chaplain (Colonel) Richard R. Tupy, Jr.
Commandant U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School
1981 – 1985

Chaplain (Colonel) Charles J. McDonnell
Commandant U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School
1984 – 1986

Chaplain (Colonel) Charles T. Clanton
Commandant U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School
1986 –
reaching OBC in preparation for service as platoon leaders. The Chaplain Officer Advanced Course (CHOAC) prepared chaplains for service on battalion staffs while other OACs prepared company commanders. The development of doctrine created similar opportunities for disagreement. The Chief of Chaplains, like the Judge Adjutant General and the Surgeon General, has significant peacetime responsibilities as well as a wartime mission. "The Army Trains as it Fights," DePuy's maxim, turned out to be very complex because the Chaplaincy's critical battlefield mission extended from the front line of troops (FLOT), back through the rear area to the families at the installations and to the home stations of the reserve components.18

Nevertheless, the fact that the school was a TRADOC school created advantages and opportunities for the Chaplaincy. TRADOC provided a powerful model for school operations in Instructional Systems Development (ISD), later called the Systems Approach to Training (SAT). SAT made it possible to link school training to field performance. It focused energies on preparing chaplains and chaplain assistants who could perform the tasks required to do the work of the Chaplaincy. The system required that USACHCS continuously monitor both the nature of jobs in the field and the performance of USACHCS graduates. Data collected in the field along with student reaction was fed back into the curriculum in order to improve its effectiveness.19

TRADOC also provided a direct link to the changes which were sweeping through the Army. From 1973 onward the USACHCS staff and faculty participated in designing curriculum for all service schools. At the same time, USACHCS students received common core and common leader training instruction in line with that taught at other service schools. During Chaplain Hyatt's tenure as Chief of Chaplains, the school took on the coloration which served it during the 1970's and 1980's. Commandants such as Charles Kriete, Clifford Weathers, and Richard Tupy all had served on Hyatt's staff. As a result, many of his initiatives in management and organizational development found their way into the USACHCS curriculum. The Leadership and Management Division, in particular, was active in promulgating by Objectives for Results. This Division was also heavily involved in formulating and disseminating computer programs for managing nonappropriated chaplain's funds. Chaplain and chaplain assistant programs of instruction show heavy emphasis on parish development, parish programs, and pastoral counseling. Courses such as the Installation Chaplain Course, Division Chaplain Course, Pastoral Coordinator, Nonappropriated Chaplain Fund Clerk, and Nonappropriated Chaplain Fund Custodian courses are tied in directly and closely with policy directives and initiatives from the installation management section of the Chief of Chaplains Office. In short, commandants are clearly in tune with the objectives of the Chief of Chaplains.20

At the same time the influence of the TRADOC system on the Chaplain School grew. Working under the SAT methodology, USACHCS produced Field Manuals, Field Circulars, Task Lists, Soldiers Manuals, Individual Training Plans, Programs of Instruction, Training Extension Courses (TEC), educational television tapes, lesson plans, job performance aids, reference books, and correspondence courses. All of these were based on the tasks that chaplains and chaplain assistants did on their jobs. From TRADOC, also came the push for "Battle Focus Training," to train for combat. The schools were to write exclusively on doctrine and training which prepared soldiers to perform their tasks in combat. The potential for conflict between TRADOC and the Chaplaincy was also part of this equation. The TRADOC orientation was on hard skills, combat critical tasks for soldiers, for the Army in the field. The Chief of Chaplains Office saw the world in terms of human relations skills with a first application to the human community of the Army installation.21
In late 1978, as he left his post as commandant of USACHCS, Chaplain (COL) Charles F. Kriete detailed for the TRADOC commander, General Donn A. Starry, a summary of his experiences in his two-year tenure. When he assumed command on December 1, 1976, Chaplain Kriete said that he was faced with the task of implementing the Chief of Chaplains' Professional Plan, which had been approved by the Army in November. It was a plan which called for, he pointed out, radical surgery on CHOAC and CHOBC. CHOBC was to be reduced from 9 weeks to 6 weeks, and two additional phases required development; a pre-commissioning text to be completed by correspondence before the students arrived, and a Phase III hands on experience to continue at the chaplain's first duty station, under the tutelage of a mentor for the remainder of the chaplain's first year of active duty.

The school dealt with this challenge by initiating a detailed front end analysis, and then devoting most of the officer resources available at USACHCS to the mission. The feedback from battalion commanders, post chaplains, and graduates was an important part of this process. Chaplain Kriete felt that this part of the change in training of chaplains was "probably the most successful training program in the Chaplaincy today."22

Chaplain Kriete judged the reorganization of the Advanced course less of a success. Two major problems existed. The first was to reduce a 39 week existing course to a 7 week core which would be compatible with a 3 week self-assessment and an 11 week self-selected program of studies. The second problem was to learn how to teach ministry in the course with a faculty selected for other skills. Finally, Chaplain Kriete saw the organization prescribed by School Model 76 as the most difficult and persistent problem faced at USACHCS.23

**USACHCS AT FORT MONMOUTH**

*(1979-1995)*

In 1979 the Chaplain School moved for the fifteenth time, and its destination was Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. It was to remain at this location for the next 16 years, which is the longest period the school has stayed at any one location. The order to move came on July 25, 1979, ending more than a year of speculation. It was to be a move involving not a little bit of drama.24

In the middle of the move the opposition of the Hon. Joseph P. Addabbo, Democratic Congressman from Queens and Chairman of the House of Representatives Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, threatened to derail the process. Congressman Addabbo wanted the school moved back to Fort Hamilton. Already, however, 69 of the 123 assigned military and civilian personnel had been moved. A number of families had purchased homes, and vans had moved the Command and Administrative sections. At the last moment a deal was hammered out, and on September 12, 1979, the Congressman dropped his opposition. In exchange for letting the Chaplain School move to Fort Monmouth, the Army promised to renovate Fort Hamilton, as well as to keep open Fort Totten, New York. The compromise came none too soon. By September 4, 1979, about 85% of the school's assigned personnel were already in place at Fort Monmouth. The remainder of the staff and faculty stayed behind at Fort Wadsworth to manage and teach the last CHOAC class to be held there. This class graduated on December 3, 1979. The commandant of USACHCS, Chaplain (COL) Roy V. Peters, could report to TRADOC that the move was made without the school losing any instructional time in accomplishing its objective.25
Chaplain Officer Advanced Course (C22) of June, 1980, the first at Ft. Monmouth. Chaplain Bernard F. Nass, Course Director, is seated fifth from the left. Chaplain Alice Henderson Harris, the first commissioned female chaplain in the Army, is seventh from the left on the second row.
Fort Monmouth, the new home of the Chaplain School began its life in 1917, when the Army established a post at Little Silver, New Jersey, to serve as a training camp for the Signal Corps. Originally named Camp Alfred Vail, its name was changed in 1925 to Fort Monmouth. The new name honored the men of the Revolution who fought and died at the battle of Monmouth Court House, which took place on June 28, 1778, about fifteen miles to the west of the installation.26

Chaplain Roy Peters was the first commandant of the school at its new location. A Catholic priest from Sacramento, California, he entered active duty with the Chaplain Corps in 1962. He served in Vietnam in 1967-1968, and had been assistant commandant under Chaplain Kriete from 1977 to 1978, when he was appointed commandant of USACHCS. He held this position until March 25, 1981.27

Writing to General Donn A. Starry, the TRADOC commander, on February 2, 1981, Chaplain Peters detailed three areas in which he saw that USACHCS had made substantial progress. Training development activities he judged to be the school's greatest challenge. He was proud of the school's heavy involvement in SQT. Also, that the Soldier's and Commander's Manuals, with a subsequent merge into Trainer's Guides for CMF 71M, had resulted in the successful establishment of basic design, content and operational procedures for succeeding products as evidenced by USACHCS enlisted developers meeting the second generation guideline. Another area of accomplishment was the completion by a Task Force of a three year RETO Job/Task Analysis in December, 1980. Completion enabled the school to drive ahead into the analysis and design phases of future officer training, as well as with plans for functional courses in accord with the Chief of Chaplains Professional Development Plan, to include an exportable mode. The process was seen as a validation of the task team matrix which forced all staff and faculty to become developers/instructors. Finally, Chaplain Peters saw a great deal of progress in the work of the Combat Developments Directorate at USACHCS with Division 86. The recently adopted doctrine of Forward Thrust gave, he said, "punch, presence and area coverage capability desperately needed by combat chaplains." The school's concepts and studies people, he informed General Starry, were continuing to look at chaplain involvement in battlefield stress, trauma and related areas.28

A number of problem areas still existed. Chaplain Peters told General Starry:

We continue to experience difficulty in motivating our staff and faculty to conform to the ISD process. Often the Chaplains grumble that even God could not have created the world in six days if he had to use ISD. Our basic problem lies in the identification and analysis of soft skills critical to ministry; behaviours, knowledge, and competencies that are rather difficult to measure. However, we are convinced that this systemic approach is critical to guaranteeing that training/educational deliverables are geared to student needs rather than staff and faculty.

Another frustration was experienced in identifying reserve components training needs and bring them on line with active duty. The One Army concept and stress on mobilization are making dents in the resistance of our civilian chaplain counterparts.29

Chaplain Peters gave the majority of credit for the school's success to Chaplain (COL)
Richard R. Tupy, Jr., who was the Director of Training Development. Peters felt that his development of mandatory staff and faculty training prior to beginning analysis and/or design roles, as well as his establishment of a two week training course for Basic Chaplain Phase III trainers in instructional methodology and curriculum, were examples of his outstanding work. It was Chaplain Tupy who would follow Chaplain Peters as commandant of the school.

Chaplain Tupy became commandant of USACHCS on March 26, 1981, following a seven month tour as the Director of Training Development at the school. A native of Detroit, Michigan, and a pastor in the American Lutheran Church, he had entered the Chaplain Corps in 1957. He served in Vietnam with the 54th General Support Group and 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Air Cavalry Division. This was his second time at USACHCS. He had been an extension course writer and a curriculum developer during a previous tour of duty. Chaplain Tupy had also been the Deputy Director of the Personnel Directorate at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Chaplain Peters thought that he was uniquely qualified to hold the post of commandant, with his strong academic and managerial background. He informed the TRADOC commander, General Starry, that under Chaplain Tupy, "you're going to be enthusiastic and proud of our school in coming years."

Chaplain Tupy, after one year in his post as commandant, wrote to the new TRADOC commander, General Glenn K. Otis, on how he viewed the school and its future. He referred to his time as commandant thus far, as a "Getting Ourselves Together" year. A new team was in place at USACHCS, built from scratch, and "working on organizational roles and relationships as [they] learned to cope with new systems and procedures." The schoolhouse was being refurbished, with only two major projects yet to begin; i.e., the renovation of the air conditioning system in the classroom building, and the modernization of the enlisted barracks. Faculty training, he told General Otis, was being developed on an ongoing basis. A program had been added in which all staff members are attached to a Task Team (teaching department) as adjunct faculty and give 15 days a year to training development and teaching.

Chaplain Tupy was convinced that the school needed a logical rational process, such as ISD, to develop training:

We have not yet become comfortable in applying that process to training and in interpersonal skills required by chaplains and enlisted students or to training that requires our students to examine their stance in regard to the ministry and beliefs of others. We've left the term 'Ecumenism' behind and taken 'pluralism - multi-cultural, multi-denominational ministry' as our watchword, but are just learning to do hard thinking required to teach these soft skills well.

In regard to Officer Training, he admitted that feedback from the field made it clear that most of the training given at the school since 1976 was a failure. Chaplain Tupy thought that a complete revision of the training program was needed, "to renew our training in staff and military skills." It was a course in which, he told Otis, the Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (MG) Kermit D. Johnson, was deeply interested. USACHCS was:

Pressing ahead while trying to stay synchronized with CAS3 training, Mobilization actions, RETO initiatives, MQS levels, ethics and history requirements, course
development constraints and new technologies. By the end of June 1982, we expect to have courses, lengths and resource requirements targeted for the core officer courses. Implementation is targeted for FY84.\textsuperscript{36}

In enlisted training Chaplain Tupy admitted to General Otis that USACHCS had published a poorly thought out Soldier's Manual on its first try, simply to meet a DA deadline. The new FY 81 revision was vastly improved, he held, and the school was now going back to "lay the foundation using survey and analysis data not available before. By FY 83 we should have an acceptable task and site selection list in hand."\textsuperscript{37}

The commandant thought that the Combat Developments Directorate had finally been integrated into the training system. "Mission Area Analysis has begun to use Training Development task lists. Division 86 and Chaplain Forward Thrust doctrine which totally change Brigade and Battalion chaplain relationships are being integrated into the training."\textsuperscript{38}

For Chaplain Tupy in early 1982 then, the future remained a challenge:

Most of our training and training products are not really done right. We're often forced to short cut, bastardize processes, and do dumb things to meet a deadline, because we're too busy covering all the action to focus our energies on priority projects or because an action officer's priorities don't match ours. The support we've received from TRADOC has been more than fair, however, requirements that divert us from important missions still flow regularly through the system.\textsuperscript{39}

Chaplain Tupy referred to his next year as commandant, in a letter to the new TRADOC commander, General William R. Richardson, as a "moving out" year. He was still as optimistic about the school as he had been with General Otis in 1982, but the problems USACHCS faced appeared to loom larger than they had in the previous year. Maintaining the schoolhouse was a serious issue. The buildings occupied by USACHCS were thirty years old with many defects in plumbing, heating, and electrical supply. A major overhaul was needed. The school was working hard on laying the groundwork for a chaplain staff section ARTEP, establishing a pattern of Mobile Training Team service to the field, organizing to manage and distribute training support packages, and tightening up the training materials support system.\textsuperscript{40}

The Commandant saw some potentially serious disconnects in the realm of chaplain officer training strategies:

The major problems to be addressed were the impact of these strategies on Reserve Forces and Mobilization. The Army Training 1990 Chaplain Training Strategy has been approved by the Chief of Chaplains and will be implemented with courses beginning in January 1984. A major problem in implementation will be the responsiveness of the ARPRINT and POI approval system.\textsuperscript{41}

As far as enlisted training was concerned, Chaplain Tupy informed General Richardson that the AT 71M Training Strategy:
Is being built on the foundation of survey and analysis data not previously available. The major weakness we see in the data is our inability to clearly identify 71M soft skills-interpersonal relations with volunteer chapel organizations and their members, self-perception as a helping person, and ability to operate with a pluralistic world view. A second order of problem is the need to incorporate shared tasks and training developed and taught at other service schools.

Chaplain Tupy worried about the effect of what he termed "Action Officer Overkill" on USACHCS. As the commandant of a small school, he pointed out to General Richardson, he could count on about fifty action officers, while TRADOC had five hundred. "Message traffic, verbal and non-verbal taskings, and formal and informal reports make it clear that your staff can identify far more work for my staff to do than the manpower system will provide or we can manage."^43

On the whole, however, Chaplain Tupy remained optimistic. His goal was to see the Chaplain Center and School settled in for the long run:

I've not seen morale and productivity so high nor interest in our common goals and service to the Army and the Chaplaincy so great. I am proud to be a member of the team that has been assembled here to help shape the future. This is a rewarding assignment and with your continued support, it will continue to be exciting fun.^44

Within the next year all of this would change, and the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School was plunged into what may be considered its most defining moment in the twenty year period between 1975 and 1995. The issue at base was the continuing debate over where the soul of the Chaplain School ultimately lay. It was the conflict between religious and academic ends, and what was referred to under the rubric of "soldierization." The debate was an old one. When the War Department was examining the options available to it in establishing a school to train chaplains in 1917, a serious alternative was considered which would have trained chaplains in a school run by four seminaries in the Boston-Cambridge area, and which emphasized the spiritual mission of the chaplain.^45

The proposal was rejected in favor of a traditional Army school, but the fissures inherent in this debate in 1917 were still real in 1984.

In a very real sense this issue of soldierization at USACHCS was compounded by the question of control; i.e., the role of the TRADOC commander in relation to the school regarding training and integrating that training into the rest of the Army. In 1983 and 1984, Chaplain Tupy and the Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain Patrick J. Hessian discussed this issue. In mid-1984, Chaplain Tupy volunteered to leave his post as commandant feeling that after four years at USACHCS a change might be in the best interests of both him and the school. At that time Chaplain Tupy decided to stay. He felt that USACHCS was making progress as far as soldierization was concerned, although he admitted that it was not fast enough as far as the TRADOC commander was concerned. The issue came to a head in late 1984, not over the question over who had the power and control, but over the negative results of an IG Assessment visit examining a separate problem. In the end Chaplain Tupy was reassigned in December 1984, in order to write the Division and Installation Chaplain courses for USACHCS, which he completed before his retirement in 1985.^46

The new commandant of USACHCS, Chaplain (COL) Charles J. McDonnell, was a 56 year old
Roman Catholic priest born in Brooklyn, New York. A graduate of Seton Hall University, he attended Immaculate Conception Seminary in Darlington, New Jersey, and was ordained in 1954. He had served as a parish priest, and was commissioned as a U.S. Army chaplain in August 1965. Chaplain McDonnell served in Vietnam, and before coming to USACHCS to be assistant commandant in June 1984, he was Staff Chaplain, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and Seventh Army in Heidelberg, Germany. He would hold the position as Commandant of USACHCS from December 1984 to September 1986, when he was appointed to be the Deputy Chief of Chaplains.\(^47\) Chaplain McDonnell brought to his post a background of strong field experience, a background which would be shared by all commandants in the future: Chaplain (COL) Charles T. Clanton (1986-1989); Chaplain (COL) Bernard L. Windmiller (1989-1992); Chaplain (COL) Bernard H. Lieving (1992-1994); and Chaplain (COL) George Pejakovich, who became commandant in 1994.

In 1986 Chaplain McDonnell, looking back at what he held to be his main accomplishments as the commandant of USACHCS, saw them falling into three categories: the development of FTX training; the creation of a firm base of doctrinal literature; and a significant advance in evaluation and standardization.\(^48\)

The insertion of FTX training into the AIT POI in 1985, he felt, was an "extremely important addition" to training at USACHCS. Field exercises were also integrated into all training, both officer and enlisted, during 1985-1986. Chaplain McDonnell saw these steps as increasing the preparation of the Unit Ministry Team to serve in a combat setting. Three new field circulars (FC 16-50, Unit Ministry Team; FC 16-5-4, Installation Religious Support; and FC 15-61, Battle Fatigue) were written. Also one new field manual (FM 16-22, Conducting Military Funerals and Memorials) was published. He saw these products as establishing "a solid foundation for our training and give a much-needed specificity to chaplains and chaplain assistants in critical areas of ministry to soldiers and their families." Finally, he felt that "significant advances" had been made in evaluation and standardization. Branch training teams had been expanded. In 1984 this had been a negligible activity at USACHCS, but in 1985 there were 16 visits. This process was being enlarged, and already the school was "beginning to gather very helpful information which supports the efforts of our new curriculum review process."\(^49\)

Other important milestones at USACHCS were a drastic upgrading of enlisted training. The school assumed responsibility for all of the 71M ANCOC course. The staff was actively engaged in the development of training support packages in the area of Religious Practices, which were to be made a part of all service school instruction in the future. Curriculum at USACHCS was being modified to insure that the UMTs were being prepared to deal with providing ministry to patients and families coming to terms with the trauma associated with AIDS; as well as ministry to soldiers with suicidal tendencies. Two new senior leadership courses were implemented, both as functional courses: A Division Chaplain Course and an Installation Chaplain Course. Also, an Instructor Training program was started. Finally, Chaplain McDonnell felt that the addition of drill sergeants had made a dramatic impact on "soldierization" at USACHCS. In particular, there was "a tremendous improvement in soldier skills, appearance and discipline as a direct result of their leadership and interaction with our AIT students."\(^50\) The school was beginning to heal itself from the trauma of 1984.

Chaplain (COL) Charles T. Clanton succeeded Chaplain McDonnell as commandant on September 9, 1986. A native of Little Rock, Arkansas, he was the first Southern Baptist to become commandant
(Top, L-R) Chaplain Theodore "Ted" Sirotko discusses the Chaplain Officer Basic Course with Chaplain Thomas Cook; Sergeant Major James Schonefeld and leaders from the NCO Academy, US Army Chaplain Center and School, Ft. Monmouth; (Bottom) Division Chaplain's Course 1989, Chaplain Charles Clanton, Commandant, second from right on front row.
Chaplain James H. Robnolt and Chaplain Bernard H. Lieving, Commandant of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey
of the Chaplain School. A graduate of Furman University, Greenville, South Carolina, he was originally commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in Armor from ROTC at Furman University. Chaplain Clanton was reappointed as a chaplain with concurrent duty on June 15, 1966. He saw service in Vietnam, and prior to coming to USACHCS he had been Corps and Post Chaplain, Headquarters, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas. Holder of a Silver Star and a Bronze Star, as well as having an Armor background, Chaplain Clanton was singularly qualified to continue the process of "soldierization" at the school.51

In two oral interviews conducted in 1989, Chaplain Clanton gave a wide-ranging assessment of his stewardship at USACHCS. The two major accomplishments in the area of training, he felt, were the introduction of the small group method of instruction in CHOAC as well as in the newly created NCO Academy, and in the continued emphasis on "soldierization." The FTX had been strengthened, which was helping young chaplains to understand how to survive on the battlefield. Chaplain Clanton stressed both the "soldierization" process, as well as spiritual development:

In regard to the soldierization process, we always have to keep a balance and I understand that, do not want to become just a military school, but we have to think about ministering in the combat environment because that's where we are being trained to go. We also stressed, and I think it has taken hold, the spiritual development. We're not only to be staff officers, which we must be, but we're also pastors to our people - that's why we are in the Army! We have to be spiritually developed ourselves. We have to be in touch with God if we are going to be able to feed the flock.52

Chaplain Clanton noted the value to USACHCS of other programs which had been introduced or strengthened during his tenure. Especially important were the newly created Leadership Assessment Program and the Basic Human Interaction Course. He placed a strong emphasis upon a viable PT program.53

It is a very strenuous PT program that we have for the students and the cadre. We have seen remarkable results in the AIT classes, extremely good scores in class after class . . . . Since we've had small group instruction in the advanced course - we've seen phenomenal scores.54

During Chaplain Clanton's tour as commandant the physical plant of the school was continually being updated, not without considerable discomfort to the staff and faculty, as well as the students. The U.S. Army Chaplain Museum began a process of renewal which, under a new curator and assistant curator hired under Chaplain Clanton's auspices, put it well on its way towards eventual accreditation as a full fledged Army Museum in 1994. The Library at USACHCS was also built up during this period, and in 1990 it was awarded the Commander's Excellence Award as the best library in the TRADOC system.55

Chaplain (COL) Bernard L. Windmiller took over the reins of the Chaplain School from Chaplain Clanton in July 1989. His three years as commandant would see the United States participate in its largest military conflict since the Vietnam War. These three years would also see the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new restructuring of the United States military.
(Left) Ms. Nella H. Hobson, Public Affairs Officer and Managing Editor of The Army Chaplaincy, with Chaplain John Patrick in field exercises near Ft. Monmouth
Command Sergeant Major Aaron Gibson
Chaplain Windmiller first entered the Army as an enlisted man in 1954. He served in Korea, and after release from active duty in 1956, he completed his B.A. degree in History at Bluffton College, Bluffton, Ohio. He was an ordained minister of the Evangelical Covenant Church of America, and while a civilian minister in Chicago, Illinois, from 1963-1966, he was a reserve chaplain with the 85th Training Division. In March 1966 he came on active duty as a chaplain, and served in Vietnam. Prior to his selection as commandant of the Chaplain School, Chaplain Windmiller, like Chaplain Clanton before him, had been the III Corps and Fort Hood Chaplain.56

Chaplain Windmiller came to the school with a priority to see trained the very best chaplains and chaplain assistants that the USACHCS could put into the field. He felt that in many ways the school was running quite smoothly, however there was one area that was of very great concern to him, and he saw it as a major organizational problem. The big change that he introduced was the reorganization of the Directorate of Military Ministry (DMM):

When I came here, it was evident to me that the organization of having one person as a course manager for the Chaplain Officer Basic Course, the AIT Course, and the Functional Courses, was not working well. What I did was to take the Chaplain Officer Advanced Course as a model... I took the CHOAC model and set up a CHOBC Division Chief, and an AIT Division with a Division Chief.57

Much of his energy, Chaplain Windmiller admitted, was focused on this reorganization. He felt that problems in how the school was organized still remained. "The only area that is always a question mark in my mind, and it's been a problem area ever since I've been associated with the school, is the relationship between the Directorate of Military Ministry and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine."58 Chaplain Windmiller was not able to correct this problem on his watch, however the organizational disconnect was settled by combining the two directorates under the next commandant. On the whole, Chaplain Windmiller felt, USACHCS fitted well into TRADOC School Model 89.59

The other important event during Chaplain Windmiller's tenure at the school was the Gulf War. The question was just what would happen, "not knowing what the Army was going to have to do, ultimately, you have to deal with mobilization."60 Besides struggling with how the school would deal with a large scale mobilization, USACHCS had to address the concerns of the Chief of Chaplains on how to supply training to a number of Reserve and National Guard chaplains who were not branch qualified. In addition the school took a key role in helping to get on line the Chaplain Resupply Kit. USACHCS "also sent mobile training teams around to five mobilization centers to train chaplains in mass casualties, how to deal with families, conduct memorial services, etc."61

The Gulf War was the first conflict in the history of the United States that the American military, especially the Army, was fully prepared to fight from the onset of hostilities. Its ability to do this was a direct product of the reforms and reorganization in the United States Army which had occurred since the end of the Vietnam conflict. TRADOC had done its job. Yet the Army and the Chaplain School was also caught in a terrible contradiction. The Cold War had ended during this period, and the Soviet Union had ceased to exist. The apocryphal sign rumored to hang in the Pentagon, "The Russians, they were always there when you needed them," was no longer valid. In many ways the Chaplain School was ending this twenty year period, right back where it started in 1975. What was
the threat? What sort of a Army did the nation require in this new era? How was the Army to train? How big was it to be? In practical terms the period after the conclusion of the Gulf War meant an overall reduction in the size of the Army. TRADOC between 1991 and 1995 lost 37% of its civilian work force, and 38% of its military staff. The U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School was similarly effected. The two commandants who followed Chaplain Windmiller, Chaplain (COL) Bernard H. Lieving, Jr., (1992-1994), and Chaplain (COL) George Pejakovich who became commandant in mid-1994, were to struggle with the effects of this great change.

Chaplain Lieving was a native of West Virginia, ordained by the United Methodist Church, and a member of the West Virginia Annual Conference. He received a B.A. degree from Otterbein University in Westerville, Ohio, and entered the Chaplain Corps in 1967. Prior to his assignment as commandant, he served as the XVIII Airborne Corps and Installation Chaplain, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In that assignment he served seven months in Southwest Asia on Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Chaplain Lieving would serve two years, 1992-1994, as the commandant of USACHCS.62

When he became commandant, Chaplain Lieving said that he did not know what to expect. He had been at USACHCS in the late 1970's, but he felt that much had changed since that time. His central focus was on what he saw to be the main mission of the school; i.e., "to train chaplains and chaplain assistants, Unit Ministry Teams, to be prepared to go out from here to provide ministry to soldiers and their families."63 Two issues which Chaplain Leiving had to deal with besides keeping up training in the face of declining resources and staff, were the reorganization of USACHCS under the Combat Arms Support Command (CASCOM), and the decision coming out of the Base Realignment Commission (BRAC) that the Chaplain School would be moved to a new location, its sixteenth, at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

The CASCOM reorganization created some confusion as to where the school stood. When Chaplain Lieving became commandant he brought his concerns to the Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (MG) Matthew A. Zimmerman:

I went to him and said, sir, you're listed as my rater, the TRADOC commander is my senior rater. Where does CASCOM fit into all of this? Chaplain Zimmerman's reply was I like it the way it is, leave it that way. And I said, yes, sir.64

Chaplain Lieving felt that after two years on the job, the question of the role of CASCOM in relation to USACHCS had still not really been answered to anyone's satisfaction.65

The 1993 BRAC implementation plan to move the school to Fort Jackson was an issue that involved a considerable amount of planning at USACHCS. Under Chaplain Lieving's direction, work was also completed on an Interservice Training Review Organization for the consolidation or collocation of tri-service chaplain training. In the end the idea of a joint or "Purple" Chaplain School was rejected -- for the present. In mid-1994, having decided to retire from the Army early, Chaplain Lieving reviewed his two year tenure as commandant. He judged that he and USACHCS could look back to a number of solid accomplishments, despite the great changes and declining resources faced by the Army. The school, he felt, had "trained every seat filled by the components in every course." USACHCS had prepared senior level training for the Chief of Chaplains annual training, "recruiting a world class faculty to teach school directed training." It had actively utilized the TRADOC Middle

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(Top) Chaplains Shea and Pejakovich assist with ground-breaking for new Chaplain School at Ft. Jackson, SC; (Bottom) Chaplains Malcolm Roberts and George Pejakovich examine new structure.
SUBJECT: WHAT DO WE AS CHAPLAINS DO FOR SOLDIERS AND SOLDIER FAMILIES?

SOURCE: Interviews with Chaplain Officer Advanced Course Students

POC: Chaplain (LTC) Peter Christy

Family Support Groups
Marriage Counseling
Family/Individual Counseling
Crises Counseling
Suicide Counseling
Suicide Prevention Workshop
Premarital Counseling
Premarital Workshops
Home Visitation
Family Retreats
Divorce Counseling
Stress Workshops
Stress Counseling
Separation Preparation Workshops
P.E.T.
Early Return Workshops
Teen-age Counseling
Parent/Teen Counseling
Grief and Loss Counseling
Weddings
Wedding Renewal
Orientation/New Arrival Workshop
Emergency Leave
Religious Education
Lay Leadership Training
Single Parent Training
Single Parent Counseling
Blended Family Retreats
Worship Services
Prayer Meetings
Hospital Lay Training
Assist. Exceptional Family Program
NEO
Counsel AIDS Patients
Train Volunteers
Cross-Cultural Communication Workshops
Drug-Alcohol Counseling
Drug-Alcohol Prevention Workshop
Moral Leadership Classes - OPD
Christmas/Thanksgiving - Dinners/Caroling/Toy Giving/Food Baskets
Holiday Celebrations - M.L. King, Sweetheart Banquets, etc.
Food Lockers
Clothes Closets
Child Abuse Counseling
Financial Assistance Finance Workshops
Bible Studies
and Senior Managers' Training Program to bring the best SAT knowledge into the schoolhouse. Numerous ARTEPS, FMs, as well as several doctrinal concepts papers and studies had been reviewed for doctrinal sufficiency, and USACHCS had undertaken the writing of the religious support portions of FM 100-23. The school was deeply involved in the staffing and writing of FM 100-1. Other milestones at USACHCS included an NCO LEAD program which now offered college credit and school college training to every AIT student who participated; a complete revision of the Reserve Component Advanced Course; and the implementation of the TRADOC Common Teaching Scenario which is used in all other TRADOC schools.66

**MOVING AND REDESIGNING THE SCHOOL**

In July 1994 Chaplain Lieving was succeeded as commandant of USACHCS by Chaplain (COL) George Pejakovich. A native of New York City, Chaplain Pejkovich was a 1967 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. Commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant in the Infantry, he served 10 years as an Infantry officer, including tours of duty in Vietnam as a company commander. He resigned his Regular Army commission in 1977, and attended Trinity Lutheran Seminary in Columbus, Ohio. Graduating in 1979, he was ordained by the American Lutheran Church and immediately returned to active duty as a chaplain. He came to USACHCS from his post as the Director of Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations, in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.67

Two remarkable tasks faced Chaplain Pejakovich as he took over the reins of USACHCS in July 1994. First, he would have to oversee the move of the school to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Second, he would initiate a process of course redesign that would produce a fundamental change in the way the school would conduct future training.

The original milestone set by the 1993 BRAC saw USACHCS in place at Fort Jackson, occupying a new school building in fiscal year 1997. At the time Chaplain Pejakovich became commandant, it was necessary to speed up the movement schedule.

Increased influence placed on the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) to vacate its high-cost leased building in Tinton Falls, New Jersey, and occupy buildings on the main post of Fort Monmouth, including Watters Hall, resulted in Chaplain Pejakovich being asked by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command if USACHCS could move one year earlier than scheduled. Such a move would necessitate an interim facility at Fort Jackson; the new building construction schedule would not change.

Chaplain Pejakovich was willing to move early if an interim facility was available for training and if he could move with the personnel spaces necessary to function at Fort Jackson before undergoing further downsizing actions. Using good personnel management leverage in obtaining the best manpower situation for the school (no further cuts would be made prior to the move), and with assurances from Fort Jackson that an interim facility would be ready, Chaplain Pejakovich consented to moving USACHCS from Fort Monmouth to Fort Jackson earlier than initially scheduled by BRAC 93.

Prior to the move, efforts to draw down the personnel strength of USACHCS as a TRADOC school had been at work already. Of significant note was the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) Realignment Study, briefed in March 1993 to school commandants (the USACHCS
The intent of the realignment was to move Proponency, Combat Developments, Evaluation and Standardization, and Training Development to CASCOM control. The schools would retain only training instructor base and commandant command and control functions at their sites. If applied to USACHCS, the school personnel strength would drop from 182 spaces (45 officer, 87 enlisted, 50 civilian) to a minimum command and control section plus 17 instructors. This did not happen due to the agreement of Lieutenant General Samuel Wakefield, CASCOM commander, with the briefing given by Chaplain Bernard Lieving on March 25, 1993 as the justification for leaving USACHCS as a stand-alone school.

With the decision to leave USACHCS "intact," the school did not fall under the combat service support school organizational model. USACHCS did, however, adopt an end strength substantially smaller than the January 1994 TDA strength level. In December 1993, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved the revised Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) study which placed the USACHCS end strength at 129. Approval to add one space requirement in February 1994 resulted in an approved strength of 130 – 34 officers, 64 enlisted, and 32 civilian.

Fort Jackson selected Building Number 2179 as the interim facility for USACHCS. Meanwhile, the school awaited completion of its new building, scheduled for early 1997.

By June 1995, an advance party was established at Fort Jackson. On August 1, 1995, the construction of the new facility began with a ground-breaking ceremony. The new school building would be the first structure built from the ground up to house the Chaplain School. It was designed to be a state-of-the-art training facility in terms of its configuration as well as its technology, and designed to take USACHCS into the next century.

The other great change which Chaplain Pejakovich would oversee, with the full support of the Chief of Chaplains, was a fundamental redesign of instruction involving the future direction of training and the U.S. Army Chaplaincy. Driven to a large extent by diminishing resources, this review of training priorities, conducted during 1994-1995, asked the question: what is it the school needs to do and what does the school need not to do? The focus of the course redesign for CHOBC would be essential training with a battalion focus. The course would train chaplains in those key skills needed to perform their mission. Their professional skills as ministers, priests, rabbis and imams would be presupposed to be in place. A new CHOAC blueprint would center on reduced training that concentrates on training the leadership skills that can be used at the division and corps level.

The following changes in course curriculum were made:

The Chaplain Officer Advanced Course (CHOAC) was shortened from 20 to eight weeks in response to concerns about availability of family housing at Fort Jackson. The advanced course thus became a temporary duty (TDY) rather than permanent change of station (PCS) course. Resourcing implications of this change required a Chief of Staff of the Army-level approval.

The Division Chaplain and Installation Chaplain courses were combined for improved training efficiency. Rescheduling accomplished during school year 1995 would permit the first combined course trained at the interim facility in October of 1996.

The Chaplain Officer Basic Course (CHOB) was restructured to increase the required resident training and also improve its accessibility for reserve component chaplains and
concerning chaplain candidates. Among the modifications:

- Conduct of initial officer training was taken over by the 108th Training Division (Individual Training)
- Students with prior Army officer experience could now forego attending the common core phase for chaplains and chaplain candidates.
- Required resident training was increased from five weeks to ten weeks.

The Pastoral Coordinator and Nonappropriated Chaplain Funds Manager courses were combined and the new course was entitled Chaplaincy Resource Manager. This change was made to improve overall training efficiency and to target more closely on the needs of chaplains with management responsibility. After the move to Fort Jackson, USACHCS would not train appropriated funds management; students would attend the Soldier Support Institute course as a prerequisite or complete the Army Correspondence Course on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Systems.

While these changes in training were being planned and implemented, the Chaplain Center and School prepared for the second task facing it - the physical relocation to Fort Jackson. Chaplain Pejakovich issued a directive to his command for making the move: "There will be no detriment in training." Based on that principle, every decision was made with the goal to continue training uninterrupted while the new interim building was prepared for training.

The advance party at Fort Jackson was responsible for supervising preparation of the interim facility and becoming operational with the Fort Jackson installation staff. Training at Fort Monmouth would proceed to a natural wind-down point and the school would systematically vacate its quarters as functions were transferred to the new location. It was an operational plan that mirrored the Chief of Chaplains - concept of "footprint forward, footprint rear" - providing religious support during force projections (deployments).

In accordance with the commandant's policy, beginning in May 1995, incoming personnel began reporting to Fort Jackson, establishing homes for their family members, then traveling to Fort Monmouth and attending the Instructor Trainer Course before working temporary duty as trainers until the school move was consummated. This policy precluded families from making two moves in a short period. Replacement soldiers were assigned directly to Fort Jackson for the advance party.

Chaplain (Col.) James Rennell headed the advance party and began operations with an initial staff of two - Chaplain (Maj.) William B. Broome and Sgt. First Class Margarita Burkhart. Working out of five mobile trailers down the hill from Building 2179, the advance party eventually swelled to 85 people by the time the interim building was ready for occupancy. The missions of the advance party were:

- prepare the interim building for classroom training
- coordinate with installation staff elements in such areas as training aid support, logistics, and housing as would pertain to the school
- train the USACHCS staff in the Fort Jackson rules and regulations (range operations, driving, etc.)

By the time Watters Hall at Fort Monmouth closed, only 15 people remained at USACHCS to
complete the movement requirements, headed by the Assistant Commandant, Chaplain (Col.) Malcolm Roberts III. The list of tasks was by no means small and included the final preparations to load 22 moving vans full of office furniture and supplies. An additional five vans of furniture and other materials were filled and left at Fort Monmouth for turn-in action. Just days before Christmas 1995, the doors were secured to USACHCS – New Jersey home of 16 years – and the keys were turned in to Fort Monmouth.70

The Chaplain School's temporary home – Building 2179, Fort Jackson – was a concrete structure built in 1968. In its "former life," it had served as an applied instruction facility for Light Wheeled Vehicle Maintenance. Its 48,000+ square feet of space had been devoted to shop bays, live engine laboratories and classroom areas under one roof. Over some 13 months, the building shell was gutted and refurbished to accommodate training and administrative office space for the Chaplain Center and School and NCO Academy. All of the museum materials, displays, etc., were put into storage within the building; a traveling exhibit was constructed for display in the large central corridor running the length of the building. The $1.4 M renovation of Building 2179 would be completed in early January 1966 and the keys to the building were signed over to USACHCS that same month.

Chaplain Rennell and Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Jim Phelps designed the interior details of the interim building. They based their layout on the functional realignment downsizing of the staff that was in progress at the time. Each new development implemented from the changing the school's Organization and Functions Manual and the TDA brought follow-on adjustments in space allocations and, subsequently, room assignments for the interim building.

A ribbon-cutting ceremony on January 11, 1996 marked the official opening of building 2179 as the interim U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School. Of the reception by Fort Jackson for the Chaplain School, Chaplain Rennell said:

A Major General William J. Bolt (commanding general of Fort Jackson) treated USACHCS the same as (the larger) Soldier Support Institute. The post gave us its full attention in making the move to Jackson as easy as possible.

It was Chaplain Rennell’s impression that General Bolt saw the arrival of the Chaplain School as a boon to the post and the local community as well. Indeed, all of Fort Jackson's agencies seemed of one mind: to work whole-heartedly in helping USACHCS settle in its new environment. The efforts of post public affairs and protocol offices smoothed the way for handling VIPs visiting during the opening ceremony of the interim facility. The Fort Jackson Military Personnel Office staff performed most admirably in dealing with the myriad of orders that assigned soldiers to Fort Jackson with duty at Fort Monmouth, to Fort Monmouth with duty at Fort Jackson, and with every possible variation involved with operating from two locations at one time. Coordination was effected between the Chief of Chaplains' office and PERSCOM to ease the inprocessing inundation of soldiers flowing into Fort Jackson.

In addition to managing its military manpower, USACHCS moved 16 civilian employees from Fort Monmouth to Fort Jackson who found new homes in the Columbia area. Making the Army relocation as civilian employees were Stephanie Alexander, Gary Blatt, Terri Binn, Gary Bobo, Mary Lou Glidden, Nella Hobson, William Hourihan, Meta Jackson, Renee Klish, Marcia McManus, Cynthia Munn, Teri Newsome, Margaret Robertson, Frank Spang, Johanne Stavola, and Paul Villano. During the transfer, the personnel records of 12 employees were lost by the U.S. Postal Service.

Before the move actually began, USACHCS underwent a series of downsizing initiatives
experienced by all TRADOC schools. The downsizing would continue after the school made its move to Fort Jackson.

One such effort resulted in the loss of the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization in all TRADOC schools. The TRADOC "school model" allowed for schools on non-TRADOC installations to perform functions normally handled by installation staff directorates. While at Fort Monmouth, USACHCS was responsible for its own museum, library, Civilian Personnel Office liaison, academic records, logistics/facility, information management, adjutant and personnel administrative center functions.

Moving to Fort Jackson coupled with budget reductions eliminated the need to have a School Secretary Directorate overseeing a multitude of activities. Those functions were realigned for the new school organization and placed under the Assistant Commandant, the RMO, and the Training Directorate:

Prior to the move:                                                                 With the move:
Adjutant and Adjutant functions                                                 Library, Museum to Asst. Commandant
  to Asst. Commandant                                                             Academic Records to Training Directorate
Logistics/facilities to RMO                                                     CPO liaison to RMO.

Decentralization was maintained for the Resource Management Office functions at Fort Jackson. The Chaplain Center and School was the last in TRADOC to have a School Secretary Directorate.

The long-standing goal to upgrade the classrooms and offices at USACHCS to the level of "current technology" in computerization began to be realized in the wake of the move to Fort Jackson. The school's automated data processing (ADP) plan would be implemented shortly after taking up quarters in the interim facility. One of two computer laboratories would be operational with the first AIT class to be trained there, and the coming months would see:

- linking of offices and classrooms on a local area network (LAN)
- network connection with the Chief of Chaplains office in the Pentagon

Future automation plans for the new building still under construction call for the total upgrading of the school to industry-standard, state-of-the-art equipment in both classroom and offices.

The year 1995 is notable in that it marked the Chaplaincy's entrance into Armywide battlefield simulation. At Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, a group of chaplain players participated in "Prairie Warrior 95" and introduced religious support actions into normal operational planning. An annual exercise of warfighting simulation for joint, combined, corps and echelons-above-corps operations, "Prairie Warrior 95" provided the opportunity to demonstrate the relevancy of unit ministry team staff functions to the maneuver unit commander. So valuable was the chaplains' contribution of real-world considerations to overall play that the Chaplaincy would be fully integrated with every maneuver unit's command and control during "Prairie Warrior 96 ."

The wheel has come full circle since 1975. In 1995 the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School completed a move to Fort Jackson to an interim structure before making its final move to a new "home." Many expect the move to be the Chaplain School's last, foreseeing Fort Jackson as being a permanent residence. In a very real sense, the Chaplain School finds itself much in the same position as it did in 1975. History has proved again and again that the past is but prologue. The
(Top) Chaplain Telencio, SFC Scott, Chaplains Quinn, Gunhus, and Pejakovich test Field Immersion Baptismal Liner at Ft. Jackson
(Bottom) Chaplain Pejakovich instructing in the field
lessons that can be learned from the events of the past two decades at USACHCS may help to shape its future. The 21st century is ahead and the staff, faculty and students look in anticipation to find what the future holds.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., 179.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


6. Ackermann, *He was Always There*, p. 221-223.


12. As quoted in, Arthur Ibid., p. 117.

13. Ibid., p. 116-120.


16. Memorandum, Chaplain (Col.) John J. Murphy to General William DePuy.
17. Oral Interview, Mr. Frank Spang, April 2, 1995.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


23. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.


41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.


46. Materials relating to this incident are contained in, *USACHCS Historical File*, 1984. It includes a long, detailed personal letter (undated) from Chaplain Tupy to General Richardson defending his tenure as commandant; Oral Interview, Chaplain (Col.) Richard R. Tupy, Jr., 9 September 1995.

47. Biographical Sketch, *USACHCS Historical File, 1985*.


49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.


53. Ibid.


55. Ibid.


58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

61. Ibid.


64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.


68. Oral Interview, Chaplain (Col.) James Rennell, 23 October 1993.


70. December 22, 1995 was recalled by Chaplain (Col.) Mal Roberts as the date that Ft. Monmouth's Watters Hall was closed as the Chaplain School for the last time.

71. Chaplain (Maj.) James Agnew, Chaplain (Maj.) Lawrence Barry, Chaplain (Maj.) Duncan Baugh, Chaplain (Maj.) Stephen Cook, Chaplain (Capt.) Scott Davis, Chaplain (Maj.) Archie Linnear, and Chaplain (Maj.) Richard Pace participated in Prairie Warrior '95.
HISTORICAL MILESTONES FOR THE TOTAL ARMY CHAPLAINCY 1970-1995

Over the course of the quarter century from 1970 to 1995, the Army Chaplaincy was characterized by increasing service to soldiers and family members in peace and war. For sixteen years, from 1973 to 1989, the Army went through a process of reorganization and modernization between the end of the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War. The Army Chiefs of Chaplains during this period established multiple programs to provide comprehensive religious support for soldiers and to increase the efficiency of the Chaplaincy itself. Several ongoing "threads" of ministry, both pastoral and administrative, were reflected in the Total Chaplaincy Goals of the various Chiefs of Chaplains. Although these goals varied slightly each year in response to the religious needs of the Army, generally they included the following:

**Goals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Leadership Goal...</th>
<th>Developing UMT professionalism; providing Multicultural Diversity Training and ethical and moral leadership guidance for the total Army community.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Human Goal...</td>
<td>Affirming the individual worth of all persons; facilitating the free exercise of religion and advising the Commander on the accommodation of religious practices; providing quality programs of worship and spiritual development and designing multi-cultural awareness programs for soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Future Development Goal...</td>
<td>Developing policy, technology and doctrine for future ministries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Materiel Goal...</td>
<td>Procuring materiel and facilities, to include funding, acquiring equipment, and planning construction to sustain ministry in the military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Readiness Goal...</td>
<td>Developing force structure, UMT combat doctrine and mobilization plans to enable the Total Chaplaincy to accomplish its wartime mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Management Goal...</td>
<td>Managing programs, personnel and resources for total ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Training Goal...</td>
<td>Designing and implementing Active and Reserve Component individual and collective training strategies to ensure tactical and technical expertise for all unit ministry teams.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The milestones indicated below reflect the consistent attention of the Total Chaplain Corps to the implementation of these goals.

**TOTAL ARMY CHAPLAINCY:**
**MILESTONES**

**Chiefs of Chaplains**
**1970 - 1995**

Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Francis L. Sampson (1967 - 1971)
Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Orris E. Kelly (1975 - 1979)
Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Donald W. Shea (1994 - Present)

**The Sampson - Hyatt Years (1970-1975)**

**Precipitating / Defining Events :**

- **1970** Racial unrest, drug abuse and morale problems throughout the Army from Vietnam to Germany.
- **1970** Total Force Policy established by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird following an initiative by General William Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff. Roundout and Affiliation programs began.
- **1973** Peace Treaty signed in Paris ending the Vietnam War.
- **1973** Yom Kippur War in Israel.
- **1973** Operation STEADFAST reorganized the Army and established TRADOC and FORSCOM.
- **1973 - 1974** First year of the All Volunteer Army (VOLAR).
Chaplain Corps Responses / Initiatives:

- 1971 Chaplains established the first Human Relations Council in U.S. Army Europe to address problems of racism, sexism and drug abuse.
- 1971 Chaplain Joseph Beasley appointed to teach history and ethics at West Point.
- 1972 The Chief of Chaplains conducted a "Conference for the Recruitment of Minority Clergymen for the U.S. Army Chaplaincy."
- 1972 Human Self Development replaced the Character Guidance Program.
- 1973 Twenty-three positions approved for chaplain instructors in Army Service Schools.
- 1973 Chaplain Theo Hoiland served as National Guard Adviser and Chaplain Elmer C. Smith served as Reserve Adviser to the Chief of Chaplains.
- 1973 Reduction of the Chaplain Corps from 1,925 to 1,491.
- 1974 Chaplain (Brigadier General) Thaddeus F. Malanowski became Deputy Chief of Chaplains.
- 1973 - 1974 U.S. Army Chaplain School moved from Fort Hamilton to Fort Wadsworth and became the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS) with the addition of the Combat Development Directorate and the U.S. Army Chaplain Board.
- 1974 Chaplain Glenn Pratt, USAR, wrote Annual History for OCCH.
- 1974 Initiation of Chaplain Assistant (71M) Paraprofessional Training Program to rewrite the 71M MOS job description and to redesign 71M training.
- 1974 Concept of Reserve Component Chaplain Command and General Staff College Course discussed at USACHCS.
- 1974 Development of Minority Chaplains Training Conference.
• 1974 Chaplain Alice M. Henderson entered active duty as the first commissioned female chaplain in the Army.

• 1974 - 1975 Chief of Chaplains Race Relations Workshops and Human Relations Conference met.

• 1975 Chaplain Charles Kriete assigned to the faculty of the Army War College.

• 1975 The Chief of Chaplains and the DACH Staff designed and directed the implementation of 48 programs to address the religious, moral and morale needs of the Total Army. Many of these initiatives, using expertise from both Active and Reserve Component Chaplains, became pilot programs for the Army as a whole.

• 1975 Chaplain Herman A. Norton assigned as Assistant Chief of Chaplains for Reserve Affairs with the rank of Brigadier General, USAR.

• 1975 Chaplain Jack Boozer, USAR, wrote Annual History for OCCH.

The Kelly Years (1975-1979)

Precipitating\Defining Events:

• 1975 Fall of Saigon; Vietnamese refugees to U.S.

• 1975 Republic of Turkey closes all joint Turkish/American bases in that country.

• 1975 Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP).


• 1978 Review of Education and Training of Officers (RETO)

• 1978-7 Development of Doctrine: Division 86 TOE.

• 1979 Creation of AGR Program.

• 1979 Iran took American Hostages.

• 1979 Soviets invaded Afghanistan

• 1979 The Tactical Command Readiness Program (TCRP).

• 1979 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt signed at the White House.
Chaplain Corps Responses/Initiatives:

- 1975  Chaplain Kenneth Edwards assigned as the second chaplain for Minority Recruiting.
- 1975/1976 Organizational Refinements: "One Army Concept", emphasis on Mobilization and Readiness, USAR/ARNG; Organization Development Programs conducted on 19 installations. Parish Development program initiated by the Army Chaplain Board.
- 1976 Joint Training of Regular Army/Reserve Components through the Overseas Deployment Training Program
- 1976 MBOR: Management of Personnel and Resources by Objectives for Results.
- 1976 Training Initiatives: Chaplain Professional Development Plan approved. First Chaplain Training Strategy linked CPE training to utilization
- 1976 Minority Workshop Conference held in Atlanta, Georgia. Chaplain Zimmerman greeted Chaplain Carlton Harper as the "token" white chaplain.
- 1976 First Standard Design Program for Army Chapels.
- 1977 Chaplain Robert Rose appointed as the first USAR chaplain at ARPERCEN.
- 1977 Human Self Development changed to Chaplain Support Activities.
- 1977 Chaplain Assistants renamed Chapel Activity Specialists.
- 1978 Chaplain (Brigadier General) Kermit D. Johnson became Deputy Chief of Chaplains.
- 1977-1978 Reserve Component Command and General Staff Course implemented at the Chaplain School. Curriculum design working group included Chaplain James Robnolt and Chaplain James E. Pierce, USAR.
- 1978-1979 Forward Thrust became Army doctrine.
The Johnson Years (1979-1982)

Precipitating/Defining Events:

- 1979  Lawsuit against Army Chaplaincy and Secretary of the Army initiated by two law students.
- 1979  Guerrilla warfare in El Salvador.
- 1980  Joint Training of Regular Army/Reserve Components through the Capstone Program (Reserve Training Program to Augment the Regular Army) and the Component Partnership Program.
- 1980  The establishment of National Training Centers.
- 1980  Failed attempt to rescue hostages in Iran.
- 1980  Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty.
- 1981  TRADOC publication of AirLand Battle Concept.
- 1981  Army introduced the Regimental System.
- 1981  DOPMA implemented.
- 1982  Revised FM 100-5, Operations, containing AirLand Battle Doctrine published.

Chaplain Corps Responses/Initiatives:

- 1979  Chaplain (Brigadier General) Patrick J. Hessian became Deputy Chief of Chaplains.
- 1979 - 1986  Court Case challenging the Constitutionality of the Chaplaincy.
1979  Chaplain Johnson put highest priority on soldier ministries.

1979  Development of insignia for Chapel Activity Specialists.

1979  Chief of Chaplains initiatives to increase the number of Catholic chaplains on duty.


1979 - 1982  Chaplain Johnson published multiple articles which raise the ethical consciousness of the Army.


1980  Project "Milestone" addressed prejudice, racism, sexism, and communication barriers.

1980  The Office of Chief of Chaplains conducted "Project Milestone" to develop skills, attitudes, and understanding for multicultural needs presented by soldiers.

1981  Chaplain Academic Board reviewed functions accomplished by USACHCS to improve policies and procedures.

1981  Parish Development Training Program introduced.


1981  Chaplain Richard Stenbakken and Chaplain Thomas Smith provided leadership for the development of marriage and family life ministry.

1981  A Multi-Ethnic/Cultural Religious Education workshop was conducted for chaplains and directors of religious education.

1981  "Ministry in Combat" Conference sponsored jointly by TRADOC and FORSCOM. General Donn Starry, the TRADOC Commander, was the keynote speaker.

1981  The Chaplain Candidate Program changed to allow training on installations and at
hospitals.

- 1982 Chaplain Donna Weddle assigned to teach ethics at the U.S. Army Engineer School as the Chaplaincy's first female chaplain service school instructor.

- 1982 The first female faculty member assigned to the United States Army Chaplain School.

- 1982 A Homiletics Planning Group met to consider the quality of homiletics and worship in the Army Chaplaincy.

- 1982 A Minority Ministry Training Course was conducted in Atlanta, Georgia, that focused on "The Challenge of Cultural Ministry Amidst Multicultural Needs".

- 1982 A Mobilization and Army Reserve Chaplain (MARCH) Conference was held in Atlanta, Georgia, to discuss new Army mobilization requirements.

**Hessian Years (1982 - 1986)**

**Precipitating/Defining Events:**

- 1982 Threat of a major conventional war with the Soviet Union.

- 1982 U.S. Army deployed 572 Pershing and Cruise missiles in five NATO countries.

- 1982 Terrorist bombed two U.S. military bases in West Germany.

- 1982 Widespread protests in England and Germany over deployment of missiles to Europe.


- 1983 U.S. Forces invaded Grenada (Operation URGENT FURY).

- 1983 In Beirut, 241 Marines died in bomb attack.

- 1985 Major reorganization in FORSCOM's Reserve Component Management Structure resulted in total elimination of Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions.

- 1985 Fourth U.S. Army was established.
1986 Department of Army modernized its inventory of weapons and forecast a 28-divisional land force.

1986 TEAM SPIRIT in Korea involved 200,000 ROK and U.S. troops in two field armies.

Chaplain Corps Responses/Initiatives:

1982 *Chaplain (Brigadier General) Paul Forsberg became Deputy Chief of Chaplains.*

1982 The Staff Specialist program was changed to Chaplain Candidate program.


1983 Chapel Activity Specialists redesignated Chaplain Assistants.

1983 - 1984 Development of the Unit Ministry Team.

1984 Publication of Field Manual 16-5.

1984 Assignment of a Chaplain to the National Guard Bureau.

1984 Chaplain Corps gained additional seats at Army War College.

1984 The UMT concept approved by OCCH.

1984 Chaplain Automated Religious Support System (CARSS) was created.


1984 Chaplain Henry F. Ackerman began writing the history of the Chaplaincy during the Vietnam War.

1985 Ministry after the Gander Tragedy.

1985 The first utilization of Reserve Component Chaplains in support of Active Component Chaplain missions by regular policy.

1985 AR 165-20, *Duties of Chaplains and Responsibilities of Commanders*, was published.

1985 Chaplain assistants issued new branch insignia.
1985 Orders drafted creating Chaplain Corps (Regiment) as part of the Army Regimental System.

1985 Chaplain (Brigadier General) Norris Einertson became Deputy Chief of Chaplains.


1986 AR 600-20, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the U.S. Army, went into effect.

1986 First Annual Unit Ministry Team Award dedicated to the memory of Chaplain Troy Carter.

1986 Chaplain Jere Kimmell received two awards for excellent broadcasting work at AFN Europe.

The Einertson Years (1986-1990)

Precipitating/Defining Events:

1986 "El Dorado Canyon" raid on Libya


1989 Berlin Wall came down.


1989 Free elections were held in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania.

1989 Chinese troops crushed student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.


1990 Famine in East Africa responsible for the deaths of 25% of children below the age of five (Ethiopia).
1986  
* Chaplain (Brigadier General) Charles J. McDonnell became Deputy Chief of Chaplains.

1986  
* Ceremony held at United States Army Chaplain Center & School (USACHCS) marking the addition of the Chaplain Corps to the Army Regimental System.

1986  
* Standardized designs for 118 Army chapels and religious facilities initiated.

1986  
* Information, Resource Management and Logistics Directorate completed the establishment of electronic mail accounts for chaplains throughout the Army.

1986  
* Chaplain William Hufham, PPDT, wrote 5 year plan for multicultural ministry training.

1986  
* First Joint Task Selection Board at the United States Army Chaplain Center & School.

1987  
* Buddhist Churches of America became the first non-Judeo-Christian endorsing agency.

1987  
* Chaplain William Noble receives DOD award for excellence in editing the *Military Chaplains Review* issue commemorating the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.

1987  
* U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency replaces the U.S. Army Chaplain Board.

1988  
* Chaplain Robert E. Lair, Jr., appointed as Reserve Adviser to the Chief of Chaplains.

1988  

1989  
* Chaplain Timothy Tatum represented the Chaplaincy in the PBS series, "Ethics in America."

1989  
* Chaplain (Brigadier General) Matthew A. Zimmerman became Deputy Chief of Chaplains.

1989  
* United States Army Chaplain Service and Support Agency (USACSSA) study of roles and functions for Directors of Religious Education.

1989  
* Active duty chaplains, 1,524 in number, represent more than 100 religious
denominations.


- 1990 Chaplain Don Crippen, assisted by Chaplain Stan Esterline, drafted Chaplain Corps Training Strategy for approval by the Chief of Chaplains.

- 1990 Medical Ethics Conference in San Antonio.

The Zimmerman Years (1990-1994)

Precipitating/Defining Events

- 1990 Iraqi Troops invaded Kuwait.

- 1990 Operation DESERT SHIELD began.

- 1991 Operation DESERT STORM was initiated.


- 1991 U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) established.

- 1991 Warsaw Pact disbanded following a failed coup in Moscow.

- 1991 Communist Party disbanded throughout the Soviet Union.


- 1991 Soviet Union disbanded following a failed coup in Moscow.

- 1991 Cuban troops withdrawn from Angola.

- 1991 VII Corps cased their colors.

- 1991 Army divisions abroad limited to two divisions in Europe and two in the Pacific.

- 1991 Plans called for reduction of active Army strength from 781,000 to 535,000 by 1995.

- 1992  Joint Task Forces Andrew and Iniki.
- 1992  Army Hospital deployed to Croatia.
- 1992  California's National Guard assisted in maintaining peace in Los Angeles.
- 1993  General John Shalikashvili succeeded General Colin Powell, CJCS.
- 1994  All U.S. and former Soviet Union missiles retargeted to point away from one another. There were 9,000 strategic nuclear warheads involved.
- 1994  Secretary William Perry succeeded Secretary Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense.
- 1994  Army missions conducted in Jordan and Rwanda.

Chaplain Corps Responses/Initiatives:
- 1990  *Chaplain (Major General) Matthew A. Zimmerman became the first African-American Chief of Chaplains.*
- 1990  *Chaplain (Brigadier General) Donald W. Shea became the Deputy Chief of Chaplains.*
- 1990/1991  860 Chaplains (active duty and reserve components) were mobilized for (DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM).
- 1991  First female chaplain and first female chaplain assistant deployed to a combat zone.
- 1991  More than 200,000 Bibles sent to soldiers in Southwest Asia (DESERT STORM).
- 1991  Managed the deployment of UMTs for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, northern Iraq.
- 1991  USAREUR Chaplain hosted representatives from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland for discussions on establishing chaplaincies in their countries.
• 1991/1992 FORSCOM managed the deployment of UMTs to Guantanamo (GTMO) for humanitarian relief efforts (twice).

• 1992 Deployed UMTs for Operation PROVIDE HOPE in Somalia.

• 1992 Formation of Reserve Advisory Council. Chaplain (Brigadier General) Donald Shea served as Chairman.

• 1992 Chaplain Abdul R. Muhammad became the first Islamic chaplain on active duty.

• 1992 FORSCOM deployed UMTs to Florida and Hawaii for humanitarian relief efforts to victims of Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki.

• 1992 Activation and deployment of chaplains for the Los Angeles riots.

• 1992 The first female division chaplain in the Army assigned in Germany.

• 1993 Chaplain Zimmerman attended meeting in Russia to assist in the development of a Russian Army chaplaincy and a position for a religious leader on the staff of the Russian Military Academy.

• 1993 Russian Relief mission with the Protestant Women of the Chapel (PWOC) for Operation Open Doors-Open Hearts, to Military and Families of the Strategic Rocket Forces at Omsk.

• 1993/1994 An enriched training program for Chaplain Candidates -- 45-day practicums in various fields.

• 1994 A five-year Religious and Cultural Diversity Training plan which expanded the concept of diversity and multiculturalism for the chaplaincy was approved.

• 1994 Fifteen UMT’s deployed to Guantanamo with Joint Task Force 160.

• 1994 Requirements for the move and construction of new Chaplain School buildings at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, were validated.

• 1994 Established a second training center for the U.S. Army Family Life Chaplain Training Program at Fort Benning, Georgia.
The Shea Years (1994-Present)

Precipitating/Defining Events:

- 1994 The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) passed both Houses of Congress.
- 1994 70 conflicts were documented world-wide from Bosnia to West Africa.
- 1994 60% of the world's 191 nations were formal democracies.
- 1994 Army conducted missions in Jordan and Rwanda.
- 1994 Operations Uphold Democracy/Maintain Democracy conducted in Haiti.

Chaplain Corps Responses/Initiatives:

- 1994 Chaplain (Brigadier General) Gaylord T. Gunhus became the Deputy of Chief of Chaplains.
- 1994 UMTs deployed to Somalia, Rwanda, Macedonia, the Sinai, Kurdish Iraq, Kuwait, Haiti, Guantanamo and Panama.
- 1995 Chaplain William Hufham began draft of "Chaplaincy White Paper Force XXI".
- 1995 Chaplain Wil Parker assigned to the Joint Staff.
- 1995 Chaplain Willard D. Goldman developed a proposal for character development in the Army. It represented an attempt to standardize the teachings of morals and ethics as related to leadership in the Army.
- 1995 The curriculum at the United States Army Chaplain Center and School reviewed and changed.
- 1995 Plans to relocate the Office of Chief of Chaplains.
• 1995 Termination of deployment of UMTs for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY/MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY in Haiti.

• 1995 Final arrangements for relocating the United States Army Chaplain Center & School from Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey to Ft. Jackson, South Carolina.
(Top) Chaplain Robert Spiegel's ministry of presence encourages soldiers
(Top) Chaplain David Peterson, Jump Master, at Ft. Bragg;
(Bottom) Tiger Chapel demonstrates natural air conditioning
(Top) Chaplain Assistant helps with administration of Communion for 2nd Infantry Division soldiers; (Bottom) LTC Herbert Harback, Lay Eucharistic Minister, assists Chaplain Charles Wheeler at Easter Service for Ft. Ord Engineer Battalion, National Training Center, 1990
(Top) Chaplain Doug McLeary conducts counseling session in his office; (Bottom) Chaplain Joseph Batluck discusses the Carlisle Barracks Chapel program with Sergeant Tom Dawson, Chaplain Assistant.
(Top) Command Sergeant Major Aaron Gibson addresses the Corps; (Bottom, L-R) Sergeant First Class Michael Swingler opens the Fourth of July celebration with the Nashville Symphony in Tennessee, Major Michael Hobson as Santa at USACHCS.
(Top) Chaplain Donna C. Weddle brings the Good News from the pulpit; (Bottom) Chaplain Brinsfield invites pilgrims from Mark Twain Chapel in Heidelberg to a baptismal service at the Jordan River in Israel, 1986
(Top) Chaplain Frank Somera baptizes infant at Ft. Hood, 1995;
(Bottom) Chaplain John Stake baptizing in the Black Sea near Sinop, Turkey
(Top) Chaplain James Jones conducts Mass on the Beach, Ft. De Russy, Hawaii; (Bottom) Chaplain Charles E. Smith, 72nd Signal Battalion, conducts service at Wirth, Germany, during exercise RETRAIN-86
(Top) PFC Hope, Chaplain Assistant, 3d Infantry Division, leads Bible study at the 42nd International Assembly of Military Protestants, Gagniers, France, June, 1993 (Bottom) Chaplain Lavern Clark, fourth from left, with American and Austrian soldiers at the same Conference
(Top) Chaplain Leo "Joe" O'Keeffe with assistants and soldiers at Christmas time in Somalia; (Bottom) Chaplain George Pejakovich and CSM Oscar Crumity (far right) observe chaplains practicing for government service at Ft. Jackson
Chaplain Lloyd provides comfort to a Bangladeshi soldier in Haiti, 1995; Chaplain Zalis conducts a Jewish prayer service in Saudi Arabia.
Sergeant Pringel, NCOIC for the Old Guard Unit Ministry Team at Ft. Myer, Virginia, prepares for a field service. Contributed by Chaplain Al Isler.
(Top) Chaplain Thomas R. Wesley instructs Chaplain Advanced Course students during FTX; (Bottom) Chaplain Wayne Mac Kirdy conducts map analysis in Germany
(Top) Thanksgiving in the AMR Chapel, SPC Greta Reyes, Chaplain Assistant, at left, with SSG Charlotte Lee at right; (Bottom) Chaplain Geoff Moran drums up a song for the youth
Chaplain Athletes: Chaplain Mary Pitts in Heidelberg, Chaplain Barbara Sherer in Somalia
(Top) Chaplain Shea celebrates Spiritual Fitness emphasis with unit ministry teams at Ft. Bliss; (Bottom) Master Sergeant David Berrier and Sergeant Major Tillman Hatcher accompany Chaplain Gunhus on a fun run in St. Louis.
Diogenes Chapel Touch Football Team, Sinop, Turkey, 1976. The Chapel sponsored five athletic teams and numerous activities to break up the boredom at a site 400 miles east of Istanbul. OJT Chaplain Assistant Dan Taylor is third from right on the front row.
(Top) Sergeant Major Elmer Castro and (Bottom) Chaplain Jerry Robinson at Arlington National Cemetery
Retreat Center Chaplains: (Top) Chaplain Anthony Imberi (Bottom) Chaplain Sam and Mrs. Gini Lamback with Christy and Mark
Chaplain Robert Loring, 25th Division from Hawaii, holds baby kangaroo during exercises in Australia.
(Top) Chaplain Einertson pins one of the first Chaplain Corps crests on Chaplain John Rasmussen's uniform. (The first crest had been presented to Sergeant Major Frank Gugudan for the Chaplain Corps Museum.) Chaplain Don Turkelson is at far right. (Below) Rabbi Daina at the Regimental Dedication Ceremony
(Top) Chaplains Don Breland and Ken Ruppar lead a Palm Sunday parade at Ft. Hood and (Bottom) Chaplains Matthew Zimmerman and Henry Wake celebrate at a Chaplain Corps Dining Out
(Top) Chaplain and assistants at worship during field training; (Bottom) ANCOC Physical Fitness Test at Ft. Monmouth
(Top) Chaplain Joseph L. Goudreau and SFC Barbara A. Taylor greet President Clinton; (Bottom) SSG Judith Kelly on PX run at Ft. Monmouth
(Top) Chaplain Wayne Schmid conducts Arlington funeral; (Bottom) Chaplain William Morrison with Family Support Group at Ft. Bliss during Operation DESERT SHIELD
(Top) Old Post Chapel at West Point hosts multiple weddings each year after cadet graduation; Happy couple at Ft. Myer
Chaplains Gott, Reynolds and Colley at Easter Sunrise Service, Haney Plaza, Ft. McPherson, Georgia
(Top) Chaplain Ray Strawser, Community Chaplain at Heidelberg, at Church Supper, Mark Twain Chapel; (Bottom) Choir Practice led by Mr. Ed Matthiessen
(Top, L-R) Chaplain Harvey Brown, Pastor of the Ft. Monmouth Post Chapel; Unit and Individual Training Division Staff at USACHCS; Chaplain Marvin Mills, USAR, Milestones Project Officer; (Bottom) Second Crest as designed for approval by Chaplain David Sandifer and Ms. Karen Dooney, UITD, US Army Chaplain Center and School, Ft. Monmouth
GLOSSARY

AAP
AMC
AOC
ARCENT
ARPERCEN
ARTEP
ASI
BBC
CARRS
CIA
CINCLANT
CMRP
CONARC
CONUSA
COSCOM
CPE
DA
DACH
DAJA
DCSPER
DOPMA
DRE
EVAC
FOA
FOC
FORSCOM
FY
HTTB
IMA
JCS
JTF-GTMO
KATUSA
MACV
MARCENT
MBOR
MDW
MOS
NTC
OCCH
OTJAG
PDP
PPBS
RDF

Affirmative Action Program
Army Materiel Command
Area of Command
Army Central Command
Army Personnel Center
Army Training and Evaluation Program
Additional Skill Identifier
British Broadcasting Company
Chaplain Administrative Religious Support System
Central Intelligence Agency
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
Command Master Religious Program
Continental Army Command
Continental United States Army
Corps Support Command
Clinical Pastoral Education
Department of the Army
Department of the Army Chaplains [see OCCH]
Department of the Army Judge Advocate
Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel
Defense Officer Personnel Management
Director of Religious Education
Evacuation
Field Operating Agency
Forward Observer/Controller
Forces Command
Fiscal Year
High Technology Test Bed
Individual Mobilization Augmentee
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Task Force Guantanamo
Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army
Military Advisory Command Vietnam
Marine Central Command
Management By Objective for Results
Military District of Washington
Military Occupational Specialty
National Training Center
Office of the Chief of Chaplains
Office of the Judge Advocate General
Professional Development Plan
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, & Execution System
Rapid Deployment Force
REFORGER  Return of Forces to Germany
ROTC  Reserve Officer Training Command
SITREP  Situation Report
SSI  Special Skill Identifier
SWA  Southwest Asia
TAADS  The Army Authorization Document System
TDA  Table of Distribution and Allowances
TOE  Table of Organization and Equipment
TRADOC  Training and Doctrine Command
UN  United Nations
USACHCS  United States Army Chaplain Center & School
USAREUR  United States Army Europe
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
BIBLIOGRAPHY


ARTICLES


Brinsfield, John W. "Our Roots for Ministry," Military Chaplains' Review, Fall 1987, p. 25.


### INTERVIEWS

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ENCOURAGING FAITH, SUPPORTING SOLDIERS

THE UNITED STATES ARMY CHAPLAINCY

1975-1995

Part Two

by

John W. Brinsfield, Jr.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 1997
"History is, above all else, the creation and recording of our heritage; progress is its increasing abundance, preservation, transmission and use. To those who study history not merely as a warning reminder of human follies and crimes, but also as an encouraging remembrance of generative souls, the past ceases to be a depressing chamber of horrors; it becomes a spacious country of the mind, wherein a thousand saints, warriors, statesmen, scientists, poets, artists, musicians, and philosophers still live and speak, teach and carve and sing. The historian will not mourn because he can see no meaning in human existence except that which man puts into it; let it be our pride that we ourselves may put meaning into our lives. If we are fortunate we will, before we die, gather up as much as we can of our heritage and transmit it to our children and to others who follow us. And to our final breath we should be grateful for this inexhaustable legacy which sometimes may have a significance that transcends our time upon this stage."

Paraphrase from The Lessons of History by Will and Ariel Durant (1968)
PART TWO

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN COMBAT, PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

“For not in my bow do I trust, nor can my sword save me. But thou hast saved us from our foes, and hast put to confusion those who hate us. In God we have boasted continually, and we will give thanks to thy name forever.” Psalms 44
PREFACE

Part Two

During the period from 1975 through 1995, the United States Army deployed more than a half million soldiers around the world on combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian and peace enforcement missions. As of June 30, 1995 there were 108,000 U.S. soldiers deployed in 39 foreign countries to include 25 soldiers in Antarctica.

In this part of the history of the Army Chaplaincy from 1975 to 1995, the contributions of unit ministry teams during five operations and two joint task force missions are outlined as a representative sample of the religious support the Chaplain Corps provided to soldiers and to their family members during this period. These operations are cross referenced in Part One with the tenure of each of the following Chiefs of Chaplains:

Chaplain (MG) Patrick Hessian...OPERATION URGENT FURY
Chaplain (MG) Norris Einertson...OPERATION JUST CAUSE
Chaplain (MG) Matthew Zimmerman...OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

OPERATION DESERT STORM
JTF Guantanamo
JTF Andrew
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Other operational deployments, such as those to Haiti and Panama during Chaplain (MG) Donald Shea's first year as Chief of Chaplains are discussed in Part One.
In presenting this representative sample, the author had to depend on oral interviews for much of the information. Even so, there were many great stories which went untold for lack of time and space. To all those who served in the effort to bring soldiers to God and God to soldiers in difficult and dangerous places, the thanks not only of the Chaplaincy, but also of the nation, is due.
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Map credits: U.S. Army War College Library; U.S. Army Topographic Engineering Center, Alexandria, Virginia
OPERATION URGENT FURY:

Religious Support
CHAPTER I
HOSTAGE RESCUE: OPERATION URGENT FURY
US FORCES, GRENADA

Grenada seemed an unlikely target for the fury, urgent or otherwise, of American military power. Precisely because Grenada was the first sustained American military action since Vietnam, each of the four services was hungry for a piece of the action.

Rick Atkinson, The Long Gray Line

Barely twenty miles long and twelve miles wide, Grenada in 1983 was a sleepy remnant of the British Empire in the West Indies. The capital, St. George's, population 35,000, featured a small harbor from which its primary industries, centered on nutmeg, bananas, and tourists, found moderate profit.

The politics of Grenada were, however, more complicated than were those of its sister islands. In 1979, a pro-Western prime minister had been toppled in a bloodless coup by Maurice Bishop, a home-grown Marxist who headed an organization called the New Jewel Movement. Bishop immediately aligned his administration with Havana and Moscow to form a base of communist influence. Among his more ambitious projects was a new airfield at Point Salines. It had a 9,000 foot runway, built with the aid of Cuban workers, capable of accommodating large military aircraft to include those of the Soviet Union.

In October, 1983, Bishop was overthrown by one of his more radical followers, Bernard Coard, also a member of the New Jewel Movement. Bishop's supporters organized themselves and fought back; but People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) soldiers, under the command of General Hudson Austin, killed almost 50 of them and then executed Bishop himself. Sir Paul Scoon, the British-appointed Governor General, was placed under guard at his residence by General Austin who assumed leadership of the government from Coard. Some 700 Americans, most of them students at St. George's University School of Medicine, were detained by 2,000 PRA soldiers pending negotiations with the U.S. State Department.

President Ronald Reagan, already concerned over the leftist government in Nicaragua, was determined not to become enmeshed in the kind of hostage crisis which had dogged the Carter Administration three years before. On October 14 the National Security Council asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft plans for a military evacuation of American students from Grenada. There was the hope that such action might not be necessary if diplomatic initiatives succeeded, but no drawn-out bickering over the safety of American citizens would or could be tolerated at America's back door.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Operation Urgent Fury: Concept Of Operations

Since Grenada was part of the West Indies, the U.S. Navy had command responsibility for Operation Urgent Fury. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf was appointed the Task Force Commander. Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of the 24th Infantry Division from Fort Stewart, Georgia, was appointed the Deputy Commander and Advisor to Admiral Metcalf for Ground Force Deployment.

The operation was to be what military strategists called a "coup de main," a one-punch knockout. While the Navy isolated the island with ships and planes, a Marine amphibious force would assault Grenada's eastern shore. The Marines' objectives were Pearls Airfield, the island's only operating airport, and the town of Grenville, which housed a military garrison. At the same time two battalions of Army Rangers would fly in and seize the Point Salines Airfield, the large installation under construction at the island's southern tip, as well as the True Blue Campus of St. George's University Medical School, where it was reported that American students were being detained. As soon as the airfield was secured by the Rangers, two battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division would reinforce them. Meanwhile, Special Operations Forces would fly their helicopters into St. George's, the capital, on the island's west coast. There they would rescue Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor General, who was under house arrest at his residence. Thereafter the Special Operations Forces would capture Fort Rupert downtown and Richmond Hill Prison above the city. As the day progressed, American units would fan out from the airfields and gain control of the rest of the island.2

None of the Urgent Fury Operation planners believed that the Grenadian Army would put up much of a fight. The anti-aircraft gunners near Point Salines and St. George's were believed to be poorly trained and not a true threat. The Cuban construction workers at Point Salines Airfield—600 to 800 men with military training—were armed but believed unwilling to fight. The Operation Plan, in fact, called for the Army Rangers to drive to the Cuban Compound and announce that they were there to reinstall the legitimate government of Grenada. General Schwarzkopf, in hearing of this assessment, wondered, "How do we know the Cubans aren't going to fight?"3

On Saturday, October 22, the first Ranger Battalion, 75th Infantry, at Fort Stewart, and the 2nd Ranger Battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington, were alerted for immediate deployment to Grenada. The next day U.S. Forces Command sent an alert message to the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to deploy on Tuesday, October 25.

The first two Army chaplains to be alerted for deployment to Grenada, Chaplain Don B. Brown, a Southern Baptist in the 1st Ranger Battalion at Fort Stewart, and Chaplain Lawrence R. "Larry" Mack, a United Methodist in the 2nd Ranger Battalion at Fort Lewis, had their hands full. In order to preserve security, the 2nd Ranger Battalion was confined to its staging base beginning on Saturday, October 22, in order to prepare for deployment. During the meal hours Chaplain Mack conducted worship services and counseled individually with personnel who requested to see the chaplain. From October 23 till noon on October 24, Chaplain Mack conducted 14 services with a total of 450 Rangers attending. Some of the soldiers asked for the chaplain to hold letters written by them for their families since mail was not allowed out of the holding area. If they returned from the mission, these letters were to be returned to the service members. If they did not return from the

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2 See endnotes at end of chapter.
mission, the chaplain was to pass them on to their wives and families. These letters were locked in the chaplain's locker at the staging area. During this time at least one soldier requested to be baptized. The baptismal service was held on Sunday, October 23.

Space and weight limitations were very critical to the Ranger Battalion. Ranger chaplains therefore had to take as little equipment as possible. Chaplain Mack modified his chaplain's kit to a small demolition bag carrying a communion cup and a host container plus some New Testaments, a Jewish Prayer Book, and rosary beads. Sacramental wine was carried in an extra canteen. Moreover, Chaplain Mack, who was trained as an Emergency Medical Technician, carried additional medical supplies to include compress bandages and extra intravenous bags and supplies in his rucksack.

Chaplain Don B. Brown's soldiers in the 1st Ranger Battalion at Fort Stewart did not have time to stop for a worship service on Sunday. Chaplain Brown visited as many men as possible in the barracks and at the hanger at Hunter Army Airfield. Groups of Rangers joined Chaplain Brown for prayer. "Knowing what they were going into and not being able to call and speak to families was tough," Chaplain Brown wrote, "I could see the anxiety in their faces." On Monday evening Lieutenant Colonel Wes Taylor, Commander of the 1st Ranger Battalion, spoke to the men and led them in prayer himself as they prepared for battle. Parachutes were rigged for a possible water landing because Point Salines Airfield was bordered on its south side by the sea.

As the Rangers prepared to deploy from Hunter Army Airfield, there was concern in the Special Operations Command about how the Rangers would get on the ground in Grenada. They could parachute in if necessary, but the operation would be more effective if they could simply land in their transport planes at Point Salines. Since D-Day was to be on Tuesday, October 25, there was simply no time to check the condition of the runway at Point Salines. Consequently the 1st Ranger Battalion would have to jump into Grenada.

On Monday, October 24, the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg went on alert. Chaplain Nicholas Waytowich, a Roman Catholic Priest and the 82nd Airborne Division chaplain, attached himself to the 2nd Brigade in order to assure himself that there was Catholic support for the soldiers going into Grenada. Chaplain Robert Knox Herndon, the 2nd Brigade chaplain, was the Brigade Duty Chaplain on Monday the 24th of October. Chaplain Herndon quickly responded to the alert and returned to his chapel to get ready to deploy. A total of 17 chaplains and 16 chapel activity specialists were alerted to go to Grenada by the close of business on Monday the 24th. The first four chaplains to deploy included Chaplain Waytowich and Chaplain Herndon as well as Chaplain Bill Merrifield and Chaplain John Owings. Chaplain Glenn Bloomstrom, in his first assignment on active duty, assumed the Duty Chaplain responsibility from Chaplain Herndon and immediately began to organize for family support ministry at Fort Bragg.

The rapidity and secrecy of the deployment tended to alarm many service families at Fort Bragg. Chaplain Lemuel Boyles, the Staff Chaplain at Pope Air Force Base, adjacent to Fort Bragg, recalled:

Chapel personnel answered telephone calls and received visitors who were frantic about Grenada and who were afraid for their loved ones. Chaplains were on duty, counseling day and night, while other chapel personnel went into action on the flight
As families began to see the news reports on television, the telephones began to ring incessantly. A few men called home from Barbados, and this turn of events generated further rumors. Misinformation is always a problem, and there was a continuous struggle to reassure families with the limited but reliable information that we received. Commanders, aided by chaplains, set up support groups to bring together wives, children, and others concerned about the plight of their loved ones going to Grenada.⁶

At Fort Bragg, Chaplain Bloomstrom received more than 30 telephone calls on the morning of October 25. Chaplain Ryder Stevens, the Division Artillery Chaplain, prepared to brief the Enlisted Wives organization on the 25th as well. Chaplain Stevens had not yet been told that he personally would go to Grenada. Likewise other chaplains, including Chaplain Frank Bruning in the 46th Support Group, counseled and briefed families of departing troopers.

A Furious Beginning

Admiral Metcalf and General Schwarzkopf had their command post on board the Helicopter Carrier Guam. At 1730 hours on the afternoon of October 24, Admiral Metcalf was informed that the operation had been approved. H-hour would be at 0500 the next morning. The Marine Amphibious Force was already present in the area, and the Ranger battalions were in route from the United States. With no time left to scout the Point Salines Airfield, the Rangers were informed that they would have to parachute into an unknown combat situation.

At 0500 on Tuesday, October 25, Task Force 124, the Marine Amphibious Force, launched a wave of helicopters against Pearls Airfield and took it almost without a fight. The Marines, their morale stiffened by a showing of the John Wayne movie "The Sands Of Iwo Jima" the night before, quickly seized all of their initial objectives on the northern half of Grenada, encountering very little resistance.⁷ However, when the 1st Ranger battalion arrived at Point Salines at 0530, the enemy was waiting for them. It was now daybreak and the Rangers, in their airborne assault, were in plain sight of the enemy gunners. General Schwarzkopf recalled, "from the bridge of the Guam we could see the parachutes coming down and the green tracers of antiaircraft fire reaching up past them. As the Rangers hit the ground, they reported that the Cuban construction workers were not only heavily armed but dug in; they occupied sand bag bunkers on the hills all along the airfield."⁸

During the next two hours, Lieutenant Colonel Wes Taylor, Commander of the 1st Ranger Battalion, 75th Infantry, set about with a handful of Rangers to clear obstacles from the runway and prepare an assault on the Cuban defenses. One company commander from Taylor's A Company climbed the heights east of the runway and shouted in Spanish to the Cubans to surrender, but the Cubans replied with bilingual obscenities and increased their fire. To reach high ground the Rangers

See endnotes at end of chapter.
needed an armored vehicle. Sergeant Manous Boles improvised one in the form of a Cuban bulldozer which he found on the runway and hot wired it on the spot. Boles raised the blade for protection, slouched in the drivers seat, and charged the enemy fortifications. Other Rangers crouched behind the blade and fired in every direction. When they reached the top, the Cubans were gone and the airfield was secure.9

Chaplain Don Brown had parachuted with the 1st Ranger Battalion with a T10 parachute, but was dragged by the wind into a mud hole near an off ramp on the airfield. With small arms and light machine gun fire "cracking and popping" overhead, Chaplain Brown ran in a crouched position to a dump truck which had become the emergency aid station. He reported: Some twenty to thirty minutes later the first wounded Ranger was brought to our location. He was hit in the upper right arm. Seeing the first wound made combat real to me. We loaded the one wounded Ranger in front, with myself and the Doc lying down in the rear. By the time we reached the airstrip there were two more wounded being given aid. They were in bad shape and were screaming as the pain came and left. At one point, before we reached the medical school library, which was to be the aid station, a machine gun opened up so close that we had to get down and run the rest of the way.10

As the wounded and dying Rangers were brought to the library, some of the American medical students who had been held there pitched in to help. It was an intense and emotionally draining time as doctors, medics, chaplains and students worked to save lives. Chaplain Brown recalled that while he was helping with medical care he was also able to minister to his men, "praying, encouraging, listening, holding an IV bag, and just being there."11

In St. George's, meanwhile, the Special Operations helicopters ran into intense anti-aircraft fire. They could not reach any of their objectives, though a few managed to land at the Governor-General's house only to find themselves surrounded and trapped. It was total chaos and confusion. General Schwartzkopf recorded, "from the bridge of the Guam we could see Army helicopters on their way back from the island. Two crashed into the ocean. Others set down on our flight deck shot full of holes and leaking hydraulic fluid."12 In response to this fire Admiral Metcalf ordered the bombing of Fort Fredrick, the headquarters of the rebel force. The air strike effectively destroyed Fort Fredrick, though the bombs also accidentally wrecked a mental hospital next door which Task Force intelligence had not known was there.

By 1000 hours the Rangers, having secured the runway at Point Salines, moved through the True Blue Campus to find more of the students they were to rescue. It was an unpleasant shock to discover that only a few of the students were there. Most of them were at a beach front hotel two miles away at a place called Grand Anse.
Reinforcements

We went in there and found a bunch of Rangers all shot up and Cubans...we didn't know they were going to fight as long and as hard as they did.

Colonel Silvsy, 82nd Airborne

While the Rangers were securing the airfield, a total of six battalions of troops from the XVIII Airborne Corps began arriving at Point Salines. Chaplain Waytowich, the 82nd Airborne Division chaplain, was the first chaplain to arrive from Fort Bragg. By the close of the day he was joined by Chaplain Herndon, the 2nd Brigade chaplain, Chaplain William Merrifield of the 2/325th Infantry, Chaplain John Owings of the 2/325th Infantry, and Chaplain Frank Whalen of the 320th Artillery.

Almost immediately the Fort Bragg chaplains began to experience difficulties. Many had packed their chaplain kits in A Bags with the promise that these bags would be delivered to them in Grenada upon arrival. When they were delayed, the chaplains had no communion equipment or other necessary supplies. Likewise there was very little transportation available, which presented difficulties in uniting chaplains and their chapel activity specialists who sometimes arrived on different aircraft. A lack of maps and communication equipment also presented bewildering situations to chaplains who had to spend time searching for their units.

Nevertheless, Chaplain Waytowich joined the 1st Ranger Battalion as soon as he could to provide comfort for the wounded and to assist Chaplain Brown with any Catholic coverage needs. Throughout the night chaplains and their chapel activity specialists worked to link up with their units and to provide ministry. Chaplain Merrifield found the bodies of three soldiers, two Grenadians and one Cuban killed in the first attack. With snipers still in the area, most of the soldiers were on high alert. Even as late as 0630 on the morning of October 26, Chaplain Herndon reported that there was rifle fire "pinging over their heads."

Throughout the first two days there also was a concern for mistakes in identity and casualties by "friendly fire." Chaplain Herndon recalled intervening personally to limit one such occurrence:

Our 2nd Brigade headquarters was on the top of a hill overlooking seven warehouses with all the munitions in them, when an A7A American fighter jet from one of the carriers mistook our headquarters for an enemy position. The jet staffed our headquarters which caused 16 casualties. Two soldiers lost their legs and one died later. I was approximately 400 meters away at the warehouses when we believed the same jet came over us. Everybody hit the ground. He came very low over us and came back around again for what appeared to be another staffing run. As he was approaching, I said to myself, 'I don't want to die lying down,' so I jumped up and grabbed an illuminating panel off a truck and stood there waving off the aircraft. I didn't want a repeat of what tragically had just happened.14

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Day Two

By mid-morning on Wednesday the 26th, General Schwartzkopf had advised Admiral Metcalf not to wait on the 82nd Airborne Division to move across land to rescue the students at Grand Anse. Rather the 2nd Ranger Battalion from Fort Lewis would be flown in by Marine helicopters to rescue the students. This raid took only a few hours to prepare and was simplified by the fact that one student, a former Special Forces medic, had simply picked up the telephone at Grand Anse and called the Point Salines Airfield. The student explained that the enemy troops were entrenched and facing south for a possible land attack. The students were told to tie white arm bands on their upper arms, put mattresses against the windows and lie on the floor until the Marines could land the helicopters and rescue them. The Rangers on Marine helicopters went in at 1615 hours and the plan worked flawlessly. The Marines shuttled Rangers to Grand Anse and students back to Point Salines. Within 30 minutes 224 students had been rescued with only two Rangers slightly injured.

Although casualties were light, the rescue was not completely uneventful. While the students were being picked up, the enemy was firing mortars at the helicopters from the top of the Russian consulate. As the last helicopter of Rangers was leaving, it was hit and downed. The Rangers used the onboard life raft to escape capture and paddled 12 miles out to sea where they were picked up by a U.S. Navy destroyer. Chaplain Mack remembered the gloom in the Regiment until the radio call came in from the Navy, "Did you guys lose some Rangers? One of our destroyers just picked up a gaggle in a raft. They were waving at us and yelling, 'Hey we're Rangers.' They're on board and safe."¹⁵

Meanwhile, a battalion task force from the 82nd Airborne, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel George Crocker, moved to the east end of Point Salines Airport. There, after a brief fire fight, the 82nd liberated 183 students at Lance aux Epines. Chaplain Herndon, the 2nd Brigade Chaplain, located an abandoned yellow golf cart which he used to visit his units. Although the vehicle was a bit odd-looking, transportation was at a premium. Chaplain Herndon asked the G4 supply officer for some USO stationary and envelopes. These he delivered to the troops so they could write at least one letter home. "Postage was free," Chaplain Herndon said, "so hundreds of letters got to families of deployed soldiers."¹⁶

On the morning of Thursday, October 27th, the Marines finished sweeping the high ground above St. George's and encircled the town. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the Task Force to take the Calivigny Barracks by the end of the day. Calivigny was a garrison situated on a peninsula about five miles east of Point Salines. It had been a Cuban-run, terrorist training camp. The 82nd Airborne was headed in that direction but moving slowly in order to clear enemy soldiers from each possible hiding place. Consequently the 2nd Ranger Battalion was ordered to secure Calivigny Barracks.

Ironically, on the morning of October 27th, Chaplain Larry Mack was celebrating company-level Communon and Thanksgiving services within the 2nd Ranger Battalion. They had not suffered any deaths to that point and they had expected to redeploy that night to Fort Lewis. However, as he was beginning a service in B Company, they received another mission. The Rangers quickly loaded on Army Blackhawk helicopters for the airmobile assault on the Cuban training camp at Calivigny.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
At approximately 1645 hours the Rangers went in. The operation had all the markings of a disaster. At least a squad of Grenadians and Cubans with automatic weapons fired on the helicopters as they crowded into a small landing zone. Shattered rotor blades flew in every direction and cut down almost a dozen Rangers. Chaplain Mack immediately joined the medics to try to save lives. Two Rangers had been immediately killed by flying rotor blades, one had been hit in the neck by small arms fire from the enemy. These three Rangers, killed in action, had attended the Thanksgiving service that morning.

Peace Again

By Friday, October 28th, the battle for Grenada was effectively over. The Marines moved into St. George's where the townspeople emerged from their hiding places and welcomed them as liberators. A total 740 American citizens, 595 of them students, were liberated and flown back to the United States. The multiple problems involved in Operation Urgent Fury—the lack of joint doctrine, the lack of transportation and communication for chaplains, and the short time available for hasty deployment—all provided lessons for future joint operations planning.

The United States Government listed 19 U.S. troops killed and 116 wounded as opposed to 84 Cubans and 160 PRA troops killed or wounded on the opposing side. Additionally, civilian casualties were estimated at 45 dead, some of whom died as a result of the bombing of the mental hospital.

President Ronald Reagan called Operation Urgent Fury a "brilliant campaign." Army Secretary John Marsh praised the invasion as a "great success." However, the Pentagon sharply criticized the operations, particularly the communication and the intelligence defects. Colonel Stephen Silvasy, 82nd Airborne Division, said his brigade could see the command ship about a mile offshore in Grenada, but because of differences in radio equipment could not communicate with it. Nevertheless more than 9,000 medals for valor and achievement were awarded, far exceeding the number of soldiers who actually deployed to Grenada. An Army spokesman defended the plethora of decorations as "a valuable and effective leadership tool to build unit morale."19

As the first sustained joint military operation since the Vietnam War, Operation Urgent Fury pointed out that American troops were still highly motivated when properly led. Eventually Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act which empowered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a more directive role in future operations. Likewise, many of the communications problems between the separate services went back to the drawing board for correction.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
The Chaplain as Interpreter

One of the tasks which fell to American troops after the shooting stopped was policing up weapons on the island. Members of the diplomatic missions from the Eastern Bloc countries (under the influence of the Russian embassy in Grenada) were particularly suspect when it came to smuggling weapons out of the country. Most of these diplomats were processed off the island though a checkpoint manned by the 82d Airborne Division Support Command (DISCOM). Chaplain Peter Telencio, who was serving as the DISCOM Chaplain at the time, recalled an incident in which his fluency in Russian as an Eastern Orthodox priest paid off:

We (the DISCOM) were responsible for all the logistics support on the island. One of the other responsibilities we had was outprocessing the Eastern Bloc personnel. DISCOM was used as a kind of rallying point prior to their being sent back to their own posts. On one of my breaks, I went into the back of the DISCOM headquarters building. There I saw a deuce and a half with all the embassy supplies in it. The Russian ambassador and his aide were talking very secretively.

Chaplain Telencio eavesdropped on their conversation, conducted in Russian. "I overheard the ambassador state that 'we have to get these people processed quickly and get this truck unloaded and onto the plane.' I thought it was strange that they were concerned about something having diplomatic immunity tied to it."

Chaplain Telencio reported his suspicion of contraband in the truck to the DISCOM commander who, in turn, promptly contacted the State Department representatives. The truck was found to be carrying small arms weapons. "I found it ironic that as a chaplain I was also playing the role of an interpreter who eavesdropped on the Russian ambassador to hear that there were weapons [in that truck]," Chaplain Telencio added. "Whether they were going to cause some harm or not wasn't known."

Staying Behind

For two months after the firing stopped, U.S. forces remained in Grenada to help with peacekeeping and nation-building operations. Weapons from the local population were collected and normal security restored.

The Rangers and most of the 82nd Airborne Division returned to their home installations, but units from the 1st Corps Support Command stayed until January 1984. Chaplain Marion Kirk, the Deputy XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain, who deployed to Grenada on October 30, provided technical supervision for the chaplains and chapel activity specialists who remained. Chaplains James Bishop, Samuel E. Smith, Robert Hall, Ronald Reddell, Michael Travaglione and Jacob Goldstein, a Jewish

See endnotes at end of chapter.
chaplain from the U.S Army Reserves, provided religious support for the soldiers from November 1983 through the holiday season.\textsuperscript{21}

Chaplain Kirk coordinated closely with Governor-General Scoon; the Grenada Conference of Churches; Bishop Sydney Charles, the Anglican Bishop of Grenada, and Vicar General Cyril Lamontage of St. George's Roman Catholic Cathederal regarding religious facilities, services and concerns. Both Bishop Charles and Monsignor Lamontagne agreed that the American military intervention not only rescued the medical students but also liberated their island from an increasingly oppressive government of terrorists. In fact, one government "hit list," recovered by 82nd Airborne soldiers, included civic leaders, ministers, priests, and nuns to be eliminated in the future.\textsuperscript{22} The rescue mission, these religious leaders told the chaplains, could not have come soon enough.\textsuperscript{23}

Chaplain Michael Travaglione, who flew to Grenada with a plane load of turkey dinners, cookies, brownies, and Christmas presents from Fort Bragg for the soldiers, said the Grenadian people were most grateful for American help.\textsuperscript{24} Chaplain Marion Kirk wrote, "... it was a privilege to be part of our ministry and see chaplains responding faithfully as they have been called to do in this unique ministry."\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{endnote} See endnotes at end of chapter.
Ranger Chaplains Larry Mack and Don Brown, Operation URGENT FURY
UNIT MINISTRY TEAMS
DEPLOYED FROM FORT BRAGG

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### OPERATION URGENT FURY

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### XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
ENDNOTES


3. *Ibid*.


5. Personal interview with Chaplain Robert Knox Herndon, 22 Aug 1994. Note: Merrifield, Owings and Herndon were all Southern Baptists and received Bronze Star medals for their service in Grenada.


13. Note: In 1983 chaplain assistants were still officially "chapel activity specialists." The old term is used here to prevent anachronistic historical writing.


15. Personal interview with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Lawrence Mack, 23 August 1994. Note: The facts in this account are true. The exact wording of the radio transmission from the Navy has been preserved only third-hand in Ranger oral tradition.


OPERATION JUST CAUSE:

Religious Support
Operation JUST CAUSE: Chaplain John J. Prendergast at Catholic Mass on Christmas morning for 82nd Airborne Division soldiers, Dec. 25, 1989. Major General James H. Johnson, Jr., 82nd ABN Division Commander, is standing at right.
CHAPTER II
OPERATION JUST CAUSE:
THE LARGEST POSSE IN HISTORY

A freezing was falling when we tramped up the tailgate of the C-141 Star Lifter Aircraft. My mind was focused on staying warm, but when I finally buckled myself in, I thought about the trip ahead... about 2,000 soldiers from three parachute infantry battalions who would be jumping into a combat zone in Panama in a few short hours. What would it be like? There was no way I could know, but it was a good time to exercise my faith and send up some serious prayers for the troopers and myself.

Chaplain Wray B. Physioc
1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

A Dictator In The Canal Zone

On Friday, December 15, 1989, the Panamanian National Assembly issued a proclamation that a state of war existed between Panama and the United States. General Manuel Antonio Noriega was appointed "Maximum Leader," a position with unlimited extra constitutional power. Supporting General Noriega were 15,000 members of the Panama Defense Force (PDF), approximately 6,000 of whom were combat trained and ready to suppress any outbreaks of dissent.

For almost two years General Noriega had been a thorn in the side of the United States. As early as February 1988 a Federal Grand Jury had indicted Noriega for drug trafficking, following testimony by former key PDF associates of his. The already tense relations between Panama and the United States deteriorated badly. For the first time the Pentagon had to consider the Panama Defense Forces, not just Noriega and his cronies, a potential military foe. On February 22, 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a planning order for U.S. Army South (SOUTHCOM) to write a plan for the defense of the Panama Canal and American lives and property in Panama.2

Between February 1988 and December 1989 General Noriega had survived two military coup attempts, the most recent one in October resulting in the execution of a number of his key officers. Noriega blamed much of the unrest and descent in his country on covert American operations. Indeed one American business man, Kurt Muse, had been imprisoned for assisting the CIA by monitoring some of Noriega's private radio transmissions.

The American intelligence community had researched details concerning Noriega's private life. Although he gave lip service to Roman Catholicism, Noriega was not only a devotee of Caribbean Santeria, an Animist Cult of African origin. He also employed at least three Brazilian sorceresses whom he maintained in comfort in two "witch houses" at Fort Amador. Noriega was also reportedly

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See endnote at end of chapter.
a bisexual satyr. He often relieved the stress of his precarious grasp on power by partaking in orgies of sex, cocaine, and liquor. Some reports indicated that Noriega sometimes enjoyed dressing in perfumed drag on these occasions. Even more distasteful was evidence that Noriega had increasingly turned to torture and sadistic sexual abuse of prisoners for his personal gratification. And, of course, the mounting irrefutable evidence that Noriega was deeply involved with the Columbian drug cartels was a direct threat to the mission of the DEA and U.S. military forces to interdict drugs coming into the United States.³

Given these adverse reports, President George Bush and his advisors became increasingly concerned for the safety of the 35,000 Americans who lived in Panama as well as for the security of the Panama Canal itself. As if to underscore the Presidents concern, two incidents occurred on Saturday, December 16, which further increased tensions between the United States and General Noriega.

On the night of December 16 four American Marine officers attempting to drive from a local bar back to Fort Clayton were detained at a road block when they saw bearded PDF soldiers in black T-shirts carrying AK-47 assault rifles, the young Marines decided to speed through the startled soldiers. As they hit the accelerator in their small Impala the PDF troops fired on the car. Lieutenant Bob Paz was mortally wounded and died before he could reach the Gorgas Army Hospital. Back at the road block an American Navy Lieutenant and his wife were witnesses to the unprovoked shooting. They were arrested, hand cuffed, and blindfolded with duct tape they were then taken to a nearby station of the National Department of Investigation and interrogated for most of the night. Lieutenant Curtis was kicked and punched while his wife was insulted and fondled. Finally, by midnight, the couple was released to American Military Police from Fort Clayton.

The next afternoon General Maxwell Thurman, the Commander in Chief of SOUTHCOM, at his office in Quarry Heights opened a binder marked OPERATION BLUE SPOON, it was the contingency operation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to crush Manuel Noriega and his army. In a telephone conversation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, General Thurman understood that the President had approved the operation. "The President said I should be sure to tell you that enough is enough," General Powell said. "Execute Blue Spoon." "D-Day," Powell continued, "will be December 20. H-hour will be 0100." General Thurman responded "Yes sir, I understand my orders." The United States was about to invade Panama.⁴

The Most Complex Operation Since Vietnam

Operation Blue Spoon, as Operation Just Cause was initially known, involved deploying more than 24,000 American military personnel for simultaneous combat operations with twenty-seven different objectives. Many of the airborne operations would likewise involve night attacks. Moreover, since the headquarters for General Thurman was at Quarry Heights in Panama and the headquarters for Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, the Commander for Joint Task Force South was at Fort Clayton, many of the forces would be inserted throughout the country between and among existing American Military Installations. The Army units alerted to participate in the various operations included a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, troops from the 7th

See endnote at end of chapter.
Light Infantry Division at Fort Ord, from the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division at Fort Polk, from the 193rd Infantry Brigade already in Panama and from three Ranger battalions of the 75th Infantry Regiment. Likewise, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Special Forces Group would join Navy Seal's in spearheading the attack. These forces were organized into nine major task forces whose objectives ranged geographically from the city of Colon on the Caribbean to Fort Amador overlooking the Bay of Panama on the Pacific side of the country.

The rules of engagement for the American forces were some of the strictest ever imposed. General Thurman insisted that fire support be used with extreme caution. Only a field grade officer, preferably a battalion commander, could authorize indirect fire from howitzers or mortars. General Stiner himself had the sole authority of authorizing air strikes from Air Force and Army Tactical Air Assets.

The Panamanian Military Forces expected to oppose the "American Invasion" were diverse in their composition. There were airport guards at Tocumen Military Airfield. Dignity Battalions known to American soldiers as "digbats," and of course the regular PDF soldiers whose combat skills would vary according to their immediate leadership. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assumed that there would be fighting and directed the deployment of forces in accord with that assumption.

With the Presidents order on December 17 to execute Operation Blue Spoon, alert messages went out across the United States, from North Carolina to California. At the same time a question arose concerning the name of the overall military operation. General James J. Lindsay, the Commander of the Special Operations Command, thought Operation Blue Spoon was terrible name for an operation. General Lindsay called Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, the Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Do you want your grandchildren to say you were in Blue Spoon?" he asked General Kelly.

It could have been worse, Kelly thought. One of the Panama contingency plans was named BLIND LOGIC. Other operations had been given equally strange names over the years, one general had executed an Operations Stumbling Block and an Operation Lima Bean. General Kelly tossed around ideas for a new name with Rear Admiral Joe Lopez his Deputy for Current Operations. "How about Just Action?" General Kelly proposed. "How about Just Cause?" Admiral Lopez countered. They agreed that Just Cause was much better than Blue Spoon. The name was sent up the chain of command and approved. Operation Just Cause had a much better military ring to it, but it also made and ethical assertion about the justification for military action.

Deployment From Coast To Coast

One of the challenges in alerting units from three different divisions was the need to organize into battalion-size task forces. With the multiple objectives inherent in the operation plan for Just Cause, not division would fight as a unit. Rather, battalion and smaller units would comprise task forces to seize key objectives such as; bridges, dams, locks, and airfields. Fortunately many of the soldiers tagged for the operation had been through real or simulated versions of this exercise before. They were accustomed to operating autonomously, and they were trained to take charge. Likewise, the joint command had good intelligence. It knew where each enemy was located and infiltrated U.S.

* See endnote at end of chapter.
Special Operations Forces ahead of the main assault elements to keep an eye out for unexpected movements.  

On Sunday, December 17, the day President Bush ordered military forces to Panama, Navy-Sea'l's from Little Creek, Virginia and the 1st Ranger Battalion from Hunter Army Airfield near Savannah, Georgia were put on alert. The following day the 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division and the 2nd Brigade of the 7th Light Infantry Division were likewise alerted for deployment.

In the concept of operations, at approximately 0045 hours on December 20, Navy Seal's would attack Paitilla Airport east of Panama to seize General Noriega's jet airplane and to neutralize the enemy forces there. At the same time members of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group would seize the Pacora Bridge northeast of the city to block an enemy mechanized task force seeking to cross the river to join the fight. Task Force Bayonet comprised of units from the 193d Infantry Brigade, the 5th Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 1st Battalion of the 508th Infantry from Fort Kobbe would seek to neutralize the Panamanian soldiers in Fort Amador and then proceed with an attack on the Comandancia, Noriega's headquarters. In further simultaneous operations, units from two ranger battalions would seize Rio Hato Airfield and Tocumen Military Airfield east of Panama City. Three task forces drawn from the 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division would participate on the attack on Tocumen at Renacer Prison and at Panama Viejo. In addition the 325th Infantry would assault Fort Cimarron, the headquarters of Battalion 2000 of the Panama Defense Force. On the Caribbean side of the Panama Canal the 4th Battalion 17th Infantry from the 7th Light Infantry Division would seize the town of Colon. These were but a few of the twenty-seven different objectives involving nine major task forces on the night of December 20. As the units prepared to deploy not all of the soldiers knew what objectives they might have to seize. This information was particularly secret. However, they all knew they were going to fight in the dark somewhere in Panama.

Providing Religious Support

The common denominator for all of the chaplains and chaplain assistants operating as unit ministry teams for Operation Just Cause was the need for speedy preparation. As much as any other operation since Vietnam, Just Cause was a "come as you are" military deployment. Fortunately, most of the chaplains and their assistants were not only prepared but well trained for such an emergency.

At Hunter Army Airfield Chaplain James J. Puchy, the battalion chaplain for the 1st Ranger Battalion had just finished his Sunday service when the phone rang. He was told to report to Post Headquarters immediately for a battalion assembly alert. Chaplain Puchy thought it was merely an exercise of a few hours. So he told his wife he would back later that evening. "I had no clue," he wrote, "that I would not see or speak to her again for nearly three weeks."

When Chaplain Puchy and his assistant, Sergeant Eric Godec, arrived at the briefing they were told that they would be locked into post and could not communicate with anyone outside the 1st Ranger Battalion. To ensure this all the telephones were cut off. Chaplain Puchy recalled:

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See endnote at end of chapter.
The air was thick with anxiety. Rangers were busy making preparations and plans for the assault on Tocumén Military Airfield and on Torrijos International Airport, both located just east of Panama City. I sat in on several operational briefings. As my anxiety level rose, so did my prayer intensity. I visited every barracks, carrying a case of Gideon Pocket New Testaments. I gave away nearly 300 of them. As I gave away the scriptures, I joked with the men, saying 'don't leave home without one!'\(^7\)

Chaplain Puchy and Sergeant Godec visited each platoon and held short services for the men. His text was taken from the book of Joshua: "Be strong and courageous. Do not be afraid; do not be discouraged, for the Lord your God will be with you wheresoever you go." Then after a short prayer the chaplain and the Rangers repeated the Lord's Prayer together. After that Chaplain Puchy held short services for the Air Force pilots and then it was time to board the planes.\(^8\)

At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the chaplains and chaplain assistants from the division ready brigade were alerted for, deployment to Panama on December 18, 1989. By 1900 hours Chaplain William L. Hufham, the 82nd Airborne division chaplain, Chaplain Rees R. Stevens, the Task Force chaplain for Operation Just Cause, and other senior chaplains including Chaplain John Prendergast, the Senior Roman Catholic chaplain, had met to coordinate the religious support plan and follow-on ministry to the soldiers deploying to Panama. Since the 82nd Airborne Division is the contingency force for the XVIII Airborne Corps, the religious support plan had already been drafted, rehearsed, and practiced before it was employed on Operation Just Cause. The plan included general as well direct religious support. It was comprehensive and addressed most of the mission essential tasks the chaplains and chaplain assistants performed. Further, the division had a comprehensive family support group organization the division Family Assistance Center began 24-hour operations to assist family members of deployed soldiers as soon as deployment was announced. The Family Assistance Center was augmented by the Spiritual Assistance Center in one of the division chapels. This center provided coordinated ministry in he event of a mass casualty situation.\(^9\)

Chaplain Rees Ryder Stevens, the Regimental Chaplain for the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, would be the Task Force chaplain for the Fort Bragg chaplains and chaplain assistants. Chaplain John Prendergast would assist Chaplain Stevens with Roman Catholic coverage throughout the area of operations. Chaplain Wary Physioc, Chaplain Kenneth Yates, Chaplain Lawrence Krause and Chaplain Darrell Thomsen were all included with their chaplain assistants in the task force. Chaplain James Benjamin McCoy, the deputy 82nd Airborne Division chaplain, coordinated the rear area ministry. Since deployment was a very busy time for chaplains and chaplain assistants, Chaplain Stevens asked for nine chaplains who were not deploying to assist in the personnel holding area as the other chaplains and their assistants prepared to depart.\(^10\)

Of the chaplains who were deploying to Panama, only the task force chaplain had had experience had in Grenada. Two chaplains, Chaplain Physioc and Chaplain Thomsen, were in their first tour of active duty. However, three of the chaplains were brigade chaplains. This combination of experience and youth supported by realistic training provided a successful mixture of wisdom and energy for the demands on the Fort Bragg unit ministry teams.\(^11\)

For eighteen hours some 2,200 soldiers in the Just Cause Task Force remained in the personnel holding area (PHA) making their final preparations for battle. The soldiers did not know

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\(^7\) See endnote at end of chapter.
their destination when they moved into the PHA. However, the nine additional chaplains who ministered to them, including two additional Roman Catholic chaplains, assisted the soldiers with their anxieties and with their questions. Protestant chaplains moved from tent to tent conducting prayer and worship services. Catholic chaplains offered Mass and general confession for Catholic soldiers. The ministry in the PHA was one of the most important during the entire operation.

At Fort Ord, California, on December 19, the 2nd Brigade of the 7th Light Infantry Division was alerted for deployment to Panama. Chaplain John A. Wells, the 7th Infantry Division chaplain, immediately responded with coordination and leadership for the departing unit ministry teams. As had been the case in other units, the 7th Light Infantry Division had been involved in emergency deployment readiness exercises. Chaplain Wells wrote:

> The hours raced by as the installation chaplain, my deputy and I moved into high gear to ensure each unit ministry team was physically, emotionally and, most importantly, spiritually ready to go into combat. There was much to do. Decisions about personnel, Catholic coverage, visiting with each deploying unit ministry team, finances, logistics, coordination with commanders, ministry to command and staff, coverage plans, the Family Crisis Center, and Family Support Groups all competed for precious time. Personal and family concerns had to be placed temporarily on hold.12

Chaplains Hubert Wade, David McMillian, Thomas Evans, and Stephen Mounts all prepared to deploy. Chaplain Mounts and Chaplain Evans were both in their first tour of active duty in the Army Chaplaincy. All of the chaplains from the 7th Infantry Division would perform significant ministry in a combat zone just as their colleagues from the 82nd Airborne and other units did.

**H Hour**

> "I prayed for all of my soldiers every day."

Chaplain Jerry W. Graham, 7th Special Forces Group

The initial phases of Operation Just Cause happened almost exactly as planned. At forty-seven minutes past midnight a unit from Delta Force attacked La Carcel Modelo Prison where they rescued Kurt Muse, the 39-year-old American business man who had helped monitor General Noriega's radio traffic for the CIA. Although three members of the Delta Force were wounded Mr. Muse was extracted safely. At approximately the same time units, from the 7th Special Forces Group infiltrated key facilities in and around Panama City. One team blocked a mechanized task force of PDF soldiers crossing the Pecora River Bridge. This team engaged the task force with anti-tank rockets and called in fire from a Specter Gun Ship to hold the bridge against heavy odds. Navy SEAL's Occupied Paitialla Airport and commandeered General Nieriga's jet aircraft. Caught in a surprise ambush four members of the SEAL team were killed.

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12 See endnote at end of chapter.
Task Force Bayonet consisting of the 193rd Infantry Brigade, reinforced by the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry from the 5th Infantry Division and by Light Tanks from the 82nd Airborne Division attacked the Comandancia with a phalanx of armored infantry carriers supported by Specter Gun Ships. The armored personnel carriers from the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry came under intense interlocking small arms fire from numerous road blocks on the perimeter three blocks from the Comandancia. The PDF soldiers fired rocket-propelled grenades at the armored personnel carriers while dignity battalion troops poured small arms fire and other grenades from tenement roofs and balconies.

While the opening attack on the Comandancia was taking place, Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion of the 508th Infantry, began the general air mobile assault into Fort Amador. Of all of the objectives seized in Operation Just Cause, Fort Amador was one of the trickiest. The fort had been jointly occupied before the operation by the 5th PDF Rifle Company which had its positions on the canal side of the fort as well as by American families who lived across the golf course on the other side of the fort. The 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry had to neutralize and block the 5th PDF Rifle Company while at the same time urging the 200 American families in their quarters to stay low and out of danger. Eventually the 1st Battalion, 508th secured the fort and began a secondary movement to assist with the assault on the Comandancia. Chaplain Allen B. Boatright, the Battalion Chaplain for the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry, recalled:

While the first lift was airborne we could see firing from Fort Amador and the downtown area of the La Comandancia it sounded like mortars, machine guns, and small arms fire. One OH-508 Helicopter was shot down during the air assault itself. A crew chief sitting next to me asked me to say a prayer for him as we were flying into Fort Amador. At 0140 hours we landed and moved by foot to the Tactical Operations Center while we were moving in, a fire fight took place at the front gate of Fort Amador. The Panamanian 5th Infantry Company had tried to break out of Fort Amador in a school bus through the front gate. Our battalion scout stopped them. The PDF were firing from the bus as they sped through the front entrance. Our scouts were on the shoulder of the road and instinctively returned fire. None of the scouts were hit but six of the PDF died and three were wounded. Because of the fighting going on we had no possibility of Medevac for over three hours. During treatment one of the PDF soldiers kept telling me he was worried about his wife and two daughters. He died about an hour and half later. I rendered proper last respects for the dead and assisted the medics with casualty identification. The dead were taken to our military mortuary. I learned later that morning that Charlie Company had sustained two deaths and six wounded on the attack on the La Comandancia.14

Fort Amador was secured as 1750 hours. As Chaplain Boatright walked around the area and visited with the soldiers, all were in agreement that the Lord had greatly blessed them and that war is terribly frightening.

While all of this firing was going on, the family members of the soldiers quartered in the American housing section of Fort Amador were busy keeping their heads down while others were

See endnote at end of chapter.
cooking dozens and dozens of cookies and cupcakes for the soldiers. Chaplain Bo truth right had the privilege of delivering several loads to the soldiers who promptly shared them with any children they could find. Chaplain Bo truth right concluded, "we conducted a brief memorial service for the dead when Charlie Company joined us as Fort Amador. We were on the golf course near a large tree as the sun was rising over the ocean. The entire company attended."15

Everywhere At Once!

Three minutes after H hour two battalions of Rangers parachuted into Rio Hato Airfield some fifty miles west of Panama City to neutralize two companies of PDF soldiers. After three minutes of assault fire by Specter Gun Ships, another Ranger battalion dropped on Tocumen Military Airfield to seize the control tower and capture PDF forces nearby. Fifteen minutes after H hour, on the Atlantic side, a task force of paratroopers secured canal locks and machinery. A small force secured Madden Dam in the center of the canal zone and, after a brief fire fight, rescued twenty political prisoners General Noriega had locked up in nearby Renacer Prison.

Chaplain Darrell Thomsen and his chaplain assistant Sergeant Aaron Poffenberger accompanied the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in its movement to Madden Dam and the vicinity of Renacer Prison. Chaplain Thomsen recalled: "an attitude of serious anticipation gripped each soldier as we drew near the objective. The possibility of death stared each soldier in the face, bringing fear and uncertainty about the future. Many wondered if they would see another sunrise. During the assault Sergeant Poffenberger guarded the perimeter around the medical station while I ministered to the incoming wounded, and observed enemy movement throughout the evening. Although our battalion suffered 31 casualties, no lives were lost.16

Forty-five minutes after H hour, a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division had parachuted into Tocumen Military Airfield to assault Panamanian Army and Air Force elements there. An ice storm at Fort Bragg hindered loading and taking off, delaying the arrival of follow-on troops for three hours.17 However, after landing the follow-on paratroopers quickly transferred to 18 waiting Blackhawk helicopters, escorted by Apaches, to conduct three coordinated air assaults on Panama Viejo, Fort Cimarron, and Tinajitas Army Barracks. The three hours' delay transformed a relatively safe night landing into a daylight combat assault against the elite PDF Tiger Company occupying Tinajitas Barracks.

Chaplain Kenneth Yates, Battalion Chaplain for the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, recalled the attack on Panama Viejo:

Once I reached Panama Viejo, I joined the rest of the battalion. As soon as we arrived, another battalion entered our area of operation, and was hit by sniper fire. There was an extensive fire fight; one of the soldiers in the other battalion was killed and three or four wounded. I was able to help with the wounded; to talk with each of them and to help carry them to the evacuation helicopter. I was then able to get to the soldiers in other areas.18

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See endnote at end of chapter.
Chaplain Lawrence Krause, the regimental chaplain for the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, was present at the same location in a convoy headed toward Paitilla Airport. Chaplain Krause recalled: "the convoy took less than ninety minutes. During that time we received fire several times. The vehicle directly behind mine rolled with two flat tires and another rolled on only the rim. I lay low in the vehicle, surrounded by grenades, light anti-tank weapons, and bullets. We arrived after several tense moments at the perimeter of the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Within about 45 seconds, six men were shot or injured, and one mortally. We pulled into the security of their perimeter and helped tend to the wounded, opening bandages, rolling soldiers over to be bandaged, holding IVs and assisting the medics."19

At Tinajitas the Blackhawk helicopters took numerous hits as they dropped soldiers into the landing zone some four hundred meters from the barracks complex. In stifling heat, the paratroopers pushed forward. When they arrived at the garrison walls, the enemy soldiers had fled, leaving most of their equipment behind. The PDF Command and Control structure and most PDF units were neutralized by H plus 10 hours. The PDF were simply smothered by unseen attackers from every direction and in every dimension. While they had expected battle, they did not expect to be confronted with such a simultaneous display of overwhelming force.20

Throughout the various engagements involving 82nd Airborne Division soldiers, Chaplain Ryder Stevens and Chaplain John Prendergast performed aid station ministries at Tocumen/Torrijos Airport and sought to remain in contact with their other unit ministry teams. Without vehicles, they had to hitch rides from one site to another. Communications were virtually non-existent to many units. Chaplain Michael G. Ortiz, the SOUTHCOM Chaplain, was trying to keep General Stiner apprised of the locations of unit ministry teams, but Chaplain Ortiz was receiving very few reports from the field. Needless to say, the stress level was high at every echelon.21

Many combat support and combat service units encountered unexpected resistance from the PDF. When the 988th Military Police Company attempted to clear some PDF buildings, including a kennel, they came under fire from 40 enemy soldiers. Captain Linda Bray, the commander of the 988th, successfully brought the firefight to a close and secured the area. Captain Bray, one of 600 female soldiers who participated in Operation Just Cause, was the first female officer in modern American military history to command a unit in combat.22

Colon

On the Caribbean side of the Panama Canal, Chaplain Thomas G. Evans and his assistant Private First Class Justice waited with the Battalion Assault Command Post of the 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry for an attack on the PDF headquarters near Colon. With a population of 70,000 people, Colon was the largest city on the Caribbean end of the Panama Canal. Chaplain Evans recalled:

As the countdown proceeded toward H hour the conversations gave way to silent anticipation. I honored that silence and just made eye contact with the commander and staff. At H minus 15 minutes I moved to the company aide station where the senior medic was understaffed. At H minus 5 minutes I stood outside the aide station

See endnote at end of chapter.
entrance and waited. On command, M16s, M60 machine guns, M-203 grenade launchers, and a Vulcan air defense gun opened fire on the Panamanian Defense Force headquarters. The sound of all that fire power was as astounding as was the damage that was being done to the target. On command, the firing stopped. Out of the stillness a Spanish linguist used a bull horn to encourage the enemy soldiers to surrender. We had delivered a two-minute combined armed show of force. Then we invited them to surrender before we resumed firing. It made me proud of our American fighting ethic.23

Unfortunately, the PDF soldiers did not surrender. The fighting continued for hours, with dead and wounded on both sides. PFC Justice, Chaplain Evans' assistant, worked as a litter bearer to transport wounded to the landing zone for air evacuation.

Approximately eight hours after the attack on PDF headquarters began, most resistance was over. Chaplain Evans visited with twenty PDF prisoners and prepared for ministry to the soldiers who were able for a brief period to rest. Although more casualties had been initialized expected in Colon itself, the opposite proved to be true. Many people opened their windows, cheered and waved flags. Chaplain Evans wrote "Praise God for touching the hearts of the Panamanian people."24

Mission Complete

By December 24, Christmas Eve, most of the fighting in Panama was over there still remained a great deal to be done for the people. For in cities like Colon there were instances of looting in almost every grocery store. Civil and church organizations worked to sort and bag bulk foods the soldiers of the 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment from Fort Ord distributed over 150,000 meals to grateful people. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion from Fort Bragg arrived at Fort Amador and distributed great quantities of food that were found in building after building. Chaplains and chaplain assistants took a leading role in much of the relief effort that took place throughout the country.

Even though the fighting had ended by Christmas Eve, there were still mixed emotions among many of the soldiers. Official casualty reports listed twenty-three Americans killed in action and 347 wounded. Nevertheless, chaplains and chaplain assistants did everything they could to make Christmas Eve and Christmas Day memorable for the troops who had to remain in Panama. Chaplain Allen Boatright recalled spending Christmas Eve in La Comandancia. A Boy Scout named Eric VanHeusen had prepared for his eagle scout project a flannel stocking for every soldier in the battalion. The stockings were filled with comfort items like toothpaste and candy. Chaplain Boatright had the privilege of delivering these stockings on Christmas Eve with an infantry fire team as security.

Chaplains conducted Christmas Eve services wherever soldiers were. Chaplain Wray Physioc of the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment conducted his Christmas Eve service under blackout conditions. He recalled: "Since we were still under blackout, there was no light. About 80 soldiers were seated on the floor in front of me, but I could see no faces. In that austere place we

See endnote at end of chapter.
sang Christmas carols from memory and listened to the ancient story of Jesus' birth. It never meant so much to me as it did then, and I believe everyone was touched."25

Chaplain Evans conducted Christmas Eve services in a high school inside Colon. In both services the men seemed to drag through the first few Christmas carols, but afterward they cheered up and sang with enthusiasm and joy. Chaplain Evans recalled: "Children from one of the Fort Ord elementary schools sent handmade Christmas cards. The Protestant Women of the Chapel at Fort Ord sent homemade cookies. Our UMT walked through Colon handing out cards and cookies and praying Christmas prayers with soldiers involved with keeping peace on December 25th.26

Back at Fort Bragg, Chaplain Ben McCoy had been challenged with ministries including spiritual refreshment for family members. Ministry to families included maintaining holiday worship services and Christmas programs which had been scheduled by the deploying chaplains. Chaplain assistants were the key players in this ministry. Which ensured the continuity of programs and services so vital to families dealing with significant stress.27

General Manuel Noriega remained a fugitive in Panama City until his final surrender on January 3, 1990 at the residence of the Papal Nuncio. With General Noriega's surrender the 24-day war was finally over.

The impact of Operation Just Cause was important for demonstrating the success of the modernization and reorganization not only of the Army but also of new methods in coordinating joint operations. Yet on another level the operation touched many lives. Among other things it validated the contingency operation ministry which was then, and would become, so much a part of the service of chaplains and chaplain assistants to the Army. Chaplain James Puchy, of the 1st Ranger Battalion, wrote:

As a chaplain, Incarnational Theology is the essential foundation for my ministry. I must represent Jesus Christ as His ambassador and permit His Spirit, who lives in me, to minister to the needs of soldiers. This theology follows the motto of the Army chaplaincy: 'To bring God to men and to bring men to God.' I thanked the Master for His protection.28

Chaplain Lawrence Krause of the 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment likewise had strong emotions over his deployment to Panama. Chaplain Krause wrote:

General George C. Marshall, an architect of strategic plans in World War II, said: 'It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit of the fighting man that wins victory.' Before Panama, I did not understand the deeper meaning of the word "spirit." It is not morale, although our troopers experienced tremendous high morale; it is not unit cohesiveness, although our unit experienced great team work. It is the willingness to sacrifice for a higher, worthwhile mission. I witnessed this during preparations for the jump into Panama as our troopers prepared in freezing rain with no complaints. When the aircraft door opened just before we jumped a hush fell over the soldiers. Yet we took our turn in the door. No one refused to jump. I witnessed this spirit repeatedly

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See endnote at end of chapter.
during Operation Just Cause. I am proud to be one of the chaplains who supported our paratroopers on Operation Just Cause and I am proud of the soldiers I served.²⁹

When Chaplain Ryder Stevens reported back to Fort Bragg, with all 12 unit ministry team members safely returned from their combat and peacekeeping missions, he credited their spiritual preparation for a large part of their success. "The most important part for me was my spiritual preparedness to do combat ministry," Chaplain Stevens wrote: "There is no substitute for personal spiritual readiness; it makes everything else possible."³⁰

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²⁹ See endnote at end of chapter.
ENDNOTES


13. Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Certain Victory*, p. 34; Chaplain James T. White, an Episcopal Chaplain at the hospital, recalled that it was strange sight to see troops with loaded weapons running through the hospital corridors.


17. Some chaplains had to deploy without their chaplain assistants due to a limited number of seats on the aircraft. One chaplain was involved with his unit in a firefight in Panama before his assistant arrived. This situation was dangerous not only for the chaplain but also for the soldiers.
who were trying to protect him and maintain their unit integrity at the same time.


21. Chaplain Mike Ortiz was in fact "triple-hatted" as General Thurman's Staff Chaplain, General Stiner's Task Force Senior Chaplain, and the SOUTHCOM Chaplain with duties involving coordination for ministry to all personnel and dependents at Quarry Heights and for logistical and personnel support to other chaplains in the various task forces. Although Chaplain Ortiz wrote that he had no trouble in coordinating with the chaplains from the 7th Infantry Division, the Rangers, or the XVIII Airborne Corps, he did experience difficulty in coordinating with the 82d Airborne Division. The 82nd Task Force chaplain was, in fact, directed to send all reports back to the 82nd Airborne Division Chaplain at Fort Bragg. Such coordination problems were corrected before Operation Desert Shield began in August, 1990. See Chaplain (Col.) Michael Ortiz, "Operation Just Cause After Action Report," USACHCS Chaplain Archives, p. 1.


OPERATION DESERT SHIELD:

Religious Support
CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

As the task force began the attack, we followed a mechanized company to within one kilometer of the objective. Mortar and artillery fire rocked the ground around us and my prayer life grew quickly as I simply asked God to give me strength and wisdom for the battle. We watched in horror as a Bradley took a hit and exploded. The radio was immediately flooded with calls for medical attention. Our battalion aid station group retreated about 1 kilometer and set up to receive casualties. Suddenly a call for help came over the radio. My assistant was dispatched with the medic vehicle in which he was riding to go to the aid of the other battalion aid station. They had taken 11 casualties, 4 were critical. I prayed for Specialist Ronald Putt and the others as he crossed the battlefield to render assistance. Forward Thrust Doctrine took on a new meaning as I watched our Unit Ministry Team on the battlefield. My forward thrust became an upward thrust of prayer. Then came the call. The voice of "Doc" Poole, our Battalion Surgeon, called out, "Six-zero PA, this is Six-zero Doc, over." "Six-zero Doc, this is Six-zero PA, over" answered Chief Lafferty, our battalion physician's assistant. "Six-zero PA, we need the chaplain." Those words were forever etched in my heart: "we need the chaplain."

Chaplain Timothy K. Bedsole
1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment
24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
The Battle of Jalibah Airfield

From August 1990 to March 1991, during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 568 U.S. Army chaplains and 514 chaplain assistants deployed to Southwest Asia. These 1,082 unit ministry team members, from both the Active and Reserve components, represented the single largest deployment of religious support personnel overseas since World War II. The role of the Reserve component unit ministry teams in this massive religious support mission was particularly significant. From August of 1990 to August of 1991 some 428 Reserve component chaplains, most accompanied by chaplain assistants, served at every echelon of the Army Chaplaincy from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, U.S. Forces Command, and U.S. Army Europe to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel and Germany. Their contribution helped define the Total Army's success in Southwest Asia.

The mission of the Army chaplains and assistants in these desert operations was to perform or provide for religious support, free exercise of religion, and pastoral care for 303,000 soldiers of all ranks and religious faiths. In meeting these mission requirements, unit ministry teams deployed

See endnotes at end of chapter.
with the first combat troops to go to Saudi Arabia and stayed there as long as soldiers remained in the theater of operations.

No less dedicated were the efforts of innumerable chaplains, chaplain assistants, Department of the Army civilians, Red Cross and Army Community Service volunteers, and recalled retired chaplains who ministered to families and filled vacancies to provide morale, logistical and organizational support for those in Southwest Asia. Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmermann, the Army's Chief of Chaplains, noted that "the efforts by all of the chaplains and assistants to afford pastoral care and free exercise of religion on such a large scale in an alien environment, and without subsequent criticism by the public media, made me immensely proud of the ministry in the Desert and all of those who supported it."^5

Crisis In The Gulf
Desert Irruption: Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

At two o'clock in the morning on August 2, 1990, 350 Iraqi T-72 tanks and 100,000 soldiers from the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces crossed the Kuwait border near Safwan. Advancing down the six-lane "Friendship Highway," this armored and mechanized infantry column supported by airmobile and commando troops, reached Kuwait City, 80 miles away, in three hours. The forces of Kuwait, outnumbered five to one, were completely overwhelmed before they could organize effectively. Some Kuwait troops, those not captured in garrison, rode bicycles into battle, close enough to fire their rifles at the Iraqi tanks; but their opposition was quickly silenced by Iraqi machine gun, tank, and rocket fire. Kuwait's Emir Jaber al Ahmad al Sabah and most of his family escaped by helicopter and a convoy of state cars to Saudi Arabia. Prince Fahd stayed behind and died, with his two sons, fighting the Iraqi invaders on the steps of the Dasman Palace.

Just a few hours before the invasion, John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, had concluded a meeting of officials from the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Secretary Baker's conference room in the State Department. Secretary Baker was at that time in the Soviet Union meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. In his communiques to his office, Baker reflected his concern about a possible Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. "We hope you'll restrain these guys," Baker reportedly told the Soviet Minister in Moscow. Shevardnadze did not feel it would be necessary. President Saddam Hussein had given his personal assurances to Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and to King Hussein of Jordan that there would be no invasion. He had told Senator Robert Dole earlier that year that he was removing all chemical or biological weapons from the region. U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, who had been in Iraq since 1988 but who was granted an audience with Saddam Hussein for the first time on July 25, 1990, told him that the United States wanted to "expand and deepen its relationship with Iraq" and assured him that "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. All we hope is that these issues are solved quickly." Ambassador Glaspie said that she urged Saddam Hussein to settle his dispute with Kuwait "nonviolently." Hussein

See endnotes at end of chapter.
replied that the United States was conspiring with Kuwait to keep oil prices low and destroy Iraq's economy. "Yours is a society," he told her, "that cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle."\textsuperscript{11}

If Ambassador Glaspie sensed any threat in this conversation, she did not report it to Washington. CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr, however, saw a greater danger. Kerr reviewed satellite photos and transcripts of radio intercepts from Iraq. Late on Wednesday afternoon, August 1, 1990, Mr. Kerr advised Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly that he believed Iraq would attack in six to 12 hours. An hour later, eight time zones away, Iraqi forces crossed the Kuwait border and roared down the highway toward Kuwait City and the eventual occupation of a country with 2 million people and 94 billion barrels of oil reserves valued at that time at 2.1 trillion U.S. dollars.

From the first day of the invasion the Iraqis attempted to obliterate Kuwait. Those Kuwaitis who tried to escape to Saudi Arabia in their cars were stopped by Iraqi troops. Vehicles were confiscated, men and women interrogated, summary executions ordered. Thousands of refugees poured into Jordan and Saudi Arabia with stories of rape and pillage. One Kuwait told the news media, "They tried to wipe out the identity of Kuwait, as if Kuwait did not exist." For seven months Iraqi soldiers committed acts of barbaric horror against the people of Kuwait, but in the first few weeks of the occupation the full extent of these crimes against humanity was not yet known in the West.

In support of Saddam Hussein's expansionist policies, however, in the first week of August the Iraqi National Assembly approved his movement into Kuwait, not as an invasion of an independent state, but as the reannexation of a former part of the Republic of Iraq. "This is what is before you to debate today, brothers, it is the return of dear Kuwait to its kinfolk," Saddam told the Assembly, "Kuwait is joining the motherland just as are all the villages, and all the good people and the good land that was detached from Iraq some time ago. The Council of Ministers unanimously agreed, as well as the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Government of beloved Kuwait, that Iraq and Kuwait become the manifestation of a full merger."\textsuperscript{12} To further support their leader, the Iraqi Revolution Command Council condemned the "criminal acts of colonialism" which have separated Kuwait from Iraq and approved of the "comprehensive, eternal, and inseparable merger" Saddam had seemingly effected.\textsuperscript{13}

Since 1961 Iraq had made a shadowy claim to Kuwait because it was, until the end of World War I, part of the Basra Sultanate in the Ottoman Turkish Empire. When Kuwait gained its independence in 1961 and became a member of the United Nations in 1963, however, Iraq recognized Kuwait's sovereignty and its partnership in OPEC.\textsuperscript{14} There was no question at the time that Kuwait was acting as an independent nation.

Kuwait had supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, extending $20 billion in credits to the Iraqis and helping transport their oil by truck when the Iranians closed the Shatt al Arab waterway. Yet after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein found himself with a crushing domestic and international debt in excess of $70 billion, with a restless Army composed in part of rebellious Shiites, and with a drop of almost $7.00 per barrel of crude oil.\textsuperscript{15} Since oil comprised 94% of Iraq's exports, in the amount of 1 billion barrels per year, Saddam claimed for each $1.00 drop in

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
price he lost $1 billion annually. Saddam needed money to placate his Army and his population which had suffered more than 300,000 casualties in his unsuccessful eight year war with Iran.

In the July 1990 meeting of the OPEC oil ministers in Geneva, Saddam charged that Kuwait had engaged in excess pumping of oil, theft of oil with an estimated value of $2.4 billion from Iraq's Ramaila Oil Field, and a conspiracy with the West to keep the price of oil low. Since the U.S. imported 12% of Kuwait's oil, it seemed to Saddam that America was profiting from his distress. Saddam demanded that Kuwait move its boundary 2 1/2 miles south, away from his oil fields, pay him $2.4 billion in lost revenues, and forgive his war debt of $14 billion. He also demanded greater access to the Gulf for his ships and planned oil terminals—also at the expense of Kuwait territory.

Above all, the Kuwaitis, according to Saddam's published remarks, were arrogant in their wealth and ungrateful for the tremendous sacrifices the Iraqis had made in the great war between Arabs and Persians, which is what Saddam chose to call the Iranians. The Kuwaitis should be willing to share their wealth with Iraq, for Kuwait had the second highest per capita income in the Gulf area, while Iraq had one of the lowest and was deeply in debt.

In the West, U.S. relations with Iraq for a decade before the August 2nd attack had been positive if a bit guarded. With the loss of Iran as an ally and the hostage crisis of 1979-81, the United States had courted Iraq economically and militarily as a foil to the influence of Iran and Syria in the Mesopotamian area. In April 1980, President Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brezezinski declared, "We see no fundamental incompatibility of interest between the United States and Iraq." During his administration, President Reagan accelerated support for Baghdad. When the Israelis in June of 1981 destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, the U.S. voted at the UN to condemn Israel's aggressive act. The U.S. gave General Electric permission to sell Iraq engines for its warships. In the decade of the 1980s, $50 billion in arms from the Soviet Union, France, Egypt, West Germany, and the United States flooded into Iraq to build the army of Saddam Hussein. In 1986 the U.S. began sharing intelligence information concerning Iranian troop movements with Iraq. By 1989 the U.S. was selling $1.2 billion a year in food to Iraq. Thanks to the Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees, Iraq became the biggest foreign consumer of American rice and one of the top buyers of U.S. corn and wheat. Other nations followed America's lead. Lacking information and intelligence concerning Saddam Hussein and the terrorist regime he headed, in the words of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Stephen Bryen; "we created a monster because we let all this stuff go to Iraq."

Washington's Response

At the National Security Council meeting on August 2nd in the White House Cabinet Room, CIA director William Webster formally briefed President George Bush on the invasion of Kuwait and the possible threat to Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi forces, at least three divisions, were just ten miles from the Saudi border. Only one small unit, the Gulf Cooperation Council's Shield Peninsula Brigade, was

See endnotes at end of chapter.
in northern Saudi Arabia. The main route from Kuwait to the vast Saudi oil fields was practically undefended.

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) who had flown to Washington from his headquarters in Florida at 6 a.m. that morning, briefed the Security Council on Operation Plan 90-1002, the defense of the Saudi Peninsula. The plan involved the movement of 100,000 to 200,000 military personnel to bases which Saudi Arabia or some other Gulf state would have to provide. The plan assumed 30 days advance warning before the first day of actual deployment.

After General Schwarzkopf's briefing there was a general discussion of the possibility of an oil embargo, but little conviction that an embargo alone would persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait. Finally General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked the President, "Don't we want just to draw a firm line with Saudi Arabia?" United Nations Ambassador Thomas Pickering observed that "such a firm line would leave Kuwait on the other side, in the hands of Iran.

On August 2, 1990, President Bush faced a tremendous challenge. If he chose a military response, he had to create a diplomatic, economic, and military coalition of Christian, secular, and Islamic states spread, incidentally, over a geographic area twice the size of NATO. He needed a formal request from Saudi Arabia for military support. He had to gain the strong support of Congress and the American people whose memories of the Vietnam War were still fresh. He had to find the right diplomatic and military leadership which could operate effectively within the heart of Islam and win, if necessary, a coalition war in the desert. He had to defeat a foe commanding the fourth largest Army in the world, armed with Soviet and Western weapons including 46,000 canisters of chemical munitions and tons of nerve agents, and reportedly possessing an incipient nuclear weapons program. He had to keep the Soviet Union and China at least neutral diplomatically and find a way to offset the enormous expense that such an enterprise of multiple nations at war might entail. Above all he had to keep Israel out of the conflict, should it develop, lest Saddam proclaim a Holy War and find support among radical elements in Syria, Egypt, Turkey, and even Saudi Arabia.

The graduated response of the American government to what it regarded as a fundamental violation of the United Nations Charter, which condemns military aggression and which provides in Article 51 for the collective defense of member nations, was three-pronged. In virtually simultaneous actions President Bush, Secretary Cheney, Secretary Baker, and General Powell prepared diplomatic, economic, and military responses to Saddam Hussein's movement into Kuwait. Without timely diplomatic and military intervention, Professor Laurie Mylroie of the U.S. Navy War College observed: "We could have a maniac with a bomb controlling half the world's oil."

By using every means of communication available, President Bush and his key advisors undertook a number of diplomatic initiatives designed to put pressure on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The President flew to Aspen, Colorado, where he conferred with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain. Later he called King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of Jordan, and President Mubarak of Egypt. At the United Nations, the Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 660, sponsored by the United States, condemning the Iraqi invasion and demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The U.S.S.R. agreed to issue an unprecedented joint statement with

See endnotes at end of chapter.
the United States also condemning the invasion, as did the Arab League on its own initiative. Japan agreed to ban oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait as well as all Japanese exports to the two countries. China agreed to stop arms sales to Iraq immediately.

On Friday, 3 August, the Security Council met again at the White House. The Central Intelligence Agency estimated that if Saddam chose to cross the Saudi Arabian border, Iraqi forces could occupy Riyadh in three days. President Bush listened to General Schwarzkopf's summary of America's national interests in the region and his concluding opinion that the United States had "to be willing to use force to stop this and to make that clear to the world." The President directed Secretary Cheney, General Powell and General Schwarzkopf to meet him at Camp David the next day to brief him on the military options.

The meeting at Camp David on August 4 was a discussion, around the President's 25-foot conference table, of Iraqi military capabilities and possible United States military responses. General Schwarzkopf said the Iraqi forces included a total of 63 divisions, comprised of 900,000 soldiers; 5,747 tanks; 10,000 lightly armored vehicles; 3,500 pieces of artillery; 1,127 aircraft; and 3,000 heavy-equipment movers. He estimated that it would take the U.S. military 17 weeks to implement the deterrence piece of Plan 90-1002 — moving 250,000 Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel into the region.

The critical point upon which all other options turned was whether King Fahd of Saudi Arabia would invite United States or United Nations forces to help defend his Kingdom. The King was not yet convinced that Saudi Arabia was truly threatened.

President Bush began making telephone calls, first to King Fahd who asked for a briefing team to come to Saudi Arabia with the latest intelligence photographs. Next he called President Turgut Ozal of Turkey and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, two leaders who had already voiced opposition to the invasion. Finally he called the Kuwait Emir, Sheikh Jabir al Ahmed al Sabah, and promised that the United States would help win back his country and would ensure that he was restored to power.

By 3 p.m. the President had decided to send Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to head a briefing team for King Fahd. General Schwarzkopf, Ambassador Charles Freeman, Paul Wolfowitz, the Undersecretary for Policy, and several other staff members and experts in various areas of interest would accompany him. General Schwarzkopf wanted Lieutenant General John Yeosock, Third Army Commander and Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces Command headquartered at Fort McPherson, Georgia, to go as well. If King Fahd accepted Bush's offer to send military forces, the first American soldiers could be in Saudi Arabia within 72 hours.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Operation Desert Shield
A Line in the Sand

On the evening of August 4, Lieutenant General Yeosock received a late telephone call at Fort McPherson from General Schwarzkopf who told him of the requirement to brief King Fahd. Schwarzkopf wanted Yeosock to fly to CENTCOM headquarters at Mac Dill Air Force Base, Florida, as soon as possible and accompany him to Saudi Arabia. General Yeosock had been project manager in 1983 for the Saudi Army National Guard and had been responsible for training and equipping much of the Saudi ground force. As Commander of Third Army, whose mission was to defend vital U.S. interests in Southwest Asia, General Yeosock was possibly the best qualified general officer in the Army to plan and execute a land defense in the Middle East.

General Yeosock promised to meet General Schwarzkopf as soon as possible. He then called Major General William "Gus" Pagonis, the chief logistian in U.S. Forces Command. Yeosock asked Pagonis to brief him as soon as possible on all major logistical requirements for a deployment to Saudi Arabia.

Before he left Fort McPherson, General Yeosock told his wife, Betta, that he would be home Wednesday night, August 8, for supper. In fact, General Yeosock did not return to Fort McPherson until May of 1991.

As Secretary Cheney and the briefing team prepared for the 16-hour flight to Jedda, Saddam Hussein announced that he was withdrawing his forces from Kuwait. Intelligence photographs and sources inside Kuwait persuaded President Bush that "Baghdad had lied once again." Mr. Bush, in a press interview on Sunday, August 5, called the Iraqi regime "international outlaws" and vowed that the "Kuwait takeover will not stand."

In fact, King Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, custodian of the Two Holy Mosques at Mecca and Medina, had already agreed to Egyptian military aid. President Mubarak had quietly sent 2,000 Egyptian soldiers to Hafar al Batin near the Kuwait border on August 5, to reinforce the Saudi Peninsula Shield Brigade.

The interview with King Fahd on August 6 took place in the royal family's private council room in the summer palace. King Fahd had already checked with several Muslim leaders to see if they would tolerate an American deployment. As General Schwarzkopf later recalled, Saudi Arabia was like a three-legged stool, balanced on support from religious leaders, oil merchants, and tribal leaders. The royal family tried to consider what policies would benefit the Kingdom as a whole, reflected by the concerns of various segments of their society.

During the course of the discussion General Schwarzkopf showed King Fahd the satellite pictures of Iraqi tanks on the way to the Saudi border. King Fahd agreed that Saddam had far more forces than he needed to occupy Kuwait. "The Kuwaitis waited too long and now there is no Kuwait," the King observed, "and all the Kuwaitis are living in our hotel rooms." The King turned to Secretary Cheney. "Mr. Secretary, we approve of the principle. Let's believe in God and do what has to be done," he said.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Secretary Cheney called President Bush in the Oval Office. "They've invited us in," he told the President. Now Cheney needed Bush's formal approval to begin moving the forces. "You got it. Go," the President replied.\footnote{Cheney, then called General Powell and told him they were authorized to start the deployment "to defend against an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and be prepared to conduct other operations as directed."\footnote{The American Army had never been ordered to project such a large force so quickly over so great a distance.\footnote{The normal chain of command and coordination for deploying Army units to Saudi Arabia went from General Colin Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, through General Carl Vuono, Chief of Staff, to General Edwin Burba, Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command. General Burba's war-fighting assets included the XVIII Airborne Corps, headquartered at Fort Bragg, III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, and I Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington.

The first units sent from the United States were 48 advanced F-15 jets from the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and the Division Ready Brigade of 2,300 men from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.\footnote{In the Persian Gulf itself, on August 6, were eight U.S. Navy vessels: one guided missile cruiser, one destroyer, five frigates and a command ship.\footnote{Opposing these U.S. forces, most of which were not in Saudi Arabia yet, were six Iraqi divisions on line with 800 T-72 tanks and supporting air assets.\footnote{At 9 p.m. on Monday, August 6, the XVIII Airborne Corps received the message from U.S. Forces Command to alert the first troops of the 82nd Airborne Division. On August 7 President Bush formally ordered the deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia. Saying that "a line has been drawn in the sand" by placing U.S. soldiers in the Saudi desert, President Bush vowed to see Iraqi President Hussein "get out" of Kuwait.\footnote{Officially Operation Desert Shield had five goals:

1. Deter and, if necessary, repel further Iraqi aggression.
2. Effect the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
3. Restore the legitimate government of Kuwait.
4. Protect the lives of American citizens.

These "Five Points" constituted the "just cause" of the Gulf War. They did not include the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, though King Fahd wanted American assurance that if fighting resulted, Saddam Hussein would not be able "to pick himself up off the floor."\footnote{In Baghdad Saddam Hussein issued an angry warning: "Our armed forces will close in an iron rank against those who try challenging us and we will make Iraq and Kuwait a graveyard for those who launch any aggression against us."\footnote{Iraq had annexed Kuwait and "all the fleets and squadrons of aircraft will not shake a single palm frond" in Iraq, Saddam said "We would rather die than be humiliated, and we will pluck out the eyes of those who attack the Arab nation."\footnote{\textsuperscript{}}}}}}}}

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Thus on August 7, 1990, began Operation Desert Shield which resulted in the largest deployment of U.S. and allied forces since the Vietnam War, involving more than 684,000 American soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, 541,000 of whom deployed to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. In terms of speed of movement, the Gulf deployment was the largest, fastest and farthest deployment of U.S. forces, including Army chaplains and chaplain assistants, in American history.\textsuperscript{55}

\section*{Initial Chaplain Corps Concerns}

The Army Operations Center (AOC) in the basement of the Pentagon was crammed with staff officers on August 8, 1990. Chaplain John J. Kaising was the duty officer from the Chief of Chaplains Office when the news of the invasion first broke.\textsuperscript{56} After a long series of briefings on the Gulf situation and President Bush's decisions, General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, told the audience that the operation in Saudi Arabia could last for a long time. "Coordinate, anticipate, and verify—make sure of your information; make sure you have the complete picture, and keep the forces in the field informed," General Vuono directed the officers.\textsuperscript{57} The first units to go to Saudi Arabia were selected already from U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), but the Department of the Army had to be prepared to support the deploying forces' requirements from any assets available to include the Reserve components.

General Vuono's directive to the DA Staff underscored preparations which had already begun in the Chaplain Corps for just such an operation. At the Chief of Chaplains Office, the Army Chaplain Center and School, the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office, the Third Army Chaplain's Office, and the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain's Office, key leaders had been planning and training for almost a year for an eventual Middle East mission. These plans were not keyed entirely on Kuwait, but also included possible missions in other Islamic countries. By "staying in the loop" with their commands, many senior chaplains and assistants had partially anticipated and begun coordination for Operation Desert Shield.

At the Chief of Chaplains Office on E-ring in the Pentagon, the invasion of Kuwait was not a great surprise. Even for those staff members who did not attend top secret briefings, there were rumors enough in the halls to discern Saddam Hussein's intent in moving 100,000 soldiers to the Kuwait border.\textsuperscript{58}

Chaplain (Major General) Matthew A. Zimmerman, the Army's Chief of Chaplains, was on General Vuono's staff and routinely briefed him on any matters involving religion in the Army. It was obvious to Chaplain Zimmerman that religion would be of high interest in Operation Desert Shield, to include three world religions with origins in the Middle East: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Yet Chaplain Zimmerman's immediate concerns were to prepare for and track the deployment of all unit ministry teams departing for Saudi Arabia and to ensure that there were enough chaplains of the Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Orthodox faiths to facilitate the free exercise of religion for all soldiers and to provide area coverage for the soldiers' religious needs.\textsuperscript{59}

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
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Within a week after the invasion of Kuwait, Chaplain Zimmerman directed Mr. Roger Able, a Department of the Army civilian and the Chief's mobilization plans officer, to monitor all unit ministry team deployments to Southwest Asia beginning with the deployment of the Ready Brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division. Mr. Able, a former Marine and a veteran of 17 years' service in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, had followed and influenced previous deployments, including those to Grenada and Panama. Mr. Able began making daily contacts with the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office at Fort McPherson to request the latest information for Chaplain Zimmerman.

Chaplain Zimmerman also directed Chaplain (Brigadier General) George D. Fields, Jr., Assistant Chief of Chaplains for Mobilization Management, to review the Chaplain Corps' requirements for an anticipated mobilization of 200,000 soldiers, many of whom would be drawn from the Reserves. Chaplain Fields began his review on August 9, two weeks before President Bush ordered a 200,000 selected Reserve call-up. Chaplain (Brigadier General) James M. Hutchens, Special Assistant to the Chief of Chaplains from the Army National Guard, visited six installations, beginning in August, to determine the readiness of large Army posts to support and sustain such a major deployment. At Fort Hood, one of the installations visited, Chaplain Hutchens asked Chaplain Don C. Breland, the III Corps chaplain, and his deputy, Chaplain James Barry Lonergan, for a total readiness report including the adequacy of mobilization plans, family support, civilian community assistance, mass casualty plans, cross-leveling of chaplains, and backfill requirements to support the families of deployed soldiers. Chaplain Hutchens concluded that Fort Hood's plans were "already in place and operational prior to this deployment."60

Chaplain Wayne W. Hoffmann, USAR, performed a number of missions related to plans for a possible mass casualty situation. Hoffmann, the senior Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) in the Chief's Office, had worked for Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, the Director of PPDT, in July 1990 researching Family Life programs and issues. From August through December, Chaplain Hoffmann, under Chaplain Donald Shea's guidance, met with Major Command chaplains to develop a mission essential task list for crisis ministry. With the assistance of Chaplain Stan Esterline and other members of Chaplain Kuehne's staff, Chaplain Hoffmann wrote a paper entitled, "Guidelines for Ministry in a Crisis Environment." This paper was distributed to a number of installations involved in deployment including Fort Benning and Fort Sam Houston. From this initial interest, Chaplain Hoffmann moved to an examination of the requirements for two IMA chaplains to form a Crisis Response Team at Dover Air Force Base. As was the case with Chaplain Field's and Chaplain Hutchens' ministries, Chaplain Hoffmann extended "the eyes and ears" of the Chief in preparing for Operation Desert Shield.61

In spite of these personal initiatives by the Chief of Chaplains, there were numerous and as yet unanswered questions for his staff concerning Operation Desert Shield. Mr. Roger Able, tracking FORSCOM units, wondered how big the deployment would turn out to be.62 Would Saddam Hussein withdraw his forces from Kuwait as he announced publicly on August 5? Would the United States go to full mobilization? Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, Director of PPDT, wondered if there would be enough chaplains available from critically short faith groups to meet the area coverage requirements and the eventual backfill vacancy requirements generated by a large mobilization.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Henry Wake noted a critical need throughout the Chaplain branch for timely, accurate information just as General Vuono had predicted.63

The Chief of Chaplains Personnel Director, Chaplain John Scott, was responsible ultimately for supervising deployments and developing plans and rosters to provide replacements for chaplain casualties. His staff was in daily contact with FORSCOM and APPERCEN to coordinate chaplain personnel requirements. Chaplain Hugh Dukes managed some of these functions initially as the point of contact for the Directorate.

Chaplain Donald W. Shea, the Executive Officer for the Chief and the Deputy Chief of Chaplains three months later, was attending the 6th Army Chaplain Training Conference when the invasion of Kuwait took place. When Chaplain Kaising and Mr. Able informed him of the full situation, Chaplain Shea said with both humor and prescience, "Now we can work our way up to chaos."64* When Chaplain Shea returned to Washington, telephones were ringing incessantly with calls from civilian pastors and Reserve chaplains offering their services in the desert if needed. With only two secure telephones to use for conversations involving classified material, often staff members would have to speak sequentially to their individual points of contact at FORSCOM, at the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN), or in Saudi Arabia. Twelve hour days in the Chief of Chaplain's Office became the rule rather than the exception and many days, due to the eight-hour time difference with Saudi Arabia, lasted much longer than that. Yet from the very beginning of Operation Desert Shield there was a great deal of selfless overtime duty performed in the Chief’s Office by military and civilian personnel alike.65

Chaplain School Products

Chaplain Bernard Windmiller, Commandant of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, had been following the events in the Middle East with as much interest as had his colleagues in the Chief of Chaplains Office in Washington. According to the School’s mobilization plan, if the United States Army went to full mobilization, the Chaplain Advanced Course students would be deployed to the field and the Basic Course student classes increased to provide as many new battalion chaplains as were needed. With the help of Mrs. Mary Lou Corcoran, the School’s Mobilization Officer, and Chaplain James E. Pierce, Special Projects Officer from the Chief of Chaplains' Office (DACH), these plans had just been validated.

As in the case of other headquarters, there were many chaplains and assistants at USACHCS who volunteered to go to Saudi Arabia if they were needed. Because more than 200 Reserve Component chaplains were called to duty, only one chaplain from the Staff and Faculty actually deployed.66

The Chaplain School made many other contributions including training and certifying all of the 577 chaplains and 514 chaplain assistants deployed to Southwest Asia from 9 August 1990 through 2 August 1991. One of the most popular training publications produced at the School just prior to the deployment was Reference Book 1-1, The Unit Ministry Team Handbook, which

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Donald Shea, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, called "the most valuable tool" the Chaplaincy produced in its reference book inventory.67

The Unit Ministry Team Handbook had been the brain child of Major Morgan Flom, Chief of the Unit and Individual Training Division (UITD) at the Chaplain School. Chaplain Jesse Thornton of UITD was the initial project officer for the first draft. The handbook captured soldier skills, first aid, battle fatigue, staff paper formats, and practical doctrinal principles for unit ministry teams in the field. It was a "how to" book which reflected contributions from more than 35 chaplains, chaplain assistants, and combat arms officers in the Army.68

In the summer of 1989, almost exactly a year before Operation Desert Shield began, Major Michael W. Hobson, a West Point graduate and the Chief of the Training Products branch of UITD, revised The Unit Ministry Team Handbook to be in accord with the newly approved FM 16-1, Religious Support Doctrine: The Chaplain and Chaplain Assistant. Major Hobson, an Army aviator, proposed that the new book be reduced in size, as Aviation manuals often were, to fit in the pockets of Battle Dress Uniforms, and further that it be laminated to make it an all-weather handbook.

Major Hobson rewrote much of the handbook with the help of his staff, Master Sergeant Richard Geiger, the senior chaplain's assistant in UITD, Mrs. Judy Lyons, Mrs. Karen Dooney, Mrs. Dorris Ryan, and Mrs. Mary Anna Lewis, the Division secretary. Upon approval by Chaplain Basil L. Ballad, Director of Training and Doctrine, and Chaplain Windmiller, the Commandant, the handbook went to press.69 Subsequently sent to the XVIII Airborne Corps, U.S. Army Europe, and to the deploying Reserve Component unit ministry teams by Major Hobson, Chaplain David Sandifer, his successor in 1990, and Sergeant First Class Allen Barber, The Unit Ministry Team Handbook became the most widely used reference book in the Chaplain Corps during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Preparing for the Desert

Tactical preparation for unit ministry teams to provide religious support for soldiers in the Desert had been monitored by the Chief of Chaplains and his staff and supported by training at the Chaplain School and at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. Yet most of the initial work on the details for a rapid deployment to Saudi Arabia took place at the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office, Third Army, the XVIII Airborne Corps, III Corps, and in the divisional and brigade units assigned to them in the United States. As the Reserve Components were called up, the staff chaplains at the National Guard Bureau, at the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center and at the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs) became key points of contact for mobilization. Within two months the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Chaplain and the unit ministry teams in VII Corps in Germany were alerted as well to provide additional heavy armor capability to the coalition forces.

Chaplain Charles T. Clanton, the Command Chaplain for U.S. Forces Command, did not personally direct the deployment of unit ministry teams, for that was a command function. Yet by

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Army Regulation 165-1, Chaplain Clanton was responsible to the Chief of Chaplains for the management of religious resources in FORSCOM and that included personnel management to ensure that units mobilizing and deploying overseas had a sufficient number of trained unit ministry teams (UMTs) to go with them.

Since the summer of 1989 when Chaplain Clanton left his post as Commandant of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School to become the FORSCOM Chaplain, he had taken a personal interest not only in the tactical expertise of chaplains and chaplain assistants on the 19 installations within FORSCOM, but in their spiritual welfare as well. In a visit to Fort Bragg in 1989, Chaplain Clanton had joined the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain, Bernard Lieving, and the division chaplains and assistants assigned to the XVII Airborne Corps for a "Warfighter Conference" at Fort Fisher, North Carolina. This conference stressed both tactical and spiritual preparedness of the UMTs and the elements of Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) as related to religious support missions.  

In July of 1990 Chaplain Clanton attended a two-day spiritual retreat at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with Chaplain Charles Adams, the installation chaplain. "I have never seen chaplains and chaplain assistants so together spiritually," Chaplain Clanton observed, "even Major General Binford Peay, Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division, was invited to ask any chaplain he saw what the daily Bible reading was for that day, and General Peay read his Bible every day as well."  

At the same time Chaplain Clanton was providing pastoral encouragement at Fort Campbell, another important exercise in preparation for desert operations was being conducted by CENTCOM with participants from the XVIII Airborne Corps and Third Army, (called Army Central Command or ARCENT when it deployed). The exercise was a Joint Chiefs' war game entitled INTERNAL LOOK 90 which focused on the defense of Saudi Arabia.

INTERNAL LOOK 90 was a product of the CENTCOM Staff at the direction of the CENTCOM Commander, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. General Schwarzkopf became the Commander in Chief of CENTCOM in late November 1988. He was one of the first to realize that with the end of the Soviet threat and the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein might seek to use his huge army to intimidate the Persian Gulf States. Since CENTCOM was responsible for America's national security interests in that part of the world, General Schwarzkopf wanted U.S. forces to be fully prepared to blunt any incursions into Saudi Arabia or into other friendly neighboring countries if they occurred.

INTERNAL LOOK 90 was based on General Schwarzkopf's revised OPLAN 1002-90, the defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia against Iraqi attack. The war game was conducted concurrently at Ft Bragg and at Hurlburt Field, Florida, from 23 July 23-28 July, 1990. Key elements included command post and map exercises without troop involvement.

When he heard about the proposed exercise, Chaplain Bernard H. Lieving, Jr., the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain, asked the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, to approve chaplain and chaplain assistant participation in INTERNAL LOOK. General Stiner approved Chaplain Lieving's request, and orders were prepared for the senior unit ministry teams from all the divisions and separate brigades assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps to attend the war game at the

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Fort Bragg site. Among the participants were chaplains from the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and the 24th Infantry Division.

The units which were represented at the Fort Bragg Training Area site included not only all of the divisions and separate brigades in the XVIII Airborne Corps but also the "down trace" support units. The 82nd Airborne Division was the key player for the initial stages of the defense, and the maps used depicted the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia.75

Participation by the Third Army Chaplain and his staff was built into the exercise at Fort McPherson.76 Third Army would interface and communicate with XVIII Airborne Corps from Hurlburt Field. The Third Army Chaplain and the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain would play the same war game and consider the same tasks and problems involved in a deployment of a large number of chaplains and chaplain assistants to Saudi Arabia.

Chaplain Dan O'Conner, a Roman Catholic priest, was the Third Army Chaplain. Chaplain O'Conner, a member of the U.S. Army Reserve, was popular with the Third Army officers and soldiers as a chaplain who exhibited all of the positive traits of a pastor.77 The Deputy Third Army Chaplain was Joe R. Colley, a United Methodist, and formerly the Protestant pastor at Fort Gillem before his assignment to Third Army. The senior chaplain assistant was Sergeant Major Mary Razel, U.S. Army Reserve, one of the first female chaplain assistants to attain the rank of Sergeant Major. Chaplain Colley's assistant, Sergeant First Class (SFC) Ed Parton, rounded out the team.78

In addition to his other duties, SFC Parton was responsible for writing many of the scenarios UMTs would face in a deployment to Saudi Arabia. These included logistical problems, such as shipping communion wine into Saudi Arabia where drinking alcohol was forbidden, transporting New Testaments and Bibles into the most restrictive country of Islam, practicing sensitivity to Islamic culture especially as related to women, and performing religious sacraments and rites in an unfamiliar environment under combat conditions.79

After a week of war gaming between Fort Bragg and Hurlburt Field, the Joint Staff concluded that if Iraq were to attack into Saudi Arabia with six armor divisions, a fully deployed XVIII Airborne Corps with coordinated tactical air support would be able to stop the incursion without losing Dhahran or Dammam. The cost was calculated at 50 percent casualties from the XVIII Airborne Corps and the loss of 200 kilometers of Saudi territory.80 The estimated losses among chaplains and chaplain assistants, especially due to chemical attack, called for 12 replacement unit ministry teams ready at the end of the first day of defensive combat.81

When the exercise was over on Saturday, July 28, Chaplain O'Conner and Chaplain Colley returned to Fort McPherson for a well-deserved rest over the weekend.82 The other chaplains and assistants went home as well. No one dreamed that within five days Iraqi tanks would be in Kuwait near the Saudi Arabian border, and that General Schwarzkopf would be on his way to Washington to brief President Bush on OPLAN 1002-90.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Speed Bumps In The Desert:
The 82nd Airborne Division

The deployment of Major General James Johnson's 82nd Airborne Division began August 6 with a thunderstorm and an alert order at Fort Bragg. The 2nd Brigade, designated the Division Readiness Brigade and commanded by Colonel Ronald Rokosz, was fully prepared to deploy, with one battalion "packed" aboard the aircraft within 19 hours.83 The 1st and 3rd Brigades were in training, with some soldiers on leave. Anticipating that the entire division would go, General Johnson ordered all units and soldiers to return to Fort Bragg immediately.

At the midnight briefing on August 6, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Epkins, the Division intelligence officer, briefed each brigade and battalion commander on the Iraqi armor lined up along the Kuwait border. The mission of the 82nd was to defend the ports and airfields at Dhahran and Damam until reinforcements could arrive. The new XVIII Airborne Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Gary Luck, told the division to be prepared to fight upon arrival. The division's aviation brigade of attack helicopters would go early. One multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battery from the 3-27th Field Artillery would go too.84 Some of the officers evaluated the mission optimistically as a "show the flag" operation; but among the soldiers, who watched the nightly news on television, there was a less cheerful assessment: if Saddam attacked soon, the lightly armed 82nd would become a "speed bump" in the desert for 800 Iraqi tanks.85

Chaplain William L. Hufham, the 82nd Airborne Division Chaplain, had been following the CNN reports on the invasion of Kuwait very closely as well as the daily briefings at Fort Bragg. Initially Chaplain Hufham remarked to his family that if the United States sent a military force to the region, "it looks like an armor operation and I don't think the 82nd Airborne Division will be involved in that at all." One brigade of the 82nd and some aviation assets were training at Fort Chaffe, Arkansas, and one battalion of the 82nd was supporting training at the R.O.T.C. Summer Camp at Fort Bragg. After the August 6 briefing, however, it was clear that all of the chaplains in the division needed to begin packing their gear.

Chaplain Hufham was personally well prepared to lead the first Army unit ministry teams to Saudi Arabia. With previous assignments in the 82nd Airborne Division, the 1st Signal Brigade in Korea, the 101st Airborne (Airmobile) Division, the 172nd Infantry Brigade in Alaska, and the 3rd Infantry Division Artillery in Germany, few other chaplains in the Chaplain Corps had had as much time performing and supervising ministry to soldiers in the field as had Chaplain Hufham.

There was not much time to spend discussing deployment with the Second Brigade chaplains, for they were due to depart within 48 hours. Chaplain Hufham met with all of the chaplains and chaplain assistants departing immediately to review their assumption of mission briefing, the war plan as they saw it and the impact of religion in the area of operations.86 In particular, the UMTs gathered up their written resources on the Middle East: country studies on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, and a pocket guide from the XVIII Airborne Corps entitled "Cross Cultural Understanding" which included two pages on the Islamic religion. The UMTs also had the laminated UMT Handbook which Chaplain Hufham thought was "one of the handiest things we had for immediate deployment."87

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
There was no need for Chaplain Hufham to bid his brigade chaplain and battalion chaplains farewell, for he would be deploying himself just 72 hours after they did. For the time being, the UMTs were as physically, mentally and spiritually fit as they could be for a "come as you are" mission.

The first unit ministry teams to deploy to Saudi Arabia from 9 August - 15 August were drawn from three FORSCOM units on three different installations: the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, and the 2/7 Patriot Battalion, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, at Fort Bliss, Texas. There were fifteen unit ministry teams composed of twelve Protestant and three Roman Catholic chaplains. Chaplain Tom Solhjem was the first Army chaplain to deploy. Chaplain James Cooper of the 24th Infantry Division was the first African-American chaplain to depart, while Chaplain Rebecca Leckrone of the 11th ADA Brigade was the first female chaplain in the history of the Army Chaplain Corps to be deployed to (what became) a combat zone. Of the seventeen chaplain assistants, two were Roman Catholic. Both Catholic assistants served with Protestant chaplains, while the three Catholic chaplains had Protestant assistants. The roster of the first unit ministry teams to go "wheels up" represented a fairly ecumenical group dedicated to performing area coverage and facilitating the soldiers' free exercise of religion in the desert:

Unit Ministry Teams Deployed to Saudi Arabia - Operation Desert Shield
First "Speed Bumps in the Desert"

Fort Bragg - 82nd Airborne Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tr>
<td>Forry, Thomas</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>1/17 Cav</td>
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<td>Frizque, Gary</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Christian</td>
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<td>Wunsch, Ron</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>DIVARTY</td>
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<td>Walraven, Dennis</td>
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<td>Disciple</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krause, Lawrence</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Pentecostal</td>
<td>2nd Bde</td>
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<td>Johnson, George</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>A. of God</td>
<td>4/325 Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solhjem, Thomas</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Arabic linguist</td>
<td>3/72 Armor</td>
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<td>Mactutis, Anthony</td>
<td>SPC (SD*)</td>
<td>Baptist</td>
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<td>George, David</td>
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<td>Rayburn, Warren</td>
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See endnotes at end of chapter.
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<td>Hufham, William</td>
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<td>Hardesty, James</td>
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<td>Pres. OR</td>
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<td>Vogel, John</td>
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<td>Sinnett, Robert</td>
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<td>Ober, Robert</td>
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**Fort Stewart - 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)**

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<td>Shockey, Paul</td>
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**Fort Bliss - 11th ADA Brigade**

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**Fort Bragg - 82nd Airborne Division**

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*SD = Special Duty

See endnotes at end of chapter.
The unit ministry teams which deployed from Fort Bragg had learned from the experience of Operation Just Cause, just eight months before, that Bibles, crosses, rosaries, and devotional tracts would be in demand by the soldiers soon after arrival. Therefore, each unit ministry team deployed with thirty days' ecclesiastical supplies for Christian worship, communion, and Bible studies. Even small field hymnals went in boxes. The 82nd Airborne Division unit ministry teams had written Religious Support Plans for Contingency Operations and had them already approved by the Division Chaplain. Resupply of ecclesiastical items would come from Fort Bragg by available transport aircraft, and supplies would be pushed forward by the sustaining installation.

The Chaplains from the 82nd Airborne deployed wearing their crosses on their collars in the normal manner. Chaplain Hufham had received contradictory advice from FORSCOM and CENTCOM with regard to wearing branch insignia (crosses and tablets) in a strictly Islamic country. Consequently, he recommended to the Division Commander, Major General Johnson, that chaplains be allowed to wear crosses in the Division area. If there were Muslims in the locality, chaplains could simply put their load bearing equipment (LBE) straps over their branch insignia as a temporary measure. General Johnson approved Chaplain Hufham's recommendation and further directed, in the absence of orders from CENTCOM, that worship services be advertised as such and not as "morale meetings." In this way all Christian and Jewish worship services would be advertised and available to soldiers without offending their Saudi Arabian hosts. This was interpreted to be in accord with CENTCOM's emerging policy.

On 9 August the first elements of the 82nd Airborne Division with seven chaplains and seven chaplain assistants arrived in Saudi Arabia. Within seven days of the invasion of Kuwait, the entire Division Ready Brigade of 4,575 paratroopers and their equipment arrived in harm's way ready to fight to defend Dhahran and Dammam. Between August 13 and September 8 the remaining units of the Division arrived using a total of 582 C-141 and C5A aircraft. With Egyptian and American combat troops in their country, the Saudi Arabians were no longer alone.

FORSCOM: "Up to Our Hips"

Beginning on Monday, August 6, the U.S. Forces Command Operations Center (FOC) at Fort McPherson went to 24-hour operations. The FOC, in the basement of the FORSCOM Headquarters building, was barely a block from the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office, across from the Fort McPherson Catholic Chapel. Each day Chaplain Clanton and Chaplain Lawrence "Larry" A. Kelly, Jr., the Deputy FORSCOM Chaplain and Chief of Operations and Support, would take turns covering the FOC briefing and subsequently brief the other FORSCOM Chaplain staff members. Once the 82nd Airborne Division, the 24th Infantry Division, and the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade were alerted, Chaplain Kelly noted that the staff members were "up to our hips" in work.

Chaplain Kelly was a native of South Carolina and, before entering the Methodist ministry, had been a police officer in Charleston, South Carolina. Although Chaplain Kelly was of medium height, he had a definite command presence punctuated by a keen sense of humor. Once in his career

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
as a police officer he had to break up a riot by himself. Chaplain Kelly recalled that by the time he had restored order, taking many punches in the process, all he had left were his shoes, his trousers and his pistol. After attending Duke University and entering the Army Chaplain Corps, Chaplain Kelly served in Vietnam with the 173rd Airborne Brigade and later as the Division Chaplain of the 10th Mountain Division. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm he played a key role in coordinating the incredible requirements Chaplain Clanton's staff had to meet. "My assignment immediately prior to Operation Desert Shield as the 21st TAACOM Chaplain in Europe proved to be invaluable, particularly my REFORGER experience in that position," Chaplain Kelly recalled. 92

When Third Army Headquarters deployed to Southwest Asia and became U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT), a rear detachment remained at Fort McPherson and joined with Forces Command to become ARCENT Rear. The FORSCOM Chaplain's Office became the ARCENT Rear Chaplain's Office. Throughout Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the Chaplains at ARCENT Rear (Fort McPherson) and ARCENT Main (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) maintained close contact on all policy, personnel, and logistical matters. 93 Coordination on ecclesiastical supplies and personnel issues began to occur daily. Chaplain William Huttham was the senior Army Chaplain in Saudi Arabia the second and third weeks in August with Chaplain Lieving, the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain, deploying August 26.

Among the key requirements the FORSCOM Chaplain had to meet were the monitoring and cross-leveling of deploying unit ministry teams; the preparation of briefing packets on Islam, Saudi Arabia, and the Iraqi threat for deploying UMTs; and the reviewing of mobilization plans for members of the Reserve Components called to duty. Communications with the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, the Armed Forces Chaplain Board, ARPERCEN, the TRADOC and AMC Chaplains, each of 19 FORSCOM installations and five CONUSAs, the National Guard Bureau, various endorsing agents, the Chaplain Center and School, FORSCOM headquarters and, of course, ARCENT Main in Saudi Arabia, on matters of policy, procedure, personnel, and logistics was a daunting task. Complicating the problem was that as of the second week in August there was no Central Command (CENTCOM) Chaplain on General Schwarzkopf's Staff, nor was there an ARCENT (Third Army) Chaplain yet named to join Lt. Gen. Yeosock's staff in Saudi Arabia. These critical staff vacancies demanded attention while all of the other requirements seemed to intensify by the hour.

Chaplain Sir Walter Scott, who served in the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office during this time, recalled his feelings:

I worked with Chaplain Robert Vickers in the FOC with long hours from 1800 to 0830. The sentiments of officers in the FOC were ones of mixed emotions. We were excited about providing support to the warfighters, however, we were saddened that we could not be a part of the front line. Some of us, including me, volunteered to go. However, we were told our mission was in rear support. We stayed back and worked with families, helping to keep them informed about loved ones. We gave talks to churches about how to support, the Reserve and National Guard member's families.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
While these supports were necessary, we can’t help but feel envy and a sense of guilt for not being there with our fellow soldiers.

Working with Force Structure to create valid positions was okay. Helping to track and make sure Bibles and other literature got smuggled to the desert was okay. To put in practice all that you trained for but never hoped to use. But when you have to use the training, you pray, hope, and want to know that you have been given all the right "stuff" to make a difference in the lives of others.94

General Schwarzkopf's Chaplain

By the second week in August, several critical issues began to emerge at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, not the least of which was the absence on General Schwarzkopf's staff of a Central Command Staff Chaplain to coordinate religious support for all services throughout the area of operations (AO). United States Central Command Regulation 165-1, dated 1 January 1985, emphasized that "commands shall provide for the free exercise of religion among their personnel through the command religious program." While the U.S. Commander in Chief, CENTCOM, "gives guidance and tasking for component and supporting command ministries, the U.S. CENTCOM Chaplain monitors, coordinates and maintains liaison with senior component and supporting command chaplains, and helps resolve issues related to the readiness and delivery of ministries associated with U.S. CENTCOM."95 The CENTCOM Chaplain was responsible for reviewing all U.S. CENTCOM contingency plans for inclusive religious support, for resolving conflicts between CENTCOM regulations and other Services' regulations regarding religious support, for reviewing command and supporting units' situation reports, and for ensuring that the U.S. CENTCOM religious program met "the needs of all personnel" according to "relevant service directives, teachings and practices of the endorsing faith groups, and sensitivity to host countries' religious environments."96

Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman's dual concern was that not only was there no CENTCOM Staff Chaplain in place, there was no authorization for one. In 1988, before General Schwarzkopf became the Commander (CINC) of CENTCOM, the Staff Chaplain's authorization had been deleted and replaced with one for a regional affairs officer.97 There was no CENTCOM Chaplain at INTERNAL LOOK in July 1990, yet by August it was clear to the CENTCOM Staff that they needed one. Consequently Chaplain Zimmerman was asked to "lend" CENTCOM an active duty Chaplain in the grade of Colonel to supervise religious support for all of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in the Gulf.99 The question of an authorization would be addressed later. Chaplain Zimmerman accepted the request.

This vacancy led to Chaplain Zimmerman's second concern. He certainly wanted a CENTCOM Chaplain on General Schwarzkopf's staff, but which senior chaplains were qualified for such a responsible joint position and also available for deployment on such short notice? Chaplain Zimmerman wanted a chaplain with an outstanding record of ministry to soldiers, with service in a

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
combat zone if possible, an appreciation for the complexity of joint operations, experience in working for commanders of various temperaments and backgrounds, and sensitivity for the faith and customs of an Islamic host country. Chaplain John Scott, the Director of Personnel (Director, DACH-PER), began coordinating with major command (MACOM) chaplains to develop a list of names for the Chief's consideration.

After reviewing the names, Chaplain Zimmerman selected Chaplain David P. Peterson from the FORSCOM Chaplain Office. Chaplain Charles Clanton had recommended Chaplain Peterson highly. Chaplain Peterson, the Reserve Affairs Chaplain on Clanton's Staff, had served two tours in Vietnam, two tours in the XVIII Airborne Corps (the last as the Corps Chaplain) and one tour as the Post Chaplain at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. More importantly, Chaplain Clanton already had Chaplain Charles G. Komschlies, from the U.S. Army Reserve, ready to replace Chaplain Peterson as well as three Individual Mobilization Augmentee chaplains: Paul Mason, Raymond E. Ennis, and Delaine Perkins, all Colonels, available for support. Chaplain Zimmerman forwarded Chaplain Peterson's nomination as the CENTCOM Chaplain to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and directed Chaplain John Scott to alert Chaplain Peterson.

"I Need You to Go Tomorrow"

Chaplain David Peterson was planning to move his family to Fort McPherson the third week of August. He had waited for his daughter to graduate from high school, rented a house, and requested ten days' leave to accomplish the move. As he was preparing to leave Fort McPherson to pick up his family, his wife called and asked if he thought he would have to go to Saudi Arabia. "Absolutely not," replied Chaplain Peterson. "I'm the Reserve Affairs Chaplain and this war will never get so big that they have to call up the Reserves. The U.S. will show some power and Saddam Hussein will back down. I have no concern."

At the FORSCOM Chaplain's meeting on 19 August, Chaplain Clanton advised his staff that they had better be prepared and organized for a large scale operation in Southwest Asia. Chaplain Zimmerman had told Chaplain Clanton that a chaplain would be going to the CENTCOM position. Chaplain Peterson, still clearing his desk before going on leave, received a call at 4 p.m. from Chaplain Scott. "Your records have been sent to the JCS," Chaplain Scott told him, "I need you to go tomorrow to CENTCOM Headquarters." Forty-eight hours later, on August 22, Chaplain Peterson reported with his field gear to the J1 at MacDill Air Force Base.

Chaplain Peterson's first mission was to write policy for the CENTCOM Commander covering all matters which dealt with religion, specifically providing guidance for Operation Desert Shield. The policy memorandum would assist commanders in dealing with sensitive issues regarding religion: the deployment of Jewish chaplains, display of religious symbols, and the wearing of Chaplain branch insignia. This policy would be coordinated with the Armed Forces Chaplains Board and the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, U.S. Army. Chaplain Peterson's second mission was to deploy to Saudi Arabia within one week.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) Right to Left: Chaplain David Peterson, CENTCOM Chaplain; Chaplain Brock Watson, MEDCOM Chaplain; Chaplain Billy Fowler; RSP Fitzgerald (USN); (Bottom) HRH Prince Charles visits with Chaplains Colley, Hatler, and SFC Ed Parton in Riyadh, Christmas, 1990
"Gladly the Cross I'd Bear"

The first, and most sensitive issues Chaplain Peterson had to address in his new job at CENTCOM were those dealing with the customary use of wine by some Christian faith groups in the administration of Holy Communion and the wear of branch insignia by Christian and Jewish military chaplains. Prior to Chaplain Peterson's arrival at MacDill Air Force Base, the CENTCOM, J5 and Judge Advocate General staff officers had written some policy statements in draft form which addressed religious support. Since CENTCOM did not have a staff chaplain assigned in early August, the European Command (EUCOM) Chaplain, Captain Raymond Dresler, U.S. Navy, and his deputy, Chaplain David Goodwillie, had also written religious support policy as the supporting major command for CENTCOM. Chaplain Peterson appreciated Chaplain Dresler's help, but the policies from EUCOM and CENTCOM were confusing when examined together since they were contradictory in a few places. Consequently Chaplain Peterson rescinded all previous policies and wrote one with input from the CENTCOM J1 and J5 that reflected a balance of concerns for meeting the religious needs of soldiers without seeming insensitive to the host country's indigenous religious traditions.

In order to override objections from CENTCOM and some Third Army staff members concerning importing wine— forbidden by the Koran— into Saudi Arabia, Chaplain Peterson corresponded with several Christian endorsing agencies. The Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Episcopal spokespersons he contacted assured him that sacramental wine was required by church tradition and law and was part of the proper administration of communion. The consumption of any alcoholic beverage was so sensitive an issue in the heart of Islam however, that the CENTCOM Chief of Staff, Major General Robert B. Johnston, preferred a policy which did not mention wine directly. Accordingly Chaplain Peterson understood that sacramental wine would be available through supply channels, but the official CENTCOM policy contained the generic statement: "Chaplains are authorized to possess such items as are necessary to conduct religious services and to use such items with discretion in the provision of religious and spiritual programs."

The guidelines for wearing branch insignia for Chaplains — the cross or the tablets — became one of the most hotly debated issues in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The policy Chaplain Peterson personally proposed would have allowed chaplains to wear their branch insignia unless a commander determined that such a display interfered with the mission of the unit. In that event the commander could ask the chaplain to remove or cover his branch insignia.

The official CENTCOM policy, dated September 13, 1990, was not so decentralized, but did allow some latitude:

Chaplains may wear Chaplain insignia (cross or tablets) when in U.S. controlled areas. Chaplain insignia should not be worn when outside of U.S. controlled areas if commanders determine that the religious sensitivities of local nationals would be offended. In such circumstances, Army and Navy Chaplains should wear rank insignia on both collars of their uniform.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
With respect to this part of his policy for chaplains in the Gulf, General Schwarzkopf wrote:

Their insistence on religious purity notwithstanding, the Saudis recognized that our troops could not be denied the right to practice their own religions, as long as they did so discreetly. After discussing the matter with Khalid, I called together representatives of the American Chaplains and made a short speech. 'We all want the troops to have freedom of worship,' I told them, 'but to do that we have to use a little judgement. You Chaplains who are assigned to Riyadh and other cities already know how sensitive the local people are. The very sight of the cross is offensive to them. So I'm asking those of you in the cities to take the Christian or Jewish insignia off your uniforms, or to wear them in such a way that they can't be seen. Chaplains with combat units in the field will continue to wear their insignia. I know some of you won't like this, but it seems to me a small price to pay.' I added with a mock growl, 'Besides, if you are worth a damn as Chaplains, your troops already know who you are. You don't need insignia.' I'd expected protests, particularly on the issue of taking off the insignia, but to my surprise the Chaplains readily agreed, and even went further: they started calling themselves 'morale officers.'

Some of the chaplains at the Chief's Office thought that approving the practice of referring to chaplains as "morale officers" was a mistake. They thought someone in the technical chain should have objected as soon as the idea surfaced in Riyadh. Chaplain John Scott wrote, "It was tolerated at DACH, but there were many dissenting voices. Some chaplains felt that while we were in Saudi Arabia to defend their freedom, we could not exercise our own." Actually the CENTCOM policy, which General Schwarzkopf approved, called for religious articles and ecclesiastical supplies shipped through other than Military Airlift Command (MAC) channels to be marked for the "Morale Officer," which in most areas soldiers understood to be the chaplain.

Other provisions of the CENTCOM Command Policy for the Administration of Religious Support—Operation Desert Shield, called "the PARSON policy" by some irreverent officers at ARCENT, gave guidance for commanders as well as chaplain and chaplain assistants:

1. Commanders must continue to fulfill the religious needs of their subordinates with integral religious support.
2. Faith specific religious symbols (including flags and pennants) will not be displayed out of doors.
3. Materials shipped by MAC channel flights may be marked for the chaplain, but should not be marked with any religious symbol. Incoming mail is closely inspected by customs officials and its use should be avoided.
4. Formal worship services will be conducted only within covered shelters or private settings, and not in open areas or in view of host nationals.
5. Inter-faith ministry with local Muslim Imams is not permitted.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
6. Benevolent activities, such as work with orphanages, will not be solicited.
7. In U.S. controlled areas, religious articles will be used with discretion. Religious materials are to be distributed only to U.S. personnel.
8. Religious support personnel will refer all media inquiries to their unit's public affairs office (PAO).

The CENTCOM policy concluded:

These guidelines are not intended to unduly infringe on the right of U.S. Forces personnel to freely exercise their religious beliefs. Rather, they are designed to ensure that the spiritual needs of our forces can be met while simultaneously respecting the sensitivities of our host nations and denying a potential adversary a basis to disseminate misinformation.

A few chaplains complained about the CENTCOM policy, especially when the Saudi Arabian authorities posed no objection to the subsequent British Forces Middle East statement that their chaplains would wear their customary Christian insignia as a normal part of their uniforms. However, in the main the American chaplains complied loyally with General Schwarzkopf's directive.

News Traveled Fast

As Chaplain Peterson was writing policy memoranda at CENTCOM headquarters, civilian newspapers throughout the United States began to list the major units deploying to Saudi Arabia. On the initial lists were the 82nd Airborne Division, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) from Fort Campbell, Kentucky.\(^\text{106}\)

The Jewish Wire Service requested a list of Jewish chaplains on active duty in the Army from the Jewish Welfare Board with the object of locating and interviewing a Jewish chaplain deploying to Saudi Arabia.\(^\text{107}\) This deployment possibility was so sensitive at every level of command, given the possible adverse reaction by the Saudi Arabian government, that Secretary of Defense Cheney took a personal interest in the issue.\(^\text{108}\) So, of course, did Chaplain Zimmerman.

With a list of Jewish Army chaplains in hand, the Jewish Wire Service reporters began contacting chaplains individually. One of the first they reached was Chaplain Barry Baron at Fort Benning, Georgia. Chaplain Baron was happy to announce that he had heard of a Jewish chaplain preparing to deploy from Fort Stewart and that "for the first time since the 7th century the ram's horn would be blown on Islamic soil" at Rosh Hashanah, the observance of the Jewish New Year.\(^\text{109}\) Chaplain Baron did not realize that his jubilant statement would have repercussions in Riyadh.

The Jewish Wire Service sent Chaplain Baron's story to all Jewish news media including the *London Jewish Chronicle*. From London the story travelled by wire and by radio to Israel where it was again publicized by the Israeli press. Prince Khalid Bin Sultan al-Saud, the Saudi General who

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
commanded the Kingdom's air-defense forces, received a clipping of the article taken from an Israeli newspaper. General Schwarzkopf noted:

Within days of my arrival, Khalid called with his hair on fire: 'You have brought rabbi into this country who is saying that for the first time in history, the ram’s horn will be blown on Islamic soil!' I very much doubted that a U.S. Army chaplain would say anything that inflammatory, but I sent my staff chaplain scrambling. We eventually discovered that the rabbi in question was neither connected to Central Command nor present in the Middle East—he was an Army chaplain in the United States who had been quoted in an Israeli newspaper. Someone had clipped the story and sent it to the king.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

Chaplain Peterson, who in early September had just arrived at General Schwarzkopf's headquarters at the Saudi Defense building in Riyadh, was summoned to the General's office. "You have the King on the ceiling!" General Schwarzkopf stormed, "There are three things that can cause this whole coalition effort to come unravelled and you have one of them! Now you get out there and you keep your chaplains under control. And you make sure that all my troops have the opportunity to practice their faith."\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} That was the only guidance General Schwarzkopf gave to his staff chaplain, but it was not the last time during Desert Shield/Storm that General Schwarzkopf and General Yeosock would be concerned about the deployment of chaplains and the provision for pluralistic religious support in Saudi Arabia.

In spite of his stormy introduction to his staff chaplain, General Schwarzkopf appreciated Chaplain Peterson's presence on his staff. On his own initiative, Chaplain Peterson met regularly with the Saudi Arabian Army's Religious Affairs Department to explain the way chaplains and chaplain assistants provided religious support to American soldiers. General Schwarzkopf asked Chaplain Peterson to lead his staff in prayer on occasion and met with chaplains from CENTCOM and ARCENT headquarters to answer questions about his policies with regard to religion, most of which Chaplain Peterson had written for his approval. General Schwarzkopf, moreover, not only worshipped with his soldiers when he was visiting field units and when his incredible schedule allowed, he also encouraged pilgrimages to Mecca for American soldiers of the Islamic faith and observances of Jewish holidays such as Passover for American soldiers of the Jewish faith. He was clearly committed, from the beginning of Desert Shield to the end of the war, to the provision of religious support by chaplains for every soldier in his command.

**Reinforcements: Heavy and Light**

With 43 Iraqi divisions, 12 of them armored, in the Kuwait Area of Operations, General Colin Powell did not intend for the 82nd Airborne Division to remain unsupported in the desert any longer than was absolutely necessary. Within four days of the Iraqi invasion, the 24th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) at Fort Stewart received an alert order, through FORSCOM and XVIII Airborne Corps, as did the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell. The next day, August 7, Lt. General Richard Graves, Commander, III Corps and Fort Hood, alerted the 1st Cavalry Division for deployment.\footnote{112} The 101st had a brigade of Apache attack helicopters and the 24th had four battalions of desert - camouflaged heavy tanks—just what General Schwarzkopf needed to blunt any attack Saddam Hussein might launch immediately.\footnote{113} Other forces, the 1st (Tiger) Brigade, 2nd Armored Division, from Fort Hood and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) from Fort Bliss were also alerted. The 101st and 24th would deploy as soon as possible with the 3rd ACR and the 1st Cavalry Division following.\footnote{114} Once the "line in the sand" was established and viable for the defense of Saudi Arabia, the liberation of Kuwait could proceed diplomatically—and militarily if necessary.

**Fort Stewart**

At Fort Stewart, Georgia, some of the units of the 24th Infantry Division were just coming back from the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin on August 6 when they were told they would deploy to Saudi Arabia, beginning August 13. Chaplain Ben Romer, the only Jewish chaplain in the division, had returned to Fort Stewart from the NTC in advance of his vehicle and equipment. The deployment of the 24th Infantry was so rapid, with but seven days to prepare before the first ship left Savannah for Saudi Arabia, that the train transporting divisional equipment from Fort Irwin went directly to the dock.\footnote{115} There the trucks, tanks and tents were loaded on the *ESS Capella* the first fast sealift ship designated to support the initial move.\footnote{116} Chaplain Romer made sure his ecclesiastical supplies, not just for supporting the Jewish soldiers but for the total religious support of his battalion, were included on board. No one knew exactly how and when more supplies might arrive in Saudi Arabia 8,000 miles away.

The 22 unit ministry teams of the 24th Infantry Division were well prepared for the deployment, even on short notice. For 13 months Chaplain Ford G'Segner, the Division Chaplain, had worked with his staff to battle-focus the training of all of his chaplains and chaplain assistants. All but three of his chaplains and all of his assistants had completed Combat Lifesaver Training with the medical section of the 724th Support Battalion at Fort Stewart.\footnote{117} This training included treating nerve agent casualties, first aid for wounds, and even starting intravenous (IV) solutions. Chaplain G'Segner required the chaplains and assistants to practice IV techniques on each other which was one of their least popular exercises.\footnote{118}

Other training included diagnostic tests for common soldier tasks, updating religious support plans, and writing SOPs for operation plans and orders. In Chaplain G'Segner's "Unit Ministry Team Leadership Philosophy," which he disseminated to every UMT member in the 24th Infantry Division, he emphasized a team approach for religious support:

We are combat service support soldiers who lead other Army soldier-leaders by modeling, teaching, and advocating morals, values, ethical decision-making, and

\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}
(Top) 24th Infantry Division arrives in SWA; (Bottom) Chaplains Pincince and D'Silva celebrate Mass
spiritual fitness. We are each members of the larger UMT, so we support and defend the rights, privileges, and practices of each other. We provide each other with advice, counsel, empathy, and coordinated actions. Wrongdoing has no place in our relationships.\textsuperscript{119}

Sergeant-Major Tillman Hatcher of the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain's Section thought that in soldier skills, readiness, and leadership philosophy, the UMTs of the 24th Infantry Division were indeed a model for the Chaplain Corps.\textsuperscript{120}

The \textit{FSS Capella} sailed from Savannah on August 13 carrying equipment, 100 soldiers, and one unit ministry team, Chaplain Michael Pollitt, a Roman Catholic, and his assistant, Specialist Ronald Putt. During the next two weeks, nine more ships sailed, each with a UMT on board. Chaplain Thomas L. Lucas, the Installation Staff Chaplain at Fort Stewart, noted that the "arrangement worked well." Every unit from Fort Stewart going to Saudi Arabia by sea or by air had at least one chaplain and one assistant with them. The "Forward Thrust" doctrine of the Chaplain Corps, positioning unit ministry teams as far forward with soldiers as possible, began not in Saudi Arabia but at the gates of Fort Stewart.

Among the first female chaplains and chaplain assistants deploying from Fort Stewart, Fort Bragg and Fort Campbell the third week in August were Sergeant Susan Bryant, Aviation Brigade, 24th Infantry Division; Sergeant Toni Laverach and Chaplain Priscilla Mondt of the 82nd Airborne Division; and Specialist Leslie A. Newall of the Aviation Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). In addition to modeling ethical decision-making and spiritual fitness, the UMTs by their composition also mirrored the Chief of Chaplains' multi-cultural and inclusive approach to ministry. Chaplain Zimmerman had decided that, in spite of some hesitation at higher echelons to deploy female soldiers to Saudi Arabia, unit ministry teams would deploy "as composed." He did not believe that changes in personnel should be made, on the basis of gender or faith group, for political reasons.

\textbf{Fort Campbell}

At the same time the 24th Infantry Division was loading tanks on ships, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was lining up on the airstrip at Fort Campbell for a series of flights to Saudi Arabia. The 101st was the first division to be deployed out of the port area of Dhahran which the 82nd Airborne Division had temporarily secured.

Chaplain Herbert E. "Herb" Kitchens, the 101st Division Chaplain, left Fort Campbell on August 25 with 70 soldiers on a C5A aircraft bound for Dhahran. Chaplain Kitchens' reception at Dhahran on August 26 was typical for many soldiers of the 101st.

There was a lot of anxiety, I think, at first because we didn't know exactly what to expect. Of course the biggest anxiety happened the very first day. They off-loaded us from the airplane. We marched over with our equipment to a tent. They

\textsuperscript{See endnotes at end of chapter.
proceeded to fill us with water. We were told that this was a terribly hot environment and we would dehydrate, so we had these visions that we would just walk out in the desert and dry up like a prune. So we were force-fed two liters of water in one hour. We were up to the brim with water. They put us on a bus to carry us out to the King Fahd International Airport. The 101st was to occupy the King Fahd Airport which at that time was under construction. That's a trip of about 45 minutes over bumpy roads. Our Saudi Arabian bus driver didn't speak English and didn't understand, "Pull Over!" That was one trip I'll never forget. After that experience everything else was a cinch.\textsuperscript{121}

The 101st remained in the King Fahd Airport area for five months, until the Air War (air strike phase of Operation Desert Storm) began on January 17.

**Fort Bragg**

At Fort Bragg Chaplain Bernard "Bernie" Lieving, the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain, departed for Saudi Arabia on August 26. He succeeded Chaplain Hufham as the senior Army chaplain in the desert. Chaplain Lieving served with the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam and then as the Division Chaplain of the 1st Cavalry in 1984 before his assignment to Fort Bragg. Chaplain Lieving had spearheaded the plans for chaplain and chaplain assistant involvement in the first chaplain "Warfighter Conference" at Fort Fisher in 1989 and in the CENTCOM INTERNAL LOOK exercise in July of 1990. Chaplain Lieving's experience with both heavy and light divisions was invaluable in his role as the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain in Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{122}

**Fort Hood**

The 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Brigadier General John H. Tilelli, had been on alert at Fort Hood since August 7. Their mission was to deploy to Saudi Arabia within 40 days, but not later than September 15. Work and training days were extended to 16 and sometimes to 24 hours.\textsuperscript{123} Motor pools were lighted at night. Both small arms and tank guns were fired on more than 30 ranges ringing Fort Hood. A year later, after the division returned from Saudi Arabia, a local politician was asked if the gunfire bothered the local civilian population. "No," he replied, "What bothered us was the lack of it."\textsuperscript{124}

General Tilelli met with his staff daily to discuss training and deployment plans, family support, and logistics. The 3d Armored Cavalry had deployed from Fort Bliss with the 24th Infantry and the 101st Airborne. There were few training days left until "America's First Team," as the 1st Cavalry was known, would be in route as well.

Chaplain Gary T. Sanford, the 1st Cavalry Division Staff Chaplain, and his assistant, Sergeant First Class Alvin Videtto, worked long hours to ensure that all of the division unit ministry teams and

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\textsuperscript{121} See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Gary "Sam" Sanford with his Moses stick, 1st Cavalry Division Chaplain during Operation DESERT SHIELD.
their families were informed, trained and ready. Much of the refresher training was similar to that provided in the 82nd Airborne Division: common soldier tasks, weapons re-qualification, defense against chemical attack, and classes on Islam. Chaplain Sanford also conducted a division UMT family cookout with a spiritual message on "Battle Buddies." Taking his text from Exodus 17, Chaplain Sanford told his chaplains, assistants, and family members that in every crisis people need friends to uphold them spiritually as Aaron and Hur held up Moses' arms during the Biblical conflict between the Hebrews and the Amalekites.

Chaplain Sanford did bear a resemblance to a beardless Moses — tall, slender, with a long twisted staff he called his "Moses Stick" recalling the verse in Exodus 4, "Take this walking stick with you, for with it you will perform miracles." Chaplain Sanford believed that unit ministry team members should make an indelible impression on soldiers so that they would be instantly recognized anywhere in the unit. It was good spiritual leadership philosophy for an operational environment in which chaplain branch insignia was officially discouraged outside troop areas.

**Dhahran**

The unsung heroes and heroines among the first units to deploy to Saudi Arabia were the logisticians of the 22nd Support Command in Dhahran and the personnel who manned the ports, docks and airfields. The Chief of Logistics for the ground forces of Desert Shield was Major General William G. "Gus" Pagonis, whom General Schwarzkopf described as "a short guy from Pennsylvania whose parents ran a restaurant; he was also an Einstein at making things happen." During the peak of Desert Shield, General Pagonis had 94 different units under his command building post offices, field clinics, phone booths, and recreational facilities to mention but a few of his projects for thousands of soldiers. With one transport aircraft landing every six minutes, and eight ships arriving with equipment for the 24th Infantry division alone, the 22nd Support Command became the most essential logistical unit in the Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield.

The staff chaplain for the 22nd Support Command, Chaplain Vincent J. Inghileterra, arrived in Saudi Arabia from Fort Lewis, Washington, on August 29. As a Roman Catholic, Chaplain Inghileterra was immediately involved not only in supporting a huge unit scattered throughout eastern Saudi Arabia, but also in providing Roman Catholic area coverage for his own and other units as well. General Pagonis supported Chaplain Inghileterra to the hilt, providing his chaplain a small fleet of vehicles, air conditioned office space in Dhahran, and authority to manage personnel and supplies as required to implement the commander's religious program. Chaplain Inghileterra not only arrived in the first month of Operation Desert Shield, but he stayed in Saudi Arabia six months longer than any other major command chaplain to support the soldiers who supplied the fighters at the front.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Calling Up the Reserves

On August 22 President Bush signed Executive Order 12727 authorizing the first use of 200,000 selected Reservists called to duty. The order also directed a limited implementation of a Stop Loss Program which delayed retirements and other projected voluntary separations from service. The next day, August 23, Secretary of Defense Cheney authorized the call-up of 25,000 Army National Guardsmen and Army Reservists in combat and combat service support units.126

Chaplain Charles T. Clanton, the FORSCOM Chaplain at Fort McPherson, Georgia, was one of those whose planned retirement was delayed by the Stop Loss Program. With the Reserve call-up, however, Chaplain Clanton and his staff were too busy to think about a future life. There were two meetings a day at FORSCOM in the Forces Command Operations Center (FOC) and 24-hour duty days with one member of the FORSCOM Chaplain's staff on duty at the FOC all night during especially critical periods.

Chaplain (MG) Zimmerman delegated the responsibility and the authority to cross-level deploying FORSCOM unit ministry teams to Chaplain Clanton the last week in August.127 However, DACH-PER retained overall personnel responsibility and provided personnel from outside FORSCOM to meet the command’s short falls as they occurred. This cross-leveling responsibility for Chaplain Clanton meant that the FORSCOM Chaplain's Personnel Section had to know which active and Reserve component units were deploying, which units needed chaplains or chaplain assistants, how soon the units would deploy, and what denominational mix was required. There were also tasks to recruit chaplains, to get their endorsements updated on occasion, to get their requests for orders to the right personnel command, and then to furnish them pre-deployment information while they were awaiting orders. Since both active duty and Reserve component unit ministry teams were coming from locations throughout the continental United States, coordination was ongoing daily between major commands, U. S. Forces Command and the Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia, to use one example. There was also constant coordination with the Army Reserve Personnel Center in St. Louis, the National Guard Bureau in Washington, and the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

Since Chaplain Clanton's staff officer for Reserve Affairs, Chaplain Peterson, had departed for Riyadh to assume the CENTCOM Chaplain's duties, the initial weight for personnel monitoring and cross-leveling fell to Chaplain Leo "Joe" O'Keeffe, to Chaplain Charles G. Komschlies, Chaplain Raymond "Gene" Ennis, and to Chaplain Paul Mason. Chaplain O'Keeffe monitored the active duty deployments and continued to handle all other normal personnel missions involving the remaining chaplains on FORSCOM's 19 installations. Chaplain Komschlies replaced Chaplain Peterson and coordinated most of the individual cross-leveling tasks involving Reserve component units.

Chaplain Paul Mason, a drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentee, worked technically as the Reserve counterpart for Chaplain Robert Vickers in the Operations Section. Chaplain Mason attended the regular FORSCOM Battle Staff meetings with Chaplain Vickers or as his representative and would bring the list of units designated to deploy to Chaplain Komschlies for analysis and any necessary cross-leveling.128 Chaplain Sir Walter Scott, who dealt with force structure issues, also

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Vincent Inghilterra, successively 22nd Support Group Chaplain, ARCENT Chaplain and Theater Chaplain, celebrates Mass during Operation DESERT SHIELD
worked with Chaplain Vickers on the FORSCOM Chaplain's staff. Chaplain Ennis worked with Chaplain Komschlies and SFC Michael Morris in recruiting volunteer reserve UMTs while Chaplain David Golden worked logistics, training, and additional personnel issues.\textsuperscript{129}

On the same day that President Bush signed Executive Order 12727, August 22, the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office began reviewing all Reserve units on the top secret deployment list to see where unit ministry team vacancies occurred. Chaplain Clanton reported the progress and changing methodology of reserve deployments to Mr. Roger Able at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains daily.\textsuperscript{130} Since time was so critically short, Chaplain Komschlies frequently would call chaplains personally and facilitate their deployment with Major Tom Syracuse, the Reserve Personnel Officer at FORSCOM. Major Syracuse would then request orders from ARPERCEN and the chaplain or chaplain assistant would deploy. This system soon was overwhelmed by sheer numbers and requirements, so the CONUSA Chaplains were asked to assist with Reserve component fills, not only for units leaving for Southwest Asia, but also for vacancies on supporting installations. The FORSCOM Chaplain's Office coordinated these requirements with Chaplain David Hoh at ARPERCEN and with Chaplain George Schwantes at the National Guard Bureau.

The first Reserve component chaplain to deploy to Saudi Arabia was not from the U.S. Army Reserves but from the National Guard. Chaplain Thomas Stokes, 176th Maintenance Battalion, Tennessee National Guard, was alerted in August and deployed to Saudi Arabia on September 20, 1990. Chaplain Stokes became the first of 41 National Guard chaplains and 92 Army Reserve chaplains to be deployed during Operation Desert Shield.\textsuperscript{131}

Some Reserve chaplains, part of the 279 who served on active duty in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, had incredibly short alert notifications. Chaplain Arthur B. Salinero, a member of the Individual Ready Reserve who had just received a call to a Baptist Church in Florida, was given 36 hours to report to a Reserve unit in Alabama which was deploying to Saudi Arabia. Chaplain Salinero left on his son's 10th birthday with no assurance that his pastoral job would be secure and no real knowledge of where his unit was going.\textsuperscript{132}

Initially, the personnel sections at FORSCOM and at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains gave almost all of their attention to the unit ministry teams deploying to Southwest Asia. Chaplain John Scott, Director of Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations, and Mr. Roger Able received daily communication from FORSCOM and from Saudi Arabia. However, on August 29 Chaplain Tom Lucas, the installation staff chaplain at Fort Stewart reported to DACH that there would be only four chaplains remaining at Fort Stewart once the 24th Infantry Division departed. Projections through the third week in September, 1990, looked bleak without an infusion of Reserve component personnel:

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
FORSCOM began to push installations to identify their unit ministry team shortfalls projected through October. Nine volunteer Reserve chaplains and 14 IRR chaplain assistants were identified for backfill duty at Fort Bragg. The Second U.S. Army Chaplain, Gerald M. Mangham, supported chaplain fills to Forts Stewart, Bragg, and Campbell. Eventually 212 Reserve component chaplains reported for duty at stateside installations. Twelve retired chaplains were also voluntarily recalled for family support and duties with notification teams.

Indicative of the possibility of heavy casualties early in Desert Shield were the 40,000 body bags stored at Fort Eustis and the plans at Dover Air Force Base for handling contaminated remains. Chaplain Henry Wake from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains visited Dover for a briefing. One plan called for the bodies of deceased U.S. service members to be dipped in vats of chemicals to decontaminate them. When Chaplain Wake asked what personnel would accomplish this mission, he was told, "the soldiers." Chaplain Wake concluded that a large number of rotating personnel would be needed, including chaplains to counsel them, for no one could work at the Dover mortuary for very long without a break. These chaplains, like many back-filling hospitals, would be drawn in part from the Reserve components.

First Services in the Desert

The "desert" in Saudi Arabia was not typical of the sandy stereotype many Americans have. The sand was not the beach quartz variety, but rather weathered sandstone and limestone, often of the same consistency as body powder. The Saudi Arabians cannot make dependable concrete from this "dust," as the soldiers called it. Instead, the Saudis trucked high quality sand from the Red Sea to Riyadh and Dhahran to make concrete for building material.

As the first American soldiers arrived in Saudi Arabia, they were greeted by temperatures ranging from 85°F to 120°F during the day. Aircraft hangers with cots and tiny bathrooms, often with cold water only, were quickly traded for "tent cities" with plywood latrines built over oil drums, and "hanging bag" showers available once a day to the lucky. Most soldiers got a hot meal every fourth day and mail about once a week.

The PERSCOM Staff Chaplain, who flew into Saudi Arabia from Fort Benning on a chartered, unmarked jet aircraft, recorded his initial impressions for his church newsletter at home:

"How can we sing the songs of the Lord while in a foreign land?"—Psalm 137.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
I thought about that question when I arrived in Saudi Arabia on a dark night in 1990. For security purposes the giant transport aircraft landed on a blacked-out airstrip in eastern Saudi Arabia. There were three hundred and thirty of us on the flight, mostly soldiers and Marines. One plane landed every seven minutes, unloading a total of six thousand soldiers, airmen, and Marines each night.

Even in the dark Saudi Arabia looks more like the moon than a beach. The eastern part is not sandy, it is dusty. The dust and sun-bleached rocks support almost no vegetation.

I know now why the wise men left the East to go to Bethlehem. Any wise man would. The miracle is not that they followed a star, but that they found enough water to survive the trip!

The one thing our soldiers asked me for were Bibles or New Testaments. Most thought they couldn't bring any religious articles or books into this country, the capital of the Islamic faith. I had only one, so I read to them—all 330 troops—from Psalm 27. "The Lord is my light and my salvation—whom shall I fear? Though an army besiege me my heart will not fear; though war break out against me, even then will I be confident."

I told them not to be afraid, for the Lord is Lord of all the earth. Even in this strange and dusty land, we will sing the Lord's songs, for He is our light and our salvation.  

Chaplain Herb Kitchens, who supervised services for soldiers in the 101st Airborne, noted that "living conditions for the troops were pretty tough." Two of the 101st Division's brigades were always out in the desert in defensive positions to cover King Fahd airport. The reserve brigade would rotate out on a regular schedule. The soldiers trained in battle drills with desert driving and physical training included. Chaplain Kitchens and Chaplain Samuel T. Boone, the deputy division chaplain, conducted frequent services in the Division Main area.

Chaplain services included "sing along" meetings in tents, supported by song sheets and small hymnals carried in chaplain kits. Chaplain Kitchens taught the soldiers choruses of songs with the aid of his guitar, which he took with him everywhere.

Supply of missalettes for the Catholic chaplains on a timely basis was difficult from the beginning of Desert Shield. At Fort Campbell, the sustaining installation for the 101st Airborne, chapel attendance went up. Therefore there were no "extra" missals to ship to the Desert. Chaplain Charles Adams, the installation chaplain solved this problem by writing larger contracts, but there was no system to get time-sensitive ecclesiastical supplies quickly to Saudi Arabia.

Chaplain William Huffham in the 82nd Airborne observed a tremendous lift in soldier morale when the troops heard that the 24th Infantry Division had arrived with their tanks. The

See endnotes at end of chapter.
paratroopers greeted the normally disparaged "leg unit" advance party with cheers followed by the high-interest question, "where are the tanks?" Indeed it was several days before the first tanks appeared, but at least they were "in country."

Chaplain Ford G'Segner, who arrived with the 24th Division staff before the tanks did, was mindful of the long, uncomfortable days in the Division Rear. There were staff meetings daily and three or four worship services a week. Much of the ministry was pastoral, being with soldiers during both their training sessions and their brief leisure hours.

Chaplain Ben Romer, the first Jewish chaplain to deploy to Saudi Arabia, had virtually no leisure time. Chaplain Romer's maintenance battalion, the 724th, was spread over 100 kilometers of desert. Chaplain Romer drove his vehicle while his assistant, Sergeant Lyenette Peggins, provided security. In addition to performing "all comers" services for soldiers of any faith in his battalion, Chaplain Romer, using helicopter transport, provided Jewish coverage for the 24th Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne, the 101st Airborne, the U.S. Marine units in his area, and later for the 1st Cavalry Division. For three months Chaplain Romer kept up this incredible pace, providing area coverage for soldiers throughout Saudi Arabia before another Jewish chaplain arrived in country. Chaplain Bernard Lieving, the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain, called Chaplain Romer's ministry a "circuit-riding success story." Chaplain Romer was delighted with the ministry but not with the pace of providing seven services in seven different places in eight days.

By the end of August there were 65 unit ministry teams deployed in Saudi Arabia. In addition to the chaplains and assistants from Fort Bragg, Fort Stewart, and Fort Campbell, there were some UMTs whose units would make the international news more than once. Chaplain Leon Kircher's 3rd (Patriot) Battalion from the 43rd Air Defense Artillery at Fort Bliss provided SCUD defense for Riyadh. Chaplains John Betlyon, Roland Clemente, and Jan Koczera arrived with the 197th Infantry Brigade from Fort Benning. Chaplain William Lewis came with the 593rd Support Group from Fort Lewis, and Chaplain Ronald Kegley and Chaplain Joseph W. Smith with Fort Sill's 47th Field Hospital, a unit which provided medical support to the Dhahran area during frequent SCUD attacks.

All of these unit ministry teams were busy providing worship services, sacraments, counseling, Bible studies, musical programs, visitation, classes on Islam, staff meeting input, UMT training, and advice over the full range of their units. Some of the statistics which have survived show multiple worship services with high soldier attendance for August, 1990:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Events</th>
<th>People Attending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>5,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 24th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Protestant 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps</td>
<td>Protestant 357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, Army Central Command</td>
<td>Protestant 838</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Since there were no alcoholic beverages, drugs, or daily television programs available for most soldiers, religious events not only provided entertainment and inspiration but also contributed to unit cohesion around command-sponsored values. For a significant number of soldiers in the desert, God had never been closer or more real than in the chaplains’ worship services.

The Rape of Kuwait

By mid-September President Bush had received some reports of criminal incidents involving Iraqi soldiers and unarmed civilians. Amnesty International forwarded interviews with refugees to the Western press, as did other humanitarian organizations, although Amnesty International’s first full report was not released until December of 1990.

The damage to Kuwait, which began almost from the moment the Iraqis crossed the border, was barbaric and revolting by any international standard. The 3,000 Americans living in Kuwait behaved like most other Westerners there. About 500 fled by any means they could find. The rest stayed in Kuwait. Of the 1.3 million foreign, mostly Third World, workers in southern Iraq and in Kuwait, more than 200,000 left as refugees — streaming penniless and physically exhausted into Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

One of the most sensational reports came from a 15-year-old Kuwait girl, Nayirah, daughter of the Kuwait ambassador to Washington.139 Nayirah told of Iraqi soldiers taking approximately 100 premature infants from their incubators in a Kuwait hospital. The incubators were shipped to Baghdad while the babies were left on the hospital floor to die. Dr. Abbas, a Kuwait physician who refused to unhook his patients from life-saving equipment, was shot in the head in front of his staff. All usable hospital equipment including dialysis machines went to Iraq.

Other reports, equally gruesome, detailed atrocities against women, children, and old men. Seven teenage girls were gang-raped by Iraqi soldiers and their bodies hanged by piano wire in a school yard.140 Their bodies hung there for a month. People who resisted Iraqi demands had their eyes gouged out and their tongues cut off. Some were executed in front of their families. Suspected resistance fighters were burned, electrically shocked, and even suffocated in human excrement. Some Kuwaitis were decapitated and their heads left on the doorsteps of their homes. More than 15,000 Kuwait men and boys were sent to Baghdad for forced labor. More than 50,000 automobiles and trucks were confiscated or destroyed. Several hundred Kuwait women applied for abortions. They said they had all been gang raped by Iraqi soldiers.141 The Emir’s palace was gutted, the water supply fouled, and power for homes and hospitals interrupted. Art museums, banks and stores were looted. Zoo animals were killed and their carcasses left to rot. Millions of dollars in gold was transferred from the central Kuwait Bank to Baghdad. Computers and software were stolen or destroyed along with most of the investment records of international business concerns. More than one million mines

See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) Tent cities and busses in the desert; (Bottom) 24th Infantry Division Chaplain Ford G'Segner (second from left) hosts a visit from Air Force Chief of Chaplains (MG) John McDonough
were positioned on Kuwait beaches. Eventually the Iraqis dumped 126 million gallons of oil into the Persian Gulf and set fire to 700 of Kuwait's 900 oil wells which daily incinerated 6 million barrels of oil and produced air pollution at the estimated rate of 500,000 tons per day. The air pollution was a danger not only to the present population of Kuwait but also to future generations, for it included what Dr. Sylvia Earle, Chief Scientist of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, called "exotic carcinogenic chemicals" such as benzopyrene. The Kuwaitis said that in the Riqqa cemetery in Kuwait City there were the bodies of 2,792 people who died unnatural deaths beginning in August of 1990.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

In spite of this incredible policy of terrorism and extermination, the Iraqi military could not entirely suppress Kuwait armed resistance. A number of cells of resistance fighters formed throughout Kuwait City. The Kuwait fighters passed information to the West, reported on Iraqi troop strength, and killed enemy soldiers and Kuwait collaborators. One young woman, named Esrar al-Ghaband, made four trips to Saudi Arabia to report on Iraqi troop movements in Kuwait. When she was caught, she was axed in the head and shot seven times in her genitals before she died.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} After Esrar's death, a few Kuwait resistance members swore never to allow an Iraqi soldier to surrender and live.

In the United States House of Representatives, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus decided to hold hearings on Iraqi human rights abuses in Kuwait, and it sought individuals who could give eyewitness accounts of what was happening there.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} Representative Tom Lantros, Co-Chairman of the Caucus, wrote that "hundreds of atrocity stories from Kuwait" carried by media around the globe and consistent with reports by independent human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, were submitted to the Caucus.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} "Given the countless cases of verified Iraqi human rights violations, including torture and murder, so many appalling accounts, all sickeningly true," Mr. Lantros noted, "it would have been totally unnecessary and counterproductive to invent atrocities."\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

The use of terrorism against the civilian population of Kuwait did not result in the total pacification of the small emirate, as Saddam Hussein may have desired. Rather, such graphic reports of cruelty stiffened the backbone of the Western coalition, which hardly needed reinforcement anyway. Classic just war theory included the use of force not only to "retake that which has been wrongly taken," but also to defend the rights of the innocent by the "punishment of evil."\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military in Kuwait succeeded in painting themselves, under international law, not as "dear brothers" of the Kuwait people, but as merciless conquerors and murderers of the innocent.

**Strengthening the Line**

**Leadership**

By mid-September Chaplain Bernard Lieving, XVIII Airborne Corps, at that time the senior chaplain in Army Central Command (ARCENT), and Chaplain David Peterson, the CENTCOM Chaplain, had sent several messages to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains asking for someone to fill the ARCENT Staff Chaplain position. Chaplain Lieving's primary responsibility was to supervise
religious support for the XVIII Airborne Corps, located north and west of Dhahran. He could not
be dual-hatted indefinitely to respond to issues at ARCENT headquarters 250 miles away. Chaplain
Dan O'Connor, the Third Army Chaplain, was still at Fort McPherson, filling what was at that time
a Reserve component position. Well aware that Third Army needed to send a senior chaplain to the
desert as soon as possible, FORSCOM Chaplain Charles Clanton notified the Chief's Office on
September 19 that he was meeting with the Third Army Chief of Staff to discuss this issue.

Some of the senior staff officers at Third Army headquarters had advised Lt. Gen. John
Yeosock in early August to be cautious about taking a staff chaplain to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis
might be offended by the presence of a non-Islamic religious leader at their Land Forces Headquarters
in Riyadh. There was no authority at that time to deploy chaplains from the Reserve components,
so as a compromise Chaplain Joe R. Colley, the Deputy Third Army Chaplain and an active duty
lieutenant colonel, was alerted to deploy as the acting ARCENT Chaplain. Chaplain Colley and his
staff would be located in Riyadh, but not at the main Saudi headquarters.

Three times Chaplain Colley was alerted at Fort McPherson to deploy, and three times his
orders were cancelled. Not only was there an issue of a possible Saudi backlash over the presence of
a Christian chaplain in Riyadh, but also Chaplain Colley's position as acting ARCENT Chaplain, while
junior in rank to the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain, also was confusing.

Thus, in spite of Chaplain O'Connor’s excellent qualifications, Third Army requested an active
component chaplain in the grade of colonel for the ARCENT position. Chaplain Clanton
acknowledged that there were active component chaplains available with experience at senior levels.
Among the candidates for the ARCENT post was Chaplain Clanton's deputy, Chaplain Larry Kelly.
Since Chaplain Peterson had just left the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office to fill the CENTCOM
position, and since his staff had heavy responsibilities at FORSCOM requiring close coordination,
Chaplain Clanton was understandably reluctant to lose his deputy.

Learning of the need for an ARCENT Chaplain in telephonic conversations with FORSCOM,
Chaplain Roy Mathis, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Staff Chaplain at Fort
Monroe, proposed Chaplain Gaylord "Gay" Hatler, his deputy, as an alternate choice. Both Chaplain
Clanton and Chaplain Mathis realized that this personnel switch would involve "lending" Third Army
a staff chaplain just as had been the case with Chaplain Peterson's assignment to CENTCOM.
Nevertheless, Chaplain Zimmerman needed experienced, senior chaplains in Saudi Arabia even if it
involved some shifts in the line. Third Army expected no less.

Chaplain Hatler was a Vietnam veteran with a long record of excellence in ministry and in
staff work. He had worked in personnel management in Germany and in training and doctrine at Fort
Monroe. He was highly regarded by Chaplain Lieving and by Chaplain Peterson for both his
organizational and pastoral skills. Chaplain Donald Shea, the Executive Officer for the Chief of
Chaplains at that time, considered Chaplain Hatler the best choice for the job. Although no one
in Saudi Arabia knew who Chaplain Zimmerman would select in advance, Chaplain Hatler's
nomination by the Chief of Chaplains and acceptance by the Third Army Commander, Lt. Gen. John
Yeosock, was good news in the desert.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
To Chaplain O'Connor's credit, he immediately volunteered to serve in any other capacity he could in support of Operation Desert Shield. Chaplain O'Connor went to Eisenhowder Army Medical Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and provided valuable pastoral support in hospital ministry throughout the Gulf War.

On October 9, two months after most of the Third Army staff had deployed to Saudi Arabia, Chaplain Hatler, Chaplain Colley, and Sergeant First Class Ed Parton deployed as the ARCENT Chaplain section. In December Chaplain David Zalis, Chaplain Michael Mitchell, Chaplain John Brinsfield, Sergeant First Class Warren Chapman, Sergeant Martin Cuellar, and Sergeant Major Michael Kutcher arrived to augment the section. Chaplain Zalis, a Reserve component chaplain who lived in Israel, became the senior Jewish chaplain in Southwest Asia. He provided support and oversight for the other Jewish chaplains' needs as well as religious support for Jewish personnel throughout the Theater. Chaplain Mitchell, a Reserve component chaplain of the Roman Catholic faith, covered Catholic personnel at ARCENT headquarters and provided area coverage wherever there was a need in Saudi Arabia. Chaplain Brinsfield was dual-hatted to serve as the ARCENT Personnel Command Staff Chaplain on the personal staff of Brigadier General Thomas Sikora and to serve as Chaplain Hatler's personnel chaplain at the ARCENT Chaplain's Office.  

Logistical Support

Most of the active duty combat units deploying to Saudi Arabia counted on their home installations for resupply. Some units, however, had no installation or division base upon which to draw after their initial 90 days' supply issue was exhausted. Among those concerned, of course, were unit ministry team members who realized that ecclesiastical supplies might have a low priority in competition with beans and bullets. Other concerned parties included the Information, Resource Management, and Logistics Directorate (IRML) in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, the Combat Developments Directorate at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, and the Staff Chaplain, Army Materiel Command.

While on temporary duty at several CONUS installations, the Facilities and Logistics Manager for IRML, Chaplain Gary R. Councell, asked some questions about how ecclesiastical supplies would get to the desert if deployed units remained beyond 90 days. The answers to Chaplain Councell's questions seemed to him to be a bit vague, so upon his return to the Pentagon he asked the Director of IRML Chaplain James B. Edgren, for permission to pursue the development of a new chaplain resupply kit. The Director of Combat Developments, Chaplain John Hannah, and his NCOIC, MSG Roger Clark, furnished a list of desirable items for the kit.

Chaplain Don Gover at Army Materiel Command responded by obtaining nearly $300,000 in funding from his commander, and by tasking his chaplain resource manager, Chaplain Mark Fentress, to work with Chaplain Councell to complete the project.

Chaplains Councell and Fentress contacted Mr. John Leigh at the Defense General Supply Center in Richmond, Virginia. Mr. Leigh and other Department of the Army civilian workers took

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
the project to heart as their personal contribution to the war effort. Preliminary plans included designing, advertising, contracting and procuring 3,000 kits within a ten-week time frame.

The contents of the kit were designed to provide a battalion UMT with sufficient religious items to supply ministry to the unit for about a month. Inside the kit were two bottles of wine, dehydrated grape juice, individual communion cups, communion wafers in two sizes, crosses, crucifixes, rosaries, prayer books, and scriptures in various versions to meet different faith needs. Individual installations, civilian agencies, or the Office of the Chief of Chaplains provided items for Islamic and other specific denominational needs.

The first kits were packaged in a wooden crate. Its lid was nailed shut with 13 nails and the whole ammo-like container was steel banded. Inside were two airline-size bottles of communion wine, carefully negotiated with the Saudi government since alcoholic beverages were forbidden there.

Chaplain Fentress coordinated packaging (glad wrapping) the pallets for transport to Dover Air Force Base and thence by air to Saudi Arabia. Aircraft tail numbers and arrival times were forwarded to the ARCENT Chaplain's Office. In early November 1990, the finished kits began arriving on the ground in Saudi Arabia. While not every UMT in the desert received one of the kits in the initial supply, eventually more than enough kits made it to Southwest Asia for all of the UMTs to have access to the essential religious items they needed.\(^{151}\)

**Personnel**

The number of units and unit ministry teams deploying to Saudi Arabia in September and October continued to increase at a steady rate. By 18 September, 94 chaplains and 89 chaplain assistants were in the desert. Commanders at every echelon received intelligence briefings daily indicating a dramatic escalation of Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO). By the end of October some 27 Iraqi divisions, eight of which were Republican Guard Forces Command divisions, were known to be deployed in or near Kuwait. Of these 27 divisions, nine were armored or mechanized, 17 were infantry, and one was Special Forces. Iraqi manpower in the KTO numbered more than 435,000, supported by more than 3,600 tanks, almost 2,400 armored personnel carriers, and more than 2,400 artillery pieces. Opposing these forces were the 1st Marine Division, the 24th Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, most of the 101st Airborne Division, the 12th Aviation Brigade, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.\(^ {152}\)

At the Chief of Chaplain's Office in the Pentagon, the primary focus of Chaplain Zimmerman's staff had been on the deployment of unit ministry teams to Southwest Asia. Every directorate had made contributions to monitoring the deployment, approving plans and policy, and providing logistical support as needed. On September 18, Chaplain Zimmerman and select members of his staff presented a Chaplain Special Topic Brief to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Carl Vuono. One of the briefing slides for General Vuono entitled "Chaplain Deployment—Desert Shield" indicated that, after deployment was complete, Fort Bragg with a military family population of 70,000, would have seven chaplains remaining. Fort Stewart, with 22,000 dependents, would have five; Fort

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Campbell with 28,000 family members would have four. Even though the briefing team emphasized plans to utilize Reserve component chaplains and contract clergy to backfill the installations, General Vuono was clearly concerned about the shortage of chaplains in general, and Roman Catholic chaplains in particular, on the sustaining installations. The Chief of Staff also wanted assurance that there would be an increase in chaplain assistant availability for both deploying unit ministry teams and for sustaining installations.

Three days after the briefing with General Vuono, Chaplains Wayne Kuehne and John Kaising forwarded information papers with a cover letter from Chaplain Zimmerman to the Chief of Staff. The papers assured General Vuono that there were no chaplain family support shortfalls on installations with deployed chaplains. In those three days the number of Reserve component chaplains reporting to Fort Bragg, Fort Campbell, and Fort Stewart suddenly increased to a total of 24.) The chaplain assistant strength would reach 97 percent of authorizations by January, 1991, and every installation would have Roman Catholic coverage.

General Vuono's concerns highlighted his belief that unit ministry teams were the front line of religious and morale support for both soldiers and their family members. Moreover, General Vuono recognized that without a chaplain assistant, the availability of religious support for the soldier was severely constrained. As was the case with many general officers in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Army Chief of Staff put a high priority on the presence of unit ministry teams wherever soldiers and family members had religious or family support needs.

The immediate effect of General Vuono's concerns was to reorient the Office of the Chief of Chaplains to the needs of sustaining installations. Even though Chaplain John Scott, the Director of Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations, and Mr. Roger Able from the Plans, Policy Development and Training Directorate, continued to monitor deploying chaplains and assistants on a daily basis, equal attention was now given to those posts from which soldiers departed.

Fortunately there was no shortage of volunteers from the Reserve components. Chaplain Robert Lair, the Reserve Affairs Advisor for the Chief of Chaplains, had received calls or letters from 79 USAR and National Guard chaplains volunteering for duty by the second week in September. By October 16, the Reserve components had furnished 29 chaplains, including five Roman Catholic priests, for nine installations.

**CENTCOM Plans: Shifting from Defense to Offense**

On September 13 General Schwarzkopf met with Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan bin 'Abd Al-'Aziz, Commander, Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces and operational commander of Saudi forces committed to Operation Desert Shield. The subject of the meeting was future strategy for defending Saudi Arabia. Lieutenant General Khalid wanted the Coalition strategy to include the defense of Saudi strong points and positions to retain territory and key population centers. This would in effect commit Coalition forces to a static defense of territory, not unlike the Iraqi strategy during most of the Iran-Iraq War.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
General Schwarzkopf preferred a more mobile defense, pointing out the possibility that Iraqi forces could bypass and destroy separated Coalition units before reinforcements could assist. The use of strong points as a temporary measure to wear down advancing hostile units was acceptable provided Saudi units could be withdrawn before they could be overrun. General Schwarzkopf further recommended a deception plan to make the Iraqis think the Coalition's main defense was along the border. The two commanders agreed on this plan with the imperative of stopping the enemy north of Al-Jubayl to protect crucial facilities and cities to the south.  

The arrival of additional Coalition forces in theater allowed General Schwarzkopf to position the 1st Marine Division along the coastal road 70 miles north of Al-Jubayl. To the west the XVIII Airborne Corps established a mobile defense in depth with the 24th Infantry Division occupying the main battle area along the Tapline Road. The 101st Airborne Division served as the Corps' covering force, forward and to the left of the 24th Infantry Division. The 82nd Airborne Division assumed defensive positions in the oil fields near Abqaiq. Upon arrival, the 1st Cavalry Division, with its heavy armor, was placed in reserve ready to counterattack if necessary. At sea a Marine amphibious task force threatened the potentially long Iraqi line of communications along the coast.  

Forward of the U.S. defenses a thin line of units from other Coalition countries carried out the Saudi plan of defending key areas. The 6th French Light Armored Division assumed positions west of Hafr Al-Batin, a critical strong point for an attack in either direction. To their front a Syrian Special Forces regiment patrolled the Iraqi border area backed by the 9th Syrian Armored Division. On their right, an Egyptian Ranger battalion screened the Kuwait border east of Wadi Al-Batin in front of the 3rd Egyptian Mechanized Infantry Division. Saudi forces, consisting of a screen of mechanized battalions, watched over the Kuwait border between the Egyptians and the Gulf.  

While the Coalition units were lining up in the Desert, General Schwarzkopf and his CENTCOM planning cell were considering options for an offensive against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. There had been some caution since August in discussing offensive planning too openly in hope that diplomatic and economic sanctions might prove effective. Saddam Hussein, moreover, still held hostages from the West in several strategic locations in Baghdad. General Schwarzkopf wanted to be prepared, however, to launch an attack to liberate Kuwait if other initiatives failed. In consultation with Ambassador Chas Freeman, General Schwarzkopf noted, "My only orders were to deter and defend, and I assume the goal of an offensive would be to free Kuwait and destroy Iraq's ability to threaten the gulf states. But no one has told me that that's what we're trying to do."  

In Washington Secretary Cheney and General Colin Powell had been discussing offensive options against Iraq in the event Hussein threatened further aggression or engaged in other unacceptable behavior such as killing citizens or foreign nationals in Kuwait. With the forces available in Saudi Arabia, the best CENTCOM concept of operations included a single corps attack at night through the main enemy defensive positions to seize high ground northwest of Kuwait City. (Lieutenant Colonel Joe Purvis, the senior member of General Schwarzkopf's planning team, had advised against a sweeping end-around attack due to the limited transportation assets in country.) The destruction of the Republican Guard divisions, the Iraqi "center of gravity," was the CENTCOM strategic objective.  

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On October 11 the CENTCOM Chief of Staff, Major General Robert Johnson, briefed President Bush, Secretary Cheney, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on the strengths and weaknesses of the single corps plan. From Riyadh General Schwarzkopf had sent a message with General Johnson in the form of a briefing slide. The slide read: OFFENSIVE GROUND PLAN NOT SOLID. WE DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO ATTACK ON GROUND AT THIS TIME. NEED ADDITIONAL HEAVY CORPS TO GUARANTEE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. After the briefing, General Powell called General Schwarzkopf in Riyadh and asked him to estimate the size force he would need to defend Saudi Arabia indefinitely—the opposite of an offensive campaign. General Schwarzkopf read between the lines, relieved that costly frontal attack would not be immediately ordered. At the same time, on October 15, General Schwarzkopf ordered his planning staff to assume another corps and develop plans for a flanking attack.

The Iraqi fortifications General Schwarzkopf proposed to flank consisted of a sand ridge or berm backed by an antitank ditch which could be filled with burning oil. Beyond the ditch were belts of barbed wire and extensive mine fields reportedly containing a minimum of 500,000 mines. Dug in behind the berm and other obstacles were tanks, infantry, and long-range artillery in triangular strong points capable of fighting in any one of three directions in the event an assault force tried to pass around them. In theory, an attacking enemy would be slowed down by the obstacles and engaged by the artillery, capable of firing chemical shells. Such positions could be breached by frontal assaults, but the cost would be heavy. Saddam Hussein and his ruling council told the Iraqi people to prepare for "the mother of all battles" if Iraq were attacked.

On October 22, after extensive telephone conversations with General Schwarzkopf and a hurried trip to Riyadh, General Powell asked President Bush and Secretary Cheney for additional forces to establish a two corps offensive option in Saudi Arabia. The additional forces would include the VII Corps from Germany, the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas, an additional Marine division, and additional tactical fighter wings. Secretary Cheney had directed preparation of options for an attack on Iraqi forces through the western Iraqi desert in lieu of the riskier frontal attack, a concept which coincided with General Schwarzkopf's inclinations as well, though not in exact detail. Before any additional troops deployed, however, Secretary of State James Baker needed to ask King Fahd and other Coalition allies to agree to offensive operational planning. In the interim period, General Powell advised General Schwarzkopf to be prepared to "go to war."

Secretary Baker was concerned about the reaction of the Coalition to a proposal that would, in effect, double the size of Desert Shield. He needed to consult personally with the key Coalition leaders as soon as possible. Baker planned to leave Washington on November 3. His itinerary included Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, London, Paris, and Moscow so that all of the soundings for allied opinion could be made. The critical question centered on whether the allies would agree to use force to expel Hussein from Kuwait.

With Baker still in Moscow, not yet finished with his consultations, President Bush decided not to wait any longer. The November 6 elections were over and the President wanted to apply all the pressure possible to Saddam. On November 8, in an address to the nation, President Bush announced that the United States would send more forces to the Gulf to give the Coalition a

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combined arms offensive capability. If diplomatic and economic initiatives did not move the Iraqis out of Kuwait, the Coalition would have a strong military option. Before the President had completed his address, the VII Corps and the 1st Infantry Division were alerted for deployment to Saudi Arabia.

U.S. Army Europe:
Deployment of VII Corps

The V and VII Corps were the keystones of the U.S. ground defense in Europe. The 1st and 3d Armored Divisions were equipped with M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, each with 120mm guns and new chemical protection systems. At the beginning of Desert Shield the planners had decided to dispatch U.S. based armor units, all with older tanks; but the increasing threat in Kuwait caused the Pentagon to shift to Europe to deploy the heaviest armor in the Army inventory. Such a deployment would not have been considered, even as late as 1989, before the virtual disappearance of the Warsaw Pact made the option feasible.

In addition to the 1st Armored Division, VII Corps would bring the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the VII Corps Artillery, the 11th and 12th Aviation Brigades, the 3d Armored Division, from V Corps and all of the VII Corps' engineer, combat support and combat service support assets. The 1st Infantry Division's Forward Brigade and the 2nd Armor Division's Forward Brigade, with three battalion-sized task forces, would deploy as well.

Ministry During Deployment

The morale among many of the soldier families in Europe had been on a roller coaster since November of 1989 when the Berlin Wall was dismantled. Even though the United States and its NATO allies had won the Cold War by any practical measure, the future of the U.S. Army in Europe seemed highly uncertain. In order to capitalize on "the peace dividend," Congress had mandated a reduction of forces in Europe to include the withdrawal of 17 battalions of soldiers from U.S. Army Europe. Chaplain Gaylord T. Gunhus, the USAREUR Chaplain, described the situation in 1989-1990 as a "state of turbulence and depression." One of the contributing factors was the "point system" USAREUR planners utilized to decide which units would stand down. Among the criteria for awarding points was a unit's history and tradition as a fighting force in America's wars. Presumably, all other factors being equal, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment would rate higher than the 11th ACR because its history was more extensive.

With the announcement on November 9 in Germany that VII Corps and part of V Corps would deploy to Saudi Arabia to give the Coalition more offensive capabilities, many soldiers and family members were in shock. Although the 12th Aviation Brigade of V Corps had deployed with its attack helicopters in September, the movement of two heavy armor divisions increased the magnitude of stress tenfold. Thirteen major military communities, each comprising three or more

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sub-communities on more than 40 different installations, sent most if not all of their military personnel to Saudi Arabia. Some units, such as the 1st Infantry Division's Forward Brigade, were in the process of deactivating when they were deployed. No one knew how long the deployment might last or if the units which were caught in the Stop Loss message would continue to deactivate once the operation was over. Most of the 300,000 military dependents remained in Germany to await the outcome.

A few of the chaplains at higher headquarters had anticipated a limited deployment of units from Germany to Saudi Arabia some months before the President's announcement. Chaplain Gunhus had authorized Chaplain Lou Scales, Chief of Plans, Readiness, and Policy at the USAREUR Chaplain's Office, to issue a sample information packet for unit ministry teams that might deploy to Saudi Arabia. The memorandum, dated 18 August 1990, had been prepared by Chaplain Scales and Chaplain Richard Kuhlbars to address interoperability, resupply, shipment of sacramental wine (labeled as "tea" in diplomatic pouches), local customs, religious support plans, channels of communication, civil affairs policies, and chaplain branch insignia. Specific provisions of the USAREUR policy, not to wear chaplain branch insignia, for example, raised questions at the USAREUR Chaplain Training Conference in Berchtesgaden that October chaplains thought the policy would affect but a small number of unit ministry teams in the immediate future. Chaplain Calvin Sydnor III, Deputy VII Corps Chaplain, told his family in October that the situation in Saudi Arabia was "just saber rattling ... I don't see that we're going."  Chaplain Timothy Kikkert was equally sure that the majority of European units would stay put: "I was convinced that my battalion would not be alerted. We were part of NATO. We had an altogether different mission."  

At USAREUR Headquarters, Chaplain Gunhus knew that deployment to Saudi Arabia might be more comprehensive. Five months before the President's announcement, Chaplain Gunhus had arranged to have all of the USAREUR chaplains briefed on the religion and customs of Islam at the October 1990 Training Conference. He developed a close coordinating relationship with USAREUR staff and his technical chain counterparts. Gunhus emphasized the mission essential task list (METL) for UMTs and had his staff in the USAREUR Chaplain's Office conduct monthly METL training, to include the development of a situation report (SITREP) to collect critical religious support data. Chaplain Gunhus and his USAREUR staff worked all religious support issues to include anticipating deployment, force structure, war planning, personnel, resupply, training, family support, and policy requirements as well as facilitating constant communication and site visit support. Chaplain Gunhus requested and received 42 Reserve chaplains from CONUS to backfill 13 military communities in Germany. These chaplains and their assistants helped to provide religious support in areas most depleted by the deployment to Saudi Arabia. It would be a fair assessment to say that the USAREUR Chaplain and his staff were at the forefront in planning to meet all aspects of the religious support requirements in Operation Desert Storm.

Most soldiers in VII Corps first heard the news of the deployment on the nightly news at 10 p.m. on Thursday, November 8. By dawn the next morning life in VII Corps had completely changed. Commanders were scrambling to get their units ready; soldiers worked seven days a week to complete deployment requirements. On November 13 Lieutenant General Frederick Franks, Jr.,

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the VII Corps Commander, took his division, corps artillery, armored cavalry regiment, separate brigade, corps support commanders, and primary staff officers to Dhahran for a meeting with General Schwarzkopf. In what may have been the most important meeting of the war for VII Corps, Schwarzkopf specified the destruction of the Republican Guard as the objective of the campaign and assigned VII Corps the main attack mission. The soldiers of the Jayhawk Corps, the VII Corps nickname, were about "to get real."

Chaplain Daniel O. Davis, the VII Corps Chaplain, had accompanied Lt. Gen. Franks to Saudi Arabia on November 13. Chaplain Davis, a Southern Baptist, wanted to see the area of operations for himself. Chaplain Davis knew that if he was going to prepare his unit ministry teams properly for deployment, he would need to know what to expect. "Some people in the Army think that the chaplain is marginal to military operations," Chaplain Davis noted, "but I thought that our chaplains would be an integral part of any missions their units performed. We needed to know just as much about the operational area as did the G3."  

While the VII Corps Commander met with General Schwarzkopf, Chaplain Davis discussed the arrival of his chaplains with Chaplain Vince Inghilterra, the Support Command Chaplain in Dhahran. The VII Corps would bring the equivalent of almost four divisions from Europe—140,000 soldiers—and religious support with adequate logistical and area preparation was extremely important.

Upon his return to Kelly Barracks at Stuttgart, Chaplain Davis and Chaplain Sydnor began to ensure that family support and cross-levelling plans for deployment were ready for implementation. Chaplain John M. Allen, the Stuttgart Community Chaplain, assumed the additional duty of coordinating and directing religious support in VII Corps Rear. Chaplain Wesley G. "Greg" Monroe, from the VII Corps Chaplain's Staff, assumed administrative and logistical support duties for the deployment. Eventually 13 Reserve component chaplains reported to VII Corps headquarters to support family ministries. Chaplain Calvin Sydnor, the Deputy Corps Chaplain, thought those chaplains who stayed behind to counsel family members worked just as hard, if not harder, than their counterparts in the desert.

Chaplain Allen, who had been at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, at the time of the Gander Aircraft Disaster, knew well what types of support family members might require in the event there were massive casualties in the Gulf. Chaplain Allen worked closely with the commanders at Stuttgart to plan for potential death notifications as well as more normal ministries to families in stress. Many of the unit commanders bent over backwards to be sure families received necessary financial and referral agency support. The chaplains interfaced with Family Support Groups, Officer and Noncommissioned Officer Wives' groups, and other helping agencies to meet whatever needs family members had. Chaplain Richard Zabel and Chaplain Greg Monroe conducted classes in various subjects for families including stress management. Four additional Reserve chaplains, including two Roman Catholic priests and one rabbi, arrived at Stuttgart to assist. As a result of active chaplain support as well as the initiative of other referral agencies during the time the troops were in Saudi Arabia, the average counseling load for chaplains did not increase.

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Spearheading Support

The 3rd Armored or "Spearhead" Division (3rd AD) from V Corps was involved in Operation Desert Shield from its outset because a portion of the 3rd AD aviation assets had been deployed in September of 1990 to support the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Chaplain Rolando Castillo, a Roman Catholic, had deployed with this element which was approximately a battalion and a half in size. Throughout the subsequent eight weeks, 3rd AD chaplains and chaplain assistants planned for contingencies involving the possible deployment of more units to Southwest Asia (SWA). Planning was difficult because it involved some units in the midst of a major (90 day) training exercise in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels and other units which had already been notified that they were going to deactivate as a part of the reduction of forces in Europe.

The 3rd AD was formally notified in the first week of November 1990, that the remainder of the division would deploy to SWA. The efforts of the 3rd AD UMTs, under the leadership of Chaplain Hulmut A. Michelson, the Division Chaplain, were directed toward assisting in family support missions and in preparing their own sections to go to war. The timetable for deployment called for units to move in stages from late December through early January 1991, with the majority of units arriving in Saudi Arabia by Christmas Day, 1990.

The ministry in the 3rd AD during the pre-deployment and deployment phases of Operation Desert Shield involved activities within the UMTs with soldiers and with family support groups. Chaplain Michelson and his NCOIC, Sergeant First Class Mary McEntee, cross-leveled personnel to provide a unit ministry team at full strength for every deploying unit. This effort was complicated by UMT personnel who were classified as nondeployable, but eventually every UMT except one departed for Saudi Arabia with both a chaplain and a chaplain assistant. The one UMT shortage was filled by a chaplain assistant replacement after the unit arrived in SWA.

Other personnel concerns which occupied Chaplain Michelson's attention, as well as the attention of his brigade chaplains, centered on the distribution of Roman Catholic chaplains, the lack of sufficient training for some chaplain assistants below the grade of staff sergeant, and the haste with which the deployment was conducted. Indeed, some chaplains who had just arrived in Germany were deploying to Saudi Arabia before they felt they had their families settled adequately in quarters.

In spite of these challenges, the 3rd AD chaplains and assistants worked with their soldiers in every task, helping staff the Processing for Overseas Movement, and assisting in planning, organizing, and participating in family support groups. All of these tasks were accomplished concurrently with the "normal" ongoing missions of counseling, training, and comprehensive religious support.

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The Iron Soldiers' Example

The 1st Armored Division, "Old Ironsides" as it was familiarly known to those who wore or had worn the Division shoulder patch, had received a top secret "probable" alert thirty days before the deployment order was announced publicly. The soldiers were excited and yet grieving, simultaneously, when they got the news in early November 1990. Chaplain Wayne J. Lehrer, Division Chaplain for the 1st Armored Division, felt that the hardest task the division had to perform during deployment was to extricate itself from Europe. The experience this division had in reorienting its mission from Europe to the Middle East was an example of the stress felt throughout VII Corps, requiring practically round-the-clock ministry by its chaplains.

The 1st Armored Division had been embedded in Europe for over 20 years. As a part of USAREUR, it was heavily dependent on its host nation of Germany for certain types of transportation and supply, not to mention housing and other kinds of facilities. The U.S. Army in Europe had a fully developed theater which contrasted sharply with the stark barrenness of Saudi Arabia from a logistical point of view. The division would be totally dependent on its own Division Support Command and the VII Corps Support Command for supplies from bullets to toilet paper and, in effect, had "to dig itself out of Europe by the roots." In the face of this challenge, the 1st Armored Division (1st AD) reacted to its deployment mission with attention to three critical areas: planning, training and unit deployment. Planning offered some unprecedented challenges. First, the division had to be shipped to Saudi Arabia in a logical order to support the build up for possible combat operations. European heavy divisions had never practiced this monumental task. The 1st AD was fortunate to have an abundance of commanders and staff officers familiar with REFORGER exercises which included integrating new equipment into units and shipping other equipment to ports or to tactical assembly areas.

Second, the division needed to orient war plans towards a new theater. While division planners prepared for combat operations, advance party personnel shuttled between Germany and Saudi Arabia to receive initial planning guidance from the ARCENT staff and to form first impressions about desert combat conditions. The division also prepared to receive new units: 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division replaced 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division and the 312th Support Center, a round-out unit composed of U.S. Army Reservists from throughout Germany, also joined the division. The 54th and 19th Engineer battalions, the 218th Military Police Company, and the 7th Support Group joined the 1st AD later in Saudi Arabia.

The training task for the division centered on individual and unit training while the same personnel were concurrently preparing vehicles for overseas movement. Pre-eminent among these activities were gunnery training and maneuver training. The division qualified 355 tanks and 300 Bradley crews, conducted division artillery section gunnery, and qualified Stinger and Chaparral missile crews.

Vehicle deployment, which would ultimately involve 210 trains and 187 convoys to move 8,050 wheeled and track vehicles to Bremerhaven for shipment to Saudi Arabia, seemed to occur mostly on short notice and in bad weather. These vehicles and the 17,400 soldiers of the 1st AD

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were due in Saudi Arabia by January 24 which meant the total movement had to be completed in eight weeks, from the last week in November to the last week in January. The deployment plans called for 44 ships to move the 8,050 vehicles while 12 planes transported the 17,400 soldiers with multiple sorties.  

The size, complexity, and speed of this deployment presented some serious challenges for the chaplains in their ministry to the soldiers and families of the 1st AD. For example, Chaplain Wayne Lehrer at the time wore two hats; he was the 1st Armored Division Chaplain and the Garrison Chaplain for Ansbach which comprised an area larger that most stateside installations. Unlike the situation in many other communities, when Chaplain Lehrer departed he went with most of the garrison and the division, leaving no senior chaplain behind. Thirteen of the 14 chaplains in Ansbach deployed. All but one of the battalions posted in Ansbach were deployed to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm as well except for one. 

Given the large percentage of the Ansbach military personnel deploying, there were concerns about having enough soldiers left to provide security and enough people left to manage daily business in the offices. Moreover, the battalion which was to remain behind felt some grief because it "did not get to go" to the desert while every other major unit in Ansbach did. 

The shrinking population in Ansbach necessitated the closure of half of the military chapels in the area. With a shortfall of ten unit ministry teams in the community, there was no other efficient choice. Two of the chapels were to consolidate, but could not agree on which would survive. Chaplain Lehrer closed them both, then took symbols from each congregation, communion trays and candle holders for example, and combined them on a common altar in the "new" consolidated chapel. 

Within the 1st AD itself, there was a shortage of only three unit ministry teams which were filled from CONUS and from stay-behind brigades in Europe. General Crosbie E. Saint, Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army had determined to send a part of every division represented in this command so that "everyone's colors" could fly in Saudi Arabia. The switch-out or "stay behind" brigades sometimes furnished chaplains to fill vacancies in units deploying to the Gulf. 

The 3d Infantry Division’s brigade that went with the 1st Armored Division had to be organizationally integrated into the division and its chaplains included in religious support planning. Chaplain Lehrer visited the 3d Infantry Division to accomplish that goal since the training schedules and even the mission essential task lists differed from one another. This was just the beginning of an "add-on" process which continued in Saudi Arabia as more units from around the world arrived to link up with divisions. 

Within three weeks the division chaplain completed cross-leveling and training unit ministry teams to deploy to the Gulf in expectation of offensive operations. Yet, to that time, the 1st AD had "not had a minute's training in desert warfare." The 1st AD did have some early "lessons learned" in the desert sent back to them from the XVIII Airborne Corps. Most of these lessons were very practical; for example, in soft sand vehicles will bog down, so drivers should carry ropes. Chaplain Lehrer realized, "we in the 1st AD didn't have any rope to tow our vehicles out of sand drifts.

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Consequently, all over Bavaria every piece of rope in a store was contracted by the 1st AD. Even though subsequently we traveled on hard sand and never got stuck, before we left Germany every vehicle had a rope. Likewise the XVIII Airborne Corps advised the 1st AD to bring flooring for tents. The 1st AD in turn contracted a whole shipload of plywood for flooring. As it turned out, the ship did not make it to Saudi Arabia before the fighting ended, but the contract was made. In each case the 1st AD tried to learn from the XVIII Airborne Corps what to expect and what items and equipment to bring.

The health and welfare of soldiers in the desert was also of interest to the 1st AD before it deployed. XVIII Airborne Corps medical officers had reported an incredible number of "battle-fatigue" cases, approximately 1,000, among soldiers who were suffering from boredom and from other problems in the intense desert heat. Major General Ronald H. Griffith, Commanding General of the 1st AD, knew that he had only four mental health workers in the division, but he had plenty of unit ministry teams whose mission essential task lists included ministry to battle fatigued soldiers. Major General Griffith designated the unit ministry teams as the primary level screeners and therapists for battle and non-battle stress casualties. The division psychiatrist had been involved in the 1st AD training program for UMTs long before anyone thought of deploying to the desert and had a rule that no soldier would be extracted from a battalion for battle or non-battle stress without a referral slip from the battalion unit ministry team. During the entire deployment, out of a total of 22,000 assigned or attached troops, only one soldier from the 1st AD left a battalion for treatment for battle stress; and he was returned to duty in 48 hours. Chaplain Lehrer noted that the same watchful care the unit ministry teams used to sense potential stress casualties also worked to prevent other problems such as dehydration and heat stroke.

As the time drew near for the 1st AD to leave Ansbach, Major General Griffith scheduled Chaplain Lehrer to depart on one of the last aircraft. Of the 14 chaplains in Ansbach, 13 were deploying, so the Division Commander wanted Chaplain Lehrer and Chaplain Andrew Dembicki, the Assistant Division Chaplain, to remain as long as possible. Some Reserve component chaplains were due to arrive, but had not reported in time to overlap with those departing.

During the last week, a lady from one of the chapel prayer groups in Ansbach asked for a list of departing soldiers who had no one to pray for them. Chaplain Lehrer said he could not furnish that list, but he could give her a total list of all 22,000 soldiers and then she and God could determine who needed prayer. The lady was delighted and took the list, an airplane roster scrubbed of all sensitive information, provided by the chaplains.

This request made Chaplain Lehrer and Chaplain Dembicki aware that many of the people in the Protestant and Catholic congregations at Headquarters Chapel, Ansbach, could not put all of their feelings into words. The two chaplains took a copy of the soldiers' roster, with their own names on it, placed the sheets in a pulpit Bible and sealed it with a golden cord and candle wax in front of their congregations the last Sunday before they left. The "book" was placed in an alcove with a light upon it so that the congregations could pray for all of the soldiers.

The "book" became so important to the families at Ansbach, that when the division redeployed, Major General Griffith personally set the time when it would be opened and prayers of

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thanksgiving offered. The knowledge of the congregations' intercessory prayers remained with the soldiers and provided an important spiritual bond between those who departed and those who waited for them to return.

A Spiritual Awakening Begins

One of the characteristics of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was a renewal of interest in religion on the part of many soldiers. Major General Barry McCaffrey remarked, after the redeployment of the 24th Infantry Division was complete, that in the Desert "we had the most religious Army since the Army of Northern Virginia" during the American Civil War. A number of statistics from the chaplains' field reports seem to verify Major General McCaffrey's impression. The XVIII Airborne Corps conducted an average of 19 worship services, Bible studies or prayer meetings per day for the first 54 days of Operation Desert Shield for a total of 1,024 religious meetings. The combined attendance for Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish services led by 102 chaplains totaled 18,474 soldiers. The average attendance of 18 soldiers per meeting suggested a large number of field services, small groups of participants, and almost daily worship.

The Army Central Command (ARCENT) figures for August through December, 1990, totaled 7,946 religious meetings led by 525 chaplains with an attendance of 341,344 soldiers. Each month for the first five months, moreover, attendance figures increased. Soldiers attending Protestant "morale meetings" numbered by month in ARCENT: •August - 24,638 • September - 29,611 •October - 48,732 •November - 51,668 •December - 58,612. The largest attendance was evidently in January 1991, when throughout CENTCOM a total of 184,362 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines attended a worship service, a prayer meeting or a Bible study. Indications were that these figures would have doubled if all key and essential personnel could have been released from duty to attend.

Figures alone do not indicate the quality of ministry soldiers experienced, not only from chaplains but also from religious fellowship and association with one another. Hundreds of soldiers were baptized, rededicated their lives to God, or assumed a more active role in expressing their faith as a result of their deployment.

There were several environmental and emotional factors which encouraged soldiers to think about their own religious commitment. First, the country of Saudi Arabia itself contained geography reminiscent of a Biblical "wilderness" as referenced often in Judeo-Christian scriptures as well as in the Muslim Koran. Second, the people of Saudi Arabia did not distinguish between religious precepts and civil law. Containing, as it did, the sacred mosques of Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia was therefore one of the most religious cultures on earth. Third, the prohibitions soldiers observed against the use or possession of alcohol, drugs, and pornographic literature were based on Islamic religious law. Fourth, the situation the soldiers faced in Saudi Arabia was uncertain. Whether war would begin was uncertain; if war did start, how many casualties would occur was uncertain; when the soldiers would see their families again was uncertain; where exactly they were in Saudi Arabia was

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at times uncertain; and how long U.S. forces would remain was uncertain, although Chaplain David Zalis at ARCENT noted cheerfully, "anything less than forever was a bonus!" Fifth, chaplains deployed to Saudi Arabia were eager to minister to soldiers and the chaplains arrived in record numbers, an average in ARCENT of one chaplain for every 533 soldiers. Chaplain assistants, lay ministers, and soldiers who had experience in religious music were also highly motivated to contribute time and talent to soldier religious support. Since initially there were no television sets or town travel available to soldiers, singing and fellowship helped ease the loneliness, boredom, and anxiety of living in "the Sandbox."

Ministry of Presence:
Go Where the Soldiers Go

For many chaplains, ministry during Desert Shield did not begin at the time of arrival in Saudi Arabia, but from the moment the troop unit was alerted. One special opportunity for witness came when the soldiers boarded the aircraft for Saudi Arabia. Many chaplains prayed with soldiers, listened to their concerns, and even served communion if time permitted. During the flights chaplains walked the aisles of the aircraft and talked and joked with their people. Upon arrival, of course, the chaplains went wherever the soldiers did.

When the 1st Cavalry Division arrived at Dhahran, they emerged into suffocating heat, ... they were flooded with sensations: the first sight of an Arab in red and white checked headdress; from nowhere, a band playing (the division's); the first drop of sweat trickling down the small of their backs ... After a quick stop at a dusty tent to collect a one-liter blue plastic bottle of water, busses whisked the arrivals off to a place called ad Dammam and a home called "the warehouse." Inside the dusty busses, soldiers opened their water and took their first pull. The water was warm. They'd have to get used to that too.

Pegasus Complex, eight metal warehouses on the edge of the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf in the port of ad Dammam, was the proper name for the new home of the 1st Cavalry Division. With 1,000 cots shoehorned into each warehouse, 12 inches apart, eight buildings were not enough. Nearby in "Ironhorse City," renamed "Tent City" immediately by the soldiers, 3,000 more cavalrymen lived under canvas.

Chaplain Gary Sanford, the Division Chaplain, was concerned about the location of housing for the soldiers. Tied up at the docks at ad Dammam were ships loaded with ammunition. If a terrorist could gain entrance by land or by sea, the 1st Cav would be a great target. "We couldn't wait to get out of there," Chaplain Sanford recalled, "but we were busy every minute listening to the soldiers' gripes, concerns and complaints."

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When the 1st Cavalry did move out, three weeks after they arrived, the soldiers were looking forward to having space to stretch out. Their assembly area, "Horse," was 165 kilometers into the desert. When Chaplain Sanford saw the utterly barren location, his stomach sank. So, too, did half of the wheeled vehicles when the drivers pulled them off the road. "For the first time some of the old soldiers were scared," Chaplain Sanford recalled. "We were sitting ducks out there, unable to move, with our wheels stuck in sand the consistency of baby powder. If the enemy attacked we were perfect targets."

Somewhat later the 1st Armored Division from Europe had a similar experience in their assembly area Hafar Al Batin when they discovered one entire battalion of tanks had moved into the desert without main gun ammunition. The ammunition had been loaded on a different ship, so when the 1st AD moved out quickly to the desert some units had only small arms ammunition. To add to the anxiety among the troops, intelligence from ARCENT warned of a possible Iraqi attack down the Hafar Al Batin corridor within 48 hours of their arrival. Some of the staff officers, Chaplain Lehrer recalled, sent an armed convoy back to the port to bring tank ammunition to the 1st AD. The convoy was supposedly armed not against a possible terrorist hijacking, but to prevent other American units from diverting their critical "bullets."210

In spite of the stress of the environment and the rush to be trained and ready for war, many chaplains were able to hold multiple worship services, at all hours of the day, wherever troops were located. In the 1st Armored Division the goal was to provide a service for every platoon-sized unit, and, in fact, some weeks the chaplains conducted 300 services in that one division alone.211

**Thanksgiving in the Sand**

As the Thanksgiving holiday drew closer, elaborate plans were made by the ARCENT G4 staff to provide every soldier with a turkey dinner. President George Bush announced plans to visit American military personnel in Saudi Arabia on November 21 and 22 with his wife Barbara. The White House communications staff prepared mobile satellite dishes to accompany the President to transmit his message to the world "from the line in the sand." The President would visit Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units from Dhahran to the XVIII Airborne Corps in the desert. General Schwarzkopf recalled part of President Bush's trip:

We landed deep in the desert where troops from the XVIII Airborne Corps had been assembled, and the President gave another brief speech to cheers from the soldiers. At the end he presented them with a set of horseshoes and challenged their champions to a match on the White House lawn after they came home. The troops loved it. As we waited in the chow line for turkey roll and mashed potatoes, he joked with the soldiers. The presidential party spread out to eat with them at sandbag-and-plywood tables in the sun. Spirits were high despite the heat.212

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
In the XVIII Airborne Corps itself Chaplain William Hufham conducted a huge consolidated Thanksgiving service in the 82nd Airborne Division for 1,500 troops, possibly the largest single worship service held during Operation Desert Shield. In addition to religious services and turkey dinners, the 82nd offered its paratroops a ten-mile run in the desert with complimentary "turkey day" T-shirts for the participants.213

Chaplains all over Saudi Arabia were involved on Thanksgiving Day with a variety of services and morale support functions to help soldiers cope with separation from their families 8,000 miles away. Chaplain David Peterson from CENTCOM visited some of the forward-deployed units and was able to have Thanksgiving dinner with his son Jeffrey who was serving in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.214 Chaplain Gay Hatler, the ARCENT Chaplain, attended a "Turkey Trot" run for the soldiers at Eskan Village in Riyadh after traditional services were held for ARCENT headquarters personnel. In many of the smaller units "on line," worship services were held after dark to prevent detection by the enemy, if any were in the area, and to take advantage of the cooler temperatures.

In the 1st Cavalry Division, Thanksgiving Day began with a division prayer breakfast for 250 soldiers including all of the brigade commanders. Major General John H. Tilelli, Jr., the division commander, gave the Thanksgiving message. Following the prayer breakfast there was a type of "organization day," with volleyball, fun runs, and lots of food. Tents, available so the soldiers could get out of the sun to eat, were decorated with cardboard turkeys and pilgrims.

The troopers had cardboard plates filled with turkey, and beverages—including "near beer," which tasted like beer, looked like beer, smelled like beer, but wasn't beer as it had little alcohol in it.215 Some of the soldiers called it "heat stroke beer, another mirage in the desert." In addition to food and drink there were worship services held all day throughout the division as the chaplains could get around to conduct them.

Some UMTs, of course, were not located near large units, so they drove around in the desert to visit small outposts to pass out rosaries, crosses, prayer books, testaments, and whatever devotional literature they had. Unit ministry teams, in spite of the restrictions on the display of flags, crosses and tablets in urban and village areas, were heavily involved in providing religious support to soldiers throughout eastern Saudi Arabia. As Chaplain Bernard Lieving reflected from the XVIII Airborne Corps: "we were in the loop all the time!"

Patience Grown Thin

Between 2 August 1990 and 29 November 1990, the United Nations had passed twelve resolutions dealing with the situation in Iraq and Kuwait. The very first one, Resolution 660, demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and condemned the invasion. It was adopted by 14 votes in the affirmative to nine in the negative with Yemen abstaining. By the end of November, just a few days after Thanksgiving, the United Nations had begun to lose its patience with Iraq. On the 29th of November, Resolution 678 authorized United Nations members to use all means

See endnotes at end of chapter.
necessary to enforce previous resolutions if Iraq did not leave Kuwait by the 15th of January 1991. In some ways the last three of the resolutions before Christmas—Resolution 674 of October 29 which demanded that Iraq stop mistreating Kuwait's and foreign nationals; Resolution 677 of November 28 which condemned Iraq's attempts to change Kuwait's demographic composition and Iraq's destruction of Kuwait's civil records; and Resolution 678 which gave Iraq the 15 January deadline—were clear signals that the United Nations did not want to witness any further mistreatment of Kuwaitis nor did it intend to tolerate an indefinite occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi forces.

With the arrival of the VII Corps' heavy armor units, many soldiers in Saudi Arabia realized that the line in the sand was much stronger. Days were still long and news from home was slow. Chaplains and chaplain assistants continued their ministries of presence and encouragement to soldiers throughout Saudi Arabia.

The 30 days between Thanksgiving and Christmas was particularly trying to the patience of the Coalition forces as the troops suffered from loneliness and boredom. Chaplain Priscilla Mondt of 82nd Airborne Division Support Command recalled an incident in which she ministered to a soldier under particular stress: "A staff sergeant whom I knew well came to the billeting area seeking me. The closer that I came to him the more significant his facial expressions became. By the time I reached him, I saw a mixture of relief and distress. He asked to speak to me alone and we walked to a place nearby where we could sit and chat. He expressed concern that he would do harm to those around him. He was 63'' tall and weighed about 240 lbs. But he began to cry, expressing that he was just not himself lately. His tears embarrassed him yet he informed me that he was glad I was there because he knew that it would be alright to cry and that I would know what to do. After some discussion, I convinced him to go to the mental health tent for more help. I literally ran to my area and retrieved my equipment. Upon my return, I took the sergeant to the tent. He carried his weapon locked and loaded and was by that time somewhat incoherent. We walked directly into mental health and I got the sergeant to lie down on a cot. He wanted to keep his weapon and fought the mental health specialist to keep it. I looked at him and told him that weapons were not allowed in hospitals by regulation, we had to secure it. He looked me directly in the eye. I saw a trust in him and he responded as a well trained soldier surrendering his weapon to the specialist. We told him to sleep and he immediately dropped off. The mental health specialist took the magazine out of his weapon and cleared it. A round dropped out."

Chaplain Mondt went back to her area and sat down on her cot to think and to pray. She had had two such incidents in two weeks, although the first case had not been as severe. Both soldiers had expressed the same idea, that they felt compelled to seek out the chaplain when they were under stress before they did anything else.

As the Christmas season approached, the CENTCOM religious support policy again came under review. The question many units raised was to what extent they could display the Christmas season or Hanukkah season emblems. The implementation of the CENTCOM religious support policy had not caused much of a stir among the field units out in the desert. Chaplain Bernard Lieving, the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain, who supervised 235 unit ministry teams at the height of Operation Desert Shield, said that the wearing of the cross and the display of religious symbols

See endnotes at end of chapter.
were never issues in the XVIII Airborne Corps. Chaplain Lieving had gone early to Lieutenant General Gary Luck, the Corps Commander, to resolve such questions. "Sir," Chaplain Lieving said, "the camels and goats could care less." General Luck agreed; and the chaplains were able to display appropriate symbols not in defiance of CENTCOM policy but in recognition that they were in a "U.S. controlled area" when they were in the desert or in a defensive position protecting airfields or ports.

Sand D. Claus and the Holidays

When the Christmas and Hanukkah season arrived in Saudi Arabia the weather turned a bit cooler. The temperature was approximately 75° in the daytime, dropping as low as 27° in the northern parts of the country at night. The Christmas and Hanukkah celebrations posed a problem at CENTCOM headquarters, however, which transcended changes in the weather. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was still concerned about the display of Christmas ornaments and any Christian or Jewish symbols, for that matter, in or near Saudi cities. As Schwarzkopf was planning for normal operations to continue, Prince Khalid notified him that all radio transmitters would have to be turned off during the holidays. The problem the Saudis had was not with music, but rather with the words of Christmas carols. General Schwarzkopf agreed to use only instrumental music so that any Saudi Arabians who heard the music would not hear also the words of the Christmas carols. This was acceptable to the Saudi government. In addition however, the Saudis wanted to ban any Christmas cards coming into the kingdom. At that point in time mail was pouring in at the rate of 300 tons a day for the soldiers. There were thousands of pieces addressed "to any serviceman" and well as gifts and cookies from individuals, schools, labor unions, offices, churches, civic groups, synagogues and senior citizen's homes. General Schwarzkopf said that he would be glad to give the Saudi governmental censors access to these tons of mail everyday, but before long they gave up. It was simply too great a volume for them to censor. General Schwarzkopf recalled that in mid-December one could see signs of Christmas popping up in the U.S. camps. Nearly every tent had spruce and wreaths and little aluminum Christmas trees complete with tinsel and battery powered flashlight ornaments that had been sent from home.

Another problem at CENTCOM was how to deal with the American media. Katie Couric of NBC pleaded with General Schwarzkopf to be allowed to film just one or two of the troop units' religious services in Saudi Arabia. General Schwarzkopf had to decline her request knowing that a single new report of a Rabbi conducting a Hanukkah observance on Saudi Arabian soil would have left King Fahd no choice politically but to enforce the law of the land and ban all further religious ceremonies. Some of the reporters found the policy hard to accept even after it had been explained. A few tried to film services in defiance of the rules, but the CENTCOM commander remained firm in his belief that the best way to celebrate the religious holidays was to celebrate them very discretely.
(Top) Chaplain Zimmerman and Unit Ministry Teams during his December visit to Saudi Arabia, 1990; (Bottom) Chaplains Ron Kegley and Joseph W. Smith raise morale in the desert.
Visit by Chaplain Zimmerman

From the 14th to the 23rd of December the Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman, visited Saudi Arabia. His itinerary was exhaustive; for in 10 days, he covered more than 1,000 miles, visiting the unit ministry yeams from Dhahran to Riyadh to King Khalid Military City. Chaplain Zimmerman not only visited the senior chaplains in Saudi Arabia, Chaplain Peterson at CENTCOM, Chaplain Hatler at ARCENT and Chaplain Inghilterra at the Support Command, but he also visited many division and battalion level chaplains and chaplain assistants as well. Chaplain Zimmerman recalled how impressed he was with the incredible number of religious services the unit ministry teams were offering to the soldiers. He was concerned that the chaplains and chaplain assistants might fatigue themselves too quickly with their demanding schedule. Zimmerman knew that it would be difficult to tell chaplains, whose ministry in the United States may have been to small numbers of soldiers, that they could not hold as many services as they felt able to conduct when there were hundreds of soldiers interested in worshiping.

Chaplain Zimmerman in particular was impressed with the high state of morale and readiness of the soldiers he visited. One of the locations which was a show piece for unit ministry team ministries was at the Riyadh airport where numbers of Patriot missile batteries were located to defend airfields from possible SCUD attacks. Some unit ministry teams had tents, folding chairs, a kind of air conditioning with piped air and electronic music provided by the Air Force. These self-contained, palletized chapels could be shipped in and set up in one day. The sharing of these facilities with the Air Force made the logistical part of the chaplains' ministries much less difficult. Some suggested that the Army draw up plans for a similar portable chapel to be used at the battalion level. After ten days in the desert Chaplain Zimmerman returned to Washington with very positive impressions of the work the unit ministry teams were doing in Saudi Arabia. He had given the soldiers "a tremendous morale boost" with his assurances of the unqualified support they had at home.

A Variety of Worship Services

Of course, many of the divisional size units had already received monumental support from their home installations. The 24th Infantry Division from Ft Stewart, for example, received not only Christmas trees and decorations, but also 20,000 Christmas stockings so that every soldier could have a Christmas stocking on Christmas eve. The 1st Armored Division which had moved to tactical assembly area "Thompson" near the Tapline Road in northern Saudi Arabia in convoys which took from 15 to 20 hours, looked forward to some Christmas presents of rudimentary but of a highly significant nature. For example, they had wooden showers and latrines as well as daily mail and 120 telephones that made possible long distance calls to the United States. These very simple amenities were most welcome in the Christmas season. The 1st Calvary Division from Ft Hood received copies of Handel's Messiah and Santa Claus suits from Ft. Hood, the sustaining installation. The 1st Calvary Division put up big trees (trucked in) and tied down with lines because in the Christmas season there

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
were at times very strong sand storms. Some Christmas trees, made from plywood sheets painted green or from camouflaged nets draped over wooden frames, were festooned with decorations made from every imaginable bauble, from Christmas cards to dog tags. Chaplain Gary Sanford, the 1st Calvary Division chaplain, formed a soldiers' choir to perform Christmas concerts throughout the 1st Calvary Division. From the 23rd through the 26th of December the choir performed eight concerts featuring Handel's Messiah and other favorite musical selections.

In the 82nd Airborne Division over 3,000 soldiers attended a candle light service at division headquarters on Christmas Eve. On Christmas day there were tons of turkey and pie with a six-mile "jingle bell run" for a second dessert. Like other divisions the Christmas season brought presents of VCRs, bingo games, transistor radios and the greatest morale booster of all—VII Corps tanks. For the first time in five months the 82nd Airborne division soldiers felt that they were no longer speed bumps in the desert but could be part of an authentic punch if they were needed.

Some chaplains were not lucky enough to be with a large unit at Christmas. Chaplain Jose Rodriguez of the 125th Support Battalion, VII Corps, was in process of visiting several small troop units in the desert. He had planned to have two Christmas dinners, one with each of two separate battalions, but in the almost complete darkness of the desert a simple movement between one unit and another unit could be quite confusing. Some units behind sand berms could not be seen in the dark even though a vehicle could be only a few yards away. Chaplain Rodriguez spent most of Christmas Eve driving around trying to locate the units he was to visit. He managed to find some of them but spent the night with a very small military police detachment at a road intersection deep in the desert.

In order to understand how some unit ministry teams had to navigate, one needs to realize that driving in the dark in the desert is somewhat like navigating at sea. If there are no landmarks, one simply takes a direction and moves a certain number of miles or kilometers and then looks for a road or trail that might lead to a unit. In some cases chaplains simply left a unit with a sketch map showing that if they watched their odometers they would be able to travel on a certain azimuth for a certain number of kilometers and then find a road leading to their desired location. These problems were overcome later in Operation Desert Shield with the addition of satellite navigation technology. However, in many cases, chaplains and chaplain assistants merely had to follow their best instincts or, if they were lucky, the tiny red lights on the rear of a vehicle ahead of them.

In Riyadh the restrictions against celebrating Christmas or Hanukkah publicly were much more stringent than in the troop units in the desert. Nevertheless, on December 24th, Bob Hope arrived with his soldier show. Mr. Hope met with General Schwarzkopf in the Commander's office and then went to Eskan Village, the location where he and his troupe were scheduled to do the first of two shows in the region. General Schwarzkopf recalled, "after introducing him I went to sit in the audience. More than 900 Americans, mainly Air Force personnel who had been the first to arrive in Desert Shield, were in attendance. The show wasn't very long because some of the equipment had failed to arrive, and Mr. Hope had been forced to leave the actresses and dancing girls out of performances in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, Bob Hope and Johnny Bench told jokes and Aaron Tippin sang country music songs. At the conclusion of the show, Mr. Hope's wife Dolores got up and led the troops in singing 'White Christmas'. There was almost overwhelming emotion in the air.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Here we were in a theater of war, it was Christmas, we were missing our families and we were seeing a Bob Hope show - just like the troops in World War II, just like the troops in Korea, just like the troops in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{216}

After the show General Schwarzkopf attended a church service in Eskan Village.\textsuperscript{217} During the service traditional carols were sung because the Saudis allowed discrete services which would not be publicized to the Arab population in Riyadh. After the service, the chaplain assistants served cookies, cake and coffee and people crowded around General Schwarzkopf, taking his picture and asking him to sign chapel programs. The soldiers and airmen expressed how glad they were that Mr. Hope had come over and how the show had made them feel a part of the American military tradition.\textsuperscript{218}

Later, on Christmas Eve night, General Schwarzkopf returned to his office in the Ministry of Defense. His wife Brenda had sent a tiny Christmas tree with lights. As he switched it on he heard the phone from Washington ring. It was President Bush. The President told General Schwarzkopf, "I couldn't let this day go by without calling to wish you and all the men and women under your command a Merry Christmas. I know that you are far away from your loved ones but I want you to know that our thoughts and prayers are with you. You now know the course we are on, our prayers will stay with you during the coming days." General Schwarzkopf thanked President Bush on behalf of all of Central Command. After the phone call the general turned on some Christmas music and listened to it long into the night until he fell asleep.\textsuperscript{219}

For at least 24 hours on Christmas Day, and the day after, chaplains and chaplain assistants continued to visit units throughout Saudi Arabia. Many units had not been fortunate enough to have a "soldier show" or very many gifts arrive, even though the Any Soldier mail was pretty constant. Chaplain Gary Sanford in the 1st Calvary Division helped the soldiers get in the mood for the holiday season by donning one of the Santa Claus suits sent to the division from Ft. Hood. Chaplain Sanford called himself Sand D. Claus. He wore a Santa hat and goggles of the type worn by vehicle drivers. He frequently came to soldier shows out in the desert where the Bob Hope show had not been able to travel. Chaplain Sanford would then sit down on a water box or a folding chair and ask the commander of the unit to come up and sit on his knee and tell him what he wanted for Christmas. The soldiers went wild with laughter watching Sand D. Claus interview their commanders.\textsuperscript{220} These comic relief episodes simply illustrated the very diverse ways chaplains sought to minister not only to the soldiers deep religious needs but also to their overall morale and welfare.

In the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Chaplain Herb Kitchens held a Christmas Eve service at the division headquarters site. The division headquarters was located at the King Fahad International Airport. "Chaplain Sam Boone and I conducted the service," Kitchens recalled:

The 101st Screaming Eagle Band provided the music under the direction of CW3 Bryan Wills. It was a beautiful night on Christmas Eve and the sky was filled with stars; but there was a 15 mph breeze, making it difficult to keep the candles lit. The Advent Wreath had five candles, one for each of the four Sundays leading up to Christmas and a Christ candle in the center to represent the presence of the Lord with
us. The wind kept blowing out our candles, forcing us to relight them over and over. When an individual candle in the congregation blew out, the worshiper would borrow a light from the next person. Each time the Advent candles blew out we relit them from the Christ candle. At the close of the service several people came up to me expressing amazement and wonder as they had called attention to the fact that the only candle that did not go out during the entire service was the Christ candle. Whatever caused the Christ candle to keep burning it made a lasting impression on those of us who worshiped in that service. The candle light service on 24 December 1990, conducted in a land where Christ was not normally worshiped, was a very special event for the 101st Airborne Division soldiers.²²¹

Chaplain Gay Hatler in Riyadh had spent Christmas Eve celebrating a Christmas service at the U.S. Embassy.²²² He recalled a very small tree and even some tiny ornaments that he had received from his wife. Other chaplains, those in the 141st Signal Battalion, simply joined the troops in games which included playing football in the sand, with protective masks slung on the belt during the Christmas season. The experiences of the soldiers, the chaplains, the commanders and even the visiting press corps during the holiday season reinforced the unified commitment that American military personnel had to the liberation of Kuwait.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) Chief of Chaplains Matthew Zimmerman visits with the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, December, 1990. Chaplain Herb Kitchens, Division Chaplain, is at the Chief's left; (Bottom) Do-It-Yourself showers and facilities in the desert
ENDNOTES


2. ARCENT Chaplain Personnel Rosters, 7 march 1991, U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency, Washington, DC. On 7 march 1991 there were 568 Army chaplains in SWA - 145 of whom were from the Reserves or National Guard. This number (145) included 15 Reserve chaplains who served in Civil Affairs units. Of the 514 chaplain assistants, 67 were from the Reserve components. Some 41 of the 145 Reserve chaplains were from the National Guard, 104 from the U.S. Army Reserve.

3. Roger Able, "2 August 1991 Desert Storm Deployment Update," Office of the Chief of Chaplains, p.1. The figure of 428 reflects 113 USAR (3 IRR) and 61 ARNG chaplains in SWA (including 2 in Turkey and 1 in Israel) for a total of 174. Some 30 USAR (16 TPU and 14 TTAD) and 12 ARNG (2 TPU and 10 TTAD) were deployed to backfill vacancies in Germany. An estimated 212 Reserve chaplains and 195 assistants served at DACH, in the MACOMs, CONUSAs, Chaplain School, hospitals, and on installations in CONUS. See Chaplain (Colonel) Robert C. Vickers, "Desert Shield/Storm from the FORSCOM Chaplain's Perspective," U.S. Army War College monograph, 15 April 1994, p. 12. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.

4. The total number of chaplains, active and Reserve, who served in SWA or in backfill missions from August 1990 to August 1991 in support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm equaled 860 (432 active duty, 428 Reserve). There were 709 chaplain assistants (447 active duty, 262 Reserve) with them. Figures are from Roger Able, DACH Roster, 2 August 1991, and from Chaplain (Colonel) Robert Vickers, "Desert Shield/Storm from the FORSCOM Chaplain's Perspective," USAWC Monograph 15 April 1994, p. 12.


35. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Personal interview with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Joe R. Colley, USA, Retired, Atlanta, Georgia, 4 January 1994.
42. Briefing by General Norman Schwarzkopf to CENTCOM and ARCENT Chaplains, Riyadh, March 19, 1991.
44. Ibid., p. 271.
45. Ibid., p. 273.
46. Ibid.


58. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col) Wayne Kuehne, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 16 Dec 93.

59. Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) M. A. Zimmerman, 9 Dec 93.


61. Personal interview with Chaplain (Brig. Gen.) Wayne W. Hoffmann, 8 September 1994.

62. Personal interview with Mr. Roger Able, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 9 Dec 93.


64. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) John J. Kaising, 23 March 95.

65. Personal interview with Chaplain (Brig. Gen.) Donald W. Shea, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 10 Jan 94.

66. Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John Brinsfield, Chief of the Unit and Individual Training Division at USACHCS from 1989 to 1990, deployed to Saudi Arabia on 26 December 1990 to become the Staff Chaplain for Third Army's Personnel Command (PERSCOM) in Riyadh.


68. Personal interview with Major Morgan L. Flom, 2 Jan 1995. The model for the UMT Handbook was Major Flom's *Field Artillery Executive Officer's Handbook*, used for teaching artillery officers and NCO's.

69. During a time of constrained funds, the production of *The UMT handbook* was nearly delayed for one year. The cost to produce the first run of RB-1-1 nearly equaled the expense of installing a revolving door at the front entrance of Watters Hall, "hot project" for the School at the time. Hearing that only one expense would be covered, Major Hobson cornered the School Commandant at a formal function at the Officers Club one evening and said simply: "Sir, concerning the reference book or installing the front door, I'd like to leave with you this thought. A helluva lot more chaplains and chaplain assistants are going to get use out of that book in the next year than will walk through the front door of the school in the same period."

70. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Bernard Lieving, U.S. Army Chaplain School, 7 Dec 93.
71. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Charles T. Clanton, USA Retired, 6 Jan 94.


73. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) William Hufham, USACSSA, 16 Dec 93.

74. Interview with Chaplain Lieving, 7 Dec 93.

75. Interview with Chaplain Hufham, 16 Dec 93.

76. Interview with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Joe R. Colley, USA Retired, 4 Jan 94.

77. Interview with Chaplain Clanton, 6 Jan 94.

78. Interview with Master Sgt. Ed Parton, Fort Carson, Colorado, 6 Jan 94.


81. Author's note: Twelve chaplains from Clinical Pastoral Education classes at Fort Benning, Fort Sam Houston, and Walter Reed Army Medical Center did deploy to Saudi Arabia in 1991 as replacements for anticipated UMT casualties. One of these, Chaplain Roger Armstead, was assigned as the assistant staff chaplain for ARCENT Personnel Command.

82. Interview with Chaplain Colley, 4 Jan 94.


85. Interview with Chaplain Hufham, 16 Dec 93.


Command Staff Chaplain; Chaplain (Col.) Lawrence A. Kelly, Jr., Chief of Operations and Support; Chaplain (Colonel) David P. Peterson, Reserve Components Affairs Advisor; Chaplain (Colonel) Charles G. Komschlies, Chaplain Recruitment; Chaplain (Lt. Col.) David O. Golden, Leadership and Human Issues; Chaplain (Maj.) L. Joseph O'Keeffe, Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations; Chaplain (Maj.) Sir Walter Scott, Force Department and Documentation; Sgt. Maj. Larry Toelstede, Chaplain Assistant Supervisor; Sgt. Maj. Michael J. Stranz, Chaplain Assistant Supervisor; Sgt. 1st Class Ellis M. Morris, Recruitment NCO; Patricia S. Copeland, DAC, Program Analyst; Annie B. Head, DAC, Secretary; Debra R. Yuhas, DAC, Office Services Assistant; and, me, with my areas of military operations (contingency planning), mobilization, and training. Over the course of the next several weeks, two FORSCOM chaplain IMAs, Chaplain (Col.) Raymond E. Ennis and Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Paul Mason, were activated to cover the increased workload created by the Gulf War. This group became a team during Desert Shield/Storm such as I have never witnessed before. Everyone was totally willing to pitch in and assist one another whenever the need arose, which was often. Desert Storm/Shield created one of those moments in time when adversity brought out the best in people, and through it we bonded together and became so much more than the sum of our individual efforts." See Chaplain (Col.) Robert Vickers, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm Chaplain's Perspective" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Personal Experience Monograph, 15 April 1994), pp. 2-3. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives, U.S. Army Chaplain School.

92. Personal correspondence, Chaplain (Col.) Larry Kelly to Chaplain Brinsfield, 1 December 1994.


94. Chaplain (Lt. Col.) S.W. Scott, letter to Chaplain (Col.) Brinsfield, undated, but sent in May 1995.


96. Ibid., pp. 1-3

97. Interview with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Joe R. Colley, USA Rtd., 4 Jan 94.

98. Interview with Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Matthew A. Zimmerman, 9 Dec 93.

99. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) Charles Clanton, USA Rtd., 6 Jan 94.

100. Chaplain "Gene" Ennis, USAR, was a key supporting player not only in personnel actions during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, but also in coordinating deployments for JTF Guantanamo and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992. He was an extremely valuable asset at FORSCOM.

101. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) David P. Peterson, the FORSCOM Chaplain, 27 Sept 93.
102. Ibid.

103. Personal papers of Chaplain (Col.) David P. Peterson, "SWA Deployment" file, USACSSA, Washington, D.C.


105. Note from Chaplain (Col.) John Scott to Chaplain (Col.) John Brinsfield, 1 June, 1994.


107. Personal interview with Chaplain (Capt.) Ben Romer, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 9 Feb 94.

108. Ibid.


111. Interview with Chaplain Peterson, 27 Sep 93.


115. Interview with Chaplain Romer, 9 Feb 94.

116. The word "capella," or cape in Latin, is the root word from which "chaplain" was derived. It was thus ironically "a fast cape" that bore the first troops and chaplains from Fort Stewart across the sea to Saudi Arabia.


118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.


121. Interview with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Herb Kitchens, Fort Gillem, Georgia, 29 Dec 93.

122. Interview with Chaplain Lieving, 7 Dec 93.


126. As of 10 March 1991, 106,047 members of the Reserve Components, Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, Coast Guard, and National Guard were deployed to Southwest Asia. Of these, 55,595 were from the Army National Guard and 78,678 from the U.S. Army Reserve. See DOD, *Defense 91*, p. 58. Among the Army Reservists were 145 chaplains and 67 chaplain assistants. Of the 145 Reserve Component Chaplains, 104 were from the Army Reserve and 41 from the National Guard.

127. Interview with Mr. Roger Able, DACH, 18 Feb 94.

128. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Paul Mason, Chaplain (Col.) Robert Vickers, Mrs. Pat Copeland, and Mrs. Debbie Yuhas, Ft. McPherson, 4 Jan 94.

129. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) R. E. Ennis, FORSCOM, 1 July 1993.

130. By the time Operation Desert Storm began, Chaplain Charles Hedrick and Chaplain David Papp from the USAR had augmented the DACH-PER directorate to coordinate all assignments and prepare rosters and plans for future personnel replacements if needed. DACH-PER supervised the assignment of all chaplains from all components for the Chief of Chaplains throughout Operations Desert Shield/Storm.


134. Interview with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Herb Kitchens, 29 Dec 93.

135. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) William Hufham, 16 Dec 93.

136. Interview with Chaplain (Capt.) Ben Romer, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, 9 Feb 94.

137. Interview with Chaplain Lieving, 7 Dec 93.

138. Interview with Chaplain Romer, 9 Feb 94.


149. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Robert Vickers, FORSCOM, 4 Jan 94.

150. Chaplain Brinsfield accomplished these two jobs with the help of three other chaplains: Roger Armstead, Arthur "Ben" Salinero, USAR, and Jimmy Smith, USAR, in ARCENT PERSCOM, as well as with the help of SFC Moses Toliver, SFC Charles Kerns, Specialist Nicole Forbes, USAR, and Private J. Smith, USAR.


154. The coalition as of February 14, 1991, included 34 nations: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States. See DOD, *Defense 91*, p. 59.


170. USAREUR Chaplain Memorandum for ODCSOPS and ODCSPER, USAREUR Headquarters, 18 August 1990.


173. Chaplain (Lt. Col.) David Tessmann, Project Officer for the Conference, arranged for Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John Brinsfield from the Chaplain School to come to Berchtesgaden to join in team training with Chaplain (Maj.) Greg Monroe on the faith and customs of Islam.


175. *Ibid.*, Tab B and Table of Contents, Tabs A-GG
176. *Ibid.*, Tabs K, Q. The chaplains and assistants from the Individual Ready Reserve were listed in the USAREUR After Action Report: Chaplains Hollenbaugh, Coggins, McConnel, Hall, Hare, Gerstine, Campbell, Beike, Borre, and Coggins. The chaplain assistants included SPC Baker, Green, Steinsberger; SGT Freiligh, Franco and Redding; SSG Jackson; and SFC Locke. See also Roger Able, "2 August 1991: Deployments," OCCH, p. 2.


179. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Dan O. Davis, 18 April 1994.

180. Note: Chaplain (Col.) Vince Inghilterra held several titles during his service in Saudi Arabia from Support Command Chaplain in 1990 to Theater Chaplain in 1991.

181. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) Calvin Sydnor, 8 April 1994.


183. *Ibid*.

184. *Ibid*.

185. *Ibid*.

186. The 3rd AD Brigade Chaplains included Chaplain (Maj.) Nathaniel Robinson (1st Bde.); Chaplain (Maj.) Richard Minch (2nd Bde.); Chaplain (Lt. Col.) James Bluett (3rd Bde.); Chaplain (Maj.) Dan Miller (Avn. Bde.); Chaplain (Cpt.) George Onstad (DIVARTY); and Chaplain (Maj.) William Ritchie (DISCOM). Chaplain (Cpt.) Otto Schnarr, Sgt. 1st Class Mary McEntee, and Staff Sgt. Betty Ramos comprised the Division Chaplain Headquarters with Chaplain Michelson.


190. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-28. Note: The *After Action Report, 3rd Armored Division Unit Ministry Teams: Operation Desert Shield/Storm*, written by Chaplain Michelson and Chaplain Arnold on 6 April 1991, has a number of excellent recommendations for future operations. Copies have been distributed to
the Director of Combat Developments, USACHCS, to the USAREUR Chaplain, and to the Chaplain Corps Archives at the Office of the Historian, U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School.

191. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Wayne Lehrer, USACHCS, 7 Dec 93.

192. Ibid.


194. Ibid.

195. Ibid., p. 8.

196. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) Wayne Lehrer, 7 Dec 93.

197. Ibid.

198. Ibid.

199. Ibid.

200. Ibid.

201. Ibid.

202. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Dan Davis, 18 Apr 94.

203. XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain Memorandum for the CENTCOM Chaplain, 30 September 1990.

204. Memorandum from the CENTCOM Chaplain to the Armed Forces Chaplain Board, 21 May 1991.

205. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) David Zalis, USA FORSCOM, 8 June 1993.


208. Ibid.

209. Interview with Chaplain Sanford, Ft Belvoir, 19 Jan 94.

210. Personal interview with Chaplain Wayne Lehrer, 7 Dec 93.

211. Ibid.

213. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) William Hufham, USACSSA, 28 Apr 94.

214. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) David Peterson, FORSCOM, 28 Apr 94.

215. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Gary Sanford, Ft Belvoir, 28 Apr 94.


217. General Schwarzkopf attended at least one service in Saudi Arabia led by Chaplain (Col.) John Schmeling, USAR, the Staff Chaplain for the 416th Engineer Command. Chaplain Schmeling is a Lutheran.

218. The Bob Hope Show was not the only example of the power of humor to cope with stress during the Gulf War. There were multiple examples each day. For instance, early in January 1991, two British soldiers from the Scots Guards Regiment, which had arrived in Riyadh from Edinburgh, decided to ask for better quarters in the following months. Anticipating a short war, they telephoned the Hilton Hotel in Baghdad and asked the English-speaking clerk if they could reserve a suite for the month of February. The clerk was excited to receive a profitable prospect, but when the soldiers identified themselves as members of Her Majesty's Regiment of Scots Guards in Riyadh, the clerk hung up. Supposedly the soldiers reported to the Headquarters, British Forces-Middle East, "Pity. No sense of humor whatever."


221. Interview with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Herb Kitchens, Fort Gillem, Georgia, 29 December 1993.

222. Interview with Chaplain Gay Hatler, 3 May 1994.
OPERATION DESERT STORM

24-28 February 1991

22nd Support Command After Action Report, V. XI
OPERATION DESERT STORM:

Religious Support
(Top) Destroyed Iraqi tank with inscription by a U.S. soldier, "U.S. Attorney's Office, Incomes Div." (Bottom) Chaplain William Sterling, Delaware National Guard, conducts field service
CHAPTER IV

OPERATION DESERT STORM

THE AIR WAR: "MOVE IT OR LOSE IT"

*What do Hiroshima and Iraq have in common? Nothing yet.*

Sergeant Victor Silvestri, Chaplain Assistant, VII Corps

Chaplain Don Harris and I passed lots of destroyed Iraqi tanks, some with bodies in them, burned arms and legs sticking out. Lots of prisoners were walking toward our unit. We stopped in a minefield. One of our soldiers was blown up by a mine. There was lots of destruction.

Specialist Lionel Robinson
2/41 Field Artillery
3d Infantry Division

After Christmas and Hanukkah many of the chaplains returned to their routine ministries of visiting the soldiers in their units, conducting worship services, counseling, administering sacraments, and participating with their chaplain assistants in training. Chaplain Edwin Ahl covered the 557th Maintenance Company, the 147th Maintenance Company, the 504th Maintenance Company, the 493d Supply and Service Company on a circuit of 55 miles. As Chaplain Ahl recalled, "I was blessed to have a good vehicle to get from place to place."1 Chaplain Thomas E. Killgore of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment remembered after Christmas going with his unit to Desert Gunnery. While visiting the troops in training, his unit received two new M2A2 tanks and some M3A2 Bradleys. He recalled, "A report of two enemy tank battalions just 30 kilometers east of us mobilized the entire regiment and caused us to move into defensive positions."2

Even in the remotest sites in the desert most of the American soldiers realized that the United Nations Security Council had authorized the use of force against Iraq unless all Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. As the radio news reports related, the Baker-Aziz meeting at Geneva's Hotel Intercontinental on January 9 failed. With this failure of diplomatic negotiations and a supportive congressional vote on 12 January, President Bush determined, as General Schwarzkopf stated, that Saddam was going to "move it or lose it."3 On the morning of 15 January President Bush summoned Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to the Oval Office and, as Commander in Chief, signed the National Security directive ordering U.S. military forces into battle.4 Bush gave Saddam a full day's grace so the Iraqi could explain, perhaps only to himself, that he had not caved in to a deadline. Then at 0230 hours, 17 January 1991, local Saudi Arabian time, the skies over Iraq rumbled with thunder and lightening as the most advanced technological weapons in the world introduced Saddam to the worst DESERT STORM he had ever imagined. Nine Navy ships launched a total of 106 Tomahawk missiles at targets in Iraq.5 From airfields at Dhahran, Riyadh, King Khalid Military City, and U.S. Navy carriers in the Gulf, F-117 fighter-bombers, F-15s, F-16s, F-111s, A-10s, Apache

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1 See endnotes at end of chapter.
Helicopters, and B-52s from distant bases began to wield, in the words of the Battle Hymn of the Republic, "the terrible swift sword" of retribution.

Along Tap Line Road chaplains in the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division and the 3d Armored Division received the news that the United States was at war with Iraq. Chaplain Dan Davis, the VII Corps Chaplain, Chaplain David A. O'Connell, Master Sgt. Ron Bowren, Private 1st Class Brooks, and Private Hainlin were in a tent in the headquarters area. Chaplain O'Connell recalled that at approximately 2300 hours in the rather cold weather "we were told to get into MOPP level 4 by a member of the Inspector General team who was in a tent next to ours. All of us got into our chemical protective gear. At 0100 hours I was told by a runner from the commo tent that I was needed at the Corps G-1 section. It was a dark 20-minute walk to the G-1 van and I remembered I was in full MOPP gear when I noticed the planes on their bombing runs flying overhead."

Chaplain Wayne Lehrer, the 1st Armored Division Chaplain, recalled, "On January 17th the morale in the division was shaky because we were the front line for VII Corps. We had very few of our combat vehicles out in the desert and even less ammunition. We still had plenty of ecclesiastical supplies but were beginning to wonder how long the war would last and therefore how to get more supplies. The beginning of the war found the division alert, our UMTs getting acclimated to maneuver in the desert and to ministry seven days a week. Things were going well, as well as we could expect."

Chaplain Helmut Michelson, the Division Chaplain for the 3d Armored Division, recalled very succinctly, "I was conscious of the gravity of the event and the location I was in." Chaplain Richard Chaverria wrote, "When Operation Desert Storm began we were ordered into MOPP. We listened to ABC news. It was pretty exhilarating. We realized that the war had finally started."

Chaplain Johnny R. Freeman of the 8/43rd Air Defense Artillery Battalion, recorded.

"At approximately 2330 hours (local) Specialist Rogers and I climbed into our sleeping bags for the night. We had had a full day of visiting troops and had settled in for the night. I had been sleeping so well when the noisy throttle of fighter jets, hundreds of them, roared from above. It startled me and I said to myself, 'Oh Lord, it's starting.' At 0200 hours sirens all over the log base were going off and everyone was shouting, 'Get up, Get up!' I jumped to my feet, kicking off the sleeping bag, hopping around trying to get dressed. I finally got it together and began walking through our site. There was a terrible silence and a bewildered look upon everyone's face. With a sincere longing for faith and quiet reassurance, soldiers began saying, 'Hey, there's the chaplain. Father, chaplain, would you pray for us? Good to see you chaplain.' Those were their words and expressions which we all understood."

Chaplain Timothy Kikkert of the 4/66th Armored Battalion remembered:

"We were awakened shortly after midnight on 17 January 1991 for a gas alert. We were told that the United States had launched a massive air attack against Iraq. In the

See endnotes at end of chapter.
next few days our vehicles would be on the way off into the desert. We had little or no control of the situation. We couldn't call time out or call in sick or ask someone to fill in for us. We couldn't stop it or change it. It was really out of our hands. One could only do a small part and then hope and pray that it all turned out all right."

Chaplain Thomas A. MacGregor of the 1st Infantry Division was asleep when the attack began:

"I awoke to the cold and dark. Sleep still shrouding my mind and somewhere in the darkness I heard a voice: 'Get your masks and get to your bunkers.' I zipped open my sleeping bag and switched on my flashlight. It seemed too early for reveille and a quick look at my watch confirmed my suspicion. It was 0230 hours in the morning. By now my wrath was aroused and I challenged the figure outlined at the entrance of my tent: 'Hey, what's the idea?' There was a moment's pause and then Private Mark Federere spoke from the darkness: 'We have just launched 100 cruise missiles at selected targets in Iraq. We are now at war with Iraq. Please get to your bunker.' On 17 January 1991 the winds of war rained steel in the desert. The desert was cold. I had not expected it to be so cold, but still colder was the darkness in my soul. Some 50 kilometers north men were dying, awaking to eternity with each burst of unprecedented technology; a distant army was striking with lethal accuracy against a faceless enemy.

My senses reeled with sensory overload. I could not grasp the magnitude of events. They burst upon my sleep-numbed mind and all I could feel was the coldness. By now Chaplain Whitaker and Sergeant Daum had joined me in the struggle to dress and move to the bunker. No one was willing to break light discipline and so we dressed quickly in the darkness. Our bunker was located 15 meters forward of our tent, a hole in the desert 6 feet deep with 2 feet of overhead cover, plywood and dirt. There was room for about 10 soldiers comfortably. Before the sun came up, 15 soldiers shared the cramped space. Chaplain Whitaker and I were the first ones to the bunker. We were the sole occupants for the moment. Sergeant Daum and the other two chaplain assistants had taken positions on the perimeter with their weapons. Neither Chaplain Whitaker nor myself felt much like talking. How would Iraq respond to our initial strike? Would they retaliate with artillery and chemical weapons? Would they launch a massive ground attack aimed at cutting our main supply route leading back to the port?

I knew VII Corps' right flank was lightly defended and it seemed to be vulnerable to penetration. I experienced very real feelings of fear. My heart rate increased and my emotions threatened to overwhelm me. Death and eternity were no longer distant horizons. They were close up, tangible, demanding. In the darkness and loneliness

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of that bunker I could reach out and touch them. And somewhere in the darkness and uncertainty of the bunker I remembered the words of a preacher: 'Those in the sunshine may believe the faith, but we in the shadows must believe for we have nothing else.' And I laughed, for those words were spoken by me in last Sunday's sermon as I was quoting from the words of a famous sermon I once read. They took on a new meaning. 'Those in the sunshine may believe the faith, but we in the shadows must believe, we have nothing else.' And into the despair of that moment the abiding presence of our Lord brought light and hope. His words spoken thousands of years ago to Moses now were whispered to me: 'As I was with Moses, so I will be with you. I will never leave you or forsake you.' The presence of God, the promises of God, were as near and real as the earth and wood beams in my bunker. I stretched out on the dirt floor of my bunker. It was going to be a long day and a good soldier knows when to sleep. Using my cold weather cap as a pillow, as I drifted off to sleep my thoughts were of my family.\(^{12}\)

Chaplain Ben Salinero from ARCENT PERSCOM was with a unit near King Khalid Military City. He recalled an unusual event:

The night the ground war began, the troops were loading magazines of ammo in case we were overrun. It was a night to remember and I witnessed, what was to me, a miraculous thing. The wind had originally been blowing from Baghdad towards our positions. Since there was always the threat of chemical warfare, this was a serious condition. When the time came for the ground war to begin, the wind shifted and blew toward Baghdad and was really kicking up dust. This meant if the Iraqi's did use chemical warfare, that it would blow back on their own troops. I personally believe that it was the Lord protecting us from the threat of gas and biological warfare.\(^{13}\)

Chaplain Salinero spent a lot of time during the next few days praying for "our soldiers and our generals." They did a "great job," he said; and, for that matter, so did he.\(^{14}\)

In Dhahran Chaplain Calvin Sydnor and his chaplain assistant, Sergeant Lucille Singleton, were in their tents at what was known as Hotel California, actually part of a tent city. Sergeant Singleton recalled that about 0330 hours on January 17th, "I was awakened by a loud whistling noise. The next thing I heard was an announcement to go to MOPP level 4 and get inside a building. I got dressed fast, the fastest in my life and then I went to look for Chaplain Sydnor. I had to get him to the building, and taking care of him took a little of my fear away. I simply did not have time to be afraid during this alert."\(^{15}\)

In Riyadh General Schwarzkopf had known, of course, the night before the attack began on Iraq that people would die on the 17th of January. At a few minutes after midnight on 17 January 1991 General Schwarzkopf wrote to his family:

\(^{12}\) See endnotes at end of chapter.
The war clouds have gathered on the horizon and I have already issued the terrible orders that will let the monster loose. I wish with every fiber of my body that I would never have had to issue those commands. But now it is too late and for whatever purpose God has we will soon be at war. As a soldier who has had to go to war three times before, I want you to know that I am not afraid. I know that I might face death, but you should know that I am far safer than most of the fine young men and women under my command. Some will die, many could die. I pray to God that this will not happen, but if it does and if I am one of those chosen by God to sacrifice my life, I wanted you to know that my last thoughts before this terrible beginning are of you, my beloved family.16

After General Schwarzkopf finished his letter to the family, he wrote a Desert Storm message to his troops. He took it to the war room where approximately 30 generals and colonels had gathered. As he entered someone announced, "Gentlemen, the Commander in Chief." They all came to attention. He walked to the front and stood before a large map of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. "I want to read you a message that I have just released to the men and women of Central Command," he said.

**DEsert Storm Message to Our Troops**

Soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines of the United States Central Command: This morning at 0300 we launched Operation Desert Storm, an offensive campaign that will enforce the United Nations resolutions that Iraq must cease its rape and pillage of its weaker neighbor and withdraw its forces from Kuwait. The President, the Congress, the American people, and indeed the world, stand united in their support for your actions. You are a member of the most powerful force our country, in Coalition with our allies, has ever assembled in a single theater to face such an aggressor. You have trained hard for this battle and we are ready. During my visits with you I have seen in your eyes a fire of determination to get this job done and done quickly so that we may return to the shores of our great nation. My confidence in you is total. Our cause is just! Now you must be the thunder and lightening of Desert Storm. May God be with you, your loved ones at home, and our country.17

H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command

After General Schwarzkopf read his message, he asked Chaplain David Peterson, the Command Chaplain, to say a prayer.18 Chaplain Peterson, of course, had known that there might be an announcement that night. Consequently he had composed the prayer for all of those participating in this experience. The prayer read as follows:

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Our Father, on this awesome and humbling occasion, we are grateful for the privilege of turning to you ... our sovereign and almighty God. We believe that, in accordance with the teaching of your word and revelation, we are on a just and righteous mission. Therefore as we now begin Operation Desert Storm, we humbly, but boldly ask for your blessing on our mission and our service members as we carry out the process of freeing Kuwait and its citizens. We ask and petition you for the safety of our service members. However, if in your providence, you call upon any of them to make the ultimate sacrifice, we pray that through the power of the Holy Spirit they would be prepared to meet their Lord and God. May they, as well as each of us, have the miraculous assurance and comfort which the Psalmist experienced when he said:

The Lord is my light and my salvation—whom shall I fear? The Lord is the strength of my life—of whom shall I be afraid? In the day of trouble he will keep me safe in his dwelling, he will hide me in the shelter of his tabernacle and set me high upon a rock. Then my head will be exalted above the enemies who surround me ...

Likewise we pray for our service members' families. May they too know the peace that passes all understanding. Then, Lord, as we seek your blessing on Operation Desert Storm, we also ask for a quick and decisive victory. May the elements, even the weather, be in our favor. Bless our decision makers with insight and wisdom: our President, Secretary Cheney, Chairman Powell and each commander. Give them clarity of mind and the wisdom to make sound decisions. And now we take great comfort in the knowledge that you are our sovereign God, the Ruler of the Universe; the One who offers certainty in the midst of uncertainty; peace in the midst of fear; comfort in time of sorrow. Your word informs us that men prepare for battle ... and we have ... but victory rests with the Lord. Therefore, we commit our ways to you and wait upon the Lord. In the name of the Prince of Peace we pray. Amen.19

Chaplain Peterson's prayer made a profound impression on General Schwarzkopf and the other officers who heard it, not unlike the prayer offered by 3d Army Chaplain James H. O'Neill for good weather during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II. Both General Patton and General Schwarzkopf appreciated their staff chaplains' support at a critical moment in warfare and in history.

A Worship Service for President Bush - by Overnight Express

The first word of Operation Desert Storm came to Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman late on the evening of 16 January 1991.20 The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Lt. General Dennis Reimer, called Chaplain Zimmerman and asked him to attend a meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Carl Vuono, at the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon that night. Chaplain

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Zimmerman recalled that when he arrived at the Army Operations Center, the CNN television news was broadcasting the bombing of Baghdad and the launching of more than 100 cruise missiles. "When I saw all of the Army staff gathered," Chaplain Zimmerman remarked, "I knew the real thing had arrived." After making some preliminary remarks about the bombing of Baghdad which was occurring in Iraq virtually at the same moment that the Chief of Staff Army was meeting with his staff at the Army Operations Center, General Vuono turned to Chaplain Zimmerman and said, "By the way, we got a call from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell. The White House wants a worship service tomorrow morning at Ft. Meyer for the President and a number of dignitaries."

Chaplain Zimmerman recalled that the guidance was very scanty. The service would last no longer than 40 minutes. All three chiefs of chaplains from the Army, Navy and Air Force would participate. There would be some music and Dr. Billy Graham would be the speaker. Above all, the worship service would not exceed 40 minutes, for most of the key personnel in the Defense Department and in the White House would attend and that was as long as the President's schedule would permit him to be absent from the Oval Office. Chaplain Zimmerman was further directed to get in touch with the public affairs section at the Pentagon and with the Military District of Washington Commander to plan the service.

Chaplain Zimmerman established contact with the other chiefs to determine who would be reading the scripture and leading the prayers the next day. Chaplain (Major General) John P. McDonough was the Chief of Chaplains, U.S. Air Force, and Rear Admiral Alvin B. Koeneman was the Chief of Chaplains, U.S. Navy. Chaplain Zimmerman requested his executive officer, Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, assist in developing the format for the service, the title of the service, and the personnel required for musical support. The service would begin at 9 o'clock in the morning on the 17th of January, Washington time.

At approximately 11 p.m. that night Chaplain Zimmerman began to wonder, by the way, where was Dr. Graham? Was he in the country? Was he well? And how would they be able to assure his presence the next morning? Consequently Chaplain Zimmerman made his first call to the White House. When he contacted the switchboard he asked if anyone could help him locate Dr. Billy Graham for a worship service the next morning. The staff replied "That's easy. Dr. Graham is here."

After the customary greetings, Chaplain Zimmerman, and later Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, discussed the service with Dr. Graham. Because Dr. Graham was suffering from a sore throat he said he would speak for only 10 minutes. Given that guidance, the rest of the service would be timed so that there would be ample opportunity for music and for appropriate scripture readings and prayers.

Once the service had been constructed, an outline was faxed to Mr. John Sununu, one of the President's advisors at the White House. Several faxes went back and forth as Mr. Sununu made suggestions and gave directions. After the service format had been completed, a solitary fax came in very late. It said simply, "President Bush wants you to include the singing of Amazing Grace."

All seemed to be in order by 8:00 a.m. the next morning, the 17th of January. The congregation, which included Dr. Billy Graham, President George Bush and Mrs. Barbara Bush, Vice President and Mrs. Dan Quayle, General Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and many other dignitaries, including most of the President's Cabinet, arrived on time. A metal detector had

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
been set up at Ft. Meyer Chapel in order to assure the safety and security of so many dignitaries. Chaplain Zimmerman was early and began to look around for his colleagues from the other services. Chaplain McDonough, the Air Force Chief of Chaplains, arrived; however, as the time for the service to begin drew closer, the Navy Chief of Chaplains was nowhere to be seen. Consequently, Chaplain Zimmerman leaned over to Chaplain Bruce Burslie, the installation chaplain from Ft. McNair. Chaplain Zimmerman asked Chaplain Burslie to write a prayer on the spot in the event the Chief of Navy Chaplains was inadvertently delayed. With but four minutes left before the service was to begin, Rear Admiral Koeneman arrived looking a bit flustered and somewhat out of breath. When Chaplain Zimmerman saw him at the back entrance he wondered how the Navy Chief would get up to the front of the sanctuary without drawing undue attention. However, Chaplain Koeneman thought very quickly and escorted Dr. Graham to the pulpit. When Chaplain Koeneman sat down next to Chaplain Zimmerman, Chaplain Zimmerman asked him "what happened?" Chaplain Koeneman said, somewhat embarrassingly, that his carefully constructed prayer had been eaten by one of the computers and he had spent some extra moments trying to reconstruct it.

When his turn came, Dr. Graham preached not for ten minutes but for 20 minutes. Again Chaplain Zimmerman became concerned over the time factor. However, he noticed that the secretary at Ft. Meyer had accidently left out a musical selection by the Army Chorus. Consequently, he simply ignored that part of the program which, although it did not make the Army Chorus very happy, did allow the congregation to sing "Amazing Grace" and to receive the benediction within the 40 minute time limit assigned to Chaplain Zimmerman.

Given his long and distinguished record of service to the nation, Dr. Graham was an ideal choice for such a service. But the service was also significant because it was the way that the President wanted Operation Desert Storm to begin, with prayers to God that the operation might be swift, cause as little damage and take as few human lives as possible to restore justice and freedom in Kuwait.

**Targeting Metal**

In Riyadh most of the military planners realized the historic fact that once a bombing campaign starts, the probability increases that there will be large numbers of civilian casualties. This had certainly been the case in World War II and Vietnam. By the direction of the National Security Council, through General Powell to General Schwarzkopf, the targeting of battlefield equipment rather than people became the CENTCOM policy. There were to be no body counts, but rather estimates of damaged weapons, equipment, facilities and sites. Some news media criticized this "stage management" of the war. However, Lt. General John J. Yeosock, the Commanding General for Army Central Command, stressed the practical military wisdom of destroying equipment. In desert warfare, in an area where logistical bases cannot be camouflaged well, vehicles are everything. Without air cover and log bases, tanks are virtually fuel-less junk and no longer major threats. Once an army is out of fuel, food and water in the desert, it ceases to be effective. "Our targeting strategy," said General Yeosock, "would be to target metal."25

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Most officers and enlisted personnel at the unit level in Saudi Arabia did not know that the air war would begin for them in the early hours of January 17th. On the first day of the air campaign most units practiced getting into their chemical protective suits and training people to do their tasks in spite of the threat of a possible enemy air attack. But as early as the second day of the air campaign the British announced over Armed Forces Radio in Riyadh that CENTCOM had achieved air superiority in the skies over Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Among the soldiers at CENTCOM and ARCENT Headquarters there was almost an audible sigh of relief, for they knew that their positions, log bases, and airfields were relatively free from Iraqi bombing attack. In January and early February the only real air threat to CENTCOM forces was in the form of SCUD missiles which, at that time, most soldiers treated with contempt as not much better than an ARTEP exercise for our Patriot missile batteries. Mr. Joseph Romanowski, a civilian expert from the Communications and Electronics Command at Ft. Monmouth, said that, as a minimum, the Gulf war presented Saddam with an excellent commercial for our weapons. In Riyadh some officers even climbed up on the roofs of buildings and ate popcorn at night while they watched the "Patriot-SCUD show." The soldiers did not realize at that time that of 17 SCUD missiles had been fired at Riyadh, six of them at ARCENT Headquarters.

The SCUD attacks, as part of the Gulf War, had begun almost exactly 24 hours after the first Coalition aircraft had screamed over Baghdad. General Schwarzkopf recalled that at 0300 on Friday, the 18th of January, after he and his staff had been in the Command Center for 24 hours, seven SCUD missiles were fired from Western Iraq toward Israel. In Israel itself, there was the wail of air raid sirens which alerted the people to a missile attack. At first people saw a shooting star with a red nose flash over their cities. The sky would then suddenly light up and the buildings shake to a deafening blast. Against all the odds, Saddam Hussein had scored his first direct hit on an Israeli city.

More missiles followed—a total of 86 fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the whole of the Gulf War. The SCUD missiles were actually designed by the Soviets to carry nuclear warheads. They were not exceptionally accurate because it was thought that the area of devastation would compensate for lack of accuracy. They did fly, however, at more than 5,000 mph. When a SCUD missile began to close on its target, it would slow to approximately 4,400 mph in the increasingly dense air; sometimes the missile would break apart. If there were Patriot launchers nearby, the Patriot batteries would spit two missiles from a canister for every SCUD acquired. In moments the sound of the missiles breaking the sound barrier announced that they had achieved their maximum speed of 3,700 miles per hour. SCUDs and Patriots, therefore, closed at more than 8,000 mph. In a climatic vision of flame and sound, the engagement ended in seconds, usually with the interception of the SCUD by one or more Patriot missiles.

The Patriots had been developed at the United States Army Defense Center at Fort Bliss, Texas, as an antiaircraft weapon. They had not been completely field tested when they became operational in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, they were largely successful in intercepting most of the missiles fired by Saddam Hussein's forces. A total of 130 Patriot missiles valued at more than $1,000,000 each were launched during the Gulf War. As was the case with some of the officers in Riyadh who would watch the Patriot-SCUD shows, many of the soldiers in the desert regarded the

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
SCUD Impact Zone: (Top) Sp. Forbes, SSG Moses Toliver, Sp. Willis, Chaplains Leon Kircher and Roger Armstead near Riyadh (Bottom) Chaplains Larry Mack and Rebecca Leckrone
SCUDs with unmasked contempt. Some thought they were used merely for harassment—to force soldiers to wake up at night and put on their chemical protective suits.

Chaplain William Huffman of the 82nd Airborne Division described the SCUD as nothing more than a political weapon, demonstrating that the Iraqis could reach out and touch someone. The SCUD missiles had a range of approximately 625 miles, but the Iraqis learned to extend that slightly by welding additional sections on SCUDs. They rechristened them "Al Abbas" missiles which could carry either a small payload of 125 pounds a much greater distance or a large payload to its normal 625 mile range. When the first SCUD missiles hit Israel, the Israeli government wanted to retaliate with waves of air attacks moving across Saudi Arabian air space to find targets in Iraq. After some very hard bargaining by General Colin Powell and other members of the American Defense establishment, the Israeli government agreed not to retaliate immediately. In return for their willingness to remain out of the Gulf War and therefore out of any posture that would threaten the fragile Coalition, the American government sent the 10th Air Defense Brigade from Darmstadt, Germany, with two of its batteries.

This brigade had not trained for deployment outside Europe, but it reacted quickly to help protect Israel from any impending SCUD attacks. The Patriot tactical missile served as a key political tool to keep Israel out of the war. Moreover, the deployment of the Patriot batteries to Israel provided an opportunity for the Army Chaplain Corps to deploy a Jewish chaplain from the Reserve components to serve in Israel. The chaplain's name was Major Jacob Goldstein. He joined Chaplain Michael Dugal, a Protestant deployed from Germany, in providing ministry to the U.S. soldiers in Israel. Chaplain Goldstein's deployment solved a problem which concerned even the Chief of Chaplains and the CENTCOM staff. The problem was that Chaplain Goldstein was an Orthodox Jewish chaplain who wore a full beard. Chaplain Goldstein had volunteered to serve in Saudi Arabia, but at every level of command there was concern that Chaplain Goldstein would be identified as a rabbi by some of the more radical groups of Muslims in Saudi Arabia and therefore his safety would be in jeopardy. His deployment to Israel happily solved that problem.

The most serious side of the SCUD dilemma for General Schwarzkopf was in locating the mobile SCUD launchers in the desert. As long as the Iraqis could launch SCUD missiles from oversized trucks in the desert, they could place these missiles on a number of cities in both Israel and Saudi Arabia. By early February, General Schwarzkopf had dedicated one-third of his air assets to locate and destroy the Iraqi mobile SCUD launchers.

While some American aircraft searched for SCUD launchers, the remainder of U.S. and allied fighter bombers flew 116,000 combat air sorties delivering 88,500 tons of bombs on 42 Iraqi divisions as well as on command and control centers, bridges, SCUD launcher sites, power stations, biological weapons factories, ammunition dumps, naval vessels, airfields, bunkers and other military targets. The Pentagon revealed that, in just over a month, the Coalition dropped a higher tonnage of bombs with more concentrated fire power than the allies dropped in all of World War II. Estimated total Iraqi losses to Coalition air power reported by the U.S. Central Command included 288 combat aircraft, 3,700 battle tanks, 2,400 armored vehicles, 19 naval vessels and 42 Iraqi divisions rendered at least 50% ineffective before the ground war started. The Department of the Air Force noted that the successful mission rate was 92% higher than their peacetime training rate. In spite of the

See endnotes at end of chapter.
suggestion that Baghdad was more heavily defended than the most highly defended Warsaw Pact sites during the height of the Cold War, Air Force F-117s flew 1,300 sorties over downtown Baghdad dropping 2,000 tons of bombs with a mission success rate of 85%.

In all of the Desert Storm sorties U.S. air losses in combat totaled only 35 aircraft, five of which were helicopters. There were no U.S. losses in air-to-air engagements as opposed to 42 aircraft lost on the Iraqi side in air-to-air combat. The actual number of Iraqi civilians killed over the 42-day air war period was remarkably limited when the scale of the bombing is taken into account. The most precise Iraqi figures put the number of civilians killed at 2,278 and the number of wounded at 5,965. However, as a result of the Coalition bombing strategy, civilian life in Iraq was becoming increasingly unbearable. There was no electricity or running water in Baghdad or in Iraq's other major cities and, as a result, the residents of Baghdad faced the threat of cholera and typhoid epidemics. By early February, the government was forced to announce an indefinite halt to the sale of fuel, thereby leading to the complete collapse of civilian vehicular transportation.

Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger of the U.S. State Department recalled a conversation he had with the King of Morocco on the effectiveness of Coalition air power. The King of Morocco said that the bombing was "not viewed in Iraq in the way the West viewed it, as the terrible awful thing it was. Rather, it was a demonstration to a lot of Iraqis as to how vulnerable they really were. It was probably, in terms of the attitudes in Iraq toward Saddam Hussein, something that will lead to antagonism and criticism of him, not the reverse." 34

A Two Corps Switch

The Iraqi forces in front of the Coalition units remained relatively stable after the air war began. Five Iraqi divisions had occupied the western desert opposite the two American corps since September 1990. Two infantry divisions, one in place since mid-August, comprised the Iraqi frontal defenses in Kuwait east of the Wadi al-Batin. A 45-kilometer gap existed between these two divisions and the 26th Iraqi Infantry Division, the next major combat unit arrayed west of the Wadi along the border. The gap between the three Iraqi infantry units was covered to some extent by two second echelon heavy divisions, the 52d Armored Division and the Republican Guards' Tawakalna Mechanized Division. 35 These heavier units were centered some 65 kilometers behind the forward infantry divisions and were positioned to strike any Coalition force that sought to exploit the 45-kilometer gap by attacking up the Wadi al-Batin toward Basra. 36

The Iraqis had used this armored ambush technique against the Iranians. The objective was simply to lure a long armored formation far enough up the Wadi that it could not withdraw, then destroy it by a mobile flank attack from two directions. Some 120 battalions of Iraqi artillery out of the 150 in the Kuwait theater were available to support these units. 37 It was estimated by Coalition intelligence sources that at least 200,000 Iraqi troops were on line to execute either a defense of Kuwait or an offensive ambush.

In order to maintain the elaborate deception plan which General Schwarzkopf and his staff had devised, a plan which included a feint at the coast with a Marine amphibious force and a seeming

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
frontal assault by Coalition forces along the southern border of Kuwait, General Yeosock needed to move the XVIII Airborne Corps around the VII Corps. The XVIII Airborne Corps could then wheel through the western Iraqi desert and deliver with the VII Corps a knockout punch to the flank and rear of 42 Iraqi divisions. General Schwarzkopf anticipated that at least two weeks would be needed to execute this "great wheel." The crossover of the two corps would have to be completed entirely during the air operation. General Franks of the VII Corps and General Luck of the XVIII Airborne Corps would have just two weeks to conduct one of the most complex movements of any major ground force in history. More than 64,000 wheeled and tracked vehicles and 255,000 soldiers would have to be shifted laterally as much as 300 miles. Concurrently, the 22d Support Command would have to construct and stock two enormous logistical bases with 60 days' supplies to support each Corps.38

Major General "Gus" Pagonis, General Schwarzkopf's Chief of Logistics, estimated that in order to provide logistical support efficiently, a series of nine logistical bases would be needed to furnish supplies and water during this movement.39 These supplies would be pushed forward utilizing 1,400 U.S. Army trucks and 2,100 host nation trucks. These trucks would travel 2,746 miles on main supply routes for total of 35 million miles driven in 3,568 separate convoys. The supplies necessary for the soldiers during these complex movements included a million meals a day, 700 tons of mail a day, 551,000 bottles of sun screen lotion and 715,000 cans of foot powder. It would take four million gallons of gasoline per day just to run the supply vehicles. General Pagonis noted that if one analyzed the main supply routes during this time frame, notably the roads leading from Dhahran to Riyadh to Rafha and the Tap Line road running from east to west, each minute 18 vehicles would pass any given point.40 This traffic would continue 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Also, the march routes the two Corps utilized intersected in order to properly position them. Therefore, this lateral movement of 300 to 400 miles, dependent upon unit location, would have to be accomplished in large part with a centralized plan that included decentralized control.41 At the time the movement of the two Corps began, that is, on the 20th of January, 1990, the XVIII Airborne Corps had a total strength of 117,844 soldiers, 28,000 vehicles and 980 aircraft. The VII Corps boasted almost 145,000 men, more than 45,000 vehicles and more than 600 aircraft. In addition to the supplies necessary to support the soldiers, there were also supplies to be stockpiled by each Corps in logistical bases which would be utilized in the ground offensive.

At the time the movement began, the 24th Infantry Division was near Jubayl. Southeast of it was the 101st Airborne Division, slightly to the east of that, near Dhahran, was the 82d Airborne Division and the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters. To the north was the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. All of these units had to move around the VII Corps toward the small village of Rafha, approximately 530 miles west of Jubayl. The distance from Dhahran to Riyadh and then to Rafha, which was the route of the 82d Airborne Division, was roughly equivalent to movement from Norfolk, Virginia, to Charlotte, North Carolina, to Cincinnati, Ohio. In fact, in 21 days of convoys and flights, 117,000 soldiers, 28,000 wheeled vehicles, 5,145 tracked vehicles, 6,334,000 meals ready to eat, 15,000 short tons of ammunition, 23,000,000 gallons of fuel and 13,000,000 gallons of water were moved over these routes. The distance covered had no parallel in the history of warfare for a such large force in so short a time.42
The 82d Airborne Division had to move farthest west of any American division involved in the pre-positioning operation. The chaplains of the 82d recalled packing up for the move on January 17th, the day the air war started. They dumped and burned any excess material and equipment. Providentially, they had received some chaplain resupply kits which had arrived from the United States. Each chaplain got two kits—sufficient for a 60-day supply of ecclesiastical items. In addition, the division chaplain maintained a 30-day supply at division headquarters. Consequently, the 82d moved forward with a 90-day supply of ecclesiastical items. Chaplain William Hufham recalled that the desert boots like those issued to most divisions never arrived in the 82d Airborne. Likewise, the chaplains never saw a tape player. To a large measure, the other equipment needed for religious support, mostly chaplain kits and resupply kits, were readily available.

The convoy of the 82d Airborne Division was characterized as "three days of misery." The 82d moved 600 miles at 30 mph. The route went from Dhahran to Riyadh somewhat southwest and then north toward King Khalid Military City. The ultimate destination for the 82d Airborne would be the vicinity of Rafha. The combat convoy carrying troops of the 82d Airborne could not take all of the soldiers. Some of them flew up to King Khalid Military City on Army aircraft. Those who were in the convoy would pull off from time to time and sleep until they finally arrived, on the 1st of February, at their objective—approximately eight miles from the border of Iraq.

Directly before them was the escarpment that marked the border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The escarpment was a large cliff or berm of sand rising at times 100 feet above the level of the ground on the Saudi Arabian side. The 82d set up its tents in the area of Rafha and waited for further orders. Although the Iraqis did not have an air threat of concern to the 82d Airborne soldiers, the division was within artillery range of Iraqi guns.

Chaplain Hufham remembered that one important morale factor for the soldiers was the receipt of Any Soldier mail. Sometimes soldiers would get 20 to 30 pieces of mail a day and many, including the chaplains, tried to answer as much of it as possible. The soldiers really felt the prayerful support of the American people which was very important to them as they waited for orders either to attack or to withdraw.

As the various divisions began to line up along the southern Iraqi border, the traffic was so intense that the Tap Line road began to be a death tap for many vehicles and soldiers. Indeed, there were more soldiers injured and killed in automobile and truck accidents moving into position along the main highway than were lost in direct combat action in the subsequent fighting. Incredibly, even with the long lines of deuce-and-a-half trucks, leased Saudi buses, and various tactical vehicles, the roads were not closed to normal Saudi Arabian civilian traffic. Consequently, traffic jams were frequent and accidents expected. Chaplain David Zalis recalled stopping on numerous occasions to give first aid to soldiers who were injured in traffic accidents. Likewise, there were several heart attack casualties suffered by drivers who were simply fatigued beyond physical endurance. Chaplain Robert Branson and Chaplain Carroll Hutcheson ministered daily to the drivers of the 7th Transportation Group without whose efforts the tons of war materiel would never have reached the necessary logistical bases.

In a sense, General Schwarzkopf's overall plan resembled the lineup of a football team. On the right wing, facing Iraq, was the 2nd Marine Division reinforced with the 1st (Tiger) Brigade, 2nd
Armored Division, the Egyptian Division, the British Armored Division and the American VII Corps. On the left side of the line to help execute the Great Wheel or, as General Schwarzkopf called it later, the "Hail Mary" play, was the XVIII Airborne Corps and the French 6th Light Armored Division.

The concept of operations by the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander, General Luck, included a strike with helicopter-borne air assault forces from the 101st Airborne Division deep into the Euphrates River Valley.\(^46\) Then, the 24th Infantry Division's heavy armor would follow to sever Highway 8, nearly 200 kilometers deep into Iraq. The Corps faced relatively weak forces consisting primarily of infantry units scattered over hundreds of miles of open desert. General Luck would accept some risk with a bold thrust of the 101st Airborne northward to secure Highway 8 as quickly as possible. Once astride the highway, the 101st would have to hold on long enough for the 24th Infantry Division to link up and completely shut off any possibility of Iraqi escape.\(^47\)

Each of General Luck's divisions had its own separate mission and independent axis of attack.\(^48\) The French 6th Light Armored Division, reinforced with the 2nd Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, was the Corps' initial main effort. The 6th would launch a lightning attack up the hard surface road that ran from the border to the town of al-Salman. After securing the town and a nearby fighter base, the French would screen to the west while the rest of the Corps advanced. The 101st was to launch the largest air assault attack in history deep into Iraq to get astride Highway 8. The 24th Infantry Division would follow the 101st on the ground with the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment on their right screening the boundary with VII Corps. The 24th would become the Corps' point division when it broke into the Euphrates River Valley.

The concept of operations by the VII Corps Commander was for the 1st Infantry Division to conduct the breach of Iraqi defenses in a deliberate, carefully rehearsed, and heavily supported attack.\(^49\) Originally, the entire Corps was supposed to pass through the lanes opened by the "Big Red One." But, by the start of air operations, the Iraqis had failed to extend their defenses to the west of the breach lanes, leaving that area relatively undefended. General Franks, in a move that showed great flexibility, decided to modify his plan by slipping the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions around to the west of the breach. He kept the brunt of his initial attack concentrated on exploiting the 1st Infantry division's breach of the Iraqi 26th and 48th Infantry Divisions' lines. Once the breach was complete, the British 1st Armored Division would thrust through the openings and turn sharply east to destroy the waiting second-echelon forces and disrupt any Iraqi plan to spring a two-division armored ambush against the right flank of the VII Corps.

As the Coalition forces were moving into their attack positions, Saddam Hussein concluded that he had little choice but to trigger the ground war rather than wait to be attacked. He took a rare military initiative by ordering a limited ground encounter in Saudi Arabia. Such a move entailed grave risks, but the potential advantages were compelling. He would have seized the initiative from the allies, at least temporarily, giving the morale of his battered troops in Kuwait a much needed boost; and it might even create a momentum that would suck the reluctant Coalition into a ground offensive. Saddam also apparently thought that the capture of many Coalition prisoners would damage Western morale. If he had picked his spot better, attacked at greater strength and executed the attack more effectively, a serious disruption could have been caused to Coalition plans.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Saddam's attack was targeted on the Saudi border town of Khafji. A small town, some 12 miles from the border with Kuwait, Khafji had been evacuated early in the conflict because of its vulnerability to Iraqi artillery. The fact that it was abandoned by its people and only lightly defended by Saudi and Qatari troops was advertised by the Western media. There is some evidence that the Iraqi attack had been under preparation for a week before it occurred. On the night of 29 January, there was an attack without any early Coalition detection. An Iraqi force comprising two armored battalions and one mechanized battalion from one of the better Iraqi army divisions, the 5th Mechanized, crossed the Kuwaiti border in the southeast and headed in the direction of Khafji. At the same time, an armada of 17 fast patrol boats, carrying landing parties, began to move down the Kuwaiti coast. Behind them three mechanized divisions with some 240 tanks and 60,000 soldiers were massing near Basra to follow through.

The Iraqi patrol boats were detected by British Jaguars and attacked by Royal Navy helicopters, leaving two patrol boats sunk or damaged and the rest scattered. The central Iraqi armored battalion met a Marine battalion from the 1st Marine Division and suffered badly from helicopter gunship and A-10 aircraft fire. The Iraqis lost 24 tanks and 13 other vehicles. The mechanized battalion also ran into trouble and was attacked from the air, driving it to a hasty withdrawal northward. However, the Americans suffered their first casualties in ground fighting when 11 Marines were killed, seven of them from friendly fire. Moreover, the last Iraqi armored battalion, accompanied by some infantry, did get through in the dark, having a forced a Saudi screening unit to withdraw. Taking the small Saudi garrison by surprise, the Iraqis occupied the town. The next day they tried to bring in two additional battalions but failed as they were attacked by A-10 aircraft. The Iraqi battalion in occupation, now isolated, was bombed by U.S. aircraft, artillery and helicopters, but resisted attempts to dislodge them for nearly two days. One option was to leave them in the town, which was of no strategic significance. They could not have been reinforced. However, this would have given Iraq a psychological victory and also have left some U.S. Marines, who had been on a reconnaissance mission, alone in the town. Consequently, an Arab force, composed of Saudis, Qataris, and Pakistanis, was sent in to retake Khafji.

Early in the morning of 31 January, the counterattack began. Khafji was initially held, but the attacking Coalition force pushed in with intensive fighting. It took another two days to clear up all the remnants of the Iraqi units. The Iraqi losses in men and equipment were high, amounting to dozens of dead and hundreds of prisoners. The Coalition Arabs lost 19 killed and 36 wounded.

One of the observers at the battle of Khafji was Chaplain David Zalis, the senior Jewish chaplain in Saudi Arabia. Chaplain Zalis and his assistant, Sergeant Martin Cuellar, had been visiting troops in the area when the fighting broke out. From the top of a hill overlooking the town, Chaplain Zalis and Sergeant Cuellar observed the activity through binoculars.

Both the Iraqis and the Coalition forces quickly claimed victory for the first significant ground encounter of the war. The Iraqis described their action as "a lightning strike into the kingdom of evil." They argued that it had been planned by Saddam, personally, together with the Revolutionary Command Council and the military leadership, and that the Iraqi President had visited his troops in Basra a couple of days prior to the battle to personally issue the command for the attack.
The Coalition, for its part, played down the significance of the battle. General Schwarzkopf said that it was "About as significant as a mosquito on an elephant. I can afford that kind of swap all day." In fact, only twenty per cent of the Iraqi troops were able to return to Kuwait after the battle.

The battle of Khafji showed the vulnerability of the Iraqi Army to air attacks.\(^{51}\) In fact, in the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations, which included Kuwait plus the adjacent area of Iraq up to the Euphrates, Coalition air attacks were constant. Iraqi armor and artillery were reduced by 50 percent overall, and the artillery by 90 percent in those areas where Coalition forces were expected to breach Iraqi defenses. In addition, Iraqi command and control and intelligence capabilities were largely eliminated and logistics severely restricted.

By way of achieving these objectives, bombardment of the Republican Guard began on the first day of the war. It was discussed in the media in terms of "carpet bombing," in contrast to "surgical strikes." Neither term was much used by the professional military. General Schwarzkopf rejected the term "carpet bombing" which tends to portray something totally indiscriminate without regard to the target. He claimed that the allied campaign was much more careful in its organization and choice of weapons. Moreover, the Republican Guards did not really present themselves as a carpet. This estimated 150,000-strong force was dug in over an area of 4,500 square miles in generally sandy terrain. In all, 5,600 sorties were mounted against the Republican Guard, out of 35,000 total sorties directed against the Iraqi Army.

For three weeks, the Coalition forces remained in their assembly areas, prepared to attack on order. By the second week in February, the commanders in Riyadh knew that a Coalition ground attack would occur within seven days. Chaplain Gay Hatler made a trip throughout the Coalition positions in Saudi Arabia to visit as many corps, division and battalion chaplains as possible before the ground war started. All of the hospitals from the Iraqi border to Bahrain were fully staffed with chaplains and all had Catholic coverage. If Saddam Hussein fired chemical or biological shells at the advancing Coalition forces, the best estimates anticipated 30 percent casualties for the attacking force. Some 100,000 body bags were already positioned in Saudi Arabia and 40,000 coffins were stockpiled at Fort Eustis, Virginia, for shipment to Saudi Arabia. Most commanders took the casualty estimates quite seriously.

From the 101st Airborne Division to the VII Corps to ARCENT Headquarters at Riyadh, during this tense time of waiting chaplains and chaplain assistants visited soldiers in every possible location to calm their fears and, if possible, increase their faith. In the 1st Cavalry Division some soldiers had traveled by vehicle to the air base at Dhahran where they were baptized by Chaplain George Garner in the Air Force swimming pool.\(^{52}\) Others more frequently were baptized in the desert in makeshift baptistries. Chaplains had to be very careful where baptismal services were held so they did not draw the attention of the local Arabs or offend any of the Muslim people. Most of the time engineer units or units with earth moving equipment would dig a trench or a small pit in the sand and then line it with plastic or rubber from fuel bladders. These "pools" would then be filled with water and the chaplains would baptize as many soldiers as requested the sacrament.

As the units waited in the desert to see what the future would bring, chaplains and chaplain assistants continued their normal ministries. One chaplain who used his unique talents to focus on

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
ministry in his unit was Chaplain Herb Kitchens, the division chaplain for the 101st Airborne Division. Early in February 1991, shortly after the air war began, Chaplain Kitchens wrote a song entitled, "The Night the Eagles Screamed." The song concerned the initial attack of the air war during the early morning hours of 17 January. Apache helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division had fired the first shots of the air war. Military strategists decided they had to eliminate Iraq's radar sites before the allied aircraft could start their bombing. They gave the mission to Lieutenant Colonel Dick Cody, the Commander of the First Battalion, 101st Aviation Brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Cody and his brave pilots crossed the Iraqi border, located Saddam Hussein's strategic radar sites and destroyed them using their deadly Hell Fire missiles. Thereby they opened an air corridor to Baghdad and insured the safety of the allied pilots.

Following completion of the mission, Chaplain Kitchens interviewed Lieutenant Colonel Cody. Cody told him that as he was flying back out of Iraq, he looked up through the windshield of his cockpit and saw more than 100 fighter bombers streaking across the sky on their way to Baghdad. Chaplain Kitchens wrote the song in his tent and made a copy of it on a cassette recorder. He took the recorder to the Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division, Major General J. H. Binford Peay, III, and played the song for him in his tent.

General Peay liked the song and suggested Chaplain Kitchens get someone in the United States to record it. Eventually, the Cable News Network picked up the song and played it several times. An ABC affiliate, Channel 7 in Little Rock, Arkansas, aired the song and then interviewed Chaplain Kitchens' parents in Benton, Arkansas. Finally, a television station in Nashville, Tennessee, aired it. Then the manager went to Chaplain Kitchens' home in Clarksville, Tennessee, near Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and interviewed Mrs. Kitchens and their children. The song Chaplain Kitchens wrote has two stanzas:

On January 17, Cody got the word,
Loaded up his hell fires and mounted up his bird.
He lifted off into the night and headed for Iraq.
They should have known the 101st wouldn't cut 'em any slack.

A hundred birds in Air Force blue were calmly hangin' high.
Apaches of the 101st were clearin' out the sky.
America had drawn the line and set the final date.
When the Eagle screamed and crossed that line, it sealed ol' Hussein's fate.

Chaplain Kitchens' song helped bolster the morale of thousands of soldiers and illustrated some of the many talents that chaplains brought to bear in their varied ministries.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
G-Day

By the third week in February the major units of the Coalition were in place in anticipation for a ground attack. Very quietly and secretly, the word was spread around ARCENT Headquarters that the proposed ground attack day, known as G-Day, would be on 24 February 1991. Not many people needed to know this information in advance, but the senior officers had to be aware of the date in order to make their last minute plans. Chaplain Gay Hatler, the ARCENT Chaplain, spent the week before the attack with his chaplain assistant, SFC Ed Parton, visiting his corps chaplains and other units along Tap Line Road on the northern border of Saudi Arabia. From west to east the French forces were positioned in the far west with the XVIII Airborne Corps on their right flank. The VII Corps was in the center of the line with the multi-Arab forces, the 2nd Marine Division, and the Tiger Brigade from the 2nd Armored Division to the east. The 1st Marine Division extended the front to the coast. The mood was expectant along the line. Chaplain Dan Davis, the VII Corps Chaplain, recalled that his commander estimated the possibility of 6,000 American casualties in the first two days of fighting. Chaplain Herb Kitchens was told in the 101st Airborne Division briefing to assume 30% casualties in the division. Obviously if there were to be heavy casualties among the soldiers, one would anticipate casualties also among the chaplains and chaplain assistants, positioned, as they were, as far forward as possible.

One of the concerns the senior chaplains had in both the VII Corps and the XVIII Airborne Corps was to reinforce morale and commitment among the unit ministry teams—some of which might not return. In the XVIII Airborne Corps, Chaplain Bernard Lieving sponsored a worship service which was called the "Blessing of the UMTs." The service was conducted by the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery Chaplain, Robert Jenkins. The Commanding General and the Command Sergeant Major attended. During the worship service the passages of scripture and message focused on the importance of facing life and death. Chaplain Jenkins reminded the unit ministry teams that "God is with us in both life and death and that in the inhumanity of war we still do not have to lose our humanity." Later Sgt. Major Tillman Hatcher, the senior chaplain assistant in the XVIII Airborne Corps, recalled that it was an exceptionally moving service for all of the chaplains and chaplain assistants who were able to attend.

Most of the division chaplains likewise conducted services for their unit ministry teams or had prayer together with them. Chaplain Herb Kitchens in the 101st Airborne Division recalled that he had prayer with all of his brigade chaplains and chaplain assistants before the ground war actually began. As in the case of the Corps services, the divisional services were likewise meaningful in sharing concerns, faith, and commitment to the religious support of soldiers in danger.

Chaplain Dan Davis, the VII Corps chaplain, and his chaplain assistant, SGM Ronald M. Bowren, visited every chaplain in the Corps prior to the ground war. Chaplain Davis likewise spent time with the major commanders so that they too would have the assurance of spiritual support. Chaplain Davis recorded:

Believing that I should provide ministry to my commanding general and speak to needs where possible, I brought the matter in prayer to God. God laid it on my heart.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
that he had anointed the VII Corps Commanding General for the great task to which they were called and that the corps was an instrument of God's righteousness. On one night while walking under the Saudi Arabian starry skies, I told my commanding general, Lieutenant General Franks, that God had revealed to my heart that he was anointed to lead the VII Corps in battle and that the forces he commanded would be an instrument of God's righteousness. I am not sure that my commander had ever been told such things before but he seemed deeply moved and indicated his sincere appreciation.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

Just a few days before the ground war started, Chaplain Davis visited with Major General Ronald Griffith in the 1st Armored Division. General Griffith told Chaplain Davis he anticipated a loss of not less than 2,000 soldiers and dreaded having to tell the families waiting in Germany that their husbands and fathers and mothers would not return to them. Again, Chaplain Davis took this concern to God in sincere prayer. Chaplain Davis said that God spoke to his heart and assured him there would be "victory without great casualties."\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} Chaplain Davis communicated this to General Griffith before the attack began. General Griffith, as was the case with so many commanders, appreciated the personal care and concern of chaplains who constantly prayed for his soldiers.

At ARCENT Headquarters in Riyadh, the ARCENT chaplain staff was very busy. There was a last minute rush to be sure that every field hospital had Catholic coverage. This was the desire of the Chief of Chaplains as well as the CENTCOM and ARCENT chaplains. Even though there were more than 60 priests in the theater at the time, some covered as many as three units including hospital units, graves registration units and mortuary units. Before the ground war started, however, every hospital had at least a priest close enough to render pastoral support in the event that heavy casualties did occur.

The basic strategy for the attack of the 24th of February was to have elements of the 1st Marine Division feint an amphibious landing in Kuwait. The 2nd Marine, the 1st Infantry Division and the British Armored Division would open breaches in the Iraqi line, in order for the more heavily armored Tiger Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division and the two Armored Divisions from Germany to pass through. In the west, the XVIII Airborne Corps was to conduct what Chaplain Ford G'Segner, the division chaplain of the 24th Infantry Division, called the "world's largest cavalry charge."\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} The units which had to breach the Iraqi defenses were usually preceded by an artillery preparation and tanks or other vehicles with bull dozer blades which simply pushed aside obstacles and opened avenues of approach. In some cases there were roads already available; but in front of the 82nd Airborne Division there was an escarpment of sand, in places 100 feet high, marking a difference in elevation between the Saudi Arabian border and the Iraqi border.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.} Chaplain Jere Kimmell, the Tiger Brigade Chaplain, reported that his troops characterized their part of the initial feint as a "sitting duck" attack to divert the attention of the Iraqi ground commanders.

Some chaplains were already in Iraq before the actual attack began. On February 23rd Chaplain James Ritchie of the 5th Special Forces Group prepared his medical kit and his chaplain kit for transport into Iraq. Chaplain Ritchie, whose base was at King Khalid Military City, was a medic as well as a chaplain. He left at 0230 hours on the morning of February 24th in order to join this
Special Forces troops in the Iraqi desert. Although much of Special Forces doctrine was classified, many of the Special Forces soldiers had been in Iraq for some time. Their mission was to report on enemy movements and to rescue, if possible, pilots who were shot down or otherwise forced to land in hostile territory. The 5th Special Forces Group was one of the most highly decorated units in the United States Army and Chaplain Ritchie said that he was proud to be their chaplain.

On the 24th of February Chaplain Ritchie recalled the following activities:

The ground forces moved into position and so did we at the 5th Special Forces Group. I was with the 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces. We were moving with the Egyptian Corps, which had the main effort in our area. I moved north with B Company across the berm and mine field. I saw a tank battle unfold to my right flank. The site was indescribable. Fire, flame, smoke and loud explosions erupted all along the horizon. I remember saying to myself, 'God be with us.' And he was with us. The war moved fast. I was up visiting the team with the forward Egyptian forces. They were in behind a large berm and the Rangers were still clearing the objective. Standing at the base of the berm a team member and I walked up it. Moments after I reached the top, I heard some familiar sounds passing by and the sand began kicking up around my feet. It was incoming rifle fire, a near miss for me.

The enemy POWs filled the road south. I was with four soldiers in a HMMWV moving toward an observation post along the Iraqi border looking for more prisoners. As we approached the observation post, I recognized something protruding through the sand. We were in a mind field! The soldiers in the vehicle were all junior to me. There was one cook, two mechanics and one from an armored unit. I was the only officer. I was the only one who saw what had happened. I made the driver stop and explained to the soldiers that we were in a mine field. I wouldn't let anyone out of the vehicle. I slowly got out and using a bayonet in the sand, I cleared a path around to the front of the vehicle. After checking all of the tires and the ground in front I cleared a path out of the mine field. It was another near miss.

The coordinated attack along the Iraqi border began at 0400 on G-Day, February 24th. Two artillerymen hundreds of miles apart pulled the lanyards on their howitzers to begin the Desert Storm ground attack. Across the Coalition front 620,000 soldiers, Marines and airmen from more than 37 nations attacked an Iraqi force then estimated at 545,000. Off shore in the Gulf, Marine amphibious forces threatened a seaborne landing as the Arab forces in the east attacked up the Kuwait City Highway. On their western flank Lieutenant General Walt Boomer's 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions crossed the border to breach Fortress Kuwait. The Tiger Brigade from the 2nd Armored Division, with its newly issued M1-A1 tanks, provided the Sunday punch for the more lightly equipped Marines. Once the Marines cleared a lane through the Iraqi defenses, the Tiger Brigade took on Saddam's Armored Reserves.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Farther west, the VII Corps' 1st Infantry Division attacked the Iraqi security zone to clear out forward reconnaissance elements and artillery observation posts in preparation for the next day's attack against the main line of resistance. On the extreme western flank, almost 400 kilometers from the coast, the XVIII Airborne Corps attacked northward to seal off the theater. General Schwarzkopf said later that his worst nightmare would be to have three divisions of Coalition troops halted along the 138 miles of fire trenches, bunkers, and mine fields the enemy had prepared while Iraqi artillery fired chemical munitions on top of them.

The primary Iraqi ground targets which had the greatest "ripple effect" on Iraq's war effort were the Republican Guards divisions with a total of 96,000 troops. These units constituted what General Schwarzkopf called, in Clausewitzian terms, the enemy's "center of gravity." The ultimate objective of the ground war in the third week in February was not, of course, merely the Republican Guard divisions. The objective was to neutralize all 42 of Iraq's 60 divisions in the Kuwait theater of operations and to force the complete enemy withdrawal from Kuwait.

Over the Top

On the far western flank of the Coalition line, early in the morning of the 24th of February, the French 6th Light Armored Division pushed north along a paved road called Main Supply Route Texas with two brigades abreast. The 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division followed in trucks to assist the French in rapidly clearing the road. The French-led force moved quickly toward as-Salman in the Euphrates River Valley. Because the asphalt road provided the only high speed route available to transport supplies, seizing it was critical to the XVIII Airborne Corps' plan. Chaplains in the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division—Chaplain Lawrence Krause, Chaplain Jeff Houston, Chaplain Thomas Solhjem and Chaplain David George—traveled in convoy with their troops. They were joined by Chaplain Donald Rutherford who was the first Catholic chaplain to cross into Iraq. Chaplain Rutherford had been on duty in the Army less than a week when he was assigned to the 82d Airborne Division and deployed to Operation Desert Storm.

The French 6th Light Armored Division and the 82d Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade knew that part of the Iraqi 45th Infantry Division waited for them 50 kilometers into Iraq. At 1100 hours on the 24th of February the French commander, Brigadier General Bernard Janvier, requested artillery fire from the American 18th Field Artillery Brigade. Under artillery and attack helicopter fire, the Iraqis quickly surrendered. Meanwhile the 82d's Second Brigade moved up and helped clear the objective. The next goal for the French and American Task Force was the town of as-Salman and the airfield north of it. At 1410 hours on the afternoon of February 24th, the Sixth French Division and the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division attacked the Iraqis near the town, following another massive preparation from the XVIII Field Artillery Brigade. By 1800 hours as-Salman and the airfield were surrounded. Mounted on trucks, the 82d Airborne Division's 1st Brigade was prepared to clear any pockets of resistance to the south that the lead corps' forces had bypassed as they attacked farther north.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
The attack by the French 6th Armored Division and the 82d Airborne Division had been so rapid that many Iraqi soldiers had been bypassed in their bunkers along Main Supply Route Texas. In the 2d Brigade convoy following the attack, Chaplain Tom Solhjem and his assistant, Specialist Pheron Brown, were looking for bunkers which had been abandoned by Iraqi soldiers. During one of their halts, Chaplain Solhjem dismounted from his vehicle and walked to the top of a sandy berm. Approximately 50 meters in front of him he saw a bunker with some Iraqis sitting around it gesturing toward him. He thought there were at least two machine guns trained on him at that time. Chaplain Solhjem was unarmed except for a knife which he used to open his meal rations. He realized that there was only one possible course of action: he would have to walk over to the Iraqis, completely exposed to their fire, and advise them to surrender. Chaplain Solhjem walked to the bunker and asked if there were any Iraqi soldiers inside who spoke English. By this time there were approximately 25 Iraqi soldiers with their weapons in his line of sight. One soldier came forward and identified himself as an English speaker. Chaplain Solhjem told him that he was a chaplain in the American Army, which to them meant that he was a holy Imam, the Muslim title for a religious teacher. Chaplain Solhjem told the Iraqis that there were many American soldiers on the other side of the berm who would kill them if they did not surrender. As it happened, the Iraqi who was speaking with him not only knew English, but had studied briefly at a branch of the University of Minnesota near Chaplain Solhjem's seminary in the United States. Chaplain Solhjem was able to convince him to direct the other Iraqi soldiers to surrender in order to save lives. After a good deal of sitting and pointing and conversations in their own language, the Iraqi soldiers began to file out of the bunker.

In the meantime, Chaplain Solhjem's absence was noticed in the convoy, and a platoon sergeant came over the berm and saw him with the Iraqis. He shouted for Chaplain Solhjem to come back, but by that time Chaplain Solhjem had the attention of the Iraqi soldiers. By the time they all filed out and turned over their weapons, Chaplain Solhjem had personally captured 80 Iraqi soldiers—all armed and all with ammunition. He brought the soldiers back to the convoy and turned them over to the Military Police who, in turn, searched and fed them and prepared them for evacuation back to Saudi Arabia. Chaplain Solhjem regarded this incident as somewhat miraculous in that he was able to locate an Iraqi soldier who had actually studied not only in his home state but also in English which immediately established a common ground of understanding.\(^{58}\) Chaplain Solhjem's act of courage was soon repeated by other chaplains and chaplain assistants in Iraq and Kuwait.

While the attack by the French and 82d Airborne troops developed on the western flank, in a valley 6 kilometers south of the Iraqi border more than 200 helicopters, almost 1,000 vehicles, and more than 6,000 soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division waited. General Peay had assembled the largest air armada the United States had ever committed to a single air assault operation. With a forward operating base 100 kilometers inside Iraq for his Apache attack helicopters as his objective, Peay was determined to be the first of General Luck's commanders to reach Highway 8.

The air assault was to begin at 0600, but an early morning fog drifted across the desert, delaying the attack for about an hour. The chaplains in the 101st Airborne Division had been

\(^{58}\) See endnotes at end of chapter.
practicing for weeks for an airmobile operation. Every chaplain and chaplain assistant knew which helicopter they were to enter and which seat they were to occupy. There was a good deal of prayer with the infantry brigades before the operation began. The soldiers of the 101st had been trained to fly into enemy territory, and upon landing immediately to fan out in a circle around the helicopter seeking such cover as might be available. Chaplain Carlton Harper, chaplain of the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, happened to be the first soldier at the door in his helicopter. As the armada took off during a break in the fog, Chaplain Harper wondered how he could fan out with the rest of the troops when he was unarmed. But given his position in the door of the helicopter, he really had no choice. When the helicopter landed in the desert, the first soldier out the door was Chaplain Harper. Since he was armed with only a chaplain kit, and since the desert floor was completely flat, Chaplain Harper ran forward the prescribed distance and then hit the sand using his chaplain kit as his cover!

The airmobile operation was so well timed, however, that within two minutes after the infantry hit the ground the first contingent of the 101st supply units began establishing refueling points for the Apache helicopters. The brigade had staked out a 15-mile diameter circle of desert just south of the east-west road to as-Salman which would be secured later that day by the French and 82d Airborne Division soldiers.

But the claim on the landing zone by the 101st was tenuous. Colonel Tom Hill, the 1st Brigade Commander, had only a portion of four Infantry Battalions on the ground and the weather was not promising. Two more trips were required to insert the remainder of the brigade. Colonel Hill had to make the area secure for the Division's attack helicopters by clearing out a few nearby Iraqi positions.

Shortly before 10:00 Captain John Russell of the 1/327th Infantry noticed Cobra attack helicopters from the aviation section firing on a ridge 2 kilometers to the north. The Cobras had located an Iraqi infantry unit dug in along the east-west road. Captain Russell contacted the Cobra company commander who landed next to him to confer on tactics and to confirm friendly locations. After some discussion, Air Force A-10s arrived and in concert with the Cobras and artillery bombarded the enemy positions. After a few convincing doses of firepower, the Iraqis caved in. Before long, Captain Russell's men had control of the position and had taken 340 prisoners.

As part of his coordinated plan, General Schwarzkopf's decision to attack early on February 24 affected the VII Corps more than any other unit because they had to move faster and farther to get into attack position. Since the breaching operation was very complex and time dependent, any change in schedule, however small, would put considerable strain on those responsible for coordinating the overall effort. The command intent was to strike quickly and finish the enemy rapidly. The acceleration of the attack time tables supported that intent. Indeed, Colonel Holder's 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment was already positioned 10 kilometers deep into Iraq, ready to continue the advance. Administrative complications did arise but subordinates used their initiative to solve those problems. By 2:30 in the afternoon on February 24th the VII Corps was on the march. Colonel Holder's 2d ACR would be the VII Corps' lead scout unit.

General Franks' mission to the regiment was two-fold: to clear the zone in front of the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions and, most importantly, to discover the exact outline of the Republican Guard's

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
main line of defense so that the two following armored divisions could aim directly toward it. For
the most part, only the Republican Guard possessed T-72 tanks, which meant that Colonel Holder
would be able to pinpoint the center of gravity for the entire operation when his squadrons began to
report engagements with T-72s.

Chaplain O. Wayne Smith, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regimental Chaplain, was well trained
for this important mission. Chaplain Smith had done extensive work at the US Army Chaplain Center
and School on AirLand Battle doctrine. In particular, Chaplain Smith had examined the light infantry
force and the religious support necessary for such operations. Chaplain Smith never dreamed when
he was at the Chaplain School, however, that one day his unit would be the point scout team for one
of the largest armored conflicts since World War II.

At dawn on February 24th, the 2d ACR already was positioned over the berm,
arrayed across a 40-kilometer front. The VII Corps screen would begin with a thin
line of Bradleys and aerial flights of Cobra helicopters from the 4th Squadron which
began to move forward at 1430 hours. To be absolutely sure that he would not be
surprised or out-matched by the Iraqis in his path, Colonel Holder established a
remarkably effective distant aerial screen using Air Force A-10s. The lead scouts
from the 4th Squadron would turn up targets and immediately request fighter bombers
to engage following a drill the regiment had worked out in training. Iraqis in the path
of the regiment found themselves continually under devastating fire, first from aerial
and ground scouts, then from the Air Force A-10s, and back again to the scouts.
Once across the line of departure, the regiment moved swiftly, cutting a 40-kilometer
path for the division behind to follow. Within two hours the lead squadrons were
40-kilometers deep and swamped by hundreds of enemy prisoners. Resistance was
light, although some of the lead troops fought fleeing engagements with Iraqi T-55
tanks throughout the rest of the day.

Chaplain Wayne Smith recalled:

"Early on the morning of 24 February 1991 all our unit ministry teams crossed the
berm with their respective units. Most of them were with their combat trains
elements, a couple went with their tactical operations center (TOC). Staff Sergeant
Kevin Jones and I positioned ourselves with the regimental clearing station which was
part of the Support Squadron. Since the Squadron Chaplain, Mitch Wilk, was Roman
Catholic, this provided a solid religious coverage plan for the several thousand active,
Reserve and National Guard personnel in the element, as well as for any casualties we
might sustain. All the UMTs were highly trained and well prepared for the operation.
I could not have asked for a better group of soldiers. All of us had had time to come
to grips with our situation; the possibility of mass casualties, the very distinct
possibility that we might not survive the battle, and that our place was with our
soldiers, to encourage, to support, and sustain. Since I had made daily contact with

See endnotes at end of chapter.
each of them (even though at times they were more than thirty miles apart) during the
air campaign, I knew they would all be able to provide the kind of ministry their units
needed and deserved. Being with the 2d ACR was like riding a fast horse. You just
climb on and hang on. As the ground war progressed, it became clear that we were
not going to sustain casualties in the numbers predicted. After two days at the
clearing station, Jones and I joined the Regimental TOC. Colonel Don Holder was
the kind of commander I would always want for a combat unit. He was extremely
knowledgeable of armor and cavalry tactics, a dedicated man of God, and always
seemed to bring out the best in his subordinate leaders. He gave me at least as much
inspiration as I gave him. It was interesting that at no time during the entire operation
was I ever afraid. A little anxious a couple times. Once, during the heat of the
shooting war, I had to locate one of my squadron chaplains and deliver him an
emergency message. As I was driving across the Iraqi desert, watching for the enemy
and for unexploded ordnance, with Staff Sergeant Jones operating his M16 and the
lensatic compass, we realized just how vulnerable we were. God is good. Obviously,
we made it safely. Some of the best ministry in my entire career took place in the
desert before, during and after the war. It was an opportunity I would not have
missed for anything.77

When the 1st Infantry Division received the call to move up to the attack, General Rhame had
already eliminated the Iraqi border outpost.78 Earlier in the morning of February 24th he had blinded
the enemy along his breach area by seizing the security zone of the Iraqi 26th and 48th Infantry
Divisions. Each battalion task force in the division, spread across a six-kilometer front, attacked
north at about 5:30 in the morning. The 1st and 2d Brigades led their respective battalions into the
security zone through 20 holes that division engineers had cut in the sandy berm. Bradley machine
gunners fired at any Iraqis who refused to surrender. Under the cover of suppressive fire, American
tanks then rolled forward to collapse remaining positions with plows. Watching their comrades die
in ever increasing numbers as the morning wore on, Iraqi soldiers in the security zone simply threw
up their hands and surrendered.

Soldiers in the assault battalions of the 1st Infantry Division, the "Big Red 1," composed
themselves for the attack, mindful of projections that 40% of them would be killed or wounded.
Chaplain John Cottingham, the 1st Infantry Division chaplain, and his 20 unit ministry teams had to
be prepared for a "worst case" mass casualty situation. Chaplain Cottingham recalled that "it was the
mission of the 1st Infantry Division to perform breach operations for the VII Corps. The dirt wall
which formed the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia was about 20 feet tall in places. some of
thought that beyond the berm was "No Man's Land."79 Though many soldiers joked that an attack
against trenches was "more of the same" for the Big Red 1, like D-Day in Normandy, they still
wondered who would be left. Those in the plow tanks did not wonder at all; they knew they were
prime targets. General Rhame considered probable casualties and he articulated his intent clearly.
The 1st Division would mass fires and concentrate on a narrow front. Tongue in cheek he told
commanders the idea was to win quickly with "enough of us left to have a reunion. 80
The 1st Infantry Division Artillery computed a firing program and began preparatory fire ahead of the attacking infantry force. The commander of the Iraqi 48th Infantry Division in the path of the Big Red 1 stated later that "the earth shook" as the barrage struck his division. The units from the 1st Infantry Division Artillery fired 11,000 rounds of artillery, dispersing more than 600,000 explosive bomblets into a 20 x 40 kilometer sector. More than 350 howitzers covered the attack with 22 artillery pieces for each kilometer of the attack zone. The gunners blasted enemy positions along the main line of resistance, crushing the Iraqis' morale with fire power. Other artillery struck command and control facilities to deny the Iraqi 7th Corps commander any vestige of control and to eliminate any possibility of responding to General Rhame's attack.

An unmanned aerial vehicle had taken a look that morning and found 13 Iraqi artillery positions that the VII Corps' artillery preparation later totally destroyed. The Iraqi 48th Infantry Division Artillery Group, 100 cannons strong on January 17th, lost 17 guns during the air operation. Following the 30 minute artillery preparation, every remaining artillery piece was destroyed.

The division planned for deep artillery fire to continue throughout the course of the attack while the armor was closing on the forward Iraqi trenches with tank guns firing and plows down. The 1st Infantry Division's troops believed they would win. Before the epic artillery bombardment ran its course, the division added its own contribution of mortar, tank cannon and 25 millimeter fires. Instead of needing 18 hours to break through Iraqi positions as originally calculated, the 1st Infantry Division successfully breached them in two hours. During the breach operation General Rhame's division had destroyed the better part of two Iraqi divisions. The British 1st Armored Division began passing through the breaches created by the 1st Infantry Division at noon on February 25th.

Fire in the Sandbox

I walked the quarter mile or so to where the first soldier lay. I did remember to walk in the tracks of vehicles since this was a potential mine field. As I arrived they were loading him into the medic track. I still remember the look of desperation as he saw me, reached out for me and said: "Ride with me, sir!" Grabbing the plastic bag of IV fluid I climbed into the M113 with my soldier. The sight of his leg blown off at the upper thigh made me want to climb out of the hatch. I prayed for strength to minister to this wounded brother and did what I could to touch his spirit and help the medics while the Doc worked.

That soldier's cry of desperation, the words, "Ride with me, sir!" teach me again that the essence of ministry is being there for people in need. And that cry also goes with me, as I ask the Father to "Ride with me, Sir!"

Chaplain (Capt.) David M. Brown
Battalion Chaplain
HHC, 1/5 Cavalry

On the far eastern flank of the Coalition line Colonel John Sylvester was waiting in the early hours of February 24th with his Tiger Brigade just below the Kuwaiti Border for the word to move. "There is one thing this Brigade does wel l... and that is to move very quickly. I don't think there is

See endnotes at end of chapter.
any unit faster. But right now I just want to get us rolling through the breach," Colonel Sylvester told his staff.82

"The Tiger Battle Team," as Colonel Sylvester called it, had joined the 2d Marine Division at the same time the 1st Cavalry Division rushed to the defense of the Wadi Al Batin. With its tanks and self-propelled artillery, the brigade was now poised to attack north in support of the lightly armored Marines. At 0400 hours the Marines breached the border berms and pushed forward, clearing six narrow lanes through a network of mine fields and trenches. The Tiger Brigade's artillery fired "thousands" of rounds in support. At noon the command post moved through the 30-foot cut in the berm. Ninety minutes later, Infantry Task Force 3-41 crossed in column, buttoned up and wearing chemical suits. Mine plow-equipped tanks led the way, widening the lanes. Within 15 minutes, Task Force 3-41 Infantry cleared the first of two mine fields safely. The others began to move. Seconds later an Abrams tank disappeared in smoke and sand as it struck a heavy mine. The explosion severed the left track, but left the crew unhurt. The crossing continued.

The brigade moved on into the nightmarish dream scape of southern Kuwait. The debris of the air war littered the flat desert: spent bomb casings, unexploded rockets like quills in the sand, wrecked and blackened equipment. Once only distant flashes and rolling thunder, now the war enveloped the brigade. Choked with a pall of at least four dozen burning oil wells, the air was an eerie purple, as if viewed through dark sunglasses.83 Against it the sand almost glowed. It seemed like the fires of hell were burning Kuwait away. Three eternal hours after jumping off, the Tiger Brigade cleared the obstacle belts and continued north into the cauldron. Chaplain Jere Kimmell, the Tiger Brigade chaplain, remembered almost endless mine fields on both sides of the cleared lanes.84 Some vehicles could not pass through and had to be backed to safety. At 1930 hours, a 502nd Military Police Company vehicle struck a mine, killing the driver and wounding the gunner. Across the brigade nerves that had slackened snapped taut again. At 2100 hours the brigade halted for the night. Enemy artillery fired blindly, coming no where near to the Americans. Other enemy soldiers who were ready to quit had better aim; more than 200 found the Tigers and surrendered.

The next morning, February 25th, Colonel Sylvester saw what appeared to be a mirage in the desert:

It was the most amazing thing I've ever seen. At one point I looked up and thought I saw a black picket fence running from one side of the horizon as far to the left as I could see and as far to the right as I could see. It looked like a black picket fence. I had my driver stop and picked up the binoculars and looked. The picket fence was men steadily moving toward us with hands in the air, waving every manner of white rag that you could imagine.85

Chaplain Kimmell helped police up the thousands of prisoners. "One guy surrendered to me in shorts," Chaplain Kimmell recalled. He said "Thank God you've come!" He said he was a school teacher from Chicago who was visiting relatives in Iraq when he was conscripted into the Army. He had been waiting for the Americans for weeks.86
On February 25th, as well, the 1st Cavalry Division began moving west through the 1st Infantry Division's breaches in order to attack north toward the Euphrates River and the Rumaylah Oil Field. In conducting this massed movement, the 1st Cavalry Division was able to refuel by using refueling on the move (ROM) sites set up by the Division Support Command. The ROM site was designed to refuel moving formations without disrupting their momentum. At each of several sites parallel columns of vehicles could pull up, halting with each vehicle along side a fuel point. As each vehicle came to a stop, a crewman vaulted out, grabbed the hose and jammed it into the filler neck. Tank crewmen never touched the ground. Engines stayed running. The whine of 1,500 horsepower Abrams turbines rising above the shouted exchanges of soldiers and the howl of the desert wind created a good deal of noise. An entire company refueled every 15 minutes. Then, with the refuelers cheering them on, the vehicles moved out and another column filed in. In many ways it reminded the soldiers of a pit stop in an automobile race track. In the 1st Cavalry Division the refueling on the move sites pumped 400,000 gallons of fuel into 6,100 vehicles headed for Iraq and the Republican Guard.

On a sea of sand, against the gray of a desert storm on the 27th of February a steel armada moved east. The 1st Cavalry Division armor glided swiftly, extending to the horizon. Somewhere up ahead the enemy waited. Up ahead there was fighting. The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment had hit the Tawalkana Division causing heavy enemy losses. Over the intercoms, rumors of a cease fire swirled. The formations passed the first destroyed positions. A Bradley ventured out to a collapsed bunker, returning with a huddle of dark figures carrying what looked like a white flag. The flying rains stung eyes aching with the lack of sleep. How much longer before contact? The formation glided on. Arriving on the heels of the 1st Armored Division, General Tilelli ordered his units into hasty defensive positions. They had come 300 kilometers in 24 numbing hours. General Tilelli had the order to prepare to continue the attack the next morning—this time against the Republican Guard Hammurabi Division trying to escape to Basrah.

Chaplain Dennis Camp, the 1st Cavalry Division Chaplain, had driven his own vehicle through the lanes in minefields while his assistant, Sergeant 1st Class Al Videtto, scanned the area for security. There was no time for anything but basic necessities. "If anyone had told me I'd go eight days without changing my clothes, I'd have said he was crazy," Chaplain Camp recalled. Yet with the exception of brief convoy halts, the UMI "drove forever." "When we stopped 90 miles from Basra," Chaplain Camp said, "I was never so glad to see the sun." 89

Working out of the Division Tactical Operations Center, a tent with a few telephones, Chaplain Camp kept in constant contact with his forward brigade chaplains. He knew the status of every division UMT almost hourly.

Direct religious support for the division headquarters and for the wounded and dying also took part of the division chaplain's time. When one soldier was brought into the field station with both of his legs blown off, Chaplain Camp held his hand and prayed with him. The medics and doctors kept encouraging the soldier not to give up, but finally he turned to Chaplain Camp and said, "I'm just too tired." Chaplain Camp put his hand on the trooper's shoulder. "It's all right," Camp said. Then the soldier closed his eyes and expired with his chaplain at his side. 90

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) Major Command and Major Subordinate Command Chaplains, Operation DESERT STORM. Chaplain Gay Hatler, ARCENT Chaplain, is second from right. Chaplain Dan Davis, VII Corps Chaplain, is fourth from right. Chaplain Lieving, XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain, is sixth from right. (Bottom) ARCENT Chaplain Assistants. Sergeant Major Mike Kutcher is second from right.
Converting Tanks to Scrap Metal

In the VII Corps main area the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions prepared to cross the line into Iraq and deliver the mailed fist of the Iron Soldiers. At approximately 0630 hours on February 24th, the 19th Engineers began berm-breaching operations. By mid-afternoon more than 250 eight-meter-wide lanes were constructed along the division's 18-kilometer front. Earlier in the day the VII Corps headquarters received word of the unexpected success of offensive operations already under way in the XVIII Airborne Corps sector to the far west and in the U.S. Marines' sector near the coast. The VII Corps commander instructed 1st the Armored Division to be prepared to launch its attack at noon, a full 18 hours ahead of schedule. At noon the Corps further placed the Division on a two-hour alert to initiate the attack. When ordered, the Division crossed its assigned line of departure at 1434 hours with the 1/1 Cavalry in the lead.

In spite of limited visibility caused by an intense sand and dust storm, the 1st Armored Division moved rapidly northward in a narrow front employing a compressed "division wedge" formation. The 3d Armored Division accompanied the 1st on its eastern flank as the main effort of the corps' deep envelopment of Iraqi defenses west of the Wadi Al Batin. The division's support elements, including the 123rd Support Battalion, totaling nearly 1,000 vehicles for tailored logistical support, brought up the rear of the division's battle formation. At 1630 hours the 3d Armored Division in the east reported crossing the 30 East-West grid line, just behind the 1st Armored Division.

With elements of the Iraqi 26th Division believed to be in the vicinity, the General Franks decided to continue the attack the following morning at 0630. Intelligence reports indicated that the Iraqi III Corps commander had ordered his units in Kuwait to begin a withdrawal, the first indication that Iraqi defenses were cracking. At 0206 hours, on February 25th, all units reported refuel operations completed. There was no significant enemy contact during the remainder of the night.

With further reports coming in from corps intelligence indicating that Iraqi resistance was crumbling rapidly in the XVIII Airborne Corps and MARCENT areas, the Division took advantage of this second tactical pause to finalize plans to push through Al Busayyah and exploit its early successes. General Franks executed a rapid turning movement to the east to destroy elements of the elite Republican Guard forces. In its first day of significant enemy contact, the 1st Armored Division destroyed two tanks, nine artillery pieces, 48 trucks, 14 air defense artillery systems and captured 314 prisoners. On February 26th a massive artillery preparation was begun which was followed immediately by a coordinated attack. The 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division attacked in the south, the 2d Brigade in the north and the 3d Brigade followed the 1st Brigade, prepared to exploit any enemy withdrawal. The 1st and 2d Brigades had significant contact with the 26th Iraqi Division elements in and around Al Busayyah but were unable to overcome it rapidly and continued the attack.

Displaying superb tactical agility, the Division shifted its attack formation to three brigades abreast to maximize its firepower and shock effect against the Republican Guard. Air scouts and Cobra attack helicopters stayed on station while air strikes and artillery fire from the corps artillery destroyed 30 of the enemy's tanks. The 3d Brigade of the 1st Armored Division attacked in the south

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
to destroy 22 more tanks and numerous other armored and wheeled support vehicles. By midnight, February 26th, the division had destroyed 112 tanks, 82 armored personnel carriers, two artillery pieces, 94 trucks, two air defense artillery systems and captured another 545 enemy prisoners of war. On the 27th of February, throughout the day, reports arrived from ARCENT Headquarters that 21 Iraqi divisions were already combat ineffective or destroyed and that elements of the 17th, 10th, 6th and 51st Iraqi Divisions were believed to be moving north towards Basrah. BBC news also reported that Kuwait City had been liberated by MARCENT (Marine Central Command) and allied forces with the allies holding over 30,000 enemy prisoners of war. By midday, the 2d Brigade of the 1st Armored Division was fully engaged with the Madinah Division and, in the largest single engagement of the war, destroyed 61 Iraqi T-72/T-55 tanks, 34 armored personnel carriers and five air defense systems in less than one hour. Because there were still significant elements of the Madinah Division nearby, General Griffith intended to continue the attack early on February 28th, stating that he wanted the accompanying artillery preparation "to be the most awesome artillery prep known to man."

In its heaviest day of fighting, the 1st Armored Division's battle damage assessment for February 27th was 186 enemy tanks, 127 armored personnel carriers, 38 artillery pieces, five air defense systems, 118 trucks destroyed and 839 prisoners captured. The 1st Armored Division lost one soldier, a scout from the 4th Battalion, 66th Armor, killed in action during the day's fighting.

During 89 hours of sustained offensive combat operations the 1st Armored Division destroyed a total of 418 enemy tanks, 447 armored personnel carriers, 116 artillery pieces, 1,211 trucks and 110 air defense systems. The Division's operations officer claimed that the 1st Armored Division drove deeper and faster into the enemy's rear area than any other division size force in the Kuwait theater of operations. Along its 259-kilometer march, the 1st Armored Division destroyed brigades, battalions and other elements of 15 Iraqi army divisions and captured 2,234 Iraqi prisoners of war from 17 Iraqi divisions. The total losses to the division were extremely light. One Abrams main battle tank was destroyed, one armored personnel carrier was destroyed, four soldiers were killed and 52 were wounded.

The experience of the 1st Armored Division was not unlike the experience of many other American divisions during Operation Desert Storm. The training, equipment and leadership of the American forces against an enemy already lacking food, water and military intelligence almost guaranteed the victory. During a lull in the fighting Major General Griffith, commanding general of the 1st Armored Division had his helicopter prepared for an overflight of the 1st Armored Division's position. He took the Command Sergeant Major and Chaplain Wayne Lehrer, the division chaplain, with him. While flying over his troops, Major General Griffith noticed a bunker with a white flag protruding from its entrance. He ordered his helicopter to land and, armed with a .45-caliber pistol, General Griffith, the Command Sergeant Major and Chaplain Lehrer approached the bunker. General Griffith ordered the Iraqis inside to surrender and personally accepted 25 Iraqi soldiers as his prisoners. Chaplain Lehrer recalled that the soldiers surrendered as much to the helicopter as they did to General Griffith since all hope of rescue for them was exhausted.

Many of the Iraqis, lacking military intelligence from the air or even from patrols, did not realize the ground war had started until it was too late. One Iraqi commander said that he did not know there were allied forces in his area until a neighboring division commander called him and said

See endnotes at end of chapter.
he had been overrun. Another Iraqi commander said that he had never seen a British Centurion tank until one pulled up to his own bunker. Obviously the control of the air and total intimidation of the Iraqi forces by bombs, artillery fire and the speed of the American and Coalition movement contributed greatly to what the Bible historically called the "spread of confusion among our enemies."

On the afternoon of the 27th of February the 1st Infantry Division, spearheaded by the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was to attack and block the main north-south evacuation routes for the remnants of two retreating Iraqi Republican Guard Divisions along a major four lane highway called the Kuwait City-Basrah Highway. Chaplain Leon Parker and his assistant, Sergeant Leonard Marks, comprised the unit ministry team for the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Chaplain Parker and Sergeant Marks were traveling with the combat trains when, without warning, Abram tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles rolled forward. Chaplain Parker recalled once the battle started there is no time for further preparation, spiritual or military:

I tried to remember if I prayed with everyone among the troops. I knew I had passed out cards with Psalm 91 on them and many Bibles and scripture tracks. As the lead vehicles of the combat trains convoy arrived at the four lane asphalt road, it was already aflame with the burning vehicles destroyed by A and B Troops of the 4th Cavalry.

Chaplain Parker and Sergeant Marks drove up to the combat trains near the highway. It became apparent that there were many tanks still engaging enemy vehicles on the horizon. The operations officer tasked the combat trains personnel to clear enemy bunkers adjacent to the road which were still a threat to the thin skinned trucks in the combat trains themselves. Sergeant Marks had to leave Chaplain Parker in order to help with this duty. Moments later the operations officer notified the medics of wounded prisoners just south of Chaplain Parker's position.

The medics and Chaplain Parker proceeded about 200 meters south. At first there were approximately nine enemy prisoners in need of medical attention, but the medics received another radio message that A and B Troops had captured many more prisoners, some of them wounded, approximately 800 meters north along the road. A doctor was desperately needed. The doctor and Chaplain Parker piled into a utility truck with the remaining medics to follow. Alpha Troop reported that the road was mined, so the S-3 told the doctor and the chaplain to avoid anything that appeared to be pock marks in the asphalt. Of course, under those conditions, with burning and exploding vehicles everywhere, every pot mark in the highway looked like a mine. The highway was littered with trash, burning civilian cars and bodies, like a science fiction movie about the world gone mad.

Chaplain Parker noted that as they approached the collection point, where possibly 300 Iraqi prisoners were behind concertina wire:

The medics were working on 25 wounded soldiers. Instinctively I began to assist the medics while simultaneously praying and anointing the Iraqis. Many of the prisoners were badly hurt and more were arriving every minute. There wasn't anything I could

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) Chaplain Leon L. Parker, second from right with sun glasses; (Bottom) Chaplain Vincent Inghilterra and burning oil wells in Kuwait
do for my soldiers already engaged in combat, so I decided to focus my ministry on the Iraqis. I had a feeling it was going to be a long night. \(^95\)

The field trains and the combat trains began to consolidate near the enemy prisoner of war cage. The Headquarters Troop commander assumed responsibility for the area. He began to set up defensive positions away from the cage on each side of the road which was becoming the center of 1/4th Cav sector. Chaplain Parker remembered the doctor grabbed his sleeve and implored, "Don't you leave, chaplain. You're my moral support." The prisoners kept coming.\(^96\)

After a while more and more prisoners began to flood into the area. At some point a burning enemy tracked vehicle exploded not too far from the prisoners, spewing hot metal in the air. The prisoners and the soldiers ducked as chunks of metal flew over and around them. As they were dodging the metal, Sergeant Marks and others from the combat train convoy brought 25 prisoners they had routed from the bunkers back to the intersection. By 0100 that morning the tiny cavalry aide station had more than 1,200 Iraqi prisoners.

There were several doctors who were taken prisoner from the Iraqi forces who spoke fluent English. The Iraqi doctors assisted the American medical personnel and helped Chaplain Parker minister by interpreting his prayers. Many of the Iraqi prisoners recognized the cross on Chaplain Parker's collar and wanted him to pray for them regardless of the fact that they didn't understand a word he was saying. Some motioned with their hands, many tugged at his collar and some cried. One prisoner with a non-Islamic name would not let go of his hand. He spoke broken English and professed to be a Christian. He lamented repeatedly: "Saddam, Saddam, why, why, for nothing!"

Chaplain Parker noted that periodically he left the treatment area to check on Sergeant Marks, 50 meters away, who had been detailed as the Sergeant of the Guard for the general prisoner population. Sergeant Marks was one of just twenty soldiers who guarded more than 1,200 Iraqi prisoners the entire night. By 0600 in the morning the cavalrmen had captured 2,000 Iraqi soldiers and by 1500 in the afternoon, when the cavalry learned of a cease fire, they had officially taken 2,098 prisoners. It was estimated that the medics had aided, and the chaplain had ministered to, some 450 of those prisoners. Chaplain Parker wrote:

Most soldiers were not mentally prepared for the aftermath. I don't think there is any way to be mentally prepared to recover enemy dead in the final grotesque stages of their agonizing death. As I walked and talked with the soldiers on the recovery detail I continually reflected with them about that night. The soldiers were grateful that they were not being placed in body bags. No cavalrmen were killed or wounded throughout that vicious and lethal night. They experienced first hand something that is very hard to explain. Chalk it up to training or the luck of battle but somewhere in it there was the clear indication of God's providence.\(^97\)

Chaplain Parker received a Bronze Star with V device for valor. His award citation may be representative of the ministry of hundreds of chaplains who worked with American and Iraqi
wounded over the course of the three days and nights of the ground war. Chaplain Parker’s citation reads as follows:

The Bronze Star Medal to Captain Leon L. Parker for heroism in support of ground combat on 27 February 1991, while providing medical and spiritual care to more than 300 prisoners. Chaplain Parker not only consoled the wounded prisoners, but he also assisted the medical platoon in triaging wounded prisoners while his unit was dangerously exposed to attack. While under enemy fire his heroic action and courage were key to the flawless execution of the unit’s mission and the liberation of Kuwait. Chaplain Parker’s unwavering courage and competence are in keeping with the proudest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit upon himself, the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), and the United States Army.98

Sergeant Leonard T. Marks, Jr., likewise was decorated for meritorious valor under fire while participating in independent offensive cavalry operations during Operation Desert Storm. Sergeant Marks dismounted his vehicle, exposed himself to enemy mortar and small arms fire, and assisted in the capture of nine enemy soldiers. His actions in the face of the enemy, like those of Chaplain Parker, reflected distinct credit upon himself, the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and the United States Army.

Certainly there were more heroes among the soldiers and the supporting personnel in Operation Desert Storm than were formally recognized in citations. But among those heroes were hundreds of chaplains and chaplain assistants who went into battle as symbols of the faith and values for which so many American soldiers fought. In fire fights, in fatiguing marches and in the long boredom of desert nights the chaplains and chaplain assistants of Operation Desert Storm drew many accolades from commanders at every echelon for their dedicated and cheerful service.

Certainly with the cease-fire at 0800 on the morning of the 28th of February, after only 100 hours of fighting, the soldiers, the chaplains and indeed all Americans and all Coalition allies, were relieved and happy at such a signal victory. Many chaplains felt that they had seen a victory similar to those described in the Old Testament, wherein God had given confusion an defeat to the enemy and victory to his people. Chaplain David Peterson, the CENTCOM chaplain, noted simply: "God was with us throughout this operation, and it was, as far as I am concerned, a matter of Providence."99

"I will never forget," General Schwarzkopf recalled in an interview later, "when Gary Luck, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, called me on the phone and I said 'what's your report?' He said, 'Well, we've captured 3,200 prisoners so far and they are just streaming in, and we have accomplished all of our objectives, and we are in the Euphrates Valley with the 101st.' I said 'OK, fine.' I was waiting for the other shoe to fall. Then he said 'Now let me tell you about our casualties. We have one wounded in action.' 'My God,' I thought."100

The largest single number of American casualties in one incident occurred ironically not in the desert of Iraq but in a warehouse in Dhahran. A Scud missile warhead impacted on February 25th, the second day of the ground war, on a barracks on Dhahran. Twenty-eight young American soldiers

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were killed and more than 100 wounded. Chaplain Barry Walker, 475th Quarter Master Group, and Chaplain Joseph Wesley Smith, 47th Field Hospital, were among the first chaplains to reach the barracks. Chaplain Vince Inghilterra, the 22nd Support Command chaplain, arrived right behind Chaplain Smith. There were charred bodies all over the place and weeping soldiers who were burned trying to save their comrades. Chaplain Inghilterra called for every available chaplain in Dhahran to assist with the wounded. With tears in his eyes Chaplain Inghilterra recalled that he felt one essential part of his ministry was always to be with those who were dying when they passed over to the next world. There were memorial services all over Saudi Arabia and in the United States, especially in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, where the 14th Quartermaster Detachment, the parent unit of many of the victims, was based. Some of the soldiers, such as Specialist Steven Atherton, had been in Saudi Arabia for less than a week. Michael Mills left a 22-month-old son and his wife who was seven months pregnant. Only one of those soldiers was over 30. Some were not yet 20. One chaplain remembered thinking at the time "there is nothing just or fair about war."

In the Coalition attacks of 24-27 February 1991, both the largest helicopter assault and the largest tank battle in US military history took place. Moving more than 300 miles in four days, the Coalition forces took 84,000 Iraqi prisoners and destroyed more than 3,000 Iraqi tanks, 700 in one day. The record for the most enemy tanks destroyed in one 24-hour period went to Captain Eric Salomonson and 1st Lieutenant John Marks of the 76th Tactical Fighter Squadron who knocked out 23 tanks, almost one per hour, with their missiles and 40 mm guns. On February 25th, the 101st Airborne was on the Euphrates River with 300 helicopters just a bit over 100 miles from Baghdad. Had they been ordered to do so, General Schwarzkopf said, they could have taken Baghdad unopposed, though how long they could have held it against the 18 other Iraqi Divisions north of Baghdad, supported perhaps by 145 combat aircraft across the river in Iran, remains a subject of debate.

Of the U.S. forces involved in combat operations, 146 soldiers and Marines were killed in action, 35 of these by friendly fire. Some 357 were wounded. Approximately 159 died in noncombat deaths. That is a total casualty count of 662 or approximately 2 per 1,000 engaged. Of the Iraqi forces involved, perhaps 50,000 were casualties in the attack, another 20,000 were casualties or deserted before the attack, and 84,000 surrendered to Coalition forces, for a rate of 400 per 1,000 engaged. It is obvious perhaps that the Iraqi soldier simply lost heart in the battle. They had been sent to the trenches with 30 days' supply of food and water and no orders but to dig in and fight to the death. By the time the ground war started their supplies were exhausted. They had no air cover, no intelligence, little communication, no resupply, no water and no orders. There was no strategic plan known to division commanders. They had few chemical suits for their own soldiers and thus could not use their chemical munitions. In all it was a bad bluff on Saddam Husein's part against an adversary who held a winning hand at least from the second day of the air campaign.

On February 28th at 0800 hours, exactly 100 hours since ground operations began, President Bush ordered a stop to the fighting. The previous evening Iraq had agreed to honor all 12 of the U.N. Security Council resolutions including Resolution 660 calling for the complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Iraq lost in the Gulf War 3,700 of its 4,200 battle tanks,
2,400 of its 2,800 armored personnel vehicles, 2,600 of its 3,000 artillery pieces and 104 of its 241 aircraft. Practically 42 of its 60 divisions were no longer combat effective. By agreement Iraq agreed to pay for the war damage to Kuwait. By U.N. resolution Iraq was limited to the sale of nearly $1.6 billion a year in oil to pay for food and medicine, less than 2% of its prewar oil export revenue. Iraq refused to comply with this limitation and a complete embargo on oil sales remained in place—effectively shutting down more than 94% of Iraq's total export trade.104

The primary military objective of Operation Desert Storm—expelling Iraq from Kuwait—had been achieved. The Iraqi Army was broken as an effective fighting force. As General Colin Powell observed, "Unbelievable carnage had been inflicted on the survivors retreating along Highway 6, the main road out of Kuwait. To press the attack further would be un-American and unchivalrous."105 Even though Vice President Quayle asked if the action would not end too soon to close the trap, as General Schwarzkopf had planned, on the remaining Iraqi tanks, there was no real disagreement with General Powell's recommendation to stop the fighting. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Tystad, who commanded the Tiger Brigade's 3/67th Armored Battalion in the ground assault along Highway 6, known as the Highway of Death, was certain that his tank battalion could have taken Basra if they had been ordered to do so. But he concluded, "if we had driven into Iraq we would have lost the moral high ground, and in the eyes of the world changed from being liberators to being invaders. When it ended as it did, we felt we had triumphed in a righteous cause."106

Cease Fire: Chaplain Ministries Expand

With the cease fire at 0800 on 28 February, 1991, most units in the Coalition forces remained in place. At CENTCOM Headquarters in Riyadh, General Schwarzkopf began planning for his trip to Safwan to formally conclude the hostilities. Within two days of the cease-fire, on March 2nd, 1991, the United Nations passed Resolution 686 which was a formal demand that Iraq cease all hostile actions and abide by the previous 12 United Nations Resolutions, most particularly the one condemning the Iraqi invasion and declaring the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait null and void.107

At the time of the initial cease -re, the XVIII Airborne Corps had achieved all of its objectives, with the 101st Airborne Division on the Euphrates joined by the 82d Airborne Division. The 24th Infantry Division had penetrated to the Kuwait-Basra highway as had most of the VII Corps units. The 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, the Tiger Brigade of the 2d Armored Division and other forces were in Kuwait City. Few of the soldiers realized that they would remain in Kuwait and Iraq almost a month before the Department of Defense would authorize the beginning of re-deployment for American forces.

During the month from 28 February to 24 March, when the 24th Infantry Division began its redeployment to the United States from Iraq, most unit ministry teams expanded their ministries not only to soldiers but also to refugees and prisoners of war. The aftermath of the 100-hour ground war demanded even more of the chaplains and chaplain assistants than had the movement under combat conditions into Iraq itself.

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One of the first duties chaplains and chaplain assistants had to perform was to assist with the burial of Iraqi dead. Although the CENTCOM J5 had directed U.S. forces to turn over the bodies of any dead Muslim soldiers to Saudi Arabian control, the relentless heat of the desert made it necessary to bury many of the Iraqi dead in mass graves. Chaplains and chaplain assistants felt it was their duty to provide some religious support not only for those who were charged with the task of burials, but also for those who mourned the passing of so many soldiers. Chaplain Daniel Davis, the VII Corps chaplain, recalled the lonely task of burying the bodies of the enemy in the desert:

As the men searched each body for identification and placed it, with any photos, money and other personal effects, into a glassine bag on which the grave location was carefully noted, or wrapped the soldiers in plastic sheeting, or the chemical protection suit and green blanket every Iraqi Republican Guard seemed to own, they dug graves in the sand with backhoes and laid them to rest. Then the chaplain paused to say a prayer to a common God, the eternal God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, men for whom the Bible says the desert was a kind of spiritual proving ground. 'Father, these are human beings. You made them. You loved them. You know who they are. The best thing we can do is commit their souls to you and their bodies to the ground whence they came, dust to dust.'

Chaplain Davis felt that his ministry of providing proper burials for enemy soldiers further underscored the humanitarian values that chaplains and chaplain assistants must uphold even in the most difficult and dangerous situations.

Chaplain Robert Flaherty likewise participated in honoring the enemy dead. He recalled, "The brigade chaplain and I were invited by the graves registration team to hold memorial services for persons whose bodies were recovered from the battlefield. Identification documents showed these persons to be Iraqi soldiers, Kuwaiti soldiers and civilians. At one point we buried what appeared to be a family, including two children, who were trying to flee from 'death valley.' In all, we buried 13 bodies. We invited U.S. personnel to attend the memorials. Sometimes we had as many as ten personnel attending. I used the prayers for the time of death of a Muslim soldier which were provided in the Unit Ministry Team Handbook, RB 1-1. One of the graves registration soldiers asked if he could say a prayer in Arabic. He taught me the prayer so that at later memorials, in addition to the English prayer, we prayed the Arabic prayer together." Chaplain Terry Cook, the 1st Brigade Chaplain of the 1st Infantry Division, recalled that the burial of the dead was one of the most moving experiences he had in all of his ministry in Operation Desert Storm.

As the units were waiting in the desert for confirmation of the cease-fire, General Franks, the VII Corps commander, had a meeting with his major subordinate commanders to discuss the disposition of troops. Late on the 28th of February, he noted, after 100 hours of battle, the total
losses for the VII Corps were only 47 soldiers. This was minuscule in comparison to the 140,000 soldiers who participated in the main ground battle. At a meeting of the commanders, Major General Ronald Griffith, commander of the 1st Armored Division, approached Chaplain Dan Davis. Chaplain Davis had told General Griffith that God had promised him in prayer that "We would have victory without great casualties." General Griffith had not forgotten Chaplain Davis' promise. As the meeting drew to a close, General Griffith put his arm around Chaplain Davis and said simply, "Chaplain, you are a prophet!" General Norman Schwarzkopf called the exceptionally small number of casualties in the VII Corps a miracle, and Chaplain Davis added, "It was a miracle, one that came from God."

Ministry to Refugees

As the units waited for further orders in Iraq and Kuwait, many of the chaplains and chaplain assistants began to assist with the enormous refugee problem. Chaplain Wayne Lehrer recalled, "I had three battalions in immediate contact with refugees, because they manned a major highway and all of the checkpoints on the highway. The highest number of prisoners we took came during that duty. Tons of medical assistance and food assistance were delivered to assist with these sick and hungry people. Our aid station did surgery on children and prisoners, dozens of them per day. At one point I visited about 100 patients in a place where we had no hospital. It should be noted that the 1st Armored Division did not get assigned a sector with a refugee camp within it like the 3rd Armored Division did. Our mission, therefore, was much more temporary. We dealt with folks moving through. We did get refugees in great numbers with horror stories to tell. The commanding general finally deployed a special team to the checkpoints with interrogators, lawyers, and intelligence personnel to record those stories for the United Nations."

In Kuwait, the morning after the city was taken, Chaplain Jack Herron of the 502nd Combat Support Battalion from the Tiger Brigade, found a mosque packed with frightened men, women and children. Almost miraculously the building had escaped attack. Chaplain Herron joined the medics from the battalion aid station to help these displaced people. Even though Chaplain Herron was a Roman Catholic priest and not Muslim, his ministry of presence and concern relieved much of the anxiety at the site.

Chaplain Dennis Whitaker, 11th Aviation Brigade, noted that his brigade "assumed a screen of the left Coalition flank and established an assembly area at Al Salman Airfield, Iraq. The refugees were provided assistance. They were residents, approximately 4,000 strong, of Al Salman and a camp outside of Raffa, Saudi Arabia. The Al Salman refugee mission included daily sick call and food and water distribution. The unit ministry teams served as consultants on the Islamic culture and on what food to distribute, how to relate to the Iraqi women and children, and how to involve the Al Salman imam. The Raffa mission was less intensive; there was time for setting up the logistic support for the camp, and detailing security elements. I assisted in an initial survey of the area. Many of the chaplains and chaplain's assistants needed all of the information they had been given on Islamic culture to deal with the settlement even in temporary camps of so many refugees. The soldiers wanted to

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provide comfort for these homeless people, and they needed the chaplain and chaplain assistant to advise them on the best way to accomplish that mission. Never was a knowledge of Islamic religion and culture more essential for unit ministry teams."\textsuperscript{115}

Among the surprises many of the chaplains found were a number of Christians among the Iraqi prisoners of war. Chaplain Edwin Ahl recalled, "We set up six miles from a burning oil field. We arrived at about 0200 and the light from the fields was eerie. The soldiers relaxed a little. We had found 27 prisoners of war who had been walking in the desert for five days. We gave them food and water. We had no medics, so I took my combat lifesavers kit and washed their feet and gave medical attention to their blisters which all of them had. Most had no shoes, so after bandaging their blisters, I used field dressings as pads for the bottom of their feet. They didn't care that I wore a cross on my collar or helmet. When the MPs came to take them away, each one of the enemy prisoners took my hand and said 'God bless you' in perfect English."\textsuperscript{116} Chaplain Wayne Lehrer noted: "The enemy prisoners were taken and Specialist Brown and I had the opportunity to talk with and help care for some Republican Guard soldiers who had escaped the bombing in Kuwait and who had walked three days and three nights with no food or water. I discovered one was a Catholic and gave him a rosary. He tried to kiss my hands."\textsuperscript{117}

Not all of the work in the desert, however, was free from danger even though technically the firing had stopped. Many soldiers were injured by live munitions which were lying about in the sand. Chaplain Melvin Stanley of the 249th Engineer Battalion remembered these dangers vividly:

We were on the Iraq-Kuwait border and it was evident that there had been a massive battle. Tanks and military Iraqi trucks and vehicles were burning as far as you could see. Most of the bodies and dead had been removed and buried in mass graves. Off in the distance you could see burning mushroom clouds of explosives and weapons being destroyed by our forces. It was very dangerous to get out of the vehicle and walk around. Many people were exploring bunkers and getting close to burning tanks looking for souvenirs. I remember getting angry at a young soldier who was about to pick up a live grenade lying next to an Iraqi tank. People were just not thinking about what they were doing. I kept observing how we all needed to be taught about what our own explosive devices look like. There were cluster bombs and neat looking little cylinders that had parachutes on them. They looked harmless and were very tempting to pick up. Soldiers who did, many times were injured. One soldier brought back some cluster bombs, not knowing what they were, and threw one down by his foot. It blew his foot off right in his tent! Once in Kuwait, our battalion was split up by several miles of main supply routes. My unit ministry team spent long hours on the road providing worship services and a ministry of presence as long as we could. Thank God we did not need any memorial services!\textsuperscript{118}

On the 7th of March, the Department of Defense announced that the XVIII Airborne Corps would begin redeploying to the United States. The first major unit to go "out" would be the 24th Infantry Division from Fort Stewart, Georgia. Even in the midst of the redeployment, however, the

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chaplains and chaplains assistants continued their ministry. Chaplain William Hufham, the 82d Airborne Division Chaplain, was celebrating the baptism of a field grade officer at Ur of the Chaldeans near the Euphrates River on March 12th. Chaplain Hufham's sermon for this occasion, "Where Faith Began," has been published several times. A few excerpts illustrate the conditions surrounding this affirmation of faith in the desert:

The Euphrates River is only a couple of miles from here. The Persian Gulf waters have been polluted by oil, which Saddam's troops released, creating one of the worst environmental catastrophes in history. We can see the smoke above us from the oil field fires in Kuwait, another sign of the actions of this tyrant. Approximately 4,000 years ago, Abraham lived here at Ur of the Chaldees. Looking around we wonder why anyone would want to live here. Just a bunch of old ruins and miles of desert, punctuated with an occasional palm tree cluster. We need to imagine the splendor of Babylon, buildings and gardens fed by irrigation trenches from the Euphrates, thousands of tents with herdsman, children playing and women working. Compared to the rest of the world it was splendid. God spoke to Abraham. Abraham trusted God and his faith was reckoned to him as righteousness, as we read in Paul's letter to the Romans. Abraham is identified as the father of faith and honored by three major world religions—Judaism, Christianity and Islam. His faith journey began here at Ur.119

Like Abraham, many soldiers, including those Chaplain Hufham baptized, found their faith either renewed or established by their presence in what was at one time the cradle of western religions.

The Redeployment-Reunion Program

While the troops were performing their final duties in Iraq and awaiting the order to redeploy, Chaplain Gay Hatler and Chaplain Joe Colley at ARCENT Headquarters were planning a program to help the soldiers reunite with their family members upon their return to their home stations. Chaplain Colley, as the Deputy ARCENT Chaplain, was given the mission of assembling a suitable packet of information for each soldier to read before leaving Saudi Arabia.120 Chaplain Colley called Mr. Don Cox, the head of Army Community Service at Fort McPherson, Georgia, in the United States. Chaplain Colley asked Mr. Cox to send whatever information he had on facilitating the reunion of soldiers and family members after an extended deployment. Mr. Cox mailed 85 pages of information to ARCENT Headquarters. Chaplain Hatler and Chaplain Colley reviewed the material and then turned it over to Sergeant First Class Ed Parton to rewrite it in a relevant format for Desert Shield/Desert Storm soldiers. After the packet was assembled and edited, Chaplain David Peterson, the CENTCOM Chaplain, facilitated the printing of thousands of these booklets for soldiers. The booklet carried a command letter, from Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock, encouraging

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commanders to include briefings by their chaplains along with the printed material so that soldiers would have the opportunity to think about some of the issues they might face soon. A few of these relevant issues included re-entering the family system after an absence, listening to one's spouse and children, and dealing with financial and other issues affecting the family during the absence of the service member.

Concomitant with the creation and staffing of the redeployment packets at the Third Army level, a concept paper with a sample packet was sent from the ARCENT Chaplain to the Chief of Chaplain's office for approval. Eventually, after some discussion, a formal redeployment/reunion program was approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army for the Chief of Chaplains to administer. At each unit and echelon in Saudi Arabia, from Chaplain David Peterson, the CENTCOM chaplain, to battalion chaplain level, unit ministry teams were given the task of briefing soldiers on the redeployment/reunion program. Chaplain Gay Hatler at ARCENT Headquarters chose Chaplain John P. Schmeling, the Engineer Command Staff Chaplain, to organize a group of stay-behind chaplains and assistants so that even the last units leaving Saudi Arabia would have the opportunity to be included in the program.\footnote{Chaplain Horace Duke, the 50th General Hospital chaplain in Riyadh, and Chaplain Wilbern Hoffman, from the 217th Evacuation Hospital, created a video cassette program to accompany the briefing booklet. This enabled the chaplains who had a video cassette player to include a video program with their oral briefings. In total, some 300,000 soldiers received a briefing on redeployment and reunion with family members either while awaiting transit from Saudi Arabia to their home stations or upon arrival back at their home installations. Some redeployment briefings were given in the desert, some in holding areas such as Khobar Towers, a high rise apartment complex in Dhahran where many soldiers waited for their flights or for their ships home, and some were even given on airplanes in flight for Germany or for the United States. In all, the reception for these briefings was positive. Indeed, many commanders felt that they were the most positive effort which was made to assure mutual understanding by soldiers and family members of one another's hardships as a result of the crisis in the Persian Gulf.} Chaplain Horace Duke, the 50th General Hospital chaplain in Riyadh, and Chaplain Wilbern Hoffman, from the 217th Evacuation Hospital, created a video cassette program to accompany the briefing booklet. This enabled the chaplains who had a video cassette player to include a video program with their oral briefings. In total, some 300,000 soldiers received a briefing on redeployment and reunion with family members either while awaiting transit from Saudi Arabia to their home stations or upon arrival back at their home installations.\footnote{Some redeployment briefings were given in the desert, some in holding areas such as Khobar Towers, a high rise apartment complex in Dhahran where many soldiers waited for their flights or for their ships home, and some were even given on airplanes in flight for Germany or for the United States. In all, the reception for these briefings was positive. Indeed, many commanders felt that they were the most positive effort which was made to assure mutual understanding by soldiers and family members of one another's hardships as a result of the crisis in the Persian Gulf.} Some redeployment briefings were given in the desert, some in holding areas such as Khobar Towers, a high rise apartment complex in Dhahran where many soldiers waited for their flights or for their ships home, and some were even given on airplanes in flight for Germany or for the United States. In all, the reception for these briefings was positive. Indeed, many commanders felt that they were the most positive effort which was made to assure mutual understanding by soldiers and family members of one another's hardships as a result of the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

The last two months of the major deployment in Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Storm, April and May of 1991, were officially titled "Operation Desert Farewell." A number of chaplains and chaplain assistants voluntarily delayed their own redeployment back home in order to help with the redeployment of thousands of soldiers from King Khalid Military City and from Dhahran. A list of the chaplains and assistants who performed this selfless duty included:

Chaplain Vince Inghilterra, USA, 22nd Support Command  
Chaplain John Schmeling, USAR, 416th Engineer Command  
Chaplain Ernest Shipe, USAR, 350th Evac Hospital  
Sgt Melvin Rountree, USAR 32nd Transportation Group  
Sgt Daniel Zambo, USAR, 350th Evac Hospital  
Chaplain Horace Duke, USAR, 50th General Hospital  
Chaplain James Herrington, USAR, 304th Civil Affairs Group  
Chaplain Wilbern Hoffman, USAR, 217th Evac Hospital  
Chaplain Paul Lemoi, USAR, 382nd Field Hospital

\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}
Chaplain David Rolando, USAR, attached to VII Corps
SGT Valorie Shidlowksi, USAR, Headquarters, ARCENT
SGT Joel Ferren, USAR, 159th Corps Support Group
SGT Mary O’Halloran, USAR, 382nd Field Hospital
SGT Carol Trowbridge, USAR, 382nd Field Hospital123

These unit ministry teams, formed as they were with hospital chaplains, Civil Affairs chaplains and two Roman Catholic priests, performed outstanding service in difficult conditions. Many times the classes were impromptu at all hours of the day and night. Sometimes as many as 75 soldiers would try to attend. Administrative support was difficult because almost all the supplies, from typewriters to vehicles, were being shipped out of the theater at the same time the chaplains were attempting to hold classes for thousands of soldiers. In spite of the fact that at times these reunification/reunion UMTs had to walk from one unit to the next, they performed their mission in an excellent fashion and contributed greatly to the harmonious reunion not only of active duty families but also of many Reservists who had never been on lengthy deployment before.

While the troops were waiting to leave Saudi Arabia, many of the health and welfare items which had not caught up to the combat trains during the ground war suddenly became available in huge supply for soldiers. These items were gifts sent to the Army from private organizations, businesses and clubs throughout the United States and even from many foreign countries. The items included sun glasses, bathing suits, soap, frisbees and all sorts of paperback books, stationary supplies and games. Through the efforts of Chaplain Thad Rudd, an Episcopalian from Georgia, a bakery in St. Louis, Missouri, even sent one million Twinkies to the soldiers of Operation Desert Storm.124 These gifts were gratefully received by the soldiers and reinforced their conviction that the American people were solidly behind them every day they were in the Persian Gulf.

In the second week of March 1991, Chaplain David Peterson, the CENTCOM Chaplain, asked General Schwarzkopf if he would meet with his senior chaplains for a discussion of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. General Schwarzkopf agreed, and his staff scheduled 45 minutes for him to address the chaplains and entertain their questions.

The meeting was held in a conference room in Rhiyad on 19 March 1991. Eighteen chaplains and senior chaplain assistants from the Army, Navy, Air Force and the British Forces Middle East met around a long table to hear what General Schwarzkopf had to say. When General Schwartzkopf arrived, he elected to remain standing while his chaplains and assistants sat around the table. General Schwarzkopf explained the difficult situation that the Coalition of Islamic and Christian military forces produced at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield. He explained to the chaplains that he did not like the idea of asking them to remove their crosses and tablets but he felt at that time that it was best for the Coalition to demonstrate to the Saudi Arabian government that we were not there to convert anyone to a foreign religion nor were we there for any purpose other than to carry out the United Nations resolutions.

At first, the Saudi Arabians were concerned about our radio stations and any religious broadcasting that might take place. But later, after the Americans demonstrated their remarkable sensitivity to the feelings of the Saudi Arabians, General Schwarzkopf said, "We taught them

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tolerance." The Saudi Arabians were impressed with our accommodation of their faith and they reciprocated in kind by attempting to allow as much freedom as possible for the celebration of our major religious events.\textsuperscript{125}

General Schwarzkopf complimented the chaplains on their support of all of the military personnel. General Schwarzkopf entertained a number of questions and re-emphasized that it was not a military goal of the Coalition forces to destroy Iraq but rather to free Kuwait. Once that objective had been achieved, it would have ultimately been detrimental to try to capture and garrison Baghdad with all of the problems that would have followed with the various groups of dissidents in the population. Moreover, in consideration of a multitude of factors including military ethics, General Schwarzkopf had decided to put all Iraqi towns and villages off-limits for U.S. soldiers.\textsuperscript{126} It was a decision he did not have to implement.

General Schwarzkopf thanked the chaplains again and had his picture taken with them before he departed. The chaplains were all immensely grateful for this opportunity to hear the concern, sensitivity and the commitment to religious support on the part of their commanding general.

\textbf{Ministry in Kuwait City}

While other chaplains were conducting redeployment briefings and ministering to their soldiers in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the Special Forces chaplains from the Special Operations command—Chaplain Lawrence Mack, the Third Special Forces Group Chaplain, Chaplain Francis Belue, the Assistant Third Special Forces Group Chaplain and Chaplain Allen Boatright, the Special Forces First Battalion Chaplain—conducted a wide ranging ministry of humanitarian assistance in Kuwait City.\textsuperscript{127} Much of this ministry was not only voluntary, it was also dependent on sharing whatever resources were available.

When the Third Special Forces Group (Airborne) entered Kuwait on 26 February 1991, the Kuwait social service infrastructure had been destroyed by the retreating Iraqis. The Kuwatis lacked the means for feeding, housing, and caring for themselves. Basic medical, sanitation and transportation means were virtually nonexistent. The spread of hunger and disease was great. The scope of the misery of the Kuwaiti people was almost immeasurable and nearly beyond description.

The requirements for humanitarian aid to the Kuwaiti populace greatly surpassed the capabilities of Kuwaiti government agencies, international charities, and civil affairs forces assigned to the Kuwait Theater of Operations. When confronted with this tragic situation, the Special Forces chaplains, and other members of the Third Special Forces Group, developed a program of humanitarian assistance beyond their assigned duties in Kuwait. This program included six elements: advice and coordination forces for assistance; emergency food and water distribution; detection, warning and removal of unexploded ordnance from civilian areas; sanitation control; medical and veterinary assistance; and protection of human rights.

Chaplain Allen Boatright and his assistant, Sergeant Phillip Lane, recalled that the Special Forces mission changed as the occupation progressed: "The Special Forces were tasked to provide internal defense assistance to the Kuwaiti Army. First Battalion soldiers were spread out all over

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Kuwait City and the area just south of the Iraqi border. The unit ministry teams volunteered to assist in coordinating relief for the non-Kuwaiti refugees in the city. The Kuwaitis were not prepared to assist the Kurds, Filipinos, Bengalis, Egyptians, and hundreds of foreigners and nationals needing food and clothing at that time. They were hard pressed to help Kuwaitis along.  

Chaplain Mack visited all the local civilian clergy he could find, including the Roman Catholic bishop, the Armenian prelate, Greek Orthodox priests, Greek Catholic priests, leaders of the Coptic Christian Church, the Arab Evangelical Church, the Philippine Evangelical Church, the Indian Evangelical Church, and the English Evangelical Church.

The ecclesiastical leaders arranged for the Catholic Cathedral to be a central distribution point for food. Each religious leader had a list of needs and families. They coordinated for pickup and delivery. There were Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Armenian, Pentecostal, Coptic, Egyptian, Christian congregations present in Kuwait City which were much in need.

The Catholic Bishop, Francis Micallef from Malta, had been hard pressed to help all who came to him during the Iraqi occupation. He personally assisted as many as possible regardless of their faith orientation. The spirit of ecumenical cooperation and Christian concern in this environment was represented by the service of Bishop Micallef. On one occasion, he personally traveled to Baghdad to request that the Iraqi military authorities release an American Pentecostal pastor, who was locked up in the American Embassy, so he could minister to his congregations in Kuwait City. By the time Bishop Micallef had returned to Kuwait City, the chain of command in the Iraqi Army had deteriorated so much that his request could not be honored.

As the Special Forces unit ministry teams traveled to visit their A-Team soldiers around Kuwait, they found an interesting situation near Safwan on the Iraqi border. There was a large refugee camp set up there with thousands of evacuees from Iraq, and hundreds of Kurds seeking refuge as well. Their children liked to run up to the military convoys and gather up rations thrown to them by soldiers in transit. One day several children were killed running to a convoy for MREs. The A-Team assigned to that area asked the unit ministry teams if they could help the children somehow. The A-Team had in mind creating a playground in a cleared area. The unit ministry team used their resourcefulness to locate some toys in Kuwait City that would occupy the children. Chaplain Boatright recalled, "Within 24 hours we had been able to locate about 100 plastic soccer balls and we delivered them to the A-Team which passed them out to the children. Most likely this simple act saved lives."  

**Passover, Easter, and Ramadan**

"Food for the General"

The four Army Jewish chaplains who served in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm—Chaplain Ben Romer, Chaplain Mitchell Ackerson, Chaplain Kenneth Leinwand and Chaplain David Zalis—had known from the beginning of their deployments that special arrangements would have to be made in order to accommodate Jewish needs during High Holy Days. The need for Kosher food, especially during Passover, was one of the greatest challenges the chaplains faced. A

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similar challenge was involved in how to hold a Passover celebration in Saudi Arabia without alienating the Saudi government.

As early as September 1990, two months before he personally deployed, Chaplain David Zalis (the senior Jewish chaplain in ARCENT) realized that one likely location for Jewish religious services might be on the recreational ship, the Cunard Princess, which had been leased at a cost of $30 million by the United States as a rest and recreation site for soldiers in the Southwest Asian operations. Chaplain Zalis kept that idea in mind even as he worked to establish a system of supply for Kosher food. The Meals Ready To Eat (MREs) were not strictly Kosher, and since Chaplain Zalis observed Kosher himself and wanted to support the Jewish personnel who did likewise, it was necessary to find a supply of Kosher food. In the month before his deployment Chaplain Zalis, who normally resided in Israel, had reported to US Forces Command at Fort McPherson, Georgia. Chaplain Zalis contacted Rabbi Perr in Brooklyn, New York, for help in locating and shipping Kosher food to the Middle East. Rabbi Perr, in turn, asked for assistance from Rabbi Billett of Long Island, New York. Rabbi Billett’s synagogue raised $20,000 to support Kosher food acquisition for Desert Shield soldiers. Chaplain Zalis then contacted a company in Zurich, Switzerland, which produced Kosher vacuum packed meals. These meals were purchased with the help of Herr Guttmann and shipped by rail to Frankfurt, West Germany. At Frankfurt, Chaplain Zalis arranged for a Jewish lay leader, Lieutenant Colonel David Wallen, and his wife to pick up the meals at the train station and take them to Rhein-Main Airfield for further transport to Saudi Arabia.

When Chaplain Zalis deployed to Riyadh on 13 December 1990, he appealed for help in his attempt to accommodate the Jewish personnel dietary laws to Chaplain David Peterson, the CENTCOM Chaplain. Chaplain Peterson located Chief Warrant Officer Wes Wolf, a logistics officer on General Pagonis’ staff in Dhahran. Chaplain Zalis worked with Mr. Wolf in order to get Kosher food items shipped by air from the United States to Saudi Arabia. Among those items were the Passover supplies which Chaplain Zalis estimated would be needed by the end of March. In addition, there were normal Jewish meals which were shipped by air and available by the first of February, six weeks after Chaplain Zalis arrived in country, for distribution to soldiers throughout the theater. Chaplain Zalis and his Roman Catholic assistant, Sergeant Martin Cuellar, carefully sought out each Jewish soldier in Saudi Arabia and arranged for meals to be mailed to them by the Army Post Office within Saudi Arabia. For those who were too remote to depend on the mail in a timely fashion, meals were hand-carryed to Kosher-observant personnel.

At the conclusion of the ground war, Chaplain Zalis realized he had one month and one day before Passover would be celebrated. Again, he asked Chaplain Peterson for assistance. Chaplain Peterson staffed the issue with General Schwarzkopf’s logistical experts and secured General Schwarzkopf’s personal approval for the Passover observance to be supported. The issue was not resolved without some dissent. General Gary Luck thought celebrating Passover in such a public manner might have serious political consequences even if it were done on a ship. Chaplain Dennis Camp in the 1st Cavalry Division heard some grumbling over taking Jewish soldiers to a recreational site when all of the other soldiers had to celebrate their holidays with their units in the sand. Chaplain Zalis was able to reserve the cruise ship for one iteration of three days during the month of
(Top) Chaplain David Zalis with General H. Norman Schwarzkopf; (Bottom) Presentation of the Torah at Passover on board the Cunard Princess, March 1991
(Top) Four Jewish Chaplains at Passover: Ken Leinwand, Mitchell Ackerson, David Zalis, and Ben Romer; (Bottom) The Cunard Princess, recreation site known affectionately as "The Love Boat"
March and was able to use the normal Rest and Recreation transport system to carry Jewish personnel from the most remote units to Bahrain where the Cunard Princess was docked.

In the meanwhile, Mr. Wolf in Dhahran had requested Passover supplies packed in dry ice be transported from Philadelphia to the Riyadh Commissary in Saudi Arabia. These items, of course, had to be refrigerated. Chaplain Zalis faced an additional dilemma of how to get refrigerated items from the Riyadh Commissary to Bahrain without having them spoil in transit. Having no other alternative, he went to the Air Force mortuary team and complemented them for having so few casualties. He then inquired if he could store some Kosher food in the Air Force morgue. The Air Force commander at Eskan Village, on the outskirts of Riyadh, felt that the Air Force could provide better facilities than a morgue. Consequently, the Air Force staff found two food lockers, one of which was suitable to use for a freezer, and the other as a refrigerator for Kosher TV dinners which would be shipped to Bahrain by truck.

Chaplain Zalis worked many nights to call suppliers all over the world in order to get the amount of food he thought he would need. There were at least 300 personnel of the Jewish faith in Saudi Arabia as well as many others who would attend a Seder service if given the opportunity. Some CARE packages arrived from the Jewish Welfare Board, courtesy of Chaplain David Lapp, for distribution to the Jewish personnel. The greater challenge, however, was how to move the Kosher food, some of which had been refrigerated, through Saudi customs at the Bahrain border in order to have the Passover celebration. Chaplain Zalis and his assistant, Sergeant Cuellar, decided simply to drive it across the border and indicate that it was for military use. Consequently, they drove through Saudi Arabian road blocks without ever unpacking their supplies. One shipment of Kosher food arrived from Switzerland by commercial air at King Khalid Airport outside Riyadh. The Swiss Air personnel were careful not to alert the Saudi Arabian custom officials that Kosher food was awaiting a rabbi for further shipment. They simply called Chaplain Zalis and told him his shipment had arrived. When Chaplain Zalis and Sergeant 1st Class Ed Parton arrived at the air cargo facility at King Khalid Airport, they found 20 Kosher meals awaiting them in boxes clearly marked in Hebrew writing. Chaplain Zalis paid the import duty in Saudi currency and then took the boxes through customs. When the customs official stopped him and asked him what was in the boxes, he told them very simply, "food for the general." At that moment, Chaplain Zalis thought about General Schwarzkopf's approval, and thus any food supporting Passover must be "food for the General."

A similar challenge arose when the question was raised about a Torah needed for the Passover ceremony. Chaplain Zalis called Chaplain Eli Seidman in Frankfurt, Germany, and asked him if he could send a Torah to Saudi Arabia. Chaplain Seidman took a century old Torah from the Frankfurt Central Chapel. Lieutenant Colonel Wallen, the lay leader who had been shipping food at all hours of the day and night to support the Jewish personnel in Saudi Arabia, placed the Torah on a plane loaded with Stars and Stripes newspapers. The plane, however, did not fly to Riyadh, but rather to Dhahran. When Chaplain Zalis realized that the plane had landed more than 250 miles from where he expected it, he called Sergeant Juan Lezcano, the senior NCO for Chaplain Inghilterra in Dhahran. Sergeant Lezcano managed to find the Torah among tons of cargo and deliver it safely to Chaplain Zalis upon Chaplain Zalis' arrival in Dhahran. The Torah, the food, the candles and all of the other

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supplies necessary were delivered personally by Chaplain Zalis and Sergeant Cuellar to the cruise ship in plenty of time to plan the Passover service.

On 29 March 1991, the largest Passover celebration in the history of Saudi Arabia was held on the cruise ship in the Persian Gulf off the shores of Bahrain. Some 300 Jewish personnel and 100 Christian and other personnel from units positioned throughout Southwest Asia attended the service. Chaplain Peterson delivered the opening words, followed by a service led by the rabbis including Chaplain Zalis and Chaplain Ken Leinwand from the 1st Armored Division. When the Torah had been delivered to the Cunard Princess, Chaplain Zalis had asked that the ancient Hebrew Psalm be sung, "Arise O Lord and Disperse Thine Enemies."

"The Seder service was very successful and added immeasurably to the religious support of all of the personnel who attended," Chaplain Hatler reported. After the celebration of Passover, Chaplain Zalis sent the Torah back to Germany in the personal care of Sergeant Martin Cuellar. Sergeant Cuellar carried it back safely to the Frankfurt Community Chaplain who had so generously lent his support to the soldiers of Operation Desert Storm.

"The Quiet Power of God"

Two days after the Passover celebration, the Christian soldiers throughout Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait celebrated Easter Sunday. There were hundreds of services for tens of thousands of soldiers from Bahrain to Riyadh to Safwan. In Riyadh alone there were seven worship services on Easter Sunday at ARCENT Headquarters. Chaplain assistants, notably Staff Sergeant Charles Kerns, Staff Sergeant Moses Tolliver and Specialist Nicole Forbes, worked for two days in Eskan Village to get all of the necessary equipment prepared for the Easter Sunrise Service. As the sun arose on Easter Sunday, a choir formed at ARCENT PERSCOM, called the "Catacombs Choir," and sang the Easter hymn "Christ the Lord is Risen" in an open courtyard near ARCENT Headquarters. Chaplain Brock Watson, the MEDCOM chaplain, delivered the sermon at the Sunrise Service. Later in the day, a host of chaplains, including Chaplain Gay Hatler, Chaplain John Schmeling, Chaplain John Brinsfield, Chaplain Roger Armstead and Chaplain John Hart (a Roman Catholic priest) continued the celebration with six more services including a gospel service which lasted for three hours. In a desert detachment from ARCENT PERSCOM near King Khalid Military City, Chaplain Arthur B. Salinero led troops in worship only a few miles from the Iraq border.

The PERSCOM Staff Chaplain, who was present at the Easter Sunrise Service in Riyadh on March 31, 1991, wrote the following description for his church newspaper:

When the sun rises in the desert, the entire horizon lights up as far as one can see. It is as if God lifts a curtain so that we might see the light.

For months we had heard the night noises of war: trucks grinding gears, sirens warning of incoming missiles, jet aircraft roaring off to the north, in the words of

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Ezekiel the Prophet, "like the roar of the sea, like the noise of a huge army, like the voice of almighty God." (Ezekiel 1:24)

On Easter morning, the sun rose silently, in all its grandeur, reminding us of the quiet power of God. The machines of war, like the oceans of sand and the desert winds, were hushed on Resurrection Day.

We had been working since 4:00 a.m. to set up a platform for a sunrise service at our compound in Riyadh. The Army and Air Force chaplains, Methodist, Lutheran, Disciples of Christ, Congregationalist, and Roman Catholic, assembled at 6:00 a.m. for worship as one Body of Christ.

Since there were 4,000 service members in our area, we held multiple services and shared our one microphone, one organ and one choir. I finished four Easter services 14 hours later. I missed my family a lot, but I was content that we had done our best to celebrate the Lord's Day.

Chaplain Gay Hatler, the Third Army Chaplain, said later that it was the largest celebration of Christianity in the Middle East in 700 years. Perhaps the crusaders had felt the same way in their day as they drew near the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem.

Yet it was neither the large number of worshipers nor the unusual historic circumstance that brought Easter Services to the capital of Saudi Arabia which charged our minds and emotions that morning. Rather, we sensed a unity in Christ that transcended all barriers, all distinctions, and all political boundaries—a sense of God's love which captured us all. God did not see the kingdom of Saudi Arabia with a few foreigners in it. He saw His people in a part of His creation worshiping Him. There was no division of male or female, black or white, Protestant or Catholic, Air Force or Army, young or old, European or Semite, Arab or Jew.

The Son rose silently in all of God's power and the whole earth saw the light. The engines of war ceased and we stood hushed before Him.133

Perhaps the most elevated Easter services were held in Kuwait City. "During the Easter season in occupied Kuwait City," recalled Chaplain Allen Boatright of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, "the unit ministry team arranged to conduct an Easter Sunrise Service on the roof of the Kuwait International Hotel. Several of the beaches on the bay of Kuwait had been considered, but we were prohibited from using them by the presence of mines left by Iraqi soldiers. The manager of the hotel suggested instead that we use his restaurant that overlooked the water. That met our needs nicely and was ideal. As the service concluded, several Marines who had not gotten the word of the exact location for the service came and asked if there was going to be one. Chaplain Mack and

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(Top) Chaplain John Schmeling, 416th Engineer Command and ENCOM Staff Chaplain; (Below) Chaplain Brock Watson listens to the Catacombs Gospel Choir, Easter Sunrise Service, March 1991
(Top) Allied Chaplain and burning oil wells in Kuwait; (Bottom) Chaplain Dennis R. Whitaker leads worship service for 11th Aviation Brigade soldiers at As Salman Airfield, Iraq
I moved to the rooftop and conducted a second service just for them and a few civilians that were part of a CBS crew in the hotel."

Chaplain Andrew Mulvaney, a Catholic chaplain in the VII Corps, related his Easter experience:

A few days after the cease-fire, we moved into Iraq to blow up ammunition and to assist with refugees and prisoners leaving Kuwait. We were there until the 2d of March. There was a lot of counseling and morale boosting. We were spread out quite far and on weekends I took a helicopter to get to areas for nine masses each weekend. Holy Week came and went. Easter was great, one of the medics made flowers out of Kleenex. A tape of Easter music arrived just in time from the parish choir in Aschaffenbg. Also, candy and other things kept coming from Franklin Academy in Malone, New York. The high school in Malone sent me almost 75 boxes of helpful things which always arrived when we had nothing and when we were parked in the middle of nowhere.134

The Tiger Brigade chaplains conducted their Easter services while the unit was moving out of Kuwait for Dhahran. At 0630 hours on Easter morning, before the convoy started, services were held in the battalions. As the worship began, Chaplain Kimmell recalled that five Egyptian soldiers walked into the area and asked if they could join the group. They were Coptic Christians who were looking for a service on Easter morning. They joined the American soldiers for a true Coalition service.

Chaplain Richard Chaverria of the 20th Field Artillery Battalion left his unit immediately after his Easter Sunrise Service in order to be medically evacuated to the 12th EVAC Hospital in Saudi Arabia for further transport to Frankfurt, Germany. Chaplain Chaverria had to have ear surgery performed in order to correct his hearing loss. Even though such problems are not unusual in an artillery unit, Chaplain Chaverria wrote, "I did not want to miss ministry with my unit!"135 Sergeant Victor Silvestri wrote, "At about this time, we were winding down from a very successful outdoor Easter Sunrise Service in which the commanding general of the Third Armored Division was the guest speaker. The Third Armored Division band was there and I had the opportunity to do the Old Testament reading for the service. Nevertheless, we were all bored after that with all the waiting to return to Germany."136 Specialist Gary Krom, a chaplain assistant, wrote a letter which found its way to Chaplain Zimmerman's desk at the Pentagon. Krom described a very meaningful worship service at which 80 people gathered under an old rugged cross beneath the Saudi skies. Six soldiers were baptized. "It was a time," Krom said, "that brought us close to the heart of God."137

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Minor Pilgrims

As early as 11 December 1990, General Schwarzkopf had requested permission from Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz for U.S. service members to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. The Umrah, or minor pilgrimage, was a shortened form of the great pilgrimage or Hajj normally observed by Muslims as one of the pillars of Islam. General Schwarzkopf wrote to General Khalid, "There are approximately 300 U.S. service members of the Islamic faith deployed in Operation Desert Shield. I have instructed Colonel David P. Peterson to inform our service members of this opportunity. With your permission, he will coordinate this program with your staff. Thank you for this consideration. Please accept my continued respect and highest esteem."138

Since Ramadan, the Islamic observance of fasting, commemorating the giving of the Koran to Mohammed, was taking place at the same time the Passover and Easter celebrations occurred, U.S. service members of the Islamic faith were allowed to travel with Saudi Arabian guides to Mecca in order to make their pilgrimage and observe Ramadan. Chaplain Peterson's policy, approved by General Schwarzkopf, required each participating service member to be identified by their ID tags as Muslims. They also had to have acceptance documents, together with a 96-hour pass, submitted and approved by their unit commanders in advance. Travel, food and clothing were provided by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia so that these service members could practice their faith.

In a summary sheet of his policy circulated to the CINCOM in October of 1990, Chaplain Peterson pointed out that it was the obligation of every person of the Muslim faith to make a Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca during his lifetime, if possible. "Although the Umrah, a lesser pilgrimage, does not fill the obligation of the Hajj, it is a valued religious practice for the Muslim who does not have the opportunity to make a Hajj. The Hajj is only conducted during the twelfth month of the Muslim year. Only those who have obtained a special pilgrimage visa are permitted to visit Mecca for the purpose of making a Hajj. For most U.S. service members of the Muslim faith deployed on Operation Desert Shield, this will be the only time they have the opportunity to participate in an Umrah."139

The service members who visited Mecca, limited to not more than 60 in each group, were accompanied by an American translator. Saudi Arabian military forces provided the escort. Participants, both male and female, were required to purchase special clothing at a cost of approximately $30.00. The total cost for transportation was approximately $100.00, but the Saudi Arabian government provided commercial air transportation at no cost to the participants. Since this was a CENTCOM program, not only Army personnel but also Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps personnel were included in this opportunity. The Umrah trips were a real lift for American Muslim servicemembers. In the 1st Cavalry Division, 28 of the 32 Muslim soldiers serving in the division went to Mecca for spiritual refreshment.140

Throughout this major holiday season (for all three of these monotheistic faiths originating in the Middle East) there were great manifestations of support for Desert Storm participants from the United States and other allied countries. The American Bible Society donated a total of 300,000 copies of Desert Storm Bibles complete with camouflage covers. Guide Posts Magazine sent 15,000 copies of its devotional literature to Saudi Arabia. Chaplain, John Scott at the Chief's Office notes cryptically that "we almost paved the desert with Bibles."141 A West Coast organization called

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"Operation Desert Hope" sent several thousand copies of devotional booklets and many cassette tapes of expository sermons. The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association sent multiple copies of the monthly *Decision Magazine*. The Catholic Archdiocese for the Military Services forwarded rosaries donated for service members. The ARCENT Chaplain's office provided an opportunity for Orthodox Christian soldiers to celebrate their special Easter date of 7 April 1991. In his March newsletter, Chaplain Gay Hatler, the ARCENT Chaplain wrote, "I am convinced that the lighter than predicted Coalition casualties were a direct result of the millions of prayers sent heavenward on our behalf. Thanks for your contribution of thoughts and prayers for all of us."\(^{142}\)

**Collecting Lessons Learned**

In March Chaplain John A. Rasmussen and Chaplain Greg W. Hill arrived in Saudi Arabia to conduct interviews with chaplains, chaplain assistants, and other officers and enlisted personnel in order to record some of the lessons learned from the operations in Southwest Asia. Chaplain (Brig. Gen.) Donald W. Shea, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, had directed Chaplain Gilbert H. Pingel at the Chief's Office to serve as the initial point of contact for such reports from UMTs. Chaplain Hill, however, represented the Center for Army Lessons Learned and was tasked to conduct interviews with a wide variety of soldiers in different units and in various staff positions.

Chaplain Rasmussen and Chaplain Hill were assigned to the ARCENT G3 staff. They coordinated their mission with Chaplain David Peterson at CENTCOM as well as with Chaplain Gaylord Hatler at ARCENT. Chaplain Rasmussen looked at U.S. Army Reserve unit ministry team issues while Chaplain Hill initially interviewed active duty chaplains, Judge Advocate General officers, and personnel from Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, and the Adjutant General's Office.

Together Chaplain Rasmussen and Chaplain Hill visited Dhahran, Riyadh, King Khalid Military City, Kuwait, and other sites including enemy prisoner of war and refugee camps. The report of the Unit Ministry Team Collection Team, as Chaplain Rasmussen and Chaplain Hill were officially designated, was based on interviews with personnel from 35 major units ranging from CENTCOM Headquarters to the 800th Military Police Brigade. Significant observations dealt with Chaplain Corps doctrine, training, organization, material and leadership. Chaplain Rasmussen noted in his conclusions:

1. Forward Thrust doctrine was validated.

2. The Unit Ministry Team, as the primary delivery vehicle for religious support was validated.

3. UMT field training at the US Army Chaplain Center and School was recommended by many chaplains and senior chaplain assistants.

4. Logistics was a problem. Ecclesiastical supplies and equipment should be pre-positioned.

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5. The largest activation and deployment of Reserve Component UMTs since the Korean War was successful. Reserve UMTs integrated well with the active Army to provide religious support. It also was noted that the largest number of unit casualties in the war were suffered by the 475th Support Group, USAR. Chaplain Rasmussen's and Chaplain Hill's collection of observations proved most valuable both the Chaplain Corps and to the Army, for they documented the success of many modernization efforts which had been in progress for almost two decades.143

Operation Provide Comfort

Within the first 30 days of the cessation of hostilities, it became very apparent to the government of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and to the other Coalition members, that a massive relief operation would be needed to care for the hundreds of thousands of prisoners and refugees the Gulf War produced. More than 60,000 Iraqi POWs were confined in camps in northern Saudi Arabia, another 24,000 in southern Iraq and Kuwait. Some 200,000 Third World workers from Iraq sought refuge in Jordan. Almost 20,000 Iraqi Shi'ites fled south from Karbala and An Najaf where their short revolt against Saddam had fizzled out. Almost 2,000,000 Kurds moved east and west to the Iranian and Turkish borders to escape Saddam's helicopter gunships, which sometimes strafed them as they struggled to escape.

Chaplain Gary Johnson, the senior Civil Affairs chaplain at ARCENT Headquarters in Riyadh, thought that the U.S. military had simply not planned for such a huge postwar exodus of people. "This was an ethical issue," Johnson stated, "Our failure was not malicious but the result of the evolution of events. We were reactive, not proactive. The key issue was the question of who was responsible for the postwar government of southern Iraq. We had no plans even for the medical triage of prisoners of war and displaced civilians."144

By March, it was clear that the United States would have to furnish aid while the United Nations sorted itself out on the problem of refugees crossing four international borders. On 5 April 1991, President Bush announced the first air drops of aid to Kurdish refugees in Turkey and northern Iraq. The next day Iraq formally accepted the United Nations cease-fire terms and Task Force Provide Comfort deployed. Within a month, 11,936 U.S. personnel had erected 23,000 tents, and provided 17,000 tons of supplies to refugees in 3,901 peaceful air sorties.145

The experience of the 82d Airborne Division in Iraq with thousands of refugees was an interesting example of some of the problems soldiers encountered in this humanitarian operation. Refugees fleeing Iraq near the military demarcation line in the Euphrates River Valley began a steady migration toward the sanctuary of the 82d Airborne Division in the XVIII Airborne Corps area of operations. They had heard that, in addition to food, water and medical treatment, the Americans would provide protection from Iraqi reprisals. The refugees settled at an abandoned Polish construction camp about 35 miles southeast of An-Nasiriyah. Soldiers named the settlement "Camp Mercy." Depending on the intensity of the fighting north of the military demarcation line, Camp Mercy's population ranged from as few as 200 to as many as 6,000.

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In wide-eyed horror, the refugees recounted Saddam's atrocities against his own people in Iraq. Stories emerged of mass executions, of family members dragged through the streets lashed behind tanks, and of patients and doctors murdered in hospitals. From February 28th until March 24th, when the 82d Airborne Division departed Iraq, doctors and medics treated more than 1,100 refugees for maladies ranging from minor illnesses to gunshot wounds. Airborne soldiers distributed more than 35,000 meals. Army trucks and helicopters returned several hundred dislocated Kuwaitis to their border near Safwan and transported non-Kuwaiti and non-Iraqi refugees to a camp established by the Saudis in Iraq, just across from the Saudi border town of Rafha. Although they encouraged the refugees to return to their homes in Iraq, the paratroopers' kindness and aid continued to attract many thousands to the American sanctuary.

ARCENT's Mobile Command Post was located in Kuwait City under the command of Brigadier General Robert Frix, who dispatched his G-5 to assess the situation in Safwan. Clearly the refugees' most pressing need was for food and water, and General Frix directed his staff to purchase large quantities of basic food stuffs and bottled water and push it forward to these unfortunate people.

By the end of March, the Saudis had established a large, semi-permanent refugee holding facility, known as Rafha I, just inside the Iraqi border. Before the end of March, Rafha I contained more than 17,000 refugees. All were non-Saudis denied entry into Saudi Arabia. However, before Coalition forces could withdraw, thousands of dislocated civilians in Safwan, as-Salman, and Rafha I had to be moved out of Iraq to protect them from Iraqi retribution. At General Yeosock's personal intervention, the Saudi government agreed to build and operate a permanent refugee camp just inside Saudi Arabia. It was not indifference to the plight of their fellow man that motivated the Saudis, but rather their desire to avoid the creation of a "Gaza Strip" inside their border. To get the refugees out of Iraq sooner, Brigadier General Gene Blackwell's 2d Armored Division (Forward) built a temporary camp, Rafha II, just inside Saudi Arabia adjacent to the proposed site of the permanent Saudi refugee camp. Rafha II was a large facility, about one by one and one-half kilometers, surrounded by a concertina barbed wire fence and capable of accommodating 30,000 refugees. On each side of a bisecting road, refugees were grouped by families and organized into subcamps known as "counties." Each county had its own water, showers and latrines.

Soldiers from the 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, moved dislocated civilians from Safwan to Rafha II in late April and into early May. Many Safwan refugees who chose to go to Saudi Arabia were making a lifelong decision never to return to Iraq. When Safwan closed on May 7th, soldiers had registered more than 24,000 people and distributed more than 979,000 meals, 173,000 cases of bottled water, and 1,136,000 gallons of water. In addition, 3d Armored Division doctors and medics had treated more than 23,400 patients. Chief Warrant Officer Ben Beaoui, an Arabic-speaking physician's assistant with the 122d Main Support Battalion of the 3d Armored Division, told of his astonishment when an Iraqi woman knelt down and kissed his foot after he treated her seriously ill baby. He recalled later that as each patient left his makeshift facility, "They all said thank you and thank God for the Americans."

In Riyadh, Chaplain David Peterson, the CENTCOM Chaplain, had received reports from chaplains working with the prisoners of war and refugees that many of the Iraqis were Christians. Chaplain Peterson took the issue to the Saudi Army Department of Religious Affairs and asked if

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
some provision could be made for the accommodation of Christian worship in the prisoner of war and refugee camps. The discussion seemed to go very slowly until Chaplain Peterson mentioned that the Geneva Conventions provide for such accommodations.\footnote{147} As soon as he said the magic words, "Geneva Convention," the Saudi leaders were happy to comply with Chaplain Peterson's request. On May 8, 1991, Colonel Ellis in the J-5 office contacted the Chief of Chaplains Office with the following report: "Our military chaplains have accomplished much. In the enemy prisoner of war camps the chaplains have been attempting to provide for Muslim prisoners to practice their faith. The chaplains contacted the Saudis for what was needed, then got the engineers to build a small mosque-like structure. The chaplains then discovered that 23 percent of the enemy prisoners of war were Christian, so the chaplains went to work to see that the needs of the Christian prisoners of war also were met. The Saudis noted all of this, set up their prisoner of war camps for the Muslim prisoners, then had the Christian chaplains help them set up worship opportunities in similar fashion for the Christian prisoners of war in their own camps."\footnote{148} This event, according to the J-5 office, was one of the first times that the Saudis actively created opportunities for Christians to worship publically in Saudi Arabia.

**U. S. Army Kuwait**

On the 12th of April, the ministry of the Special Operations chaplains under the leadership of Captain Larry Mack concluded with re-deployment. Over the course of two months, these chaplains had provided 86 worship\footnote{149} services, conducted 336 counselling sessions and, with the help of their assistants and other personnel, distributed more than 200 tons of food to the hungry people of Kuwait City. During the spring and summer, Chaplain Vince Inghilterra, the 22d Support Command Chaplain in Dhahran, continued to supervise and supply much of the ministry effort by chaplains in Kuwait. In November of 1991, Chaplain Inghilterra, by then the Theater chaplain, assigned Chaplain Daniel J.G.G. Block to be the staff chaplain, United States Army Kuwait.\footnote{150} Accompanying Chaplain Block was Chaplain Joseph Brando, a Catholic priest, Master Sergeant Bill Neuiszer, and Specialist Lisa Palmer. Upon the arrival of Chaplain Block and the other members of his unit ministry team at Camp Doha, Kuwait, the only building available to serve as a chapel was an empty warehouse. In less than 120 days, Sergeant Neuiszer and many volunteers transformed the warehouse into a first class worship facility which continued through 1994 to serve the soldiers remaining in Kuwait.

Chaplain Block's facilities at Camp Doha were next to the United Nations Command Observers' Base (South). There was fairly free movement between their facility and the chapel. Because the observers had no chapel or chaplains to support them, the unit ministry team for U.S. Army Kuwait filled that need. Chaplain Block recalled:

"A few days before Christmas 1991, when the Soviet Union was on the brink of disbanding, the Soviet officers assigned to the United Nations Command did not know what would happen to their families, to their jobs or to their country. Far away from home, they had no security; and because they were official atheists, the chaplains..."
Chaplain O. Wayne Smith conducts Memorial Service in Kuwait, Headquarters Troop, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, February, 1991
had had little interaction with them. Then one day, while most of the UMT members were outside the chapel, the Russians 'invaded the sanctuary.' Several Soviet officers entered my office and declared 'we pray now' and all of us did. We prayed for their families, for their country and for their future. For these few minutes we gathered around an altar built by soldiers, within a chapel built by soldiers, and shared our fears and our hopes as soldiers—regardless of nationality. The Soviets returned to their country, and did not enter the chapel again."

Among other ministries in Kuwait City, Chaplain Joe Brando conducted the first legal wedding of U.S. Army personnel in Kuwait. Other unit ministry team members organized Christmas caroling and worship services for the United Nations Command as well as for U.S. Army troops stationed in Kuwait.

The ministry in Kuwait City was important as the Kuwaitis and Americans attempted to care for 600,000 residents. Seven hundred oil wells had to be capped and fires put out. Mines and booby traps had to be cleared from beaches and then inspections of 1,260 hospitals, schools and telecommunications centers made. Damage to these facilities had to be assessed and repaired. As the New York Times reported, "It is the American Army that has turned the electricity back on in Kuwait City, got the water running, cleared the highways of shrapnel and wrecked cars, hooked up those telephones that worked, dredged the main port and unloaded the ships, brought the drinking water and food, fixed the police cars, and fed the animals in the zoo." General Frix's recovery units formed what was known as "Task Force Freedom." The Task Force was a tremendous success. During its tenure, not a single Kuwaiti died from lack of water, medical care, or food. In addition, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Kuwait Emergency Recovery Organization surveyed and restored major infrastructure systems and facilities in Kuwait. It worked on electrical substations, water mains, two sea ports, the international airport, and more than 160 public schools and buildings, including police, fire, medical, ministerial headquarters, and defense facilities. In the first ten months after the liberation of Kuwait, the Corps of Engineers contracted and managed $300 million dollars in repair work done by major American and foreign construction firms.

By the summer of 1992, most of the repair work had been completed in Kuwait. A small battalion of U.S. Army troops remained to run the port. Chaplain Block and Chaplain Brando, with their assistants, Sergeant Neiszer and Specialist Palmer, who had gotten married, returned to the United States. In the tradition of the Chaplain Corps, however, as long as there were troops in the theatre, a chaplain remained with them. In August of 1992, Chaplain David Somerville, an Episcopalian, reported to Kuwait City as Chaplain Block's replacement. Chaplain Somerville continued a wide ranging ministry not only with the American soldiers at the port, but also with various embassy personnel as well.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Conclusion

From August 2, 1990, to August 1, 1992, some half-million American military personnel had joined the military forces of 37 nations to effect the liberation of Kuwait. Although casualties were relatively light in comparison to operations of the same magnitude in World War II, the situation could have been drastically different had the Iraqis attacked early in 1990 during Operation Desert Shield. Providentially, most things that could go right for the Americans, and indeed for the Coalition allies, did. Many of the leaders of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm including the Commander in Chief, General Schwarzkopf, and the CENTCOM Chaplain, David Peterson, were Vietnam veterans. The mistakes of policy during the Vietnam War were not only avoided but also reversed by the Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience. President Bush had been able to gain a strong and effective consensus among the Coalition members for a limited military objective. There was no "body count" policy nor were enemy personnel themselves deliberately targeted. The objective to destroy the machines of war and to liberate the Kuwaiti people from their horrific occupation met with accolades throughout the world. As Chaplain Peterson observed after Operation Desert Storm: "The hand of God was clearly with us." In assessing the performance of unit ministry teams in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the ministries of chaplains with their chaplain assistants set the standard and provided a model for future deployments of the same type. There was not one operation in Southwest Asia, but rather a series of operations. The Americans taught the Saudi Arabians and their Muslim allies how to be tolerant of other people's customs and religious traditions. The Americans provided gigantic support for rebuilding Kuwait and for caring for refugees and prisoners of war.

As Chaplain Donald Shea, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, reflected: "My greatest joy was that the training and doctrine which the Chaplain Corps had developed over the last 15 years proved effective in providing ministry to hundreds of thousands of military personnel of various faiths throughout all of the Operations in Southwest Asia, and that in the course of such difficult ministries, involving more than 1,100 unit ministry team members, we did not lose a single chaplain or chaplain assistant." General Schwarzkopf, when asked how he assessed the performance of the Army's chaplains and chaplain assistants during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, replied without hesitation, "They exceeded all of my expectations. Even without their crosses and tablets, they continued to minister to soldiers. They showed that they knew what their true mission was."
Chaplains at Arkansas National Guard Evac Hospital; (Bottom L-R) Chaplains Greg Hill and John Rasmussen record lessons learned
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid., p. 371.

6. Chaplain Sydnor, "Historical Synopsis," p. 44. Note: MOPP-4 refers to "Mission Oriented Protective Posture" level 4, or a full chemical protective suit with mask.

7. Ibid., p. 45.

8. Ibid., p. 50.

9. Ibid., p. 44.

10. Ibid., p. 45.

11. Ibid., p. 57.

12. Ibid., p. 51-52.


14. Ibid.


17. Ibid., p. 413.
18. Ibid., p. 414.


20. The following account of the worship service for President Bush was taken from a personal interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Matthew A. Zimmerman, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 4 April 1994.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


28. Ibid.


31. Chaplain Goldstein demonstrated that his beard would not prevent a good seal for his protective (gas) mask as well. All soldiers had to be protected against chemical attack whether they were in Saudi Arabia, Israel or elsewhere in the SWA Theater.


36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.


40. Ibid.


43. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) William Hufham, 16 Dec 1993.

44. Ibid.

45. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) David Zalis, Ft McPherson, 8 June 1993.


47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., p. 149.


53. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Herb Kitchens, Ft. Gillem, GA, 29 Dec 93.

54. Ibid.

55. Words and music copyrighted by Chaplain Kitchens.


57. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Dan Davis, USA Rtd., 18 April 1994.


59. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Dan Davis, 18 April 1994.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.


64. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) William Hufham, 82nd Airborne Division Chaplain in Operation Desert Storm, 16 Dec 1993.


66. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) William Hufham, 16 Dec 1993.


68. Personal interview with Chaplain Tom Solhjem, 5 May 1994.

69. Personal interview with Chaplain Herb Kitchens, 29 Dec 1993


71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., p. 223.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid., p. 224.

76. Ibid.


78. Ibid.

79. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) John Cottingham, 25 May 1995.

80. Ibid., p. 226.

81. Ibid.


84. Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Jere Kimmell, Ft Belvoir, 28 Sep 1994. Chaplain Kimmell provided information from Colonel John Sylvester’s After Action Report and from *The Fort Hood Sentinel* regarding the activities of the Tiger Brigade in Operation Desert Storm.


89. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Dennis Camp, 11 Oct 94.


92. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Wayne Lehrer, 7 Dec 1993.


99. Interview with Chaplain (Col.) David Peterson, 27 Sep 93.


105. Ibid.

106. Ibid. and interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Jere Kimmell, 28 Sep 94.


108. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Dan Davis, 18 April 1994.


111. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Dan Davis, 18 April 1994.

112. Ibid.


116. Ibid., p. 83.

117. Ibid., p. 84.

118. Ibid., p. 83.


120. Personal interview with Chaplain Joe R. Colley, 4 Jan 94.

121. Personal interview with Chaplain John Schmeling, 25 May 94.

122. Personal interview with Ch (Col.) Horace Duke, 25 May 94. Chaplain Duke also recalled passing out 70,000 Desert Storm Bibles to redeploying soldiers.

123. List supplied by Ch (COol.) John Schmeling, 25 May 94.

124. Personal interview with Ch (Col.) John Schmeling, 25 May 94.
125. Chaplain (Col.) John Brinsfield's Desert Storm Diary, Chaplain Corps Archives.


129. Ibid.

130. Most of the following information came from a personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) David Zalis, Ft McPherson, 8 June 93 and from an interview with Chaplain (Col.) David Peterson. Ft McPherson, 27 Sep 1993.

131. Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Matthew Zimmerman, 17 June 95.

132. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Gaylord Hatler, 3 May 93.


135. Ibid., p. 90.

136. Ibid., p. 93.


138. Chaplain (Col.) David Peterson, Files from the CENTCOM Staff Chaplain's Office, file 4. Chaplain Corps Archives.

139. Ibid.

140. Personal interview with Ch (Col.) Dennis Camp, 12 Sep 94.

141. Personal interview with Chaplain (Colonel) John Scott, 24 Dec 1994. Chaplain (Col.) James A. Edgren, Director of Information, Resource Management, and Logistics (IRML) had tasked this staff in August of 1990 to try to locate a supply of Bibles sufficient for a major deployment of troops. Chaplain Gary Councell, Chaplain Donald Hanchett, and Mrs. Laura Dobson worked with their contacts and the American and International Bible Societies to obtain quick delivery of durable, pocket-sized editions. The Gideons donated thousands of New Testaments which were
immediately available. Chaplain David Peterson, the CENTCOM Chaplain, secured permission from the Saudi Ministry on Religious Affairs for Bibles to be flown into Saudi Arabia by military aircraft. After the Bibles started arriving, Chaplain Peterson wrote, "...never in my life have I seen so many service-men reading the Bible." See "Bible Demand," Chicago Sun Times, Saturday, July 20, 1991, p.14; and Chaplain (Col.) Gary Councell, "Resourcing the Chaplaincy," unpublished manuscript, U.S. Army War College, 1994, p.24.

142. Personal interview with Ch (Col.) Gay Hatler, 3 May 93.

143. Ibid. Copies of the UMTCT Executive Summaries are in the Chaplain Corps Archives for Operation Desert Shield/Storm.


146. Chaplain (Maj.) R.W. Collins, 4th Brigade (AVN), 3d ID, was deployed to Turkey as well in May to support soldiers flying supplies to refugee camps in northern Iraq. See Chaplain (Col.) G.T. Gunhus, "Operation Desert Storm," USAREUR After Action Report, TAB XYZ. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.

147. Ch (Col.) David Peterson interview, 27 Sep 93.


149. Chaplain Inghilterra, assisted by Chaplains Rolando, Mullins, Lemoi, Kelly, and Cromartie, all from the Reserve components, was supervising religious support throughout Saudi Arabia which included 24 additional chaplains and their assistants at King Khalid Military City, Riyadh, Dhahran, and other sites on 24 June 1991. Chaplain Inghilterra, moreover, was planning for the arrival of 10,000 replacement soldiers, many from Fort Dix, when the Reservists redeployed in September. See Chaplain (Lt. Col.) William DeLeo, U.S. FORSCOM Memorandum, 24 June 1991, p.1. Copy in the Chaplain Corps Archives.


151. Ibid.


154. Chap (Col.) Peterson Interview, 27 Sep 93.

155. Personal interview with Chaplain (Brig. Gen.) Donald Shea, DACH, 10 Jan 1994.

JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO:

Religious Support
(Top) Sergeant Martin Cuellar, Lay Eucharistic Minister, and (Bottom) Chaplain Sidney J. Marceaux serve communion to Haitians.
CHAPTER V

MINISTRY TO HAITIAN MIGRANTS:
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO

1991-1992

For all the world like minstry in a bus station...
Chaplain Robert Collins

The Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was a joint service task force involved in humanitarian assistance to Haitian migrants.1 Over the course of two years, more than 34,000 Haitians including 800 unaccompanied children were rescued from sinking and unseaworthy boats in the Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti and delivered to Guantanamo Bay by U.S. Coast Guard cutters. Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) consisted of administrative support, civil affairs, medical, dental, security, billeting, and religious support personnel from all branches of the Armed Forces and Reserves, acting in conjunction with representatives from the U.S. Department of Justice, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Public Health Service, the Community Relations Service, the International Organization for Migrants, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Haitians picked up by Coast Guard cutters were brought to temporary camps at the U.S. Naval Base where they were permitted to apply for political asylum in the United States. While they were awaiting decisions from the INS on their requests, they received food, clothing, medical care, and spiritual support from Joint Task Force personnel.

An important aspect of the JTF's work was the provision of spiritual support and religious ministry to the migrants.2 The Haitians were deeply religious and at times superstitious, and the presence of JTF chaplains and enlisted religious support personnel in the migrant camps contributed greatly to the maintenance of order in the camps and calmed the fears of the migrants, who, due to a history of military repression in their homeland, were fearful and distrustful of personnel in military uniforms.

The activities of military chaplains and their assistants were an integral part of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo. No concerted effort was made in the early days to document the activities of the JTF Chaplain's Office, so the history of this ministry is in large part based on comments gleaned from after-action reports, weekly statistical reports, interviews, and personal awards citations.

Historical Background

The first report of significant numbers of Haitians entering the United States was in 1972, shortly after Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier, the military dictator of Haiti and "President for Life," named his son, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc," as his successor. What little stability Haiti's government enjoyed under the Duvaliers disappeared in 1986 with Jean-Claude's forced resignation and exile to France, a result of pressure from the United States as well as other nations. The violent repression

See endnotes at end of chapter.
of the Haitian people under the Duvaliers was only a precursor to that practiced by a series of military governments that came and went in the next six years.\(^3\)

It has been estimated that, between 1972 and 1982, more than 55,000 Haitian boat people migrated to Florida. Probably fewer than half were detected, so the actual number may have been greater than 100,000. In 1981 the U.S. and Haiti signed an agreement in which the United States agreed to intercept Haitian boats and return the migrants to Haiti. Migrants were given the chance to apply for asylum as political refugees but, of the 24,000 boat people rescued between 1980 and 1990, only eight were admitted to the U.S. for further interviews, and only three were granted asylum. From January 1990 through August of 1991, only 20 were admitted to the U.S. for further screening, and none was granted asylum.

In September 1991, a coup overthrew the elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the return to military dictatorship brought a sharp increase in emigration. U.S. Coast Guard cutters began rescuing large numbers of migrants from flimsy boats, then sinking the boats to prevent their re-use or their possible danger to other craft as floating hazards. By 14 November, eighteen cutters, each with over 400 migrants aboard, were anchored in Guantánamo Bay. The decision was made to bring the migrants ashore and to establish temporary shelter for them. Navy Chaplain Scott Davis' account of the first 48 hours of this operation illustrated some of the problems the support people faced:

A camp was established and the entire base pitched in to help. Security transported them from the piers to the camps. The Navy Exchange donated clothes, towels, soap, toothpaste, and toothbrushes, and I transported that stuff from the Exchange to the camp in the chapel van. The hospital staff gave each refugee a physical and treated any conditions that were discovered. The Seabees built shelters, wired the camp for electricity, established latrines, and set up lighting. The mess hall set up a place to feed them. And the chaplains (there were only two of us here at the time) began moving about seeing to any overlooked needs, comforting refugees, and encouraging workers. The chapel staff instituted clothing and toy drives and the residents of the base donated these items by the truckloads. One lady even organized her street into baking cookies for all the refugees and the workers.

The first night's work lasted until after midnight. We processed 487. I had two primary tasks. The refugees were scared and didn't trust anyone. But they did trust the cross on my collar and I was able to persuade bus load after bus load that they were safe and that we were all acting in their best interests ...

By the second day, with the camp population growing, no one knew what to do with them once we had processed them, cleaned and clothed them, and fed them. But Christian worship is a worldwide common denominator. The other chaplain, Commander Bruce Martin, and I began holding three or four services a day, both in the camp and on board the various ships that had not yet off-loaded.\(^4\)

\(^3\) See endnotes at end of chapter.
Navy Chaplains Davis and Martin were assigned to Guantanamo, but not to any task force with responsibility for Haitian ministry. Their voluntary service was so valuable, however, that chaplains became an essential part of the subsequent JTF manning roster.5

The massive exodus from Haiti, coupled with a U.S. Court-issued restraining order halting repatriation of Haitians, made it clear that a larger, organized response was needed. On 30 November, Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay was formed. The United States Army was given overall charge of camp security for migrants, while the Air Force established Camp Harvest Eagle to house the 2,000 military personnel assigned to the JTF. The Marines expanded facilities for Haitians at Camp Bulkeley—a Marine Reserve training camp—and began building the McCalla Camps, marking off sections of the abandoned McCalla Airfield with concertina wire and erecting tents. The Navy provided medical care, converting the unused Blue Caribe Restaurant building at McCalla Airfield into a hospital. From the beginning, the ministry of the chaplains and their assistants was three-fold: ministry to the military personnel working with the Haitians, ministry to the Haitians themselves, and interfacing with the military on behalf of the Haitians.

Formation of Joint Religious Support

Joint Task Force Guantanamo (GTMO) was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) through the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) for command and control purposes. CINCLANT tasked Army, Air Force, and Navy component organizations, ARLANT, AFLANT, and CINCLANT Fleet for equipment and personnel requirements.

Because of the large number of migrants and the humanitarian nature of the operation, chaplains and chaplain assistants were critical assets. However, as the operation was refined at JCS and CINCLANT levels, no joint service religious support doctrine existed, nor was a chaplain assigned to JCS or CINCLANT to ensure that a religious support plan or annex was included in the operation plan or order.

The CINCLANT Fleet Chaplain, Captain Fred Rothermel, USN, was dual-hatted to serve also as the CINCLANT Chaplain for Operation GTMO.6 This position evolved from the need for a senior chaplain supervisor after the JTF was formed.7 The JTF Chaplain assignment rotated each 90 days as did the chaplain and chaplain assistant personnel in general. The JTF Staff Chaplains for the period December 1991 to June 1992 were: Chaplain E.L. Goss, Jr. (USN); Chaplain William C. Graham, (USAR); and Chaplain James L. McDonald, (USAR).

Although CINCLANT questioned the assignment of Army Reserve component chaplains to the JTF position, Chaplain (Brig. Gen.) Donald Shea, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, supported these assignments by direction of Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Matthew Zimmerman, the Army Chief of Chaplains.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) Chaplain William Graham, USAR, JTF Staff Chaplain in Guantanamo; (Bottom) Haitian girl smiles behind barbed wire...
There were no active duty chaplain colonels available for 90-day assignments to the JTF due to the press of other worldwide Chaplain Corps missions. Moreover, Chaplain Zimmerman was confident that Army Reserve component chaplains would do an outstanding job, just as they had done the year before in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

U.S. Forces Command was tasked by the JCS to furnish Army chaplain and chaplain assistant personnel for the operation in Cuba. Chaplain David P. Peterson, formerly the CENTCOM Chaplain in Operation Desert Storm, was the FORSCOM Staff Chaplain and thus was responsible for Army unit ministry team support. Chaplain Peterson’s staff, involved in multiple duties, supported the operation by recruiting Reserve component UMTs and by requesting orders and deploying both active and Reserve component chaplains and assistants.

Chaplain Lawrence Kelly coordinated the work of the staff. Chaplain Thomas Cook, the Training, Mobilization, and Military Operations Officer for the FORSCOM chaplain, interfaced with the FORSCOM Operations Center on a daily basis to brief the personnel team on GTMOs growing personnel requirements. Chaplain Raymond Ennis, USAR, Mastr Sgt. Mike Morris, and Chaplain John Brinsfield, Personnel and Ecclesiastical Relations Officer for the FORSCOM chaplain, worked with Major Tom Syracuse at FORSCOM headquarters to identify and deploy chaplains and chaplain assistants. Eventually requirements became so heavy that the Staff Chaplain sections at U.S. Army Personnel Center, St. Louis, the National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., the U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, and the various CONUS Armies throughout the United States assisted in the recruitment and deployment process.

Organizing for Ministry

The most difficult task we had in Operation Guantanamo was finding Roman Catholic chaplains who could speak Creole French.... Chaplain Larry Racster, ARPERCEN

The first alert order for the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office came just hours after Operation GTMO began. Chaplain Tom Cook announced on December 1 that CINCLANT had requested that two Roman Catholic chaplains, fluent in the French Creole language, report to Navy Base Guantanamo before Christmas. At first Chaplain Ennis and Chaplain Brinsfield thought the message was a joke. There were barely enough Roman Catholic chaplains available to cover active duty units. What unit commander or civilian bishop, for that matter, would willingly allow a Roman Catholic priest to leave at Christmas for Cuba and, moreover, where does one find priests who speak Creole French? FORSCOM did not recognize April Fools’ Day in December, however, so a serious search began.

Chaplain Larry Racster, the personnel action officer for Individual Ready Reservist chaplains at the Army Personnel Center in St. Louis, screened his records for priests who could speak French. Staff chaplains from the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th Continental U.S. Armies looked for Reserve troop unit volunteers, and the National Guard Bureau checked its files to help meet the same requirements. At the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Mr. Roger Able and Chaplain Robert Lair, the DACH Reserve

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Advisor, searched their computer for all available Roman Catholic chaplains throughout the Total Army.

Given the short response time involved, FORSCOM had little choice but to send an active duty Catholic chaplain to meet at least part of the CINCLANT requirement until the Reserve components had time to locate volunteers. With the approval of Chaplain Don Shea, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, FORSCOM requested through XVIII Airborne Corps command channels that Ft. Stewart, Georgia, deploy Chaplain Gerald Pincence to Cuba.

Chaplain Pincence, a veteran of Operation Desert Storm, was one of only a half-dozen chaplains in the Army who had the necessary language skills to minister effectively to Haitian migrants. Upon notification, Chaplain Pincence left Fort Stewart immediately to become the Army's first chaplain to be deployed in this major humanitarian operation.

The first Catholic chaplain from the Reserves to volunteer had all of the prerequisites needed as well. Chaplain Sidney J. Marceaux, a Desert Storm veteran from Beaumont, Texas, was eager and able to help. Chaplain Marceaux, a Monsignor and a diocesan canon lawyer in the Roman Catholic Church, had served several units in the 6th U.S. Army area. With the permission of his bishop to serve for 60 days, Chaplain Marceaux departed for Guantanamo on December 12.

Marceaux was the senior Army chaplain in Cuba for several weeks. Known as "le blanc pere," the white priest, he was immediately accepted by the Haitian children. "They were on me as soon as I walked into camp; I was pulled in every direction," he recalled. Working 12 hours a day, seven days a week, Chaplains Marceaux and Chaplain Pincence established a model for ministry for the chaplains who followed them.

When Chaplain Marceaux returned to Texas, he brought letters from Haitians looking for relatives in the United States. He also brought a photograph of himself taken with General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who thanked Chaplain Marceaux for his ministry to the Haitian people at a critical time for them and for the military personnel assisting them.

Eventually 50 Army chaplains and chaplain assistants deployed to Navy Base Guantanamo to assist in the humanitarian effort. Eleven chaplains and eight assistants were from the active component, twenty chaplains and five assistants from the USAR, and two chaplains and four assistants from the National Guard.

Chaplain E.L. Goss, Jr., CAPT, USN, the first JTF chaplain, organized the joint chaplain and chaplain assistant teams to cover specific camps. Each of the 2,500 person camps, four in all, had two chaplains assigned, one Catholic and one Protestant. Assistants were assigned to help the chaplains without regard to service, so some Army chaplains had Air Force assistants, some Navy chaplains had Army assistants. While this plan was not popular with the ministry teams at first, it proved to be workable and helped familiarize team members with the way other services conducted ministry.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force maintained separate supply channels for chaplain ecclesiastical items and equipment. At times one service would supply its chaplains well while another service would lag behind. The JTF staff chaplains were constantly balancing and shifting personnel and equipment to cover requirements. In the absence of any real joint doctrine, each JTF

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
chaplain experimented with "workable" arrangements and sought feedback in daily staff meetings with the members.

Life in the camps was not always easy. More than 200 of the Haitian migrants were HIV positive or had fully developed AIDS. Many were bored or angry. Some contemplated suicide rather than returning to Haiti. Others attempted to smoke pieces of tent rope and got sick.\textsuperscript{10} Ministry to the hundreds of unaccompanied minors, ranging from toddlers to teenagers, who were placed on leaky boats by parents hopeful that they would find food, medicine, and freedom in the United States, was taxing to the chaplains, the assistants, and to the Military Police. Some incidents of rape by young Haitian males and sexual fraternization by camp personnel were reported as well as cases of assault and battery. Sergeant Martin Cuellar, a chaplain assistant from Texas and a lay brother in the Franciscan Order, helped quell more than one impending riot among Haitians upset by the slow progress of their "repatriation."

On the Haitian side, among other attributes, the chaplains represented safety. Most Haitians' experiences with people in military uniforms had been negative, and the migrants were fearful of the military and uncertain about accepting anything from them. Chaplain Scott Davis reported that the Haitians even refused to drink from a military "water buffalo," or trailer, until it had been blessed by the chaplain to ensure that there was no voodoo curse on it and the military had not poisoned it.\textsuperscript{11} Only after the chaplain had blessed the water and taken the first drink would the Haitians accept the water. The cross on the chaplain's uniform was recognized by the migrants, and they knew the wearer of the cross could be trusted. In many cases of unrest in the camps, the camp staff would send first for the military police, and then for the chaplain to calm the crowd.

The Haitians were very warm, open, and emotional people and they quickly accepted the chaplains and assistants into their community. Indeed, the extent to which the religious support team members became involved in the lives of the migrants was limited more by the military guidelines and the chaplains' and assistants' own physical and emotional stamina than by any reluctance on the part of the Haitians to include them.

When Chaplain William Graham, USAR, arrived in February 1992 as the second JTF staff chaplain, he found a group of chaplains and chaplain assistants with mixed emotions about the ministry there. The policy of assigning chaplains and assistants from different services to work together as "purple" (i.e. combined) religious support teams, Army chaplains with Navy assistants for example, had created confusion because of differences in doctrine, training, organization, and tradition in the Navy, Air Force and Army. Chaplain Graham solved this problem by assigning new chaplains and assistants arriving in Guantanamo according to their service. The JTF Chaplain's office was "purple" but the teams were all Army, Navy or Air Force. The "older" teams remained mixed until their rotation back home.\textsuperscript{12}

Personnel issues took a great deal of time. There was a constant need for Roman Catholic chaplains from all services since majority of the Haitians were of that faith. Chaplain Goss, the first JTF staff chaplain, had enlisted the help of a civilian Haitian priest, Father Jacques Fabre, to help with ministry. Father Fabre spoke fluent Creole and was very effective with the people. However, Father Fabre had no written job description or contract for payment of services, which made his status and

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
support difficult. Moreover, Father Fabre disagreed with U.S. policy and eventually joined in a suit against the government to force admission of all the Haitians into the United States.\textsuperscript{13}

Chaplain Graham, with the support of the FORSCOM Chaplain, received five Roman Catholic chaplains from the Army Reserves or National Guard to serve from February through the Easter season in 1992. Chaplain Graham, in a report to Chaplain Ennis and Chaplain Brinsfield at FORSCOM, noted that he had more Catholic chaplains at Guantanamo than were assigned to most active duty installations.\textsuperscript{14}

Another time consuming, but essential, duty was coordinating with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Public Health Service, and the Community Relations Service. The JTF Staff Chaplain worked many issues with these agencies and found their participation invaluable. Chaplain Graham recalled that his senior enlisted assistant, RPC Robin Holdren, USN, was a tremendous asset to his office in her ability to communicate ministry concerns through regular Navy operational channels to the appropriate agency.\textsuperscript{15}

As the population of the camps continued to swell, the hours grew longer, and the desperation of the Haitians' situation became more apparent, religious support teams found themselves becoming overwhelmed. Approximately one month after the establishment of the Joint Task Force, Chaplain Earl V. DeBleux, USAF, noted in his weekly report: "Chaplain staff feeling a sense of helplessness in the Haitian situation. Their future outcomes, the barrage of questions that we have no answers for, and the very deep emotional worship services have played havoc with our feelings."\textsuperscript{16} As chaplains and assistants rotated through Guantanamo on short tours, sometimes programs suffered if their replacements were delayed. Chaplain Charles B. Hagearty, USAR, noted that "when I got there in May I found the Catholic program in disarray ... no rosaries, Bibles, or anything; but having had French I learned to do some translating into Creole."\textsuperscript{17}

The result of the chaplains' ministry also was emotionally taxing at times. Chaplain Patrick J. Fletcher, USAF, told of a 16-year-old Haitian boy who, as a result of the trauma of the situation, kept completely to himself and refused to talk to anyone in any language. He began to respond, however, when Chaplain Fletcher showed him some attention. Chaplain Fletcher wrote: "I hugged him, bringing him close to my heart. 'You're never alone. God is always with you,' I told him. A tear came down his stone-like face. Next day he volunteered as an altar-boy. After Mass he said something. He spoke to me in fluent French—a sign of education. All the Haitians around us were dumbfounded."\textsuperscript{18}

**Camp Problems**

Because of the many steps involved in the screening process, migrants were moved from camp to camp as they progressed. Therefore, one of the important ministries of the religious support teams was reuniting families who had gotten separated in the many moves. Chaplain Claude Newby, USA, assisted personally in helping families visit between camps. Chaplains also ministered to the military police who had to provide security. Chaplain James McDonald, USAR, the third JTF Chaplain,
wrote: "Chaplains offered encouragement, support and a listening ear to the security police who worked long hours to perform a humanitarian mission. This was not a POW camp."10

Another frequently encountered problem was the frustration and anger among the migrants at the length of the time involved in the screening process. Some migrants were in the camps for three or four months before a decision was made on their status. Others were "screened-in"—selected for transport to the U.S.—and had to wait months for an available flight to Miami.

Some Haitians gave up on the process and volunteered for repatriation to Haiti. The chaplains were called upon to counsel them because some had a "sense of shame and failure for not having achieved their goal of being 'screened in' to go to the U.S."20

As the population swelled toward 12,325 in the last week of January 1992, another 1,500 migrants arrived, and there were reports of "too many boats to be counted" in the waters of Haiti. The ministry teams and camp staff braced for trouble on 22 January, when a court hearing on the status of migrants was scheduled. During this period of time, chaplains and chaplain assistants distributed 4,000 French Bibles, 500 New Testaments, and "a few thousand" Psalm books to help the migrants cope with the situation and pass the time.21

Ministry to military personnel (and to each other) continued as well. The Army Civil Affairs personnel responsible for the camps were beginning to show the stress of long hours and heavy responsibility, and counselling for stress and burnout became a part of the chaplains' daily routine. Many of the statistical reports mentioned volleyball, basketball, and fishing tournaments organized by the chaplains to help the JTF members unwind.

VIP Visits

A visit to JTF by Admiral Leon A. Edney and General Colin Powell the second week of January led to some unexpected ministry opportunities. Chaplain Fletcher reported that pastoral presence and counseling were necessary for some of the military police who were not visited personally by Admiral Edney or General Powell—"they felt left out and overlooked."22

Even the Martin Luther King, Jr., memorial service held on 20 January increased the demand for pastoral services because it was made a mandatory military formation. Navy Chaplain Timothy J. Koester reported "increased frustration and complaining in Harvest Eagle" or, more specifically, "complaints about being forced to attend a religious ceremony."23

The migrant population peaked at 12,325 during the week of 27 January to 2 February 1992. Twenty worship services were conducted in the migrant camps that week, "a record high," despite several complications. A shortage of vehicles assigned to the Chaplains Section caused great difficulty in the coordination of transportation. A chicken pox epidemic on two cutters resulted in the removal of all the migrants from the two ships to quarantine in Camp V, where chaplains and chaplain assistants who had not had the disease were barred from entry.

Dr. Benjamin Hooks, head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, visited the migrant camps at this time, but his visit was not announced to the Haitians. Chaplain Fletcher, however, informed the migrants at Camp Buckeley; more than 500 turned out to see Dr. Hooks.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Also at this time, the chaplain/chaplain assistant assignment process was reorganized, and chaplains and their assistants were granted one day off each week. The term "religious support team" was adopted as the official designation of the chaplain/enlisted ministry unit.

Repatriation Stress

February 1992, began with a major storm blowing through Guantanamo, bringing high winds that tore down and flooded tents in the migrant camps. The population began to decline as court rulings lifted the restraining order and allowed repatriation of the migrants to resume. Chaplains were called upon to calm disturbances in the camps when it was learned that a group of screened-out migrants were told that they were going to the hospital for medical tests. Once on the bus, they were informed that they were instead going to the cutters for repatriation. The effects of this event continued to be seen weeks later. Migrants awaiting flights to Miami sought assurance from the chaplains that they were indeed going to Miami and not back to Haiti.

Religious support teams in Camp IV were called upon to work overtime dealing with despair and disappointment among the residents, all of whom were scheduled for repatriation. An ecumenical service for all migrants was held to commemorate the anniversary of Jean-Bertrand Aristide's election.

Seven new chaplains and a like number of assistants arrived to begin ministry, and opportunities quickly presented themselves as camp rules became more restrictive. Sealed letters were no longer allowed to be passed between camps; only open postcards were permitted, and chaplains were no longer allowed to deliver cards directly from one migrant to another. Instead, all mail had to be placed in a box in the camp commander's tent.

In Camp III, sick migrants went unfed for several days because they were unable to stand in the food line and the food service crews would not allow anyone to take food to them. Fortunately, chaplains were able to intervene quickly and resolve the issue of food service. The illnesses were harder to cure. Chaplain David McClary, USAR, noted and documented cases of tuberculosis, chicken pox, AIDS, and cancer in his camp along with "starving children." He said he felt like a missionary just trying to save lives.24

Migrants continued to fear repatriation. One jumped overboard from a cutter, clutching his Bible, preferring to die rather than to return to Haiti. He was rescued by the Coast Guard, and returned to Haiti. On the other hand, many of the migrants "screened in" to go to the United States had never flown on an airplane before and were afraid, so chaplains began accompanying them to the airplanes.

On the positive side, an ecumenical JTF Choir was formed, and on 23 February a Religious Praise Concert was held at the main open-air theater for all Naval Station residents. The JTF Mass Choir and the United Jamaican Fellowship—whose members were contract employees of the Navy or of civilian contract agencies—sang for an hour and a half for more than 500 appreciative spectators.

The professional relationship between JTF chaplains and the government civilian agencies processing the migrants was demonstrated by the fact that when several migrants volunteered to

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return to Haiti, Immigration and Naturalization Service officers asked JTF chaplains to counsel with them first. The INS wanted to be sure they had considered their decisions carefully.

Ministry to JTF personnel was enhanced by the erection of a chapel tent at Camp Harvest Eagle. This eliminated the need to beg or borrow space for Sunday services. Chaplain Phillip Spence from the 503rd Military Police Battalion borrowed a hymn player from Fort Bragg to supplement the music available for these worship services.

Boredom and stress among the military personnel began to increase as the migrant population decreased, leading several chaplains to express concern over "drinking, bad language, noise at night and sexual behavior" in the U.S. Forces' camp, in the words of Chaplain DeBlieux. To create alternative activities, the JTF religious support teams and the base chapel combined for a joint picnic, and JTF Chaplains Section personnel organized a Mardi Gras carnival for the Haitian children at Camp Bulkeley. Chaplain F.M. Belue from the 3rd Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg secured more than 100 soccer balls from Navy supply for three Haitian camps. Chaplains organized competitive soccer games between the Haitian camps. "The Haitians loved the sport though they played without shoes because they had none," one chaplain recalled.

With the beginning of repatriation came screening for the HIV virus of those hopeful of going to Miami. Those Haitians testing positive were housed at Camp Bulkeley, and chaplains were called upon increasingly to counsel military personnel afraid of contracting AIDS from the Haitians. Chaplain Arthur "Ben" Salinero, USAR, the only chaplain to serve two tours at Guantanamo, worked with many of these support personnel. Chaplain Salinero wrote:

When my ministry to the Haitians began, other chaplains were completing their 90-day commitments. I noticed that the Haitians were completely drained—physically, mentally, emotionally and spiritually. Some were justifiably angry with the system that was separating some families. Some were being sent to one part of the United States, some to other parts, and some back to Haiti. The nature of a chaplain is to be compassionate and it was hard to accept families being torn apart. But to be fair, the confusion was not completely of our own making. Much of the confusion was culturally induced by the names the Haitians used; it seemed that everybody was a part of somebody else's family.

My ministry to Camp V was interesting. The camps were filled with Haitians wearing brightly colored clothing. Children played in the camps. Water came from water buffaloes. The meals consisted of oatmeal in the morning, fruit for lunch, and dinner consisted of black or red beans and rice. The camps were surrounded by barbed wire for control purposes. The Haitians would bathe openly.

Three or four times a week we held worship services in two GP medium tents that were latched together. It was not unusual for a service to last two hours because they loved to sing, praise God and pray. It was here that I found that the musical instruments I brought were worth their weight in gold. Over the next 90 days, I

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
learned to be a pretty good drummer on the bongos. Occasionally a prayer service would last all night long. This too was an eye opener to a pastor, to be in a service where the congregation was not watching the clock to see when the service would be over.27

By 1 March, 24 chaplains and 20 chaplain assistants were in place as the migrant population continued to decline, dropping below 3,000. Redeployment plans were set into motion, and eleven chaplains and nine assistants departed in the month of March. Camp IV was emptied and closed, and all non-HIV residents were moved out of Camp Bulkeley.

While the population was decreasing, the challenges to the ministry teams were not. Counseling with HIV-positive migrants increased, since chaplains were both able to obtain answers and information for the migrants and willing to spend the time talking to the migrants, answering their questions and passing along the information.

The first case of AIDS-related dementia, an attempted suicide, was reported the week of 8 March, causing great concern in Camp Bulkeley, to which the religious support teams responded. Following the departure for Miami of the last plane-load of screened-in migrants, the Marines instituted a lock-down in Camp Bulkeley to prevent disturbances, which in itself created a disturbance as the non-HIVs interpreted the lock-down as a sign that they had become infected too.

The arrival of additional Public Health Service workers with information about AIDS in the Creole language helped alleviate some of the chaplains' workload with the Haitians, but equally pressing was the need to counsel military personnel fearful of acquiring AIDS from working with the migrants. Chaplain Fletcher pointed out that the Spring 1988 issue of the Military Chaplains Review, concerning AIDS, was a valuable resource in counseling both the Haitians and the military support personnel.

On March 25, a rainstorm accompanied by 55-60 mph winds dumped two inches of rain on the camps, knocking down ten tents and damaging fourteen of them. This caused a loss of much of the personal property the migrants had which was minimal to begin with, and created another morale crisis among the migrants. In addition, some migrants who had been in the camps since November were still waiting to leave. Religious support teams procured more clothing for the migrants and continued efforts to get INS personnel to address the camps regarding reasons for the delay in moving people out.

Meanwhile, stress levels were rising among the military personnel as well. Chaplain James J. Madden, an Army Reservist, reported that the "attitude of the military appears to be changing from viewing Haitians as migrants to (viewing them as) detained persons," and the military personnel therefore became more aggressive in their treatment of the Haitians.28 Fatigue, burnout, and alcohol appeared much more frequently on counselling statistics during this period; and the ministry teams took action to reduce stress and create diversions. Four "Chaplains Challenge" fishing trips were held, as was a "Chaplains Challenge" volleyball tournament.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Continuing Support

During all this time, chaplains and chaplain assistants continued to conduct or facilitate a full schedule of worship services. In most camps services were a daily event. Catholic services were conducted with the aid of linguists and occasionally a visiting Creole-speaking priest. Protestant services were usually conducted by a native pastor, with the chaplains and assistants in attendance. Chaplains would frequently preach, either in French or in Creole, if they spoke either language, or with the help of an interpreter or linguist. Protestant services generally involved a great deal of singing, prayer, exhorting, and personal testimony, and lasted from two to three hours.

Chaplain Bernard Lieving, the XVIII Airborne Corps Chaplain, even purchased a set of bongo drums and flew them to GTMO at FORSCOM's request so the Haitians could use them with their singing. Religious support personnel generally spent 10 to 15 hours a week or more in worship services, in addition to counselling, problem-solving and their ministry of presence.

As March drew to a close, the JTF prepared to shut down. Occupants of Camp V were moved to Camp III in a consolidation move and Camp V was closed. Chaplains and chaplain assistants prepared the migrants for the move, meeting with elected camp leaders and religious leaders to discuss the transition and to head off any conflict between the leaders over their respective positions in the new camp.

Then, once again, the courts intervened. Once again repatriation was halted, screening for HIV was prohibited, and the camps began to fill up again. Camp V, which was closed the week of 30 March, was reopened the week of 6 April. Two more chaplains had departed, and the weekly report for 12 April noted a shortage of chaplains.

The religious support teams covering Camp II noted logistical problems in providing services because the camp was divided into three areas: one section for HIVs, one area for screened-ins, and one section for unaccompanied children. The sections could not be combined. In a related issue, some of the linguists complained that some of the children had lied about their ages, claiming to be younger than they were in order to remain in the children's camp, and they were disrupting the school classes. The linguists expressed frustration at not being allowed to physically discipline the disruptive students.

In Camp III another crisis arose with the removal of all HIV positives to Camp Bulkeley. Chaplains reported "hysteria" and "grief" in the camp after the HIV sufferers were notified of their condition. Chaplains and chaplain assistants had their hands full counselling the Haitians, both those who learned of their illness, and their families and friends from whom they would be separated. A diagnosis of HIV also eliminated migrants who were already screened in—screened-outs were not tested—from going to the United States. Grief counseling also was necessary for some of the military staff who had developed friendships with the migrants and were overwhelmed to learn of their friends' conditions. Additional problems faced by ministry teams in Camp III included strife between long-term residents and newcomers because of the fear that the newcomers would go to Miami first.

Many of the native pastors were lost to repatriation or transfer to Miami. This situation increased the need for chaplain support and hindered the provision of migrant worship services.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
The rapid increase in the migrant population, moreover, overstrained the military staff still crippled by the drawdown. Stress, fatigue, burnout, and alcohol and drug abuse counseling were mentioned frequently in the chaplains' weekly reports.

The ministry of the chaplains and chaplain assistants expanded in an interesting direction the week of 20 - 26 April, when LT Michael J. Parisi, Jr., CHC, USN, was invited to accompany Haitian repatriates to Haiti aboard the Coast Guard Cutters Tampa and Vigilant. While underway, he was also invited aboard the Colombian Corvette Caldas to hold Mass. He returned to the Caldas the following week as the corvette paid a visit to Guantanamo. Chaplain Victor Tadeo, USA, accompanied 258 migrants on the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Bear to Port Au Prince, ministering both to them and to the crew. His assistant, Specialist D. A. Young, who taught English to Haitian children, witnessed to the sailors while Father Tadeo said Mass.

By the second week of May, most of the veteran religious support team had been "repatriated," and the first of the chaplains and chaplain assistants that would see the Task Force through the second drawdown began to arrive. Chaplains began suicide counseling for Haitians, and briefings on Haitian culture and customs were provided for incoming Chaplain Section personnel. The subdivision of Camp II continued to create problems for ministry to unaccompanied children and HIV patients.

Chaplain Gloria Taylor and Airman First Class Leslie Quiroz, USAF, began a school for unaccompanied Haitian minors, holding class 5 days a week for an average of 100 children a day. They also began an intensive program of counseling for the Haitian orphans.

By 24 May, eleven chaplains and eight assistants were present to help, and five services a day were offered. Bible studies and a mid-week service were started at Harvest Eagle by Chaplain Phillip E. Spence, USA, and Lieutenant Thomas J. Love, CHC, USN, both deployed with their assigned units, who provided the first full-time chaplain coverage for the military camp. That week, the number of military counselling cases surpassed the number of Haitians counselled, probably as a result of the increased coverage at Camp Harvest Eagle.

The following week, the migrant population topped 11,000 and Camp VI, housing those screened out, was seething with discontent. Chaplains ended a hunger strike by serving as mediators between the camp military staff and the migrants, allowing the migrants' concerns to be heard. The ministry teams distributed four boxes of clothes, ten boxes of toys, 200 soccer balls and basketballs, 165 rosaries, 102 scapulars and 75 hymn books to the migrants. At the same time, the lack of linguists proved frustrating to the ministry teams and migrants alike, hampering ministry efforts because of the language barrier.

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A Termination Order

On 29 May, President Bush ordered the camps closed as soon as possible and directed the Coast Guard to return all boat people directly to Haiti rather than bringing them to Guantanamo. Although the migrant population had reached more than 12,500, the days of the Joint Task Force were numbered, and redeployment plans were once again drawn up. Chaplain James McDonald, successor to Chaplain Graham as the JTF Staff Chaplain, arrived in time to supervise the redeployment ministry.

Hospital work took on increasing importance as the number of hospitalized HIV sufferers increased, and Chaplain Hilarion Mikalofsky, USAF, was assigned to the hospital ministry. One of his first accomplishments in that role was to establish an interface with the INS and the Community Relations Service in order to cross-check patient records against the INS "No Show" list. Prior to this, migrants missing interviews were automatically repatriated. Chaplain Mikalofsky's action prevented migrants from being repatriated simply because they were too ill to appear for interviews.

Chaplain Curtis Cadenhead and SSG Rolf Holmquist, USAF, began classes on American language and customs for screened-in Haitians, and Chaplain Evie L. Pritchett, ARNG, began accompanying screened-out migrants to the Coast Guard cutters to provide pastoral care for those going back to Haiti. As a result, he was invited to hold Sunday service aboard USCGC Confidence. From this opening, Coast Guard District Chaplain CDR Robert Adair, USN, and JTF Command Chaplain James L. McDonald, USAR, were able to establish a program of sending chaplains and, in some cases, assistants, on each cutter taking migrants back to Haiti for the duration of the operation.39

Seven cases of clothes were received from the Army's 2nd Battalion, 3d Special Forces Family Support Group, and over the next two weeks more than eleven boxes of clothing, 13 boxes of shoes, 2 boxes of toys, 12 volleyballs, 12 soccer balls, 2 basketballs, 20 decks of cards, 78 rosaries, 75 scapulars, 56 English Bibles, and 50 hymn books were distributed to migrants. Lieutenant Stephen J. Gergel, CHC, USN, ensured that every migrant at Camp Bulkeley received a new pair of shoes and new underwear. Chaplain Charles B. Hagearty, USAR, completed his personal project—the first known translation of the Mass into colloquial Haitian Creole.

Camp V closed for good during the week of 14 June, allowing chaplains and chaplain assistants to spend more time on the docks ministering to repatriates, and accompanying screened-ins to their flights to Miami. Chaplains and chaplain assistants continued to accompany cutters to Haiti, providing counseling not only for migrants, but also for the Coast Guard crews, many of whom had been on migrant interdiction duty for more than three months. Just how emotionally draining was this duty was brought home in a dramatic way by an attempted suicide on one of the cutters.

Migrant frustrations over living conditions, the slow process of screening, and the failure of most to achieve screened-in status, compounded by the summer heat, led to increasing incidence of demonstrations in the camps. More than once, worship services were interrupted by demonstrations. Chaplain H.A. Mikalofsky, Chaplain Allen L. Heckman and Sergeant Theresa Wilcox, USAF, and Chaplain Phillip M. Armstrong and Sr A Michael E. Dryer, also USAF, each found themself at some

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point surrounded by angry mobs. In each case, the ministry teams were able to calm the crowd and prevent confrontation between migrants and camp staff.

Because of the trust established between the migrants and the religious support teams, the Army Forces commander requested increased chaplain presence in the camps. Everyone was needed to quell the epidemic of rock throwing and camp disruption.

By 21 June, all the camps except III (screened in), VII (the disciplinary camp), and Bulkeley (HIVs) had been closed and most of the chaplains had departed. The migrant population was less than 1,500, and all repatriation had been completed. Chaplain Gergel, and Lieutenant Diane Comer, CHC, USN, along with Religious Program Specialist One Henry W. Boatright, USN, were tasked to remain after dissolution of the Joint Task Force to continue their ministry at Camp Bulkeley. The remaining chaplains turned their focus to remaining military personnel for whom the frustrations and stress of dealing with the migrants was replaced by the frustration and stress of trying to get home.

In the early stage of the final push to redeploy, cargo took precedence over people on many flights, and some personnel, particularly medical, religious support, and other personnel who had not deployed with large units, found themselves bumped from flights two or three times before finally departing. Many of the JTF personnel, especially the 503rd MPs from Fort Bragg, also had served in Operation Just Cause, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and in the Hurricane Andrew relief effort. Chaplain Armstrong reported that some JTF members had not spent Christmas at home in over four years, and the delays in returning them home when the job was done gave the counseling skills of the few remaining chaplains "quite a workout."

The week of 29 June saw responsibilities of religious support teams changing daily. As soon as a team would be assigned to a particular ministry, its members would receive plane tickets and assignments would have to be shuffled again. Services continued at the Harvest Eagle Chapel and in Camp III, whose population was now below 500.

The Camp Bulkeley chaplains continued to deal with serious issues, including a prison camp atmosphere created by the camp staff, and a shortage of information in Creole on AIDS and its effects. Chaplain Comer obtained an additional supply of HIV and AIDS information for use in counseling the patients and their families; Chaplain Gergel assisted the Seabees in establishing an activity center at Camp Bulkeley and in installing playground equipment. Chaplain Gergel also obtained new gym shorts and T-shirts for every resident in the Camp. Chaplain Comer’s planned puppet ministry with the children had to be abandoned, however, on the advice of native pastors who felt there was too great a chance that the migrants would associate the puppets with voodoo.

By the long Fourth-of-July weekend, most of the tents were gone from Camp III, and the concertina wire had been rolled up. The fewer than 300 migrants remaining in the camp were all awaiting flights to Miami and posed no threat of either disturbance or escape. The camp staff, joined by Lieutenant Randolph C. Nolen, CHC, USN, Assistant JTF Command Chaplain, engaged the migrants in a softball game, and then escorted them, free of the concertina wire for the first time in months, to McCalla Hill overlooking the bay where they were served popcorn and soft drinks, and watched the Fourth-of-July fireworks.

By 8 July, McCalla Airfield, which a month earlier sported a sea of olive canvas as far as the eye could see, housing nearly 13,000 migrants, was once again an abandoned airfield. The tents were

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) Haitian Tent Compounds; (Bottom) Chaplain James L. McDonald (above cross) leads unit ministry teams in worship at Guantanamo
gone, and the last plane-load of migrants awaited their flight to Miami in a camp beside the road, bounded only by string. Camp Harvest Eagle was a ghost town—a shadow of its former 2,000-inhabitant self, well on the way to reverting to its previous life as Phillips Park. Logistics crews were dismantling fourteen tents a day and packing them for transport home. Since 1 February, 23,800 migrants had been repatriated and 10,390 had been sent to the U.S., where they faced another round of interviews and the possibility that they yet might be sent back to Haiti.

**Measuring Ministry**

In the seven and one-half months of JTFs' existence, chaplains and chaplain assistants conducted 563 Catholic services, 975 Protestant services, four ecumenical services, and one Jewish service. Cumulative attendance (Haitian and military) for the Catholic services was 53,303—an average of 95 per service. For the Protestant services it was 137,974, or 142 per service. Six hundred fifteen attended the four ecumenical services (154 per service) and two attended the Jewish service. Attendance at services for the military staff averaged less than twenty per service, Catholic or Protestant—most of the numbers above reflect ministry to Haitians. The numbers may seem confusing in light of the fact that Haitians are 75-80% Catholic and 20-25% Protestant, but it should be remembered that there was always a preponderance of Protestant chaplains, hence many more services, and that many Haitians attended both Protestant and Catholic services. In addition, chaplains conducted 11,606 counseling sessions with military personnel (including each other) and 13,429 with the Haitians. There were four funerals and one baptism.

Chaplains and assistants distributed over 1,000 religious articles, including rosaries, scapulards, Bibles, New Testaments and songbooks, and over a ton of clothing, shoes, and new toys. Much of this was provided by the residents of Naval Station Guantanamo whose sacrifices and contributions to the migrant relief effort, both before and during the tenure of the Joint Task Force, have gone largely unsung and unacknowledged. Their efforts were certainly not unappreciated by the ministry teams and support personnel, as well as by the migrants themselves.

For the 50 chaplains and 41 chaplain assistants of all services and components that were attached, at one time or another, to Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, overall it was a sobering experience. A few after-action reports lamented a lack of cooperation and communication among chaplains and chaplain assistants; most praised the high level of professionalism, cooperation, communication, and caring among the religious support teams. Many chaplains wondered just how humane the humanitarian actions were, and most questioned the prisonlike atmosphere of the camps with their concertina wire and guard sheds and the excessive control exerted on the migrants who were guests and not prisoners. And many conversations wandered to speculation and wonder at the depths of poverty or desperation that would drive people to risk their lives on the open sea in leaky wooden boats, caulked with little more than rope and heavy paint. The boat people sought, in many cases, a new life for themselves and their families; in some cases, freedom from persecution; and in a few instances, just the chance to live in the camps where, as grim as conditions were, life was better than what they had left in Haiti.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
The ministry was demanding, exhausting, constant, and intense. It was challenging, exciting, and emotionally wrenching. Chaplain Robert C. Collins, USAF, likened the crowded, constantly-changing atmosphere in the camps to "ministry in a bus station," and Lieutenant Edward C. Domme, CHC, USN, commented that "ministry of presence will, with time, open up avenues and ideals yet unexplored or unrealized."^30

Avenues yet unexplored, unrealized, unimagined did open up for religious support teams. Time and again the stamina, creativity, dedication, and initiative of the ministry teams were tested, and they passed the test. The work of the religious support teams with the migrants, in the camps, was a significant factor in the successful completion of the Joint Task Force's mission.

At the direction of the FORSCOM Chaplain, the JTF Staff Chaplains from Army components prepared a list of recommendations for ministry in joint operations involving overseas humanitarian assistance. Among these recommendations were:

- Prior to deployment, joint ministry teams must receive training in joint doctrine, indigenous cultural and religious traditions, language, and history, and any special medical skills needed, such as methods of ministering to infectious counselees and patients. Training in suicide prevention and care of minors should be considered as well.
- Each service, Army, Navy, or Air Force, represented in country should have a senior chaplain to handle unique service personnel, supply, and administration tasks for the JTF Staff Chaplain. Transportation requests and vehicle requirements must be prepared early.
- Religious support teams should maintain their service integrity wherever and whenever possible.
- Personnel qualified for immediate deployment overseas, especially from the Reserve and National Guard Component, must be identified in advance of alert notification.
- Supplies should be stockpiled and the personnel system streamlined to facilitate a rapid deployment of unit ministry teams. JTF operations should have a continuously updated mobilization and deployment plan even for small-sized operations.
- The supporting major command should designate a senior chaplain to be the point of contact for the JTF Staff Chaplain's concerns involving JTF personnel replacement, communications, finance and pay complaints, and awards and decorations.
- Dated religious literature, for support of Roman Catholic worship for example, must be included in advance ecclesiastical supply planning. Hymn players or field organs should be considered as necessities, not as luxuries.
- Records and files of JTF religious support efforts, to include after action reports and lessons learned must be maintained for consideration by future planners. 31

See endnotes at end of chapter.
After he read the reports of the ministry in Cuba, Chaplain David Peterson, the FORSCOM Chaplain, wrote, "Christian worship is a worldwide common denominator. The refugees were scared and did not trust anyone. They did, however, trust the cross on the collar of the Chaplain. Significant contributions were made by chaplains and chaplain assistants in calming, controlling, persuading and carefully filling the time of migrants. Operation GTMO will serve as a model JTF operation."32

As the Joint Task Force mission ended, on a hill above Guantanamo two chaplains and a chaplain assistant remained to provide spiritual and emotional support to some 200 HIV-positive migrants and their families. The ministry begun by the Joint Task Force ministry teams, and by the Naval Station Chapel staff before them, continued. In Miami, 10,000 Haitians whose lives were touched by that ministry faced another round of interviews, followed by either deportation, or an uncertain future in a land of strange customs and a strange language. And in Haiti, another 20,000 migrants whose lives were also touched by that ministry faced economic struggle and political turmoil.33

**CHAPLAINS ASSIGNED TO JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO BAY**

(NOTE: In the list that follows, as in the article above, the initials USN, USA, and USAF are used to denote the branch of service of active-duty chaplains, and (Res) is used to denote Reservists on temporary active duty. It does not differentiate between active-duty chaplains holding Reserve commissions and those holding regular commissions.)

Almendras, Joel J., 1LT, USA (Res)
Armstrong, Phillip M., Capt, USAF
Belue, Francis M., CPT, USA
Borlang, Stephen M., ILt, USAF
Cadenhead, Curtis C., Maj, USAF
Carr, Nathanael A., CPT, USA (Res)
Clarke, Winston M., MAJ, USA
Clegg, Timothy W., Capt, USAF
Collins, Robert C., Capt, USAF
Cromer, Diane M., LT, USN
De Blieux, Earl V., LiCol, USAF
Domme, Edward C., LT, USN
Fletcher, Patrick J., Capt, USAF
Garment, Stanley J., LCDR, USN
Gergel, Stephen J., LT, USN
Goss, E. L., Jr., CAPT, USN
Graham, William C., COL, USA (Res)

---

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Hagearty, Charles B., LTC, USA (Res)
Hamaday, Ronald A., LT, USN (Res)
Hamilton, Frank M., Capt, USAF
Heckman, Allen L., Capt, USAF
Hokana, Steven C., CPT, USA
Kimble, Gregory H., CPT, USA (Res)
Koester, Timothy J., LT, USN
Linnear, Archie, CPT, USA
Love, Thomas J., LT, USN
Madden, James J., CPT, USA (Res)
Marceaux, Sidney J., LTC, USA (Res)
McClary, David M., CPT, USA (Res)
McDonald, James L., COL, USA (Res)
McGuin, Lawrence J., Capt, USAF
Mikalofsky, Hilarion A., Capt, USAF
Newby, Claude D., LTC, USA
Nolen, Randolph C., LT, USN
Parisi, Michael J., Jr., LT, USN
Pincence, Gerald P., MAJ, USA
Pritchett, Evie L., MAJ, USARNG
Ramsey, Ira E., LCDR, USN
Realmuto, George, CPT, USA (Res)
Salinero, Arthur B., I LT USA (Res)
Smith, Gabriel J., I LT USA (Res)
Spence, Phillip E., CPT, USA
Stroop, Kevin P., CPT, USA (Res)
Tadeo, Victor, C., CPT, USA
Taylor, Gloria O., Maj, USAF
Williams, Phillip T., Jr., CPT, USA
Wismer, Frank E., III, MAJ, USA (Res)
Yacovone, Paul J., CPT, USA

JTF CHAPLAINS AND ASSISTANTS
ACCOMPANYING U S COAST GUARD CUTTERS

Phillip M. Armstrong, Capt, USAF
Curtis C. Cadenhead, Maj, USAF
Michael E. Dryer, SrA, USAF
Ronald A. Hamaday, LT, USNR
Rolf E. Holmquist, SSgt, USAF

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Hilarion A. Mikalofsky, Capt, USAF
Leslie A. Quiroz, AIC, USAF
Victor C. Tadeo, CPT, USA
Gloria O. Taylor, Maj, USAF
Donald A. Young, SPC, USA

ENLISTED PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO
JOINT TASK FORCE - CHAPLAIN SECTION

Boatright, Henry W., RP1, USN
Brown, Floyd, Sgt, USAF
Centeno, Albert J., Jr., SSgt, USAF
Clayton, Robert, W., SPC, USA (Res)
Clinton, C. L., SFC, USA (Res)
Cuellar, Martin A., SGT, USA (Res)
Danielson, A. W., PFC, USA
Dryer, Michael E., SrA, USAF
Duffy, John A., Sgt, USA (Res)
Echols, Daniel L., RP3, USN
Edwards, R., PFC, USA
Ferguson, T. J., RPSN, USN
Fraser, Kevin D., RP3, USN
Gooch, Arthur Perry, RPSA, USN
Holdren, Robin S., RPC, USN
Holmquist, Rolf E., SSgt, USAF
Houchins, Beverly A., Sgt, USAF
Johnson, Debra A., AIC, USAF
Juliana, Steven W., SPC, USA
Koon, Victor L., RP3, USN
Kropp, Brad J., AIC, USAF
LaPaix, Pency N., RP3, USN
Little, William S., MSGt, USAF
McBeath, Gene, SPC, USA
McCall, K., SGT, USA
Meyer, David W., SGT, USA (Res)
Morissette, Murphy, SPC, USA
Morrell, Timothy P., Ssgt, USA (Res)
Nigh, Ralph G., Sgt, USARNG
O'Connor, Kevin T., RP2, USN
Quinones, Jose I. S., SGT, USA (Res)
Quiroz, Leslie A., AIC, USAF

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Saelua, Mase D., MSgt, USAF
Shepard, Linda G., RPl, USN
Slaughter, J. E. SPC, USA (Res)
Stice, Christopher, RPSN, USN
Wilcox, Theresa M., Sgt, USAF
Winder, Jacqueline M. RP2, USN
Young, Donald A., SPC, USA

See endnotes at end of chapter.
**OPERATION GTMO**  
**MIGRANT STATUS**  
1 to 22 APRIL 92

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**NOTES:**  
*NUMBER OF MIGRANTS REPATRIATED "TO HAITI" DOES NOT INCLUDE 955 INDIVIDUALS PRIOR TO 1 FEB 92.*

THE PEAK MONTH FOR MIGRANT INTERDICTIONS WAS JANUARY 1992 WITH 6,477.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
ENDNOTES

1. Taken from an account of JTF GTMO written by Lt. Randolph C. Nolen, CHC, USNR, Assistant JTF Command Chaplain, 29 May - 10 July, 1992, and included in the FORSCOM After Action Report for Operation GTMO. The original copy of the FORSCOM Report, 1992, is in the office of the FORSCOM Chaplain, Ft. McPherson, GA.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

5. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) William Graham, USAR, second JTF Staff Chaplain, 23 September 1994.

6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.


12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.


31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW:

Religious Support
CHAPTER VI

JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW:
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN DEVASTATED AREAS

The storm was the nation's costliest natural disaster.

USA Today, November 25, 1992

By the end of the first week, the relief effort was already being called the largest U.S. military rescue mission ever.

Soldiers Magazine, November 1992

At midnight on August 23, 1992, Hurricane Andrew slammed into the south Florida coast. The eye of the storm passed directly over Homestead Air Force Base and the communities of Homestead and Florida City with winds speeds exceeding 160 miles per hour.\(^1\) The Air Base was totally destroyed, trailer parks were completely demolished, and most of the businesses in the surrounding communities were heavily damaged. The area, in short, lost all basic services.

At seven o'clock the following morning Lieutenant Colonel Walter Presha and Chaplain Albert W. Bush, from the 1st Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment, Florida National Guard, toured the Coconut Grove area of Miami.\(^2\) The scene that greeted them was devastating. From the city limits of Miami to the southern border of Dade County, some 85,000 houses, 38,000 apartment dwellings, and 82,000 businesses were damaged or destroyed. One-hundred sixty thousand people had lost their homes; 85,000 people had lost their jobs. Forty-one people lost their lives.\(^3\) Two-hundred and fifty thousand telephone poles were blown down and 8,500 street lights were out. Looters roamed freely through several shopping centers. The scene was "reminiscent of a nuclear blast," Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said in a television interview. "All the houses, trees, fences, telephone poles—everything is absolutely flattened over an area of nearly 100 square miles," Cheney reflected.\(^4\) This category four hurricane caused a maximum estimated damage of $30 billion.

Florida Governor Lawton Chiles mobilized 6,400 National Guard troops within 24 hours of the disaster. These soldiers, largely from the 124th Infantry, 116th Field Artillery, 53rd Infantry, 146th Signal Battalion, and 20th Special Forces Group, deployed to assist victims even though many of them had lost their homes as well. Chaplain Bush of the 124th Infantry Regiment recalled the initial scene his unit encountered:

Power lines and traffic lights were down everywhere. Passage was nearly impossible. By the coast, boats had been pushed up, around, and onto land and each other. It is hard to describe the destruction we experienced as we deployed south. Streets and intersections were nearly blocked by downed street lights, power poles, and overturned signs, many parking lots were impassable, water was up to the footwell of our vehicles. Many malls had already been broken into and our troops, who were

See endnotes at end of chapter.
first on site, chased away looters. We began to set up a command post at the Cutler Ridge Mall. I lived on a sidewalk in front of an abandoned building for three nights.

The destruction was indescribable; debris was everywhere. People were in shock. The National Guard troops had a very difficult time even with their own needs while they were attempting to restore order and security to the disaster area. They had nothing to eat but concentrated Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) in sealed packages. Their water had to be hauled to them from unaffected areas in the north. There were no showers or other bathing facilities. Garbage and litter were everywhere. Roofing nails which had blown down into parking lots caused driving hazards for all wheeled vehicles. Even concrete block buildings had windows and sections of concrete blown out of the walls which faced the force of the hurricane winds.

By the second day the Florida Guardsmen had been able to clear roads and some driveways, enabling rescue vehicles and private automobiles to pass up and down Highway 1. Some people had been trapped in their homes and were waiting to be released. By the second day there were critical shortages of food and water. Every day volunteers brought cars, vans, or semi-trucks loaded with supplies to distribute to the needy. The soldiers helped unload supplies and stacked them for distribution the next day.

Three days passed before the first federal help arrived. In the meantime, there was no electricity, potable water, working sewers, telephone service or passable streets. Relief operations got underway slowly in a disorganized and uncoordinated manner. It became obvious very quickly that state agencies and the Florida National Guard would require assistance.

Presidential Response

Answering Governor Chiles' urgent request for federal aid, President George Bush declared Southern Florida a federal disaster area. President Bush directed the Secretary of Transportation, The Honorable Andrew Card, to head a Presidential Task Force composed of various federal and state governmental agencies. As part of the disaster relief effort, the Department of Defense was tasked, under the President's authority outlined in the Stafford Disaster Relief Act, to create a joint task force for humanitarian purposes. It was given the name "Joint Task Force Andrew" and consisted of organizations and service members from all of the armed services, to include the U.S. Coast Guard. At the peak of the relief operations, Joint Task Force Andrew contained just under 30,000 military personnel.

Second Army was assigned the primary mission of implementing the Joint Task Force (JTF) directive with Lieutenant General Samuel E. Ebbesen, the Second Army Commander, designated the JTF Commander. Eleven flag officers were assigned to the JTF Headquarters Staff. Major General Dennis Crumley served as the Deputy JTF Commander. Major General Richard B. Griffitts served as the Chief of Staff. The XVIII Airborne Corps was assigned the Army Forward relief mission. The 82nd Airborne Division Ready Brigade, two brigades from the 10th Mountain Division, headquartered at Fort Drum, New York, units from the 101st Airborne Division and the 24th Infantry

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Division as well as the 841st Engineer Battalion, a U.S. Army Reserve unit, filled out the Army Forward Organization.

The Florida National Guard, not federalized, maintained a large presence. Several U.S. Navy ships were deployed to the Port of Miami, bringing with them a contingent of Navy personnel as well as a battalion of Marines. The Air Force already had a presence at Homestead Air Force Base. Canada sent the equivalent of a construction battalion and brought a chaplain with them. With the inclusion of the Canadian force, the operation became a Combined Task Force, although its name remained Joint Task Force Andrew.

The JTF Headquarters was housed in a vacated Eastern Airlines building near Miami International Airport, located approximately 25 miles from the heart of the disaster area. Communications in the early days of the operation were almost non-existent except to Second Army at Fort Gillem, Georgia and to U.S. Forces Command at Fort McPherson. Eventually vehicles and cellular telephones made communications with South Dade County possible.

On August 28 Joint Task Force Andrew began operations with the missions of providing humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, and other logistical support to the local population in South Florida. The operation consisted of three phases: Phase I, Relief; Phase II, Recovery; and Phase III, Reconstitution. In the first ten days of the military's response, United States Air Force planes flew in 14,000 tons of supplies, which was nearly identical to the volume of shipments brought to Saudi Arabia at the start of Operation Desert Shield. Officials said the scale of the relief effort rivaled a combat operation.

On August 31 Chaplain Gerald M. Mangham, the Second Army Chaplain, deployed to Miami to become the Joint Task Force Chaplain in support of Operation Andrew. Chaplain Mangham served on the personal staff of the Deputy JTF Commander, General Crumley. Chaplain Mangham's mission was to coordinate all religious support activities for joint services personnel deployed to the area of operation and serve as a point of contact for local civilian religious organizations. Moreover, Chaplain Mangham was to serve as the senior staff officer for religious support and the technical supervisor for all chaplains assigned to elements of JTF Andrew.

### Organizing Religious Support

When Chaplain Gerald Mangham arrived in Miami on Monday, August 31, 1992, he faced a number of challenges in his attempts to organize his religious support assets. First he needed a staff to help coordinate with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which was the Presidential Task Force's operational element; the Army Forward units; the Florida National Guard; and local religious leaders and organizations in South Florida. Chaplain Mangham shared a single office with Chaplain Michael Day, the State Area Command (STARC) Chaplain for the Florida National Guard, and later with Chaplain Robin Murray, the Florida Deputy STARC Chaplain, on the fourth floor of the Eastern Airlines building near the Miami International Airport. The facilities were very limited with hundreds of people trying to find enough chairs, desks and telephones to meet their

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
mission requirements.

Almost at once, FEMA and other federal agencies were swamped with requests for help. More than 2,000 applications a day for financial aid for families poured into the FEMA office. Seventeen insurance companies tied up telephones asking if the military had secured neighborhoods which were begging for insurance adjustors to call. Every office needed more personnel—including the Task Force Chaplain—to deal with a growing list of emergencies.

Initially, requests for unit ministry team personnel for the JTF Chaplain Section went from the Joint Task Force J1 section to the Emergency Operations Center at Second Army, Fort Gillem. If Second Army could not fill the requirements, they forwarded requests to U.S. Forces Command at Fort McPherson. Chaplain Mangham requested a senior chaplain to serve as his plans and operations officer, a senior chaplain assistant to serve as NCOIC and resource manager and a chaplain and chaplain assistant to help with administrative duties. U.S. Forces Command alerted Chaplain Paul Mason to serve as the Plans and Operations Chaplain, Sergeant Major Will Rogers to serve as the NCOIC and Chaplain John Gibbon and Sergeant Robert Spoelstra from Fort Lewis, Washington, to serve as the administration section. Likewise, Chaplain Mangham requested a Jewish chaplain and a Catholic chaplain to ensure faith group coverage in the area and to facilitate coordination with their respective civilian religious leaders. Chaplain David Zalis and Chaplain James Coindreau were deployed to meet these needs.

Within the first 24 hours of his arrival, Chaplain Mangham made an assessment of the magnitude of the disaster and determined needs for additional specialized religious support for this mission. The storm had destroyed homes, synagogues and churches, striking many of the people who were the spiritual care givers in the community. Normally churches and synagogues came to the aid of families experiencing tragedies. But in the case of Hurricane Andrew, most religious buildings and congregations had themselves been damaged. Likewise, many pastors, rabbis, priests, and lay leaders could not help because they were victims as well. Army unit ministry teams with special training in Family Life and Clinical Pastoral Education were needed to help reconstitute the counseling services available to victims.

Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman, the Army Chief of Chaplains, immediately offered ten unit ministry teams with training in disaster relief, counseling, death and dying, and trauma ministry to reach out to the community. Chaplain Mangham quickly took advantage of the Chief's innovative approach. On Tuesday, September 1, 1992, Chaplain Mangham requested the ten unit ministry teams, consisting of one chaplain and one chaplain assistant each.

They were deployed specifically to assist the pastors and other spiritual care givers who were disaster victims. Chaplain Diana James was assigned to be the team chief and supervisor.

Chaplain Don Shea, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, planned the mission briefing for these teams personally. In addition to alerting the ten crisis unit ministry teams, the Chief of Chaplains also authorized a special non-appropriated fund grant for Joint Task Force Andrew in the amount of $5,000 to purchase needed religious supplies to support the troops. The items purchased included hosts, rosaries, and video and electronic equipment to record historical data.

Among the first chaplains to arrive in the Homestead Air Force Base area were Chaplain

See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) JTF Andrew Chapel/Theater; (Bottom) Chaplain Alvin (Sonny" Moore demonstrates proper box transport technique
Chaplain Ed Hartmann leads worship in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew
Stephen C. Fountain from the 1st Corps Support Command, XVIII Airborne Corps, and Chaplain Kristi Pappas from the 10th Mountain Division. Since Chaplain Pappas arrived before the other chaplains from Fort Drum, she performed advance coordinating duties as the Acting Division Chaplain.7 Chaplain Pappas, still on her first tour of duty in the Army, became the first female chaplain in Chaplain Corps history to serve as an Acting Division Chaplain in a major humanitarian operation.

As a coordinating measure, the JTF G3 (Operations) Staff had divided the disaster area into sectors which were represented by grid squares on the maps of Dade County.8 Each incoming unit received a sector or grid in which to operate. Chaplain Mangham made sure this information was available to each arriving unit ministry team.

While Chaplain Fountain, who was located at a local high school, was establishing communication with Chaplain Pappas at the Homestead City Hall, the headquarters of the 10th Mountain Division, other chaplains from Fort Bragg arrived at Homestead Air Force Base. The Fort Bragg contingent was known as "Task Force All-American" (TF-AA), and included five unit ministry teams: Chaplain Alvin "Sonny" Moore and Staff Sergeant Gary Frisque; Chaplain Jeff Houston and Corporal Gregory Carbajal; Chaplain Terry McBride and Specialist Tarin Brown; Chaplain Donald Rutherford and Staff Sergeant Dennis Walraven in the Cutler Ridge section of Miami, and Chaplain Henry Haines and Staff Sergeant George Johnson in the Division Rear.9

Even though movement was possible, communication outside of a sector was extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the TF-AA unit ministry teams went to work quickly, helping their soldiers neutralize downed power lines and remove fallen trees and dead animals from the roads. Chaplain Don Rutherford, the only Roman Catholic chaplain in the task force, provided religious coverage for seven battalions of soldiers for almost a month. Chaplain Rutherford's service included performing 74 Roman Catholic Masses, working with soldiers in rubbish removal and food distribution, and coordinating relief for civilian religious organizations in his area.10

By September 2, U.S. Marines and the Army had erected the first tent city to benefit homeless victims of the hurricane. Each tent city, technically called a Life Support Center, was comprised of 40 tents, each tent housing ten people. The Life Support Centers, located largely in shopping malls on either side of Highway 1, continually furnished temporary housing in tents and trailers for 160,000 victims.

From the moment of arrival, soldiers were extremely busy. In addition to providing security, the military cleared 14,000 cubic yards of debris from more than 2,000 miles of streets. They constructed tent cities and prepared to furnish blankets, cots, meals and even radios to the people who had lost their homes.

By September 3 most of the senior chaplains were at their unit headquarters locations. Chaplain Richard Adams, the ARFOR Chaplain, had arrived from Fort Bragg on August 31 to coordinate with the JTF.11 Chaplain Billy Fowler, the XVIII Airborne Corps Operations Chaplain, arrived on September 3 to assist the Corps chaplains. Chaplain Robert A. Hutcherson, the division chaplain for the 10th Mountain Division, set up his division chaplain office in a tent at the west end of the Homestead Public Library.12

Meetings with local city and county government officials and civilian religious leaders lasted
for hours in the various division areas. On September 5, Dr. Billy Graham, the noted evangelist, arrived at Homestead to conduct a worship service at Campbell Middle School. Chaplain Hutcherson, Chaplain Adams, Chaplain Fowler, and other chaplains attended the service and then met to further coordinate their respective religious support activities. Communication and transportation were horrendous problems because most battalion unit ministry teams did not have vehicles or cellular telephones. Many times communication was established by messenger or by borrowing communication equipment.

Chaplain Donald Shea, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, arrived on September 9 for an official visit and to lend his support to the relief operations. Between September 9th and 13th, ten Added Dimension teams, the chaplains and chaplain assistants trained to conduct crisis and trauma ministry, arrived in the area. Chaplain Shea impressed upon them the need for their help. The teams received an orientation at a local church in Coral Gables, where they were introduced to key civilian leaders of religious organizations with whom they would interact throughout the operation. They also received briefings from local pastors and governmental officials who provided background information on the area, the disaster and the demographics of the local population.

The Added Dimension teams were assigned to the Joint Task Force Chaplain for deployment throughout the disaster area. Chaplain Paul Mason, the JTF Plans and Operations Chaplain, was given the responsibility for coordinating their utilization. One team was assigned to each of three Life Support Centers. One team went to each of two local hospitals. Three teams worked with churches and local pastors and two teams worked with the Christian Community Services Agency and the Interfaith Disaster Coalition. These Added Dimension unit ministry teams provided specialized counseling and support to other care givers.

One of the first local clergy contacts was made by Chaplain Ken Werho who called on a pastor and his wife. Before Chaplain Werho could explain the program to them, the pastor's wife said, "I am so glad you are here. We now have food, water and shelter, but nobody had addressed our emotional needs." Chaplain Werho conducted his first counseling session, listening to a pastor and his wife in Florida City talk about their pain and grief.

The Added Dimension teams who served in local hospitals spent a significant amount of time ministering to the hospital staff. Local hospitals were short of help. Some of the people on the staff had lost their homes and were out taking care of their own families. The Added Dimension teams also proved to be valuable in helping the religious organizations get in touch with the assistance that was available. One team discovered that a local Catholic church had received several truck loads of relief supplies, but was unable to move the items to an affected area. This need was relayed to the office of the Joint Task Force Chaplain who, in turn, contacted the Movement Control personnel on the Joint Task Force staff. Almost immediately, trucks from the U.S. Army were dispatched to move the goods.

While the Added Dimension teams were reporting to their assigned locations, the other Army and Florida Guard chaplains continued their emergency missions. Chaplain Albert Bush, who served temporarily as Task Force Chaplain for the Florida National Guard, recalled:

Our line companies performed multiple missions from site security to emergency

See endnotes at end of chapter.
relief. Fallen trees and electric poles blocked streets, imprisoning families within their homes. Employing a grid plan, our soldiers began to clear roads and driveways, cutting branches for rescue vehicles and for private autos. Each company had an incredible story to tell of people rescued and lives saved.

I accompanied the line companies visiting families and individuals who had been trapped. They were very grateful to see us and very appreciative of our efforts in their behalf. After two days these people had run out of food and water. As part of our efforts we distributed donated food, clothing and water to them. Every day volunteers brought cars, vans, or semi-trucks loaded with supplies to distribute to the needy. Our soldiers helped unload supplies, stack them for the next day, and distribute them from the backs of our vehicles to the needy.14

Unfortunately, telephone land lines and cellular phones were not immediately available to the National Guardsmen either. Chaplain Bush had to drive from one unit location to another to determine if their chaplains and assistants had mobilized to help with the disaster.

Chaplain Richard Adams at ARFOR had a number of challenges to meet as well. Communications and accountability for area and zone coverage were problems that had to be sorted out. The 82nd Airborne Division from Chaplain Adams' own XVIII Airborne Corps had been assigned the Goulds Community sector which suffered from typical problems of the inner city.15 There were nightly confrontations between gang members, interested in protecting their turf, and patrols of 82nd Airborne soldiers attempting to provide security for victims. Chaplains and assistants were needed everywhere and on call constantly in ARFOR.

During the month of September a total of 95 chaplains and 74 chaplain assistants deployed to the greater Miami area from the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. The assigned chaplains represented 32 different religious denominations. The Florida National Guard was not formally federalized to be a part of the Joint Task Force, but Chaplain Michael Day, the National Guard State Chaplain, worked closely with Chaplain Mangham, the JTF Chaplain, to coordinate ministry in the area of operations. Chaplain Day also coordinated with 12 civilian Catholic priests and one civilian rabbi from the local area who volunteered their services to augment support to deployed military personnel.

The U.S. Army Forward (ARFOR) senior chaplain throughout the operation was Chaplain Richard Adams. The senior U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps chaplains changed as ships entered and left the area of operations. The U.S. Air Force assigned two chaplains to assist at Homestead Air Force Base. The U.S. Navy deployed a Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) which had two chaplains assigned, one Catholic and one Protestant. By the end of September, Chaplain Chana Timoner from Fort Bragg arrived to serve as the Joint Task Force Jewish Chaplain replacing Chaplain Zalis. Chaplain Jose Santillanes, just returned from Sinop, Turkey, served as the Joint Task Force Catholic Chaplain replacing Chaplain Coindreau who departed on September 12. Chaplain Herb Kitchens from Second Army replaced Chaplain Mason as the JTF Plans and Operations Chaplain on September 15th.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
As tons of bottled water, food and tentage arrived in South Florida, it was evident that some organized means was necessary to store, warehouse and distribute the massive amounts of relief material arriving for the victims of the hurricane. General Tuttle, commander of the Army Materiel Command (AMC), established four supply depots to regulate the distribution of the humanitarian supplies. Through Logistic Support Groups, these critical materials were delivered to field kitchens and Life Support Centers throughout the affected area. Chaplain Benjamin C. Manning served on the transition team for the Army Materiel Command, providing ministry to AMC team members. Chaplain Manning operated from the Joint Task Force Chaplain Office and provided valuable ministry during and at the conclusion of the military operation.

**Forty Days and Forty Nights**

From September 2 through October 12, almost 160 Army chaplains and chaplain assistants provided relief, recovery and reconstruction ministry to a quarter of a million victims of Hurricane Andrew. Unit ministry teams served in formal settings such as hospitals and Life Support Centers as well as in informal settings, visiting local community areas with soldiers on security and relief missions. Chaplains helped unload trucks, distribute food, water and medicine and provided counseling services for local people. The official prioritized policy for unit ministry team involvement, as written by the Joint Task Force chaplain, provided for religious support to military personnel, department of defense civilian employees, local clergy, and civilians in the disaster area as coordinated with local helping agencies and religious organizations.

In many instances the uniformed military personnel had fewer luxuries initially than did the victims of the hurricane. Chaplain Mary Pitts, deployed from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, recalled the wretched sanitary conditions in the camps where her unit was located. Chaplain Pitts provided religious support and helped unload trucks so that more supplies could be distributed.\(^6\) Chaplain Kristi Pappas recalled that in the 10th Mountain Division area many of her soldiers had nothing to eat initially but MREs. Chaplain Pappas noted that the Salvation Army became very popular when they began cooking hot meals for soldiers and civilians alike.\(^7\) Many Florida National Guardsmen providing security in shopping malls had neither hot food nor showers for a week at a time. Since most banks were closed, there also was a shortage of available cash. Clearly the ministry of chaplains and chaplain assistants was critical to help soldiers who lacked basic necessities and who also had a need to communicate with their own family members concerning their welfare.

Many chaplains became intensely involved with victims of the hurricane during the Relief Phase of Operation Andrew. Chaplain James Hartz, a Southern Baptist chaplain, helped organize some Mormon volunteers who repaired the roof of a local Jewish synagogue. Chaplain Juarez-Palma and Chaplain Juan Loya provided support to local ministry in the Homestead Migrant Labor Camps. Many of the migrants were Haitians who had come to Florida from unspeakable conditions in their own country. They were doubly hurt by the circumstances of their immigration through Guantanamo and Miami as well as the devastation of Hurricane Andrew.

Some of the migrant workers from Central America were afraid of uniformed military

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW

personnel and would not come to Life Support Centers for food. In many cases, 82nd Airborne soldiers would take food into local communities and leave it for the Hispanic migrants to pick up after the soldiers departed. Chaplain Kristi Pappas was commended by her division chaplain, Chaplain Robert Hutcherson, for her ministry to women and children in the migrant labor camps. Chaplain Pappas recalled finding one woman who was providing day care for 27 children while the children’s parents attempted to repair their homes. Chaplain Pappas said that it was a most moving experience to see the sacrifices many people were willing to make on behalf of the children trapped in difficult circumstances by the natural disaster.18

Some children were not so lucky. Chaplain Keith Croom, 3/20th Special Forces, Florida National Guard, recalled:

I was out in a neighborhood in Homestead, Florida. I was helping distribute food and water to needy civilians. Suddenly, I was approached by a middle age female. She knew I was a minister because of the cross on my cap and her husband's past military experience. I did not even have to ask any questions. She simply started talking. Before 'Andrew' hit, it was agreed that her sister would stay with her during the storm. She brought her daughter with her. As the storm came busting through, both of the front windows blew out. The lady was holding her niece at the time so she quickly placed the 15 month old girl on the floor and tried to secure the windows.

Suddenly, a part of the roof was ripped off and the 15 month old was sucked up through it.

I asked the lady if she needed anything and she responded by saying, 'Nothing except a big hug and to tell her God understands.'19

From the first day of Operation Andrew both the Forces Command Chaplain’s Office and the Chief of Chaplain's Office had monitored the disaster situation and the challenges the unit ministry teams deployed to South Florida were meeting. On September 16 Chaplain David Peterson, the FORSCOM Chaplain, visited the disaster area to see how the unit ministry teams from Fort Bragg, Fort Drum, Fort Stewart, and Fort Lewis were faring. Chaplain Peterson had received numerous reports from the Joint Task Force Chaplain and from his own staff through his Deputy, Chaplain James B. Lonergan, with respect to the deployment.20 On September 22 Chaplain Matthew A. Zimmerman, the Chief of Chaplains, also visited the Homestead area to see firsthand how the ministry to soldiers and victims was progressing. Both Chaplain Peterson and Chaplain Zimmerman had high praise for the efforts of the chaplains and the chaplain assistants involved in Joint Task Force Andrew.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
"An Extraordinary Response"

Throughout the Operation, chaplains and chaplain assistants continued to perform a wide variety of religious support missions. The Department of Defense itself furnished victims more than 100,000 blankets, 55,000 cots, 1 million Meals Ready to Eat, 900,000 hot meals, and 20,000 radios. Camps and other facilities housed more than 160,000 homeless victims. Medical personnel treated 50,000 patients, soldiers and engineers repaired more than 250 schools. As part of this overall relief effort, chaplains and chaplain assistants conducted worship services for military personnel of all faith groups throughout the area of operations. Chaplains met with small groups of soldiers for brief worship services and counseled with them. Even though it was difficult to get accurate records of worship services, chaplains recorded a total of 465 worship services (136 Catholic, 306 Protestant, 7 Jewish, 16 denominational) held during the forty days of major religious support activities.

By September 28 the 1st Corps Support Command from Fort Bragg was prepared to redeploy. The 10th Mountain Division assumed the final missions for the last two weeks. Chaplain Benjamin C. Manning from the Army Materiel Command ministered to the AMC soldiers who were withdrawing from the area and transitioning supply support to local civilian helping agencies. Chaplain Herb Kitchens arranged for a continuity of religious services for the Corps of Engineers and FEMA personnel left in the residual JTF section at the Eastern Airlines building in Miami.

As the operation concluded, there were many compliments at every level for the work that Task Force Andrew accomplished. President George Bush in particular stated in The Washington Post that he was "very proud of the federal response—an extraordinary and very appropriate response to this human tragedy."\(^{21}\) Chaplain Gerald Mangham called the service of all unit ministry team members "a marvelous exercise in cooperation."\(^{22}\) Chaplain Richard Adams, the ARFOR Chaplain, said he was proudest of the initiative of his unit ministry teams in finding and meeting the needs of people.\(^{23}\) One high school student from Virginia who had traveled to Miami to see the area and to assist wrote, "It was nice to see everyone come together in a time of disaster. What impressed me the most were all of the people who came to help even though they were not victims themselves."\(^{24}\)

The unit ministry teams from the Florida National Guard were singled out for special and deserved praise. Chaplains Paul Mason and Herb Kitchens, who had headed the JTF Chaplain Plans and Operations section consecutively from September 2 to October 14, noted that the Guard "provided outstanding ministry to the stricken area of south Florida. Their reports were voluntarily submitted, always on time and accurate. They were on their home turf among their own people. They did a super job."\(^{25}\)

The chaplains who participated in the Operation, moreover, found their lives changed. Chaplain Floyd Gilbert, from Walter Reed Army Medical Center, one of the Added Dimension team members wrote: "As time passed I saw people coming together; slowly but coming together. I saw progress. People and victims became involved. Those who sat back and were apathetic at first stood up and started taking control of their lives. My life was changed once again. I was angry, depressed, sympathetic, empathetic, frustrated, fulfilled and unfilled. More strongly than anything else, however, I felt humbled and blessed. I was forced to reflect on all those small things that one takes for granted such as water, food and clothing."\(^{26}\)

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) Chaplain Robert Hutcherson, 10th Mountain Division, accepts thanks from Rabbi in south Florida; (Bottom) Chaplain Don Rutherford celebrates Mass with his soldiers
When Chaplain Robert Hutcherson departed with the last unit ministry team from the 10th Mountain Division on the 12th of October he wrote: "We have worked hard, prayed hard, and accomplished our mission. We have done great work and I am extraordinarily proud of every unit ministry team."27

Can Military Chaplains Minister Legally to Civilians?

In spite of the high echelon support the Joint Task Force Andrew unit ministry teams received by the end of September 1992, there was a question from the Joint Task Force Staff Judge Advocate concerning the utilization of chaplains in this disaster relief operation. As a result of a picture which appeared in The Miami Herald, Colonel Vahan Moushegan, the JTF Judge Advocate, questioned whether military chaplains were authorized to minister to civilian disaster victims. Colonel Moushegan was of the opinion that chaplains were legally authorized to minister to soldiers, when requested, in guaranteeing their free exercise of religion. But he was concerned that the same rationale might not extend to the civilian victims who presumably were supported by their own local religious faith groups. Colonel Moushegan wanted to protect the command, and the chaplains for that matter, from "further judicial challenge by those who would see the chaplaincy abolished or further constrained." Chaplain Paul Mason who spent considerable time with Colonel Moushegan at JTF Headquarters, noted that "It was my strong impression that his sole purpose in the rendering of his legal opinion was to protect the chaplaincy.28 Nevertheless, Chaplain Mangham, the JTF Staff Chaplain, was surprised at this legal issue for it brought into question not only individual chaplain ministries but the utilization of the Chief of Chaplains' Added Dimensions teams as well.29"

The picture in the Miami Herald was of Chaplain Jeff Houston praying with a disaster victim in the victim's home.30 The chaplain had been asked to pray by the civilian victim and in no way was violating the religious conscience of the individual. Nevertheless, Colonel Moushegan felt that those hostile to the military chaplaincy could argue that such prayers constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution if the government were perceived as becoming entangled, as a primary purpose, in sponsoring religion. Colonel Moushegan added, however, that chaplains do have a role in disaster relief operations with civilians to include counseling, furnishing information, and participating in the distribution of food, water and medical supplies. In Colonel Moushegan's memorandum for the Joint Task Force Chaplain dated September 30, 1992, he advised:

Failure to operate within prescribed Constitutional parameters could result in further judicial challenge by those who would see the chaplaincy abolished or further constrained. I would note that the courts have confirmed the constitutionality of the chaplaincy but did so, in part, on the basis that the mission of the chaplaincy was to engage in activities designed to meet the religious needs of a pluralistic military community. It would not appear that a court would consider activities designed to meet the spiritual needs of a civilian community, even under the unique circumstances presented here, as being appropriate and proper. If the chaplains are unable to

See endnotes at end of chapter.
segregate the two roles, chaplain participation in disaster relief operations must be limited to ministering to the needs of only those military personnel who are located in a disaster area.\textsuperscript{31}

Colonel Moushegan's memorandum was referred through the Joint Task Force Staff Chaplain to the Joint Task Force Commander, General Ebbesen. On the 1st of November Colonel Moushegan's opinion was reviewed by the Department of the Army Judge Advocate General. Responding for the DA JAG Office, Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Buchholz, Chief of the General Law Branch, Administrative Law Division, concluded "that the JTF Andrew Staff Judge Advocate's memorandum accurately states the constitutional limitations on the role of military chaplains in disaster relief operations."\textsuperscript{32} Colonel Buchholz further noted however, "Neither this opinion nor the opinion of the JTF Andrew Staff Judge Advocate should be read as infringing on the free exercise rights of chaplains while they are in an off-duty, private capacity not representing the United States Army. In this context, chaplains could pray with civilian disaster victims or preach at civilian churches without raising Establishment Clause concerns."\textsuperscript{33}

Chaplain Herb Kitchens, the JTF Plans and Operations Chaplain and Acting JTF Chaplain during a brief absence of Chaplain Mangham, had a long conversation with the JTF Staff Judge Advocate. Chaplain Kitchens tried to convince him that incidental prayers for civilians who voluntarily requested them did not constitute a serious threat to the Constitution of the United States. In fact, Chaplain Kitchens wrote a very proper and logical response upholding ministry to victims who asked for support as one of the expectations of the JTF Commander for unit ministry teams.

When Chaplain Mangham received Colonel Moushegan's original memorandum, he called Chaplain David Peterson at the FORSCOM Chaplain's office. Chaplain Mangham asked Chaplain Peterson if he wanted the unit ministry teams in South Florida to curtail all religious activities involving disaster victims, local religious leaders, and local religious organizations. Chaplain Peterson felt that the activities of the chaplains and chaplain assistants in Joint Task Force Andrew were appropriate to the overall Army mission. The Army was not officially advocating any particular religion or theology. The various unit ministry teams were simply responding to requests for humanitarian support in a pluralistic civilian community of Jewish, Catholic and Protestant people where homes, synagogues and churches were damaged or destroyed. Therefore, pending direct orders from the Joint Task Force Commander, Chaplain Peterson advised that the chaplains and the chaplain assistants should continue their ministries in accord with Chaplain Mangham's policy: ministry to military personnel and DoD civilians first, ministry coordination and support with local religious organizations and disaster victims second. Chaplain Mangham therefore continued to support the coordination and relief ministries of the chaplains and chaplain assistants with civilian victims in South Florida. It became obvious, however, that some attention was needed to draft Chaplain Corps doctrine more directly related to ministry in disaster relief operations, and perhaps subject in advance to legal reviews.

\textsuperscript{31} See endnotes at end of chapter.
See endnotes at end of chapter.
ENDNOTES


3. USA Today, November 25, 1992, p. 6-A.


7. Journal of Chaplain Kristi Pappas, Operation Andrew, August 28 - September 30, 1992, p.3. "I called back to Fort Drum and talked with Chaplain Hutcherson," Chaplain Pappas wrote on September 2d. "He told me to stay in the position until he arrived so that there would be consistency."


9. Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Donald Rutherford, August 19, 1994. Chaplain Rutherford, the first Catholic Chaplain to cross into Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, was also the first Catholic Chaplain to arrive in Miami during Operation Andrew.

10. Ibid.


15. Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Don Rutherford, August 19, 1994.
16. Personal interview with Chaplain (Maj.) Mary Pitts, September 2, 1994.

17. Personal interview with Chaplain (Capt.) Kristi Pappas, August 3, 1994.


20. Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John Brinsfield, the Personnel Officer from FORSCOM, was on leave in Miami from September 1 - 5 and made daily telephone reports to Chaplain Lonergan on the extent of the disaster from Miami to Homestead, Florida.


24. Personal interview with Casey M. Brinsfield, July 31, 1994. Miss Brinsfield was in Miami on September 1 - 2 with her father who was reporting to Chaplain (Col.) James B. Lonergan, the Deputy FORSCOM Chaplain, on the needs of the unit ministry teams in the Miami-Homestead area.


29. Personal interview with Chaplain (Col.) Mangham, Army Material Command, November 15, 1994


33. Ibid., p.2.
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE:

Religious Support
CHAPTER VII

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE: MINISTRY IN A CAULDRON

*Half of all of Somali children born between 1988 and 1993 died from the effects of famine, disease and war.*

Chaplain Gary R. Councell
U.S. Army War College

*This is real combat and we have to understand that.*

General Gordon Sullivan
*Army Times*, October 18, 1993

*The United Nations operations in Somalia were the bloodiest peacekeeping operations in Africa in more than 30 years.*

*The Washington Post*, March 26, 1994

Of the ten countries in East Africa where twenty million people faced starvation in 1992, Somalia captured the attention of the world possibly for two reasons. First, there were featured on international television vast numbers of children lying in refugee camps with listless eyes, wasted limbs, and flies nonchalantly walking across their bodies. Second, there was no central government in Somalia to deal with the problems of famine, disease and, at times, civil war. Although seven million people in Ethiopia and five million people in Sudan were undernourished, Somalia presented a troubling example of the deliberate interdiction of food supplies by armed tribal militiamen. Relief organizations were sometimes forced to play God in attempting to decide where to deliver food. Because the monthly cost of relief flights exceeded 4.5 million dollars, only 36% of the food needed by the people of East Africa was delivered in 1992. The World Food Program, the U.S. Relief Agency, CARE and the United Nations World Food Program sent appeals for 2.1 million tons of food worth more than $880 million to help the countries in the horn of Africa.¹

Somalia, or the Somali Democratic Republic as it was formally known in the United Nations, was not always a land of famine, pestilence, and war. With the total land area of 246,000 square miles, only a bit smaller than the state of Texas, Somalia has a wide variety of geographic regions ranging from mountains in the northern part of the country to a wide coastal plain on the Indian Ocean. Claiming a coast line of approximately 1,700 miles with several harbors, Somalia was able to export citrus products, live stock, petroleum and other minerals as recently as 1986. Even though the population of 7.3 million people was widely dispersed throughout the country, Somalia did have a capital city, Mogadishu, with a population of 700,000. Though Somalia was clearly a Third World country with only 15% of its roads paved and no railroads extant, it nevertheless had a government-

¹ See endnotes at end of chapter.
During 1974-1975, the President of Somalia, declared Somalia a socialist state. In the following years, most of the modern businesses in the country were nationalized. A drought in 1974 to 1975 caused widespread starvation. In mid-1977, ethnic Somalis in the adjacent Ogaden region of Ethiopia initiated open warfare aimed at ending Ethiopian control of the area. The rebels were armed by Somalia which also contributed troops to the effort. The Somalis captured most of the Ogaden by late 1977. But Ethiopia, aided by Cuba and the USSR, reasserted control over the region in early 1978, as the Somali Army suffered heavy losses.

Subsequently, guerrilla fighting in the Ogaden and the bombing of villages in the region by Ethiopian planes precipitated a flood of refugees into Somalia; the number of homeless in 1981 was estimated at close to two million, and many were near starvation. The United States gave both humanitarian and military aid to Somalia and in return was granted use of the naval facilities at Berbera, previously a Soviet base.

Hostilities with Ethiopia erupted again in 1982 and occurred sporadically thereafter, as did clashes between Somali government troops and Ethiopian-based Somalia rebels. A peace accord with Ethiopia was signed in 1988. The civil war intensified however, and Barre was forced to flee the capital in January 1991. During the next thirteen months, more than 30,000 people were reportedly killed in factional fighting, and another 250,000 people in and around Mogadishu were threatened with famine.

The guerrilla leader who headed the victorious coup against Barre in 1991 was General Mohammed Farrah Aidid (also Aideed), whose name in Somali means, "One Who Will Not Be Insulted." Aidid's ambition was to unify Somalia after the coup and succeed Barre as President. Aidid's base of power in his coalition of fourteen clans and sub-clans was not powerful enough, however, to command the allegiance of the other rival clan leaders throughout Somalia. To further complicate the already chaotic situation, United Nations Secretary Butros Butros-Ghali, in his former role as Egypt's Foreign Minister, agreed to recognize not Aidid but his rival Ali Mahdi Mohammed as the head of the hastily formed national government. Aidid saw a conspiracy developing between Ali Mahdi and other nations when the United States joined Egypt in officially recognizing Mahdi as the President of Somalia. Aidid was not alone, however, in opposing Mahdi's accession to power. Omar Jess, leader of the Ogadeni clan at Kismayo, allied himself with Aidid in opposing Mahdi's administration. With the allegiance of approximately half of the population of Mogadishu, Aidid was able to form an organization which he named the Somali National Alliance. At its height SNA could count seven thousand armed guerrillas under the control of General Aidid.

From the summer of 1991 through the fall of 1992, Aidid and his allied clan leaders waged virtually a gang war against their principal rivals, including Ali Mahdi, Mohamed Abshir and Mohamed Said Hersi. One of the tactics the clan leaders used to try to gain control of the country was the seizure and control of as much grain as possible, depriving opposing clans of the food they needed to survive.

By the summer of 1992, food shortages, compounded by a drought and exceptionally hot weather in the coastal plain of Somalia, began to take a toll in the rural villages. Hundreds of

See endnotes at end of chapter.
(Top) Chaplain Guy Jolin with Navy Chaplain in Somalia; (Bottom) SPC Edward Grayson tests local laundry methods
thousands of people faced starvation and death. Psychologically the people of Somalia began to change their thinking from "the good of society" to provisions for personal survival. As one United Nations official observed, the psychology in Somalia among the people could be summarized as follows: "I and Somalia against the world; I and my tribe against Somalia; I and my clan against the tribe; I and my family against the clan; I and my brother against the family; I against my brother."

By the end of July 1992 it was estimated that half of all the Somali children born between 1988 and 1993 had died. Malnutrition among the living half was estimated at 95%. Three-fourths of the people of Somalia were affected by the clan wars, resulting in two million persons displaced from their homes. More than 350,000 people had died from the civil conflict, disease, or starvation. Banditry, looting, and thievery became the most common means of obtaining food. Fifty cases of gunshot wounds were being treated every day in Mogadishu. Fifteen different factions disputed with each other for control of the country, using food and weapons as power. The only working distribution system in the country provided "khat" (a mild narcotic) and arms; otherwise, the common people had to resort to black marketing to obtain anything. United Nations' and volunteer organizations' efforts to help were largely frustrated because food supplies sent to the people were often either extorted or highjacked by armed clansmen.

Responding to urgent appeals from the United Nations in August 1992, President George Bush ordered air drops of food to prevent starvation in Somalia. Entitled "Operation Provide Relief," the food proved helpful but inadequate given the immense size of the starving Somali population. United Nations troops arrived in Somalia on September 14 to attempt to protect food convoys, but were out-numbered and out-gunned by the tribal militiamen who were intent on continuing the policy of food control and consolidation of tribal power.

Operation RESTORE HOPE

On December 4, 1992 Secretary General Butros Butros-Ghali requested that President Bush augment the United Nations peace keeping and humanitarian relief forces in Somalia with ground troops from the United States. President Bush, in the closing days of his administration, discussed the options available not only with his advisors but also with President-elect Bill Clinton. On December 9 President Bush ordered United States Marines to secure the Port of Mogadishu and prepare for a division-size force to enter the country. The military mission of Operation Restore Hope was to:

Secure major air and seaports, key installations and food distribution points, provide for open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations and assist United Nations/non-government organizations in providing humanitarian relief under United Nations auspices.

Eventually more than 33,000 allied soldiers served in the U.N. operation in Somalia (UNISOM). The United States supplied up to 24,000 members of its armed forces, although only

See endnotes at end of chapter.
17,000 served on the ground in Somalia at any one time. Military objectives were to:

1. Keep factional militia neutralized.
2. Provide sufficient, appropriate force.
3. Support political plans without creating vulnerabilities.
4. Ensure against the reemergence of violence.
5. Help rebuild the infrastructure.
6. Safeguard the flow of relief supplies.9

Operation Restore Hope had all the characteristics of a major invasion, with the added challenge of simultaneously supporting humanitarian relief operations. The theater was divided into nine humanitarian relief sectors for command and control of the coalition forces. The United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) of twenty nations had their own problems of fuel, maintenance, dusty conditions, and potable water. To help restore order as well as hope, a policy of the "Four Nos" was instituted. The "Four Nos" were: No Bandits, No Somali Check Points, No "Technical"s (civilian vehicles with mounted heavy weapons) and No Visible Weapons.10

Although Aaidid and the other clan leaders did not initially oppose the insertion of United States Marines, each clan leader watched carefully to see if an opportunity might arise to manipulate the United States forces to meet individual, political objectives. Mohamed Sahnoun, a former United Nations Envoy to Somalia, warned: "If the United Nations really tries to eliminate all the war lords at the same time, there will be great popular support. But to eliminate one and leave others active, that they can not accept."11 Overnight, without realizing it, the United States began to shift the balance of power within Mogadishu's two main rival clans. One veteran western aid worker in the Somalia capital warned: "That's the stuff desperation is made of." Richard Armitage, a senior official in the Bush administration, stated bluntly: "we are taking sides in a civil war."12

One of the reasons the clan leaders opposed U.S. Marine intervention was that it led to an immediate loss of income. As Lt. Colonel George A. Biszack, U.S.M.C., wrote:

Relief agencies, forced to hire gunmen to guard themselves and supplies, were faced with demands for food and money. When the Mogadishu port was open, humanitarian relief organizations paid $5,000 a day in protection payments. The money went to 'thugs' who patrolled the area in 'technical' [a vehicle mounted with a 105mm recoiless rifle or heavy caliber machine gun]. The NGOs listed under 'Technical Expense' the money that was paid for protection. The CARE team in Baidoa spent $20,00 a day on security, paying local thugs and their own guards not to attack them.13

When the Marines arrived, some clan leaders offered to work with the allies, but wanted their protection money to continue.14

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Organization for Support

The United Nations forces attempting to secure the delivery of food for the Somali people grew in size from 7,500 soldiers in December of 1992 to more than 28,000 soldiers drawn from thirty countries in May of 1993. The Commander of the United Nations Joint Task Force and the Senior American Commander in Somalia was Lt. General Robert Johnston, United States Marine Corps. The Joint Task Force included both Marine and Army land forces which were abbreviated, MARFOR & ARFOR. The Army forces were eventually comprised of soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, the 13th Corps Support Command (COSCOM) from Fort Hood and other units drawn from various installations including Fort Lewis, Washington. The XVIII Airborne Corps, III Corps and I Corps all contributed units, therefore, for Operation Restore Hope.¹⁵

Since Somalia was in the area of responsibility for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General Joseph Hoar, the Commander of CENTCOM, whose headquarters was at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, tracked the operations in Somalia quite closely. Tasking for unit and individual replacements went from the Commander, Joint Task Force Somalia, in Mogadishu, to the Commander for U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) which was the designation Third Army used in fulfilling its role as the land force for Central Command. Third Army, or ARCENT, was headquartered at Fort McPherson, Georgia. Since Third Army had very few assigned troops, they in turn would request support from U.S. Forces Command whose headquarters was also at Fort McPherson.

Because there was no staff chaplain position at CENTCOM, the Army Chaplain technical chain which was used to communicate situation reports and personnel requests of a specific nature went from the Senior ARFOR Chaplain in Somalia to the Third Army Chaplain and thence to the U.S. Forces Command Chaplain's Office for coordination and subsequent tasking through command channels. Chaplain Jerry Reynolds, the Third Army (ARCENT) chaplain normally received daily reports from Somalia. Chaplain Reynolds would then forward his request to Chaplain David Peterson, the FORSCOM Chaplain, or to his deputy, Chaplain James B. Lonergan. The FORSCOM Chaplain staff, including Chaplain Tom Cook, Chaplain John Brinsfield, Chaplain Raymond Ennis and Chaplain Paul Mason, would in turn seek to meet the requirements from Third Army. Daily reports on the situation in Somalia, to include the names of all deployed chaplains and chaplain assistants, were sent from the FORSCOM Chaplain's office to Chaplain Henry Wake, the Executive Officer in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains in Washington D.C. Chaplain Matthew Zimmerman, the Chief of Chaplains, and Chaplain Donald Shea, the Deputy Chief of Chaplains, thus would be fully informed as to the status of religious support for soldiers in Somalia. In order to track each unit ministry team deployed to Somalia, Chaplain Wayne Kuehne, Director of Plans, Programs, Training and Doctrine, directed Mr. Roger Able to maintain a daily status file for the Chief of Chaplains.

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¹⁵ See endnotes at end of chapter.
First Deployments

Responding to a call from the United Nations, on December 4, 1992, U.S. military forces were committed to support Operation Restore Hope in East Africa. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney specified that the Joint Task Force would "restore conditions so that the relief operations by the United Nations could occur there." Secretary Cheney identified the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York, as the principal Army unit called upon to follow the initial Marine forces into Somalia. Support troops were drawn from fourteen other Army installations in the United States, from the Reserve components and from four area support groups or divisional units in Germany. Among the principal Army units were the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, from Fort Drum, New York; the 62nd Medical Group from Fort Lewis, Washington; the 86th Evacuation Hospital from Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and the 593rd Area Support Group from Fort Lewis, Washington. A bit later in January the 13th Corps Support Command from Fort Hood, Texas, arrived as well. Combat power for the 2nd Brigade Task Force, 10th Mountain Division, came mostly from the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, and one company from the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry. The 3rd Battalion, 14th Infantry, from the 10th Mountain Division, operated south of Mogadishu in the port city of Kismayo. Supporting the infantrymen were elements of the 10th Mountain Division Support Command and Division Artillery, the 10th Aviation Brigade, the 10th & 511th Military Police Companies, the 41st Engineer Battalion, and the 3rd Battalion, 62nd Air Defense Artillery.

The first chaplain to deploy to Somalia for the Army land forces was Chaplain Kelly Moore from Fort Drum. The principal chaplains who arrived between December 16, 1992 and mid-January 1993 were Chaplain Robert Hutcherson, the 10th Mountain Division Chaplain, Chaplain Ernest "Guy" Jolin, the Joint Task Force Support Command Chaplain, Chaplain Barbara Sherer, the 62nd Medical Group Chaplain, Chaplain Vincent Inghilterra, the 593rd ASG Chaplain, and Chaplain Dennis Newton, the 86th EVAC Hospital chaplain. The 2nd Brigade chaplain, 10th Mountain Division, was Chaplain Joseph Krantz; Chaplain Juan Loya was the Division Support Command chaplain. Chaplain Kristi Pappas served as the Division Support Command chaplain, 10th Mountain Division, when Chaplain Juan Loya redeployed.

Most of the chaplains from the 10th Mountain Division, along with their chaplain assistants, were well acquainted with deployments since many of them had been involved in Operation Andrew at Homestead, Florida, 90 days before the deployment to Somalia. It was very difficult for Chaplain David O'Connell, the Installation Staff chaplain at Fort Drum, to prepare religious support for the Post in the Christmas Season as the 10th Mountain Division chaplains departed. Nevertheless, with the assistance of the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office, Chaplain O'Connell was able to send not only the unit chaplains who had to go with their units to Somalia, but also two Roman Catholic chaplains to assure Catholic coverage throughout the theater of operations. As early as December 14, 1992, U.S. Forces Command identified a Roman Catholic chaplain to assist Chaplain O'Connell at Fort Drum. Chaplain James Madden reported over the Christmas season to help with family support and Roman Catholic services at Fort Drum. Chaplain David Sandifer, the Family Life Chaplain, and Chaplain Malcolm Hess, the Senior Protestant Chaplain, also helped provide for family support at Fort Drum during the deployment.

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Jerry Reynolds, the 3rd Army (ARCENT) Chaplain, made sure that the deploying unit ministry teams understood that their first priority for religious support would be to the soldiers who were in Somalia. While direct humanitarian services to the Somali people were not forbidden, it was clear that the mission of the Army was to provide security for the relief organizations to do their job. Therefore, the mission of the unit ministry teams was to support the soldiers who were providing security for the United Nations and for other non-government relief organizations (NGOs).

Within Somalia itself the various headquarters were scattered throughout the country. The Army Forces Chaplain was located at the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu; the Joint Task Force Support Command Chaplain and the 62nd Medical Group Chaplain were located at the University near the Embassy. Other units were found in bases which functioned to provide security as well as accessibility to the area of operations. For example, one former Russian tank factory was renamed Victory Base and became an important location for deployed American troops. Within Mogadishu there were unit ministry teams located at Mogadishu Airport southeast of the city, at the University, at the U.S. Embassy in the center of the city, at the seaport, and at Sword Base and Hunter Base along 21 October Road to the northwest of the city.

Early in January 1993, Somalia's leading war lords, Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Aidid, jointly announced that the so-called "green line" dividing Mogadishu into separate sectors had been abolished. Thousands of men and women cheered as the two rivals promised for the first time in more than a year to allow people to travel freely across the capital. However, individual thugs and vandals continued looting and shooting even after the green line was no longer an official barrier. In the port city of Kismayo, 250 miles southwest of Mogadishu, up to 200 members of the Harti Clan, including religious leaders, business men and doctors, were reportedly dragged from their homes and shot during several nights of terror. The killing spree was said to have been ordered by Kismayo's de facto boss, the war lord Colonel Omar Jess, an ally of Aidids. According to an American diplomat, Jess may have ordered the massacre to consolidate his control over the city before relief forces arrived in Kismayo. It was clear from the beginning of Operation Restore Hope that many individual clan leaders would continue their policies of intimidation in spite of the presence of United Nations and American troops.

By January 1993, some 22,568 American service men and women, including 5,255 soldiers, were enroute to or already in Somalia. The Somali people, as well as their leaders, had mixed reactions to these foreign peace keepers. The Somalis gathered by the hundreds on the sides of the roads from dawn to dusk. They reached into slow moving vehicles to snatch sunglasses off the faces of reporters and relief workers. They taunted the armed American guards at the compounds. Some waved and smiled at soldiers and Marines; others threw rocks and told the Americans to go home.

On January 7, Marine Cobra helicopters treated American troops in Mogadishu to a serious fireworks display, their missiles lighting up the clear night sky in an attack on Somali gunmen just outside the Embassy compound. Thousands of soldiers and Marines watched and cheered. A January 11 raid in Mogadishu netted enough Somali weapons to fill seven 5-ton trucks. The booty included everything from missiles, mortars, and machine guns to rifles and ammunition. Near Baledogle the same night, military police from Fort Drum set up all-night road blocks and confiscated small arms, crew-served automatic weapons and two mortars. U.S. Forces personnel suffered their
first fatality on January 12 when a Marine Private First Class was shot dead. He was on patrol near the Mogadishu Airfield when his unit was ambushed by Somali gunmen.

Even in inland towns, where most Somalis welcomed the soldiers as saviors for their dying nation, there was trouble. In Wanle Weyne, soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division's 2nd Brigade were called in to quell a riot at a Red Cross food warehouse. The soldiers rushed to the scene after receiving reports that more than a thousand villagers had overwhelmed a lone Somali soldier in charge of guarding the food. Warning shots were fired by the Americans to help keep the villagers back.

But by mid-January 350,000 Somalis had died of drought, famine and civil unrest. The daily death rate had peaked in the summer of 1992 at 300, until beefed up security and increased food deliveries lowered the toll. A relief center in Wanle Weyne housed about 100 sick people on any given day. Most suffered from malnutrition, diarrhea or malaria. Before the arrival of the Americans, relief workers said five or six people died at the center each day. One American chaplain observed" "It's almost as if the four horsemen of Revelation—war, famine, disease and death—watered their horses in Somalia."21

Chaplains and chaplain assistants deploying to Somalia experienced, in many ways, conditions which were more severe than in any other operation since Vietnam. Deployment orders, for example, required immunizations or chemoprophylaxis for ten different diseases before one could deploy to Somalia. These diseases included tetanus, diphtheria, polio, influenza, typhoid, yellow fever, measles, malaria, and tuberculosis. Deployment orders from the Commander, ARCENT, contained the warning that deploying personnel must take enough uniform items for the temporary change of station because there would be no desert camouflage uniforms or accessories to issue. In the words of Chaplain Terry Walsh of the 10th Aviation Brigade: "if you don't bring it with you, you ain't gonna get it."22

Chaplain Kristi Pappas from the Division Support Command at Fort Drum took these warnings seriously. When Chaplain Pappas deployed she took five foot lockers, four duffel bags, and all of her field equipment with her. In the foot lockers and duffel bags were not only 33 bottles of wine, hosts, prayer books, Bibles, medals, rosaries and even copies of the Koran but also candy and books for the troops.23

Many of the deploying chaplains were aware that the environment in Somalia was particularly dangerous, especially for Christian clergy. In 1989 the Franciscan Bishop had been killed in Somalia, and in 1991 the Roman Catholic Cathedral had been sacked.24 Even some United Nations volunteers had been killed as recently as January of 1992. One chaplain reported seeing a volunteer from Ireland, seeking to take a child to the hospital, shot in the back by Somali gunmen.25

In addition to the dangers from disease and sniper fire, there also were natural dangers which threatened the American soldiers. In Somalia there were 11 different species of snakes—all poisonous. For the bites of five of these snakes there was no anti-venom. Some snakes were called "Two-step Charlies." Soldiers said if you were bitten by such a snake you could take two steps before you died.26 For all practical purposes soldiers regarded every insect, plant and reptile in Somalia to be dangerous.

In addition to the physical dangers in Somalia for soldiers, there were also physical
discomforts. In some locations showers were available every four days. If one could get a shower, the second bath the soldier would take would be in insect repellent to prevent mosquito bites which could result in malaria. Throughout the month of January 1993, sleep was very difficult for unit ministry team members, especially in Mogadishu. Mortar and sniper fire was constant every night for a month. In short, American soldiers found themselves involved in a humanitarian peacekeeping mission in the midst of an inter-tribal civil war.

Since the protection that is normally extended under the Geneva Conventions for noncombatants was not universally available in Somalia for the peacekeeping forces, many chaplains and chaplain assistants faced a situation not addressed in Chaplain Corps doctrine. In combat zones chaplains frequently drove vehicles while chaplain assistants provided security. In Somalia some commanders forbade officers to drive because Somali gunmen targeted drivers of vehicles. Consequently, in order to move it was necessary to have some kind of security in the vehicle if the chaplain assistant had to be the driver. Some chaplains were advised to carry weapons, but the majority refused. The alternative was to travel only in armed convoys, and this produced severe restrictions on the movement of unit ministry teams to places where they were needed. In some locations commanders would gather from four to seven unit ministry teams in one place and, in effect, bunch them up for security. In other locations chaplains would fly to critical areas on helicopters leaving their assistants to do counseling or other jobs in more secure areas. In other cases chaplain assistants became convoy commanders and were not available to render direct security support for their chaplains.

Perhaps the most dangerous scenario the unit ministry teams had to encounter was the problem of hidden snipers in crowds of Somali people. As convoys sought to negotiate street throngs in Mogadishu, it was not unusual for hundreds of Somali men, women and children to mob the vehicles. Sometimes Somali gunmen would hide in the midst of the civilian population and take shots at soldiers. Since the rules of engagement for American troops required that the gunmen be identified and that the situation plainly be life threatening, frequently no return fire could be authorized lest civilians be caught in the cross-fire. The rules of engagement however, changed over the course of time and were not consistent for each nation involved. Some nations allowed their troops to return fire regardless of the civilian presence. In such situations American soldiers frequently felt guilty because they somehow were participating in a type of engagement which seemed to counter many of the prohibitions in the Geneva Conventions.

Types of Ministries

By the last week in January 1993, sixteen unit ministry teams from Fort Drum, Fort Hood, Fort Lewis, Fort Eustis, Fort Benning, and from U.S. Army Europe had arrived in Somalia. Direct religious support to soldiers to include Bible studies, counseling, worship and sacramental opportunities, and ministries of encouragement and visitation were the first priority of the unit ministry teams. However, many other organizational tasks had to be accomplished in order for the UMTs to do their work.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain Vince Inghilterra, the 593rd Area Support Group Chaplain, had arrived on Christmas
Day with his troops. Father Inghilterra had Mass on Christmas with his soldiers and then proceeded
to provide religious coverage for as many other Catholic soldiers as he could locate including those
in Kenya. As the senior Army priest in Mogadishu, Chaplain Inghilterra felt it necessary to coordinate
with the Navy and UNISOM chaplains in setting up an organized chaplaincy for all of the United
Nations forces. In early January there were forty-three chaplains from all branches of the American
military. Of the forty-three chaplains in Somalia ministering to American forces, twenty-five were
from the Navy, sixteen from the Army and two from the Air Force. Chaplain Inghilterra recalled his
initial impressions upon his arrival in Somalia:

As the only Army priest in Mogadishu I felt it necessary to coordinate with the
UNISOM Chaplain to organize for proper religious coverage in our area. Life
support was virtually non-existent. There were no showers. We had to wash in
buckets. The American forces took over the university but there was more mortar
and artillery fire for over a month. Many of our soldiers worked with humanitarian
relief organizations. Everyone was scared because we could not identify the enemy.
The people were the enemy. Soldiers involved in humanitarian actions did many tasks
for the impoverished people of Mogadishu. They set up more than 150 feeding
kitchens. They saved food from their rations and gave away parts of their MREs.
They found building materials for huts; they used their own supplies to set up clinics.
Thousands of children were all over the streets. Even though some volunteers had
been threatened and killed, there was an important ministry in saving the lives of
children. We also had ministries with civil affairs people. Children were virtually
taking care of other children. Some of our soldiers taught school. Instead of telling
the children about Jack and Jill who went up the hill, they changed the names to
Fatima and Amed. Even while teaching the children, the soldiers still had to wear
their combat gear. We were relieved to turn over many of these functions to
humanitarian organizations. But above all I recall that there was no security for the
Joint Logistical Task Force, soldiers whom we called "loggers." Mogadishu was a
battle zone. Between warring clans there were no clear rules of engagement. Women
and children were shot down. I spent hours counseling soldiers about the things they
were seeing.

Chaplain Robert Hutcherson, the 10th Mountain Division Chaplain, was by position the
ARFOR Chaplain after January 3. Chaplain Hutcherson remained in constant contact with Chaplain
Jerry Reynolds at Third Army at Fort McPherson to coordinate the arrival of additional unit ministry
teams. Situation reports were made daily from Mogadishu to Fort McPherson and then, as previously
noted, through the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office to Chaplain Wake or to Mr. Roger Able in the
Office of the Chief of Chaplains. As the messages and requirements increased, Chaplain Raymond
E. Ennis, USAR, assumed some of the personnel duties in the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office.
Throughout Operation Restore Hope there was constant communication between all chaplain

See endnotes at end of chapter.
echelons from Mogadishu to the Pentagon.

Chaplain Barbara Sherer, the 62nd Medical Group Chaplain, recalled the challenges her unit faced in providing medical support to the dispersed American Army units:

Since my Medical Group was responsible for overseeing all medical care in the country, the 86th EVAC Hospital came under my commander's control. This meant that with my position as Group Chaplain I was responsible for the two chaplains who deployed with the 86th. Chaplain Dennis Newton and Chaplain Greg Estes both technically outranked me, but it was a really comfortable relationship. I just left them to take care of all the hospital's needs, and I focused on the other diverse units in the 62nd. This worked well because the hospital was located on the airfield until April while my headquarters was at the university complex. I had units "or portions of units" at the port of Mogadishu, the Embassy, Baledogle, Bardera, Kismayo and Belet Uen. I worked with people from a variety of countries. I had the opportunity to help my unit provide some food relief for a feeding center, and establish relationships with the adults and children housed at that center. There were many teenagers actually living on the street on their own. They had learned to care for themselves, sometimes by approaching vehicles and reaching in and stealing items. Refugee camps sprung up to house the many refugees from outlying areas. The camps consisted of hundreds of huts made from long tree limbs covered with cardboard, corrugated metal or anything else people could find. Many of the huts looked like an Eskimo's igloo, except that they were made of cardboard instead of snow. Even when I was preaching I could hear automatic weapons fire in the background. But the most valuable experience was in dealing with the children and then interacting with them. Ministry for their improvement, once they had food and security, was worth the risk.30

In the 10th Mountain Division the soldiers had the mission of transportation security so that the United Nations and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could distribute the needed food and water to the population. Some soldiers wound up loading and unloading food, running soup kitchens and even building schools for children. In general, however, most of the combat troops were charged with security missions. Some of the Somali people did not understand that American black soldiers were from the United States. They were constantly asking the Afro-American troops what tribe they came from. The Somalis warned some of the black soldiers that if there was a slave ship they would hear the slave bell ringing in the market place.31

In general the ministries of the chaplains and chaplain assistants in the 10th Mountain Division included conducting worship services, counseling, visiting the troops and the sick and wounded in the hospitals, as well as providing religious support for United Nations and diplomatic personnel when the opportunities arose. A typical day for a chaplain in the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia might begin with a stand up at 0600 hours, followed by counseling with ten to 20 counselees a day. There would be trips to visit soldiers and a visit to the hospital and, on Sundays, as many as five worship services for each UMT. Some services began as early as 0800 and ended by 1900 hours.32

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Chaplain and chaplain assistants also attempted to provide care packages for soldiers that included candy and books and sometimes popcorn poppers so that there could be a diversion from the constant after-duty boredom. Eventually a MARS radio station went into operation providing some communication for the soldiers with their home installations. Initially, however, there were no Stars and Stripes newspapers available and only limited radio programming.

A good deal of the counseling support chaplains and chaplain assistants provided to the soldiers could be categorized as morale support or "putting out fires." Many soldiers reacted emotionally to inaccurate information or rumors which contributed to their anxiety in Somalia. Some of the soldiers from Fort Hood, for example, were told that they would be in Somalia only thirty days when actually their orders called for them to be in the country for six months. Some soldiers needed assurance that what they were doing was of lasting value, and some soldiers did not understand the type of conflict or limits on their mission which they encountered in Somalia. There was no real doctrine for chaplains and chaplain assistants to use in each contingency and, therefore, much of the ministry was simply directed by the unit ministry teams' own concepts of what it meant to serve soldiers in such unusual circumstances.

Mission Shift 1

In February and March it appeared that things were going well in the effort to provide relief for the Somali people and to keep the peace with a minimum of security. The United States and other multi-national troops opened roads, got the food moving again and even carried out some (though not enough) disarmament. President Clinton gave his blessing to negotiations by Secretary of State Warren Christopher with U.N. Secretary General Butros Ghali to draft a plan for replacing American soldiers with a United Nations multi-national force. Since American troops were coming out of Somalia rather than going in, President Clinton left the detail work to subordinates. By March, in a hurry to withdraw most of its troops, the United States agreed to a Security Counsel Resolution specifying what the United Nations would do to rebuild Somalia while the Blue Helmets kept security throughout the country. The resolution assigned the U.N. force some nation-building tasks. These included setting up regional counsels with a view to eventual nationwide elections. That complex and time-consuming mandate might have set off alarm bells in Washington. But since U.S. forces were being cut from 28,000 to 4,500, and because things were going so well in Somalia, none was sounded. In fact, the House of Representatives decisively passed a resolution endorsing the nation-building mission and favoring the use of American troops to support it, for several years if necessary.33

There were some misgivings from the start however. If the Somali war lords perceived that their power bases were eroding during this nation-building process, many observers warned that they might seek to undermine the mission. Smith Hempstone, Ambassador to the neighboring country of Kenya, persistently noted: "Somalis, as the Italians and British discovered to their discomfiture, are natural born guerrillas. They will mine the roads. They will lay ambuses. They will launch hit-and-run attacks."34 Nevertheless, on March 26, 1993, Aidid and fourteen other clan leaders signed a

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peace pact under United Nations auspices in Addis Ababa which pledged their mutual efforts toward a peaceful Somalia. Under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, a mandate was developed for the United Nations to support this nation-building effort. The nation-building mission did not preclude the continuing relief and peacekeeping missions as much as it shifted emphasis toward a broader scope for the United Nations operations.

Robert Oakley, the special Presidential Envoy who helped launch the political talks among the fifteen clan leaders, left Somalia in March. Somalia "clearly looked like it was back on the road. Somalis were starting to repaint their houses, clean their own streets, relocate market places, and open schools," said Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnston. In light of the peace pact and with strong U.S. backing, the United Nations adopted a resolution on March 27 setting up an international (UNISOM II) peacekeeping force. The United States was to contribute some 4,000 logistics troops, a number that was to dwindle to 3,000 by the end of 1993.

But even as the United Nations was organizing its force, signs of trouble began. Oakley's idea, said a senior U.S. official, was to marginalize the so called war lords—the political and military leaders of the country's clans—and allow other leaders to develop. Such grass roots leadership was envisioned to include clan elders, intellectuals, former government officials, and some of the war lords who ruled by more than just the barrel of a gun. Among the war lords, U.S. officials in Somalia thought Mohammed Aasid's biggest rival, Mohamed Abshir, was the "best of the lot." April Glaspie, a State Department official, who served as political advisor to U.N. Envoy Jonathan Howe, was one of several Americans who met with Abshir and made no secret of the U.S. dislike of Aasid. Aasid, sensing he was being marginalized, complained that the United Nations was cutting him off. Mr. Howe responded that if he wanted to talk he could come to U.N. headquarters. Lieutenant General Johnston noted, "I consciously avoided any indication that we were supporting one clan over the other."

With the announcement that the bulk of American forces would be redeployed to the United States—to be replaced by a multi-national force of United Nations troops beginning May 1, and with a change of command ceremony on May 4—a great deal of administrative work had to be done. From the chaplains' perspective it was not only a matter of redeploying units and substituting other units with their unit ministry teams; but, as it happened, the change in units occurred at the primary religious holiday season of the year. Both the Jewish Passover season and the Christian Easter season would take place from the first through the end of the second week in April. In effect, by the end of April Operation Restore Hope would be concluded with all of the senior chaplains, to include Chaplain Hutcherson, Chaplain Jolin and Chaplain Inghilterra, departing from Somalia.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Observing Holy Days

"Sweating seemed to be the national pastime."

Chaplain Richard White

At the FORSCOM Chaplain's Office it became clear that a Jewish Chaplain would be needed to help the American Jewish soldiers celebrate the Passover season in Somalia. Chaplain Richard White from the United States Army Chaplain Center and School at Fort Monmouth was selected to go. In addition, Chaplain Paul Bomba, a Roman Catholic Chaplain assigned to the U.S. Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency, was selected to augment Catholic support in Somalia at Easter.

At Third Army Headquarters at Fort McPherson, Chaplain Jerry Reynolds began the process of coordinating the assignment of chaplains to replace those leaving Somalia at the end of April. As the 2nd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division prepared to depart, the 43rd Corps Support Group from Fort Carson, Colorado, was alerted to deploy. The new contingent of troops which was projected to number almost 4,000 would include 1,100 soldiers from the First Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, and a logistical support unit of 2,600 soldiers from Fort Carson to help support the Quick Reaction Force from the First Brigade. Chaplain requirements for these 4,000 soldiers included one Major and one Captain in the First Brigade, and a Lieutenant Colonel, a Major and three Captains in the logistical unit.

Since most of the chaplains in the 10th Mountain Division, to include both of the re-deploying Roman Catholic chaplains, had already been in Somalia, requests went from Chaplain David O'Connell at Fort Drum through U.S. Forces Command to crosslevel some chaplains from other installations to help meet the requirements in Somalia. This crossleveling took a great deal of time and several chaplains working at different echelons. Chaplain John Rasmussen at the Chief's Office, Chaplain Raymond E. Ennis and Chaplain John Brinsfield at FORSCOM coordinated with Chaplain Willard D. Goldman, the assignments officer at the Chief of Chaplains Office, to try to meet the requirements either from the Reserve components or from the active duty forces. Since the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord was losing many of its units and the chaplains' positions that went with them, Chaplain Mark Werner and Chaplain Dean Rominger from the 7th Infantry Division were selected to go to Somalia. As Chaplain Jolin was scheduled to leave Somalia on May 2, Chaplain Werner would be the senior Army chaplain in Somalia until a Lieutenant Colonel could arrive. Chaplain Steve Doman, the Installation Staff Chaplain at Fort Ord, and Chaplain William De Leo, who helped manage personnel, played key roles not only in preparing two chaplains for deployment but in covering their units at Fort Ord as two brigades of the 7th Infantry Division prepared to deactivate and Fort Ord prepared to close.

The two chaplains sent to assist with the celebration of Easter and Passover had a rather rocky deployment to Somalia in April. Chaplain Bomba from the Chaplaincy Services Support Agency developed back trouble in route to Europe and had to be hospitalized at Fort Dix. Chaplain Bomba departed for Somalia, nevertheless, as soon as he received medical clearance to leave. Chaplain White departed from the U.S. Army Chaplain School in the company of his chaplain assistant, Sergeant Alvin Chaplin, from Fort Bragg. Unfortunately, Sergeant Chaplin was bumped from the
(Top) Colonel Ian "Red" Natkin and Chaplain Barbara Sherer at Passover Service, Mogadishu, 1993; (Bottom) Chaplain Leo "Joe" O'Keeffe at Mass in Somalia
manifest at the last moment, but made it to Mogadishu four days after Chaplain White's arrival. Chaplain White recorded his impressions upon landing at the airport in Mogadishu:

The Airport was humming with activity. You could definitely tell that this was a U.N. operation. There were French, Italian and Canadian troops leaving and arriving. The Airport was guarded by Egyptian soldiers, and vehicles from many nationalities zoomed about the area. After retrieving my luggage and donning my helmet and flak jacket, we set off through the streets for the University of Somalia compound. Evidence of mass destruction abounded. Most people lived in small shacks. Many streets had no paving left, and burned and battered vehicles were scattered here and there. Sweating seemed to be the national pastime. After settling into my quarters (a spacious room in a building with no running water or toilet) I set about preparing for the Passover services and Seder. I found out that J. W. B. (Jewish Welfare Board) supplies were nowhere to be found but that we had plenty of kosher Passover wine.

Chaplain White could not find all of the things he needed; but Chaplain Nichols, U.S. Navy, had already arranged through a civilian contractor for a supply of hard boiled eggs, celery, and a roasted leg of lamb. This sharing of supplies by the Navy with Army enabled Chaplain White to conduct his Passover Seder.

Jews and Christians from all over Mogadishu gathered for the Seder. Colonel Ian Natkin, Commander of the 62nd Medical Group, brought his chaplain to the celebration. Colonel Natkin described how important it was to meet with other Jews for prayer on the Sabbath. “The Seder was the culmination of all my previous experiences of worship during the deployment,” he explained. The fact that they were celebrating in an Islamic country added to the unique quality of the experience. “Gathering for this celebration was a real high point. What made it even more special was the opportunity to share it with my chaplain.”

Chaplain White concluded his observations:

The situation was far more secure than just a few months ago. Before I left Somalia, the water was turned on in Mogadishu and I saw many of the merchants repainting their store fronts. The city is gradually coming back to life. There is now a local police force (I heard they will receive weapons soon), and negotiations to form a government continue. No one knows what will happen when the U.N. and U.S. forces leave Somalia, but for now we should all be justifiably proud of the job we have done.

Easter came on April 11 and many of the chaplains in the 10th Mountain Division attempted to travel throughout the country in order to visit soldiers at different outposts. Sunrise services were held wherever possible. Chaplain Inghilterra coordinated with chaplains from Nigeria and Australia.

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in order to cover as many soldiers of different nationalities as possible. On one occasion he was even able to hold Mass on a guided missile cruiser. Nevertheless, by the end of the Easter/Passover season, most of the soldiers and unit ministry teams were concentrated on meeting their redeployment schedules. In effect, UNISOM I ended on the last day of April 1993.

UNISOM II

On May 1, 1993, the United Nations formally accepted responsibility for the peace-keeping and nation-building operations in Somalia. On the 4th of May a new military command relieved Lieutenant General Robert Johnston to set up UNISOM II. The Commander, Turkish General Cevik Dir, was assisted by Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, the Deputy Commander of United Nations Forces and the Commander of U.S. Forces Somalia. General Montgomery thereby maintained command of U.S. troops, but under the overall authority of the United Nations Command. Within U.S. Forces Somalia was the Quick Reaction Force drawn from the First Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, and the United Nations Logistical Support Command, largely made up of the 43rd Corps Support Group from Fort Carson, Colorado.

In May and early June eight chaplains and eight chaplain assistants formed the nucleus of religious support for the American soldiers in UNISOM II. Chaplain Mark Werner was the Quick Reaction Force troop chaplain supported by Chaplain Dean Rominger and Chaplain Nathanael Carr from Fort Drum. Since Chaplain Werner was the senior chaplain for a brief period of time he also served on the "Pocket Staff" for General Montgomery. Chaplain Michael Norton from Fort Knox arrived to support the 43rd Corps Support Group in the U.N. Logistics Support Command. As the only Roman Catholic Chaplain, Chaplain Norton was very busy trying to cover the entire American force. Chaplain Duncan Baugh from Fort Carson arrived to likewise support his own 43rd Corps Support Group. Other chaplains included Chaplain James R. Miller, 68th CSB, Chaplain Jon E. Lambert, 42nd Field Hospital, and Chaplain Jack A. Woodford, 260th CSB.

Since Operation Restore Hope had ended officially with the change of command on May 4 between General Johnston and General Montgomery, the Army began using the term "Operation Continue Hope" to describe the continuing presence of Army troops in Somalia. The official United Nations designation, however, was UNISOM II.

On May 11, 1993, General Montgomery, published General Order 1. The purpose of the order was to publish guidance for the activities of the U.S. personnel. One paragraph, number 5, contained prohibited activities; among which were the introduction, purchase, possession, use, or sale of privately owned firearms, ammunition, or explosives. Entrance by non-Muslims into a mosque also was prohibited. The introduction, purchase, possession, use, sale, transfer, manufacture, or consumption of any alcoholic beverage was also forbidden unless it was command-approved. Such command-approved alcoholic beverages were limited to beer or wine. Other activities prohibited including the possession of the narcotic stimulant known as "khat," gambling of any kind, removing, possessing, selling, defacing or destroying archeological artifacts or national treasures; selling, bartering or exchanging currency other than at the official exchange rate; and taking or retaining of

See endnotes at end of chapter.
individual souvenirs of the operation in Somalia. The last paragraph contained what was known as "further restrictions." These included adopting as pets or mascots any domestic or wild animal; providing food items directly to or feeding civilian refugees; and distributing small items such as candy to civilian refugees unless approved by the individual supervising non-commissioned officer or officers, under conditions that were safe both for the recipient and the military personnel involved. These restrictions were designed to protect U.S. personnel as well as the Somalia people from any harmful substances or food which the Somalis were unaccustomed to ingest.39

On 14 May U.S. Forces Command changed the rotation policy to reflect a normal tour of 179 days rather than 120 days as had been the case at the beginning of Operation Restore Hope. Operation Continue Hope was supposed to be a relatively "steady state" mission of humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and nation-building.40 Although the nation-building mission was supposed to be a peaceful function, the term "peacemaking" was perhaps more accurate. George J. Church, a correspondent for Time Magazine wrote on 17 May:

So was Operation Restore Hope a failure? The U.S. sent in 25,800 soldiers armed with machine guns, tanks, rocket launchers, anti-tank weapons and helicopters at a cost of $30 million to $40 million a day to carry out the humanitarian mission. They accomplished the primary goal: saving thousands of Somalis from imminent starvation. The Americans and their allies in the 24 nation expedition created at least some oasis of safety in a desert of anarchy. And they blazed the way for a new kind of U.N. Force—not the lightly armed peace keepers of the past but "peace enforcing troops" toting enough weapons to fight a real battle and authorized to shoot when needed. To the U.S. military the job is finished yet the unfinished, and in some cases unstated, tasks the Americans are handing over are staggering. The Somalis' underlying problems—the absence of any central government, the lack of basic security, the clan warfare and banditry, the destruction of the countries infrastructure—have not significantly improved. Charged with broad responsibility for national repair and reconciliation, the U.N. troops will have much more to do than the U.S.-led force. They will be more lightly armed, deploying weapons such as mortars but no tanks or heavy artillery, and they will be stretched over the whole of Somalia, not just the southern and central population centers.41

As the UNISOM II military command shifted into high gear the last week in May, some of the previous directives from UNISOM I began to be implemented with greater attention to detail. One of the missions the United Nations Forces had was to continue the disarmament of the rival Somali clans in and around Mogadishu. In an effort to carry out this mission with a minimum of resistance, on 4 June the United Nations informed Aidid that his weapons depots would be inspected the next day, 5 June. Aidid clearly viewed this announcement as a threat. His perception was heightened when he was informed also that a force of Pakistani U.N. peacekeepers had an additional mission to close Aidid's Mogadishu radio station, thereby prohibiting the Somali nation from hearing any voice other than that of the United Nations. Whereas this information may not have been

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
accurate, Aidid's clan saw it as a direct and unfair threat to its power base in Mogadishu. On 5 June gunman loyal to Aidid ambushed a force of Pakistani troops inspecting unguarded weapons depots, killing 24 of them. The bodies of the 24 dead Pakistani soldiers were mutilated and left for the United Nations to recover. An outraged United Nations Security Council immediately passed resolution 837 authorizing "the arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment of those responsible" for the murder of the Pakistani troops. Eleven days later retired U.S. Admiral Jonathan Howe, Butros-Ghali's chief deputy in Somalia, plastered the bombed out buildings of Mogadishu with posters offering a $25,000 reward for information leading to Aidid's capture. On June 17 the United Nations formally classified Aidid himself as an outlaw.

**Mission Shift 2**

The ambush of the Pakistani troops led to yet another shift in mission among the U.N. peacekeepers. In Washington, President Clinton directed his advisors to draft a document known as "Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 13," which welcomed the rapid expansion of U.N. peace enforcement operations and pledged the commitment of U.S. troops under U.N. commanders. American officials pointed to United Nations Resolution 837 as the moment when the humanitarian mission began to turn into a mini-war against Aidid. At the time, authorities in Somalia thought Aidid posed a serious threat and could be contained most efficiently by military means. Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, wrote that "failure to take action against Aidid would have signaled to other clan leaders that the U.N. is not serious."

From the 14th to the 18th of June, under the auspices of the U.N. mandate for peace enforcement, United Nations troops attacked suspected weapons caches, Aidid's compound and other military targets. U.S. C-130 ground support planes and Cobra attack helicopters pounded the capitol. Pakistani troops opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators, killing at least 20 Somalis, women and children included. Whereas Mr. Howe called the operation "very surgical," most Somalis were not convinced. Aidid remained at large, whereas four Moroccan and one Pakistani soldier were killed and more than 100 Somali militiamen died in the raid.

As the sniping continued after the June raid, General Montgomery asked the Pentagon for additional armored vehicles. General Montgomery's request was ultimately forwarded to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin who disapproved it on the grounds that armored vehicles would be "over-kill" for such a lightly armed enemy. Moreover, the situation in Mogadishu was viewed as a political problem rather than a purely military one. The Clinton Administration, as well as the Security Council of the United Nations, was not interested in conquering and occupying Somalia. Their interest was to help build the nation, and the introduction of more troops and armor was not the first priority.

In the new mission of peace enforcement the United States took the lead in a deadly cat and mouse game with Aidid—turning him into an outlaw and completely changing the mission from one of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief to a police manhunt. "It was a gross miscalculation," Lieutenant General Johnston suggested. U.S. officials also admitted that they underestimated Aidid's

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
strength, his intimate knowledge of Mogadishu, and his training as a guerrilla fighter. The standoff escalated, with a succession of raids against Aidid followed by reprisals on his part. It began to take a toll on the 28-nation U.N. force, and events began to reel out of control.46

UMT Rotations: A Chaplain Assistant's Perspective

On 15 June Sergeant First Class Wayne Collum, a senior chaplain assistant, from Fort Hood, Texas, arrived in Mogadishu with 30 other augmentees for the U.N. Logistics Support Command. Sergeant First Class Collum was to assist Chaplain Craig Dunham, who would arrive two weeks later to become the U.S. Forces Somalia Staff Chaplain. Sergeant Collum, who had previous tours in both Korea and Germany, had departed knowing that fighting was going on in Mogadishu. Upon his arrival at the University Compound in a convoy from the airport, Sergeant Collum discovered that the Chaplain Section had no space for an office nor was there an operations plan, an operations order or even a religious support plan for the orderly administration of religious support. For two weeks Sergeant Collum worked to get a space for the U.S. Forces Somalia Chaplain's office and then to set up the office, and the supply network which was needed in order to function properly. In addition to his administrative duties Sergeant Collum also was informed that he would have to learn how to run combat convoys, to set up gun positions and to function as a combat NCO. As the senior chaplain assistant in the Army forces, Sergeant Collum coordinated with the other chaplain assistants for communication and area responsibilities. Sergeant Collum wrote:

I arrived in Africa on June 15, 1993. The mission up to that time was strictly humanitarian assistance, with a dash of peacekeeping. The day prior to my arrival on the ground that [mission] changed. Although humanitarian aid was still going on in other parts of the country, in Mogadishu the U.S. mission changed to peace enforcement.

Sergeant Collum wanted to ensure that the chaplain assistants, and indeed the chaplains throughout Somalia, were familiar with both the defensive and the offensive missions of the U.S. forces. In order to accomplish this task he made sure that he understood the rules of engagement, the restrictions on travel and the necessity to protect convoy vehicles against the possibility of mines, rocks and projectiles thrown from crowds. Chaplain assistants also had to know about the establishment of main supply routes as well as search and seizure missions and the control of key areas such as airfields, seaports and roads.

Unite ministry teams also made friends and gained support for the United Nations' presence. That resulted from working along side former university professors, police and tribal leaders, although the primary job of the military chaplains was to support the G5 (civil affairs officer) and his team and not to be part of any formal negotiation process.

The primary mission of the unit ministry teams was no different than that in any other military operation: to perform or provide direct religious support for soldiers. UMTs provided worship

*See endnotes at end of chapter.*
services, counseling support, and classes on reunion and world religions where appropriate. The most important security mission, of course, was providing security for the unarmed chaplain and the ministry team itself.

Sergeant Collum also had an eye to considerations for mass casualty support, memorial services, contingency forces ministry, and cooperation between UMT’s. Some of the challenges which he encountered, even before the arrival of Chaplain Dunham, included problems of supply, unit ministry teams deploying without chaplain assistants, and the need for technical supervision in extremely difficult circumstances. Whereas unit ministry teams could communicate with one another, movement from one position to another was extremely challenging because of the necessity to move only in combat convoys.47

It took Sergeant Collum approximately three weeks to reserve a space for the U.S. Forces Somalia Chaplain Section. Eventually, in his words, "after I stood on the right desk," Chaplain Dunham was given an office with the Provost Marshal. Sergeant Collum set up the office, found the necessary supplies, and helped draft the first operation plan and operation order to include religious support considerations after Chaplain Dunham arrived. He realized, as did the chaplains almost immediately, that a good chaplain assistant has a most important role even in the absence of a chaplain.48

To make the situation even more challenging for the arriving UMT replacements, gun battles raged in the streets as they had almost daily since the 24 Pakistani peacekeepers had died in the ambush on June 5th. The U.S. troops led the U.N. forces in several aggressive bids to flush out Aidid. In early July, at the end of a 20-minute barrage of missiles and cannon fire from U.S. helicopter gunships, dozens of bodies lay scattered around a demolished villa where Aidid's top commanders were reportedly meeting. When foreign journalists arrived to view the carnage, an enraged mob turned on them with stones, guns and machetes, killing four. The Italian government, which had three soldiers killed in Somalia in July, threatened to withdraw its 2,400 troops unless the goals of the mission were reassessed. The German defense ministry, which had sent only 250 of a promised 1,700 strong contingent, grumbled that it was a mistake to have soldiers in Somalia at all. In Washington, Senator Robert Byrd thundered a warning that, "the Senate has not bought into a police action against Somalia war lords."49 A total of 35 peacekeeping troops died in May and June but none of them was American. "The U.S. is quick to stir up trouble with air strikes," said a Pakistani peacekeeper, "but it is Pakistanis and other Third World soldiers who always draw the tough assignments on the ground."50

Fear and resentment frayed cohesion among the 20,854 troops that 29 countries had sent to Somalia for UNISOM II. India had promised a brigade for February that still had not arrived in July. The Kuwaiits and the Saudis would not take action without first checking with their home governments. A growing number of critics suggested that the United Nations had gone off-course in hunting Aidid, damaging its credibility as a neutral peace maker. Mr. Howe insisted that the United Nations remained impartial. "We oppose no clan, sub-clan or party," he said. "We must, however, defend ourselves and the people of Somalia against terrorists' attacks and take the necessary measures to prevent such attacks." Howe was supported by the Pakistanis and others, who agreed that Aidid had to be removed from the scene if national reconciliation was to be achieved. That determination

See endnotes at end of chapter.
was shared at the Pentagon in July when Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said bluntly, "there is no reason to change the course."51

On July 18, Aaid told supporters to rebel against the United Nations military presence in Mogadishu in retaliation for U.S. bombing. "We can not accept foreign domination," he said.52 In Washington, Frank Crigler, former Ambassador to Somalia, stated somewhat sarcastically, "Perhaps we should rename the United Nations mission ... Operation Inflict Punishment and Restore Hatred."53

By the end of July, Chaplain Dunham, the U.S. Forces Somalia Staff Chaplain, had been notified of expected unit ministry team replacements due in to Somalia in August. These replacements included Chaplain Stephen Fountain, Chaplain Orlando Sunga, Chaplain Geoffrey Alleyne, Chaplain Richard Sones, Chaplain James Hartz, and Chaplain Terry Walsh. These chaplains represented the third rotation of unit ministry team members into Somalia since December of 1992.

A Long, Hot August

Upon Chaplain Craig Dunham's arrival he had discovered that no mission statement, standing operating procedure, or religious support plan existed for U.S. Forces Somalia. Since these documents were standard for any operation in peace or wartime situations, one of his first priorities was to develop a religious support plan for all unit ministry teams in the theater. The SOP was general in nature and broadly written to allow each unit ministry team to use it as a guide. One invaluabable resource for all unit ministry teams was Reference Book 1-1, the unit Ministry Team Handbook, which had been developed at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield.

Chaplain Dunham also discovered that there was some confusion about the primary mission of unit ministry teams. Some unit ministry teams were acting as civil affairs teams for the civil affairs officer. Chaplain Dunham noted: "their idea of ministry was to devote a great deal of time to the humanitarian effort, neglecting their primary duty of ministry to the U.S. soldiers."54 Chaplain Dunham immediately reminded the unit ministry teams of their first mission priority as received from the ARCENT Chaplain's Office, namely to be available primarily for the religious support of the United States soldiers. The second issue Chaplain Dunham addressed was the lack of training for chaplain assistants to provide adequate security for the chaplain during a hostile attack in an urban environment. As a corrective measure he scheduled training for all chaplain assistants within two months of his arrival. The training was conducted by United Nations personal security agents and was quite valuable for the overall mission.

Area coverage was yet another problem in an environment where detachments were scattered throughout a large geographical region. Chaplain Dunham urged unit ministry teams to make every effort to provide general religious support to any units they could possibly reach. Other training topics Chaplain Dunham and SFC Wayne Collum addressed in the field were as follows:

- Training in key religions represented in the multi-national force to enable unit ministry teams to cooperate with religious coverage for multi-national and multi-cultural forces.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
• Mass casualty training.
• Transition between ministry teams arriving and departing the country.
• The resupply system and proper techniques for securing necessary items.

In addition to training, Chaplain Dunham and Sergeant First Class Collum implemented a mission essential task list which included the provision of worship services, pastoral care, religious support activities, sacramental ministry, and battle fatigue/stress ministry for all soldiers. The overall goal of the unit ministry teams in U.S. Forces Somalia was, as doctrine dictated, to insure comprehensive religious coverage and free exercise of religion for all soldiers in the theater.

In any given week Chaplain Dunham and his staff of eight unit ministry teams were able to provide, on the average, some 22 worship services a week ranging from Catholic Mass and collective Protestant services to denominational services held in at least eight different locations throughout the greater Mogadishu area. Chaplain Sunga was able to conduct seven Roman Catholic Masses for soldiers each week. In addition, the chaplains also conducted 18 Bible studies a week and two song services on Saturdays.

In response to Aidid’s call for rebellion against military authorities, Somali gunmen increased the attacks on United Nations personnel beginning the first week in August.

- August 4 — a U.S. soldier and a civilian engineer were injured when their truck hit a command- detonated land mine.
- August 8 — four Military Police soldiers from Fort Riley were killed when their vehicle drove over a bomb remotely detonated by Somali guerrillas.
- August 19 — four soldiers were wounded when their vehicle drove over a bomb October 21 on Road west of the U.S. Embassy.
- August 22 — six troops were hurt when their truck, traveling in a 22-vehicle convoy to Mogadishu’s port, was destroyed by a bomb triggered by Somali soldiers.

Chaplain James C. Hartz, the battalion chaplain for the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, recorded a number of other attacks which required chaplain and chaplain assistant support. On August 4, there was a mortar attack at the University of Somalia which resulted in one U.S. casualty. On September 9, Somalis ambushed some engineers, killing one Pakistani soldier and wounding two U.S. soldiers. Additional fire fights on September 13 resulted in three more U.S. soldiers wounded and on September 25 a downed aircraft resulted in four soldiers from the 10th Aviation Brigade being killed in action and five wounded in action. Chaplain Hartz, Chaplain Baugh, and Chaplain Norton were very busy with hospital visitations and memorial services for all who were casualties in these operations. Chaplain Hartz recorded his reactions on September 25th when he heard that a U.S. aircraft had been shot down:

I was first notified by Chaplain Walsh from the Aviation Brigade that an aircraft was down. I prepared to respond but awaited further guidance. Since he was at the combat support hospital and no reports had come from the tactical operation center.

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about the Quick Reaction Force movement, I called back later and determined that a unit ministry team was needed. I was informed that we had casualties enroute to the combat support hospital. We proceeded to the 46th Combat Support Hospital where we stayed for approximately five hours ministering to the soldiers and to the hospital staff—listening, praying, and crying. Chaplain Dunham, the U.S. Forces Somalia Chaplain and Chaplain Sunga, the 46th Combat Support Hospital Chaplain, were both busy providing ministry and assessing needs of soldiers, staff, and unit ministry team members. During the next week our focus of ministry was on C Company and several individuals identified as having the most difficult time—squad members and one M-60 gunner who had killed a large number of the enemy. On 28 September we held a memorial service with Chaplain Walsh and Chaplain Sunga presiding. Over 300 soldiers attended. It was a catharsis for many.55

In response to the escalating attacks against United Nations’ and United States’ forces, President Clinton ordered 400 Rangers from the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia, to deploy to Somalia. The Rangers were to augment those forces designated with the special mission to try to capture Aidid. As was so often the case in other operations, the Rangers expected and received the most dangerous missions involved in the peace enforcement operation.

Despite signs of trouble, the Clinton Administration was eager for the U.N. mission to succeed as a model for humanitarian operations around the world—from Bosnia to Haiti. The Rangers mission, to capture Aidid and improve security for the other American soldiers there, seemed a first step.

Yet as the American forces encountered a handful of embarrassing setbacks, the White House and Clinton himself began having second thoughts about the effectiveness of the U.N. force. On September 28, President Clinton publicly began to distance himself from the U.N. operation, saying it had become too directed against Aidid and asked for a date certain to end the U.S. role in Somalia.56 In response to the Presidents request, General Joseph Hoar, the CENTCOM Commander, proposed a date in March, 1994, for the withdrawal of American troops from Somalia.

October: Mission Shift 3

At 0730 hours on Sunday, October 3, 1993, 100 U.S. Rangers and 12 Blackhawk helicopters closed in on an area near the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu where followers of General Aidid reportedly were meeting. The members of Task Force Ranger had orders to capture two of General Aidid’s chief lieutenants and as many of his supporters as possible. The Rangers captured the hotel, the two men, and 20 bodyguards. Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel Lee Van Arsdale recalled that “a small convoy of five ton trucks with the prisoners and three HMMWVs broke off from the main body to return to the compound. One Ranger had been critically injured and needed immediate attention.”57 As the Rangers tried to take the prisoners away, the streets erupted with gun fire. reportedly escaped out a back door. As the Rangers tried to lead the prisoners away, the streets

See endnotes at end of chapter.
erupted with gun fire. Somali fighters from all over Mogadishu ran to join the action. In the Bakhara Market, near the hotel, gunmen set up barricades of burning tires and anything else flammable to block the Rangers' retreat. Soldiers fanning out into nearby streets found fire coming at them from small arms in every direction. Specialist Carlos Rodriguez recalled, "all of a sudden the Somalis just opened up on us with small arms and grenades. There was shooting from all directions and we couldn't see who was shooting at us. I saw a muzzle once sticking around a corner and I shot at it."

Almost immediately Specialist Rodriguez himself was shot in the right hip. He continued, "then I got some shrapnel in my left foot and a little bit in my face. It broke some bones, and I was down. Our squad leader got hit too. It got pretty confusing."\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

The convoy fought a tremendous battle all the way back to the airfield, taking numerous casualties. Meanwhile, Van Arsdale wrote:

The remainder of the [Rangers from the] four blocking positions were pulling in to the objective for a helo pick up. As they moved in, MH-60s with snipers aboard provided support to the assault force and [Rangers in the] blocking positions. During this time the first helicopter was shot down. Six crew members and four snipers were killed in the crash. The Quick Reaction Force from the Embassy/University Compound was ordered to the crash site. Rescue helicopters could not land in the narrow streets, the only way in or out was by ground vehicle. Ranger Major David Stockwell commented, "it sounded like the air was filled with angry hornets. The buzz and crack of small arms fire was all around." The pinned-down Rangers, with ammunition running low, returned fire as two rescue columns fought to reach them. The Quick Reaction Force, riding on armored trucks, could not get through.\footnote{See endnotes at end of chapter.}

One of the attack helicopters, flown by Warrant Officer Michael Durant, was shot down approximately one mile south of the first crash site. The entire Task Force Ranger effort was on the first crash site—there was no way to get to the second. Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart from the U.S. Special Operations Command were in the lead helicopter when Durant went down. "They requested three times to be allowed to land and go to the aid of Durant's chopper. On their third request, the mission commander relented and approved, knowing he couldn't get anyone else there," Van Arsdale recalled.

In spite of automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenade fire, Gordon and Shughart quickly landed and attempted to provide cover for Durant and four injured crewmen at the helicopter crash site. When Shughart and Gordon hit the ground, equipped with only their sniper rifles and pistols, they fought their way through a dense maze of shanties and shacks to reach the critically injured crew members. Upon reaching the helicopter, they immediately pulled Durant and his crew members from the aircraft and established a defensive perimeter. Gordon and Shughart killed an undetermined number of Somali attackers until they ran out of ammunition. They attempted to locate any unspent rounds in the helicopter, but when Shughart ran out again he was killed. Gordon handed a rifle that contained the last five rounds to Durant saying simply, "Good Luck." Soon after Gordon was also killed. Michael Durant, who was captured alive by the Somalis, said later, "anyone in their
right mind would not have done what Shughart and Gordon did. But they passionately believed in that creed that says, 'I will not fail those with whom I serve."

Both Sergeant First Class Shughart and Master Sergeant Gordon received Congressional Medals of Honor posthumously for their actions in Mogadishu.

Pakistani, Malaysian and U.S. troop—some ironically aboard Soviet-made armored personnel carriers—finally made it to the scene 16 hours after the Rangers came under attack. By then the Rangers had suffered a shocking toll: 14 dead, plus one who died 4 days later, and 77 wounded. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimated 200 Somalis had died in the battle, and hundreds of wounded piled into hospitals that in some cases had no plasma or other supplies to treat them.

At the 48th Field Hospital located next to the University Compound, Chaplain Craig Dunham and SFC Wayne Collum met incoming helicopters carrying wounded Rangers. Some of the helicopters carried not whole bodies but pieces of them. SFC Collum recalled watching Chaplain Dunham pull an amputated foot out of a boot which the accompanying medic was unable to do.

As soon as the choppers landed, Chaplain Sunga, Chaplain Fountain and Chaplain Hartz began ministering to the most seriously injured soldiers. Chaplain Steven Michalke, a 160th SOAR Chaplain, was ministering to soldiers at the airfield and was unable to reach the Army Field Hospital at the University. There was no available transportation for the chaplains or assistants because every armored vehicle and helicopter was dedicated to trying to rescue the American soldiers under fire and to transport the wounded back. The ministry to 83 casualties at the 48th Field Hospital lasted for more than 40 hours. Chaplain Fountain recalled the scene at the hospital:

The doctors had done all they could to repair the damage on the bodies of the soldiers in intensive care. But we all knew they were slipping away fast. I read scriptures for them. I prayed with them. I held their hands. I kept vigil. I was there when they died. A young newlywed went first. The older father of four fought for several more hours before his body gave out. The nurses and medics who had cared for the soldiers could not hold back the tears when the doctor finally turned off the machines. A nurse from the Intensive Care Unit came and asked if I would go break the news to the wounded friends who had risked their own lives to save them.

Chaplain James Hartz from the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, worked for 19 hours at the 46th Combat Support Hospital. In the course of his ministry he practiced a type of "spiritual triage." At the Combat Support Hospital the critically wounded soldiers at risk of immediate death were identified and the chaplain was notified to give prayers of reconciliation or comfort. The seriously wounded soldiers were usually surrounded by medical staff. If possible the chaplain would wedge in to comfort the soldier and pray. If not, the next critical area for ministry included the less seriously wounded who were conscious, those who were usually worried about team members, friends, or their own wounds. The third area of concern was to make sure that the chaplain and chaplain assistant got back to visit soldiers who were unconscious or sedated. By practicing the "spiritual triage" the unit ministry teams were able to go to the place of the most critical need in the shortest time possible.

See endnotes at end of chapter.
Four days after the helicopter incident the chaplains held a memorial service for the dead. More than 500 soldiers attended to pay their respects to their fallen comrades.

On Thursday, October 7, President Clinton met with Congressional leaders in Washington. The most common complaint Congress had was that the United States had no vital interest in Somalia. Clinton replied that the vital interest at stake was the credibility of American power. At 1700 hours President Clinton went before cameras in the Oval Office and proclaimed his policy. The President sent 1,700 additional soldiers to Somalia, plus 104 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, and four Cobra attack helicopters. In addition, 3,600 Marines would be waiting offshore if needed. All together the available force was doubled to 10,000 troops. That did not count another 10,000 or so aboard the ships of the Carrier Battle Group steaming offshore. There were not many targets in Somalia for the F-18s aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln to bomb and strafe, though U.S. officials threatened to take out Aaidid's arms caches in the countryside if he made more trouble in Mogadishu. However, in addition, President Clinton ordered the United States forces to begin restricting their mission to three primary points: 1) protecting U.S. troops and bases, 2) securing ports, roads, and lines of communication, and 3) keeping pressure on attackers. The President's position was essentially to downgrade the manhunt for Aaidid. Whether or not Aaidid was captured, the President set a deadline of March 31, 1994, when U.S. troops would leave Somalia. Seven days later, on October 14, when Warrant Officer Michael Durant was released by the Somalis, President Clinton stopped the manhunt for General Aaidid.65

President Clinton's policy of sending more troops to Somalia on one hand and yet setting a withdrawal date on the other hand had an accordion effect on the country. An armor company, the 1/64th Armor from Fort Stewart, Georgia, prepared to deploy. Reinforced by the 4th Aviation Battalion and the 2/22nd Infantry Battalion along with the 10th Mountain Division's Aviation Brigade, the number of combat troops increased. However, some chaplains saw a siege mentality develop around Mogadishu. From October 14, in general terms, soldiers no longer carried out search and destroy missions, but rather sought simply to consolidate the humanitarian gains until additional United Nations troops could arrive. By the end of October the last rotation of chaplains and chaplain assistants was alerted and partially deployed to Somalia. Some 14 unit ministry teams were on the ground in Somalia in November of 1993. Of the 14 chaplains, 11 were captains and of the 11 captains, seven were on their first tour of active duty. Chaplain Chester Egert, from the 10th Mountain Division, served his second tour in Somalia.

Chaplain Leo J. "Joe" O'Keefe, from the 18th Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and his assistant, Sergeant First Class Steven Carter, replaced Chaplain Dunham and Sergeant First Class Wayne Collum. Other chaplains arriving included Chaplain Stephen Russ, Chaplain Richard Sones, Chaplain Sammy Wade, Chaplain David Epperson, Chaplain Timothy Bedsole, Chaplain Rubin Colon, and Chaplain Wylie Johnson. Chaplain Bernie Lattner, with the 169 Combat Support Battalion, and Chaplain Joseph W. Smith, with the 4th Aviation Battalion, rounded out the unit ministry teams in Mogadishu. At the end of October, Chaplain Jerry Reynolds and Sergeant Major Oscar Lee Crumity, the ARCENT Chaplain UMT from Fort McPherson, Georgia, visited Somalia. Chaplain Reynolds met not only with the chaplains and chaplain assistants but also with General Thomas Montgomery. General Montgomery told Chaplain Reynolds, "We had great chaplain

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See endnotes at end of chapter.
coverage,"—a compliment Chaplain Reynolds was happy to pass on to the other chaplains in the country.66

"An Armed Truce"

Chaplain Joe O'Keeffe arrived in Mogadishu on November 15 to replace Chaplain Dunham as the U.S. Forces Somalia Chaplain. With but a 24-hour overlap with Chaplain Dunham to receive essential information and guidance, Chaplain O'Keeffe began work. The U.S. Forces had been consolidated into the area around Mogadishu to include the port, the airfield, Hunter Base, Sword Base, Victory Base, the University Compound, and the Embassy Compound. The Joint Task Force/Quick Reaction Force Commander, Major General Carl F. Ernst, from Training and Doctrine Command, consolidated convoys and directed that there be no needless travel. The security around the American compounds was provided by the United Nations troops, many drawn from Third World countries. Among these were some outstanding Tunisian soldiers who guarded the United Nations Logistical Support Command, among other sites. The day after Chaplain O'Keeffe arrived in Somalia, the United Nations Security Council suspended the arrest order for General Aaidid. After November 16 Aaidid began to appear in public and even to carry on negotiations with Mr. Oakley concerning the future of the Somali people.

In effect from October 14, 1993, to the end of March 1994, American soldiers were involved in an "armed truce" in Somalia. There also existed a situation which was rare in military history: the American forces would execute a tactical redeployment, that is a redeployment under combat conditions. No other military operation had concluded in this manner for the U.S. Army in recent history.

As the U.S. troops began their redeployment in December, United Nations forces increased in strength to a level of 19,000 troops drawn from 26 nations and extended UNISOM II in Somalia through at least May of 1994.67 Eventually Chaplain O'Keeffe wore three hats. He became the United Nations Logistical Support Command Chaplain, the Joint Task Force Chaplain and the UNISOM II Staff Chaplain. Even though the redeployment of American Forces was on everyone's mind, the risk level for American soldiers did not diminish. Chaplains moved only by helicopter or in combat convoys. By order of the commander, everyone carried ax handles or pepper spray in the event the Somali people attempted to swarm vehicles. There was still no central Somali governmental authority nor had there been one since 1991. There was no recognition of the Geneva Conventions among the various clan militiamen; yet, chaplains were still prohibited by their own doctrine and tradition from bearing arms.

Among the 8,000 American soldiers in Somalia in mid-November, 700 to 800 of them were female soldiers. Chaplain O'Keeffe thought that they needed a female chaplain to assist with some of the counseling responsibilities. However, the deployments had been set and no additional reinforcements were authorized.

Ministry to soldiers continued unabated until the last unit ministry team left Somalia. A rest

See endnotes at end of chapter.
and recreation program was instituted to take soldiers to Mombasa, Kenya, where they could recuperate from the endless nights under fire in Mogadishu. Sergeant Steve Carter was able to get kosher meals for Jewish and Muslim soldiers over the December holidays. By coordinating with the NATICK Laboratories in Massachusetts, Sergeant Carter secured 864 kosher test MREs for the soldiers during Chanukah.

Moreover, Chaplain David Lapp, the director of the Jewish Welfare Board in New York, contributed candles, menorahs, and Chanukah gifts for soldiers in Somalia. During Christmas week, from Wednesday, December 22, through Saturday, December 25, the Christian chaplains conducted 24 worship services for the soldiers in Mogadishu. Chaplain O’Keeffe and Chaplain Sunga held a total of 12 Masses on three days at every site where soldiers were located. By February 1994, Chaplain O’Keeffe was able to get a newspaper from Europe, the old reliable Stars and Stripes, for the soldiers in addition to limited radio and television programming. Moreover, the U.S. Forces Somalia Commander, Major General Montgomery, authorized a small newsletter to be distributed to the soldiers each week. The title of the newsletter was The Somalia Sandpaper. The small newsletter contained information about redeployment, laundry services, religious services and other information of command interest.

In spite of the armed truce environment, American forces continued to take casualties. On March 13, eight soldiers were killed when an AC130 aircraft crashed off the coast of Kenya. The total losses among American military personnel in Operation Restore Hope and Operation Continue Hope, from December 1992 through March 1994, equalled 42 killed in action and 175 wounded in action. Among the United Nations troops, exclusive of Americans, 68 soldiers were killed in action, while 262 were wounded in action. The Washington Post noted that Operation Restore Hope and Operation Continue Hope were the bloodiest peacekeeping operations in Africa in more than 30 years.68

Evaluation: Contributing Food, Time and Hope

America’s Army is seen by all the world as a force of peace keepers. Our mission in Somalia has strengthened and tested that picture as never before. Our soldiers have been bloodied and some have given their all, but they never lost their sense of purpose.

Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Matthew A. Zimmerman
Chief of Chaplains

On March 16, 1994, the last units from the 10th Mountain Division returned from Somalia to Fort Drum. President Bill Clinton made a special trip to the post to welcome the soldiers home. President Clinton complimented the soldiers upon completion of their part of a large mission and a difficult one—a mission that saved hundreds of thousands of innocent Somalis from starvation and gave that nation a chance to build its own future.69

In Mogadishu Major General Thomas Montgomery told a circle of reporters that he thought

See endnotes at end of chapter.
the operations had seen "some very great success," and he said American troops should "be very proud of what we have done here." General Montgomery added: "I pray to God for the Somalia people. I pray that they will find a way to raise themselves above this anarchy and turmoil, and to build some kind of society based on love, instead of based on the gun."70

At Fort McPherson, Chaplain Jerry Reynolds, the Third Army Chaplain, reflected: "Things worked well in Somalia as far as ministry was concerned. Soldiers got the ministry they needed in spite of the way the various organizations worked. Our unit ministry teams demonstrated great cohesiveness and cooperation in order to get a very difficult job done."71

In Mogadishu, Chaplain Joe O'Keeffe prepared to leave on March 17, 1994—St. Patrick's Day. As the last Army support troops and the last Army chaplains left Somalia, Chaplain O'Keeffe reflected on the ministry and the mission of U.S. Forces:

> We made a huge difference. We gave the Somali people a breathing space. They were a nation imploding, destroying themselves with multi-tribal civil wars. We provided the time and perhaps the hope they needed to build a better future.72

At the United States Army Chaplain Center and School, Chaplain Wayne McCurdy noted that the operations in Somalia demonstrated a need for the Chaplain Corps to review its doctrine regarding operations other than war.73 Chaplain Kristi Pappas, who had served in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope, agreed, stating: "Somalia was a proving ground for many chaplains, it showed what ministry is in the most difficult conditions."74

From December 1992 through March 1994, more than 40 unit ministry teams including two female chaplains and three female chaplain assistants served in Operation Restore Hope and in Operation Continue Hope. One of the simplest and yet most eloquent evaluations perhaps came from Chaplain Barbara Sherer of the 62nd Medical Group. Given the intense suffering in Somalia, and the values of compassion and sacrifice exemplified in so many international relief organizations, Chaplain Sherer noted simply: "We had to try."75 For more than 100,000 Somalis who might not have otherwise survived, the international effort constituted a new lease on life and evidence of the humanitarian impulse within the many nations that provided food and hope to those who were hungry for both.
ENDNOTES


5. Interview with Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Leo J. O'Keeffe, August 18, 1994. The quotation was from a conversation with Maj. Gen. Thomas Montogomery as recalled and cited by Chaplain O'Keeffe.


9. Ibid.


14. Ibid.


18. Named for the 24th Infantry or "Victory" Division from Fort Stewart, Georgia, after troops from that division arrived in Somalia.


27. *Ibid*.


29. Chaplain (Maj.) Steven Fountain, Combat Developments Teleconference, July 5, 1994. Chaplain Ed Hartmann, for example, flew with New Zealand "Kiwi" pilots serving areas where Catholic coverage was not always available. Chaplain Bob Hutcherson called his ministry "indispensable."


32. *Ibid*.


34. *Ibid*.


40. Chaplain (Col.) Jerry Reynolds at Third Army thought the steady state mission would involve about 4,000 soldiers without large increases as long as UNISOM II lasted.


47. Personal interview with Sgt. 1st Class Wayne Collum, August 24, 1994.

48. *Ibib.*


62. *Ibid.* Eventually the casualty toll climbed to 18 Rangers killed and 75 wounded.


67. The final withdrawal date for U.N. forces was finally designated—31 March 1995—after an "armed truce" of 5 months from October 14, 1993 to March 31, 1994.


71. Personal Interview With Chaplain (Col.) Jerry Reynolds, September 27, 1994.


73. Mrs. Margaret Robertson, Combat Developments Directorate, USACHCS, was working on this project with Chaplain McCurdy and Chaplain Richter in 1994 for the next edition of FM 16-1.


75. Letter From Chaplain (Capt.) Barbara Sherer to Chaplain (Col.) John Brinsfield, September 11, 1994, p. 2.
Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants at the University Compound Chapel in Mogadishu, Somalia
EPILOGUE

Each chapter in the long history of the Army Chaplaincy, from its beginnings in Colonial America through the end of the Cold War, adds fresh insights to the ways and means by which chaplains, chaplain assistants, civilian staff and volunteers have facilitated the free exercise of religion for service members in the military. Certainly this most recent part of our history recalls the selfless service of thousands of dedicated people of God around the world who supported soldiers, family members and the United States Army as a whole in difficult times.

Yet histories are written not merely, as Herodotus indicated, "lest great and wonderful deeds should become lost to fame." Histories also remind us of the processes by which our peoples, cultures, and institutions evolved. History teaches us who we are, what values we hold and how we have met the challenges of the past. History provides the roots for our religion, our language, our laws, and our form of constitutional government. In some sense, history is also prophecy; for it portrays issues which have recurred periodically in the past and which may well appear again in the future. The solutions of the past, especially within defined, traditional institutions, may well suggest the parameters of possibility for future choices. History, therefore, is not a field to be scanned egocentrically, but to be studied systemically and ecumenically for its practical lessons.

In his epical Study of History, the late Professor Arnold Toynbee noted that all histories are but slices of time wherein we try to articulate a meaning, however imperfectly, for the events of which we were a part. We may not know the full import and meaning of our service to God and Country these last twenty years for quite some time, if ever. What is certain is that even in partial analysis we have met our challenges with confidence, honor and humility. As we look to the future, to the Army after next, I hope that we will not only look forward with expectation and excitement, but also that occasionally we will look back to see from whence we came.

Gaylord T. Gunhus
Chaplain (BG) USA
Deputy Chief of Chaplains


ARTICLES


Brinsfield, John W. "Our Roots for Ministry," Military Chaplains' Review, Fall 1987, p. 25.


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